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A  UTHOR: 


MASSON,  DAVID 


TITLE: 


RECENT  BRITISH 
PHILOSOPHY 

PLACE: 

NEW  YORK 

DA  TE: 

1866 


COLUMBIA  UNIVERSITY  LIBRARIES 
PRESERVATION  DEPARTMENT 

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1 .11  1^' 


'^iavM'wanp 


^  ■"■■■ 


Masson,  David,  1322-1907. 

•Rooent  British  philosophy;  a  review,  with  criti- 
cisms, including  sone  conraents  on  I.!r,  Llill's  answer 
to  Sir  William  Hamilton,  by  David  Llasson.   Hew 
York,  Appleton,  1866. 

335  p.       19  cm. 


.! 


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EEOEE^T  BEITISH  PHTLOSOPHT. 


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RECENT    1     I    IP.H  ARV 


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BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY: 


/ 


A  EEVIEW,  WITH  CEITICISMS ; 


; 


i  INCLUDING 


SOME  ^COMMENTS  ON  MR.  MILL' 8  ANSWER  TO 
SIR  WILLIAM  HAMILTON 


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BY 


DAVID  MASSON". 


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NEW  YOEK: 
D.    APPLETON    AND    COMPANY, 

443  &  445   BEOADWAT. 
1866. 


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The  substance  of  the  greater  portion  of  the  following 
pages  was  delivered,  in  the  form  of  lectures,  at  the  Royal 
Institution  of  Great  Britain,  in  Albemarle  Street,  on  the 
afternoons  of  March  21,  23,  and  28,  in  the  present 
year. 

London,  Juney  1865. 


1 


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CONTENTS. 


-♦♦♦- 


CHAPTER  I. 

PAOB 

A  SURVEY  OF  THIRTY  YEARS, 9 

CHAPTER  IL 

THE   TRADITIONAL  DIFFERENCES  :    HOW  REPEATED  IN 

CARLYLE,  HAMILTON,  AND  MILL,      ....    30 
I.— The  Psychological  Difference, ^3 

II._C0SM0L0GICAL   DIFFERENCES, ^^ 

III.— The  Ontological  Difference,        .        .        •        •        •         '^ 

CHAPTER  III. 

EFFECTS    OF     RECENT    SCIENTIFIC     CONCEPTIONS    ON 

PHILOSOPHY, ^^ 

CHAPTER  IT. 

LATEST  DRIFTS  AND  GROUPINGS, 1^5 

105 

I.— Native  Seniors, 

200 
II.— British  CoMTiSM, ^^ 

III.— Mr.  Bain  and  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  ....        207 

IV.— Hamiltonianism  and  its  Modifications,    .        .        .        -216 

v.— Mr.  Ferrier  and  a  British  Hegelian,  ...        221 

VI.— SWEDENBORGIANISM  AND    "SPIRITUALISM,"  .  .  .233 

VII.— Mr.  Mill  on  Sib  William  Hamilton 246 


'. 


II 


in 


EEOEIJ^T  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


•♦• 


CHAPTER  I. 


A  StTEVET  OF  THtBTY  YEAES. 


Bx  recent  British  Philosophy  I  mean  the  Philoso- 
phy of  this  country  during  the  last  thirty  "years. 
But  what  do  I  mean  by  British  Philosophy  during 
that  period  ?    Yon  have  all  a  general  notion  of  what 
I  mean.    I  mean  the  aggregate  speculations  during 
that  period  of  some  of  our  ablest  British  minds  in 
what  are  vaguely  called  "  the  moral  sciences  "—their 
aggregate  speculations  on  those  questions  of  most 
deep  and  enduring  interest  to  man  which  have  occu- 
pied thoughtful  minds  in  all  ages  of  the  world,  which 
are  handed  on  from  age  to  age,  and  which  each 
generation,  however  much  of  previous  thought  con- 
cerning them  it  may  inherit  and  preserve,  has  to 
revolve  over  again  for  itself.    It  has  been  proclaimed 
among  us,  indeed,  that  Philosophy  in  this  sense  haa 

1* 


h; 


10 


BECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


11 


at  length  happily  ceased  to  exist— that  great  Pan  is 
dead.  I  do  not  believe  it ;  and,  if  I  did,  I  should  be 
sad.  Wliatever  nation  has  given  up  Philosophy— 
I  will  be  bolder,  and,  nsing  a  word  very  much  out  of 
favour  at  present,  I  will  say  whatever  nation  has 
given  up  Metaphysics— is  in  a  state  of  intellectual 
insolvency.  Though  its  granaries  should  be  burst- 
ing, though  its  territories  should  be  netted  with 
railroads,  though  its  mills  and  foundries  should  be 
the  busiest  in  the  world,  the  mark  of  the  beast  is 
upon  it,  and  it  is  going  the  way  of  all  brutality. 

Britain,  notwithstanding  temporary  misrepresen- 
tations of  her,  is  not  yet  in  this  state.    We  have  not, 
it  is  true,  and  we  have  not  had  for  a  long  while,  the 
reputation  among  our  continental  neighbours  of  being 
a  nation  caring  much  for  Philosophy.    The  Germans, 
in  particular,  have  long  pitied  us  on  this  account.     It 
is  more  than  forty  years  since  one  of  their  greatest 
thinkers  publicly  denounced  us  by  pointing  out  that 
England  was  the  only  country  in  Europe  where  the 
word  Philosophy  had  become  synonymous  with  nat- 
ural science,  where  the  barometer  and  thermometer 
were  spoken  of  as  "philosophical  instruments,"  and 
where  a  so-called  Philosophical  Journal  treated  of 
agriculture,  housekeeping,  cookery,  and  the  construc- 
tion of  fire-places.*    Historically  it  might  be  shown 

♦  Hegel  as  quoted  by  Mansel,  Metaphysics,  p.  4,  note. 


that  this  very  degradation  of  the  word  Philosophy 
among  us  arose  from  what  was  originally  a  philosophi- 
cal conception  and  may  have  been  a  good  one.  Not 
the  less  was  the  taunt  well  deserved.  And,  though  we 
may  have  been  recovering  since  then,  our  recovery, 
it  must  be  admitted,  has  been  very  gradual. 

Exactly  thirty  years  ago  Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill 
could  write  as  follows :  "  England  once  stood  at  the 
head  of  European  Philosophy.     Where  stands  she 
now  ?    Consult  the  general  opinion  of  Europe.    The 
celebrity  of  England,  in  the  present  day,  rests  upon 
her  docks,  her  canals,  her  railroads.    In  intellect  she 
is  distinguished  only  for  a  kind  of  sober  good  sense, 
free  from  extravagance,  but  also  void  of  lofty  aspira- 
tions  Instead  of  the  ardour  of  research,  the  eager- 
ness for  large  and  comprehensive  inquiry,  of  the  edu- 
cated part  of  the  French  and  German  youth,  what 
find  we  ?    Out  of  the  narrow  bounds  of  mathematical 
and  physical  science,  not  a  vestige  of  a  reading  and 
thinking  public  engaged  in  the  investigation  of  truth 
as  truth,  in  the  prosecution  of  thought  for  the  sake  of 
thought.    Among  few  except  sectarian  religionists— 
and  what  they  are  we  all  know— is  there  any  interest 
in  the  great  problem  of  man's  nature  and  life ;  among 
still  fewer  is  there  any  curiosity  respecting  the  nature 
and  principles  of  human  society,  the  history  or  the 
philosophy  of  civilization,  or  any  belief  that  from  such 


12 


RECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EECEKT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


13 


M 


inquiries  a  single  important  practical  consequence  can 

follow?"*  • 

Even  at  the  time  wlien  Mr.  Mill  wrote  these  words 
I  cannot  but  think  they  described  matters  as  some- 
what worse  than  they  really  were.    "When  I  remem- 
ber that   Coleridge  and  Bentham  and  Mackintosh 
were  then  but  recently  dead,  that  Mr.  Mill's  own 
eminent  father  was  yet  alive,  and  that  the  poet  Words- 
worth, no  less  the  philosophic  sage  than  the  poet, 
survived  as  an  honoured  recluse,  I  cannot  think  that 
the  tradition  of  our  national  faculty  in  philosophy 
had  become  then  so  utterly  extinct.    Possibly,  how- 
ever, the  educated  mind  of  Britain  Tiad^  about  thirty 
years  ago,  sunk  to  its  lowest  in  respect  of  interest  in 
philosophy,  or  any  general  notion  of  what  philosophy 
might  be.    For  Mr.  Mill  was  not  the  sole  British 
thinker  who  then  looked  round  with  something  of  this 
conviction.     Other  voices  had  been  crying  in  the 
wilderness.    Mr.  Mill's  senior.  Sir  William  Hamilton, 
had  strongly  uttered  the  same  complaint.    "  The  pres- 
ent contrast,''  he  had  written  in  1830,  "which  the 
philosophical  enthusiasm  of  France  exhibits  to  the 
speculative  apathy  of  Britain  is  anything  but  flatter- 
ing to  ourselves.    The  new  spirit  of  metaphysical  in- 
quiry which  the  French  imbibed  from  Germany  and 

*  Review  of  Professor  Sedgwick's  Discourse  on  the  Studies  of  Cam- 
bridge, 1835  ;  reprinted  in  Mill's  Dissertations. 


Scotland  arose  with  them  precisely  at  the  same  time 
when  the  popularity  of  psychological  researches  be- 
gan to  decline  with  us ;  and  now,  when  all  interest  in 
these  speculations  seems  here  to  be  extinct,  they 
are  there  seen  flourishing  in  public  favour  with  uni- 
versality and  vigour  corresponding  to  their  encourage- 
ment." * 

Should  another  authority  be  wanted  to  the  same 
effect,  it  may  be  found  in  writings  of  Mr.  Carlyle  at 
about  the  same  date.  "  It  is  admitted  on  all  sides," 
he  had  written  in  one  of  his  Essays  as  early  as  1829, 
"  that  the  Metaphysical  and  Moral  sciences  are  fall- 
ing into  decay,  while  the  Physical  are  engrossing, 
every  day,  more  respect  and  attention.  In  most  of 
the  European  nations  there  is  now  no  such  thing  as  a 
science  of  Mind ;  only  more  or  less  advancement  in 
the  general  science,  or  the  special  sciences,  of 
Matter.  The  French  were  the  first  to  desert  Meta- 
physics ;  and,  though  they  had  lately  affected  to  re- 
vive their  school,  it  has  yet  no  signs  of  vitality. 
Among  ourselves  the  Philosophy  of  Mind,  after  a  rick- 
ety infancy,  which  never  reached  the  vigour  of  man- 
hood, fell  suddenly  into  decay,  languished,  and  finally 
died  out  with  its  last  amiable  cultivator,  Professor 
Stewart.    In  no  nation  but  Germany  has  any  decisive 

*  Art.  on  the  Philosophy  of  Perception,  Min,  Revi^w^  Oct.  1830 ; 
reprinted  in  Hamilton's  Discussions. 


H 


\ 


hi 


In 

I;) 


14 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


ID 


effort  been  made  in  psychological  science,  not  to 
speak  of  any  decisive  result."  '^  In  this  passage,  not- 
withstanding a  difference  in  the  tone  from  those  writ- 
ten almost  immediately  afterwards  by  Hamilton  and 
Mill,  there  is  substantially  the  same  complaint. 

Kow,  certainly,  the  concurring  testimonies  of 
three  such  minds  may  be  taken  as  evidence,  if  not 
that  Philosophy  was  then  at  a  lower  ebb  than  usual 
in  Britain,  at  least  that  such  British  Philosophy  as 
was  current  did  not  come  up  to  the  standard  of  the 
best  critics,  whether  judging  by  their  own  require- 
ments and  aspirations,  or  by  comparison  with  other 
nations. 

Let  us  admit,  then,  that  thirty  years  ago  the  phil- 
osophical credit  of  Britain  was  justly  low  in  Europe. 
Has  the  state  of  affairs  been  changed  since  then? 
Surely,  to  some  extent,  it  has.  Those  three  critics 
themselves,  as  we  all  know,  were  not  content  with 
crying  in  the  wilderness.  Even  while  they  were  so 
crying,  they  had  begun  their  own  best  efforts  that  the 
wilderness  should  rejoice  and  blossom.  Hamilton, 
the  eldest  of  them,  had  begun,  in  his  maturity,  to  put 
forth,  from  his  seclusion  in  Edinbm-gh,  those  occa- 
sional essays,  the  fruits  of  long  previous  thought,  the 
very  titles  of  which  took  away  people's  breath,  which 

*  Article  "  Signs  of  the  Times,"  Min,  Review^  1829  ;  reprinted  in 
Carlyle's  Miscellanies, 


EECENT  BRniSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


16 


probably  not  twenty  persons  in  Britain  could  intelli- 
gently read,  but  which,  where  they  were  read,  aston- 
ished by  their  profundity  and  erudition,  and  seemed 
to  herald  a  new  era  in  formal  speculation,  if  only  by 
reinstating  difliculty  where  men  had  been  taking  their 
ease.  Carlyle,  the  second  in  age,  had  already  put 
forth,  in  the  same  periodical  or  in  others,  those  earlier 
essays  of  his  in  which,  though  they  were  in  form  lit- 
erary or  biographical,  there  was  evidently  the  work- 
ing of  a  great  new  philosophical  force,  and  the  deep 
assumption  of  a  new  set  of  fundamental  principles. 
He  had  also  published  his  Sartor  Hesartus^  in  which, 
under  such  a  poetico-grotesque  guise  as  confounded  all 
precedent,  and  took  both  phantasy  and  reason  by 
storm,  he  compelled  readers  to  behold  his  principles 
and  their  developments  in  something  like  system. 

Finally,  Mill,  the  youngest  of  the  three — ^he  was 
but  twenty-nine  years  of  age  when  he  wrote  the  pas- 
sage which  I  have  quoted — ^had  for  several  years  been 
wilting,  in  the  Westminster  and  other  Reviews,  arti- 
cles from  which  it  was  to  be  inferred  that,  when  his 
courageous  and  truth-loving  father,  and  that  father's 
friend  Bentham,  should  be  gone  from  the  earth,  they 
would  leave  behind  them,  in  this  heir  of  their  hopes, 
one  fit  to  be  an  expositor  of  their  ideas  through  an- 
other generation,  but  who  was  likely  rather  to  look 
right  and  left  in  that  generation  for  himself,  and  to 


fi 


16 


RECENT   BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


BECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


17 


honour  Ms  descent,  not  by  mere  adhesion  to  what  he 
had  inherited,  but  by  an  open-mindedness  that  should 
even  solicit  contrary  impressions,  and  push  on  passion- 
ately, at  every  break  of  light,  in  the  quest  of  richer 
truth.  If  the  history  of  London  during  the  last  reign 
and  the  present  should  ever  come  to  be  written,  the 
historian  might  be  reminded  of  one  building  in  it, 
now  no  longer  extant,  of  which  rather  particular  men- 
tion might  be  desirable.  It  was  the  dingy  old  India 
House'in  Leadenhall  Street,  of  whose  many  interesting 
legends  it  is  now  certainly  not  the  least  interesting 
that,  thirty  years  ago,  young  John  Mill,  not  so  well 
known  to  the  general  public  as  he  has  been  since, 
had  there  his  official  room,  to  which,  along  intricate 
passages,  friends  and  admirers  of  his,  seeking  his  con- 
versation, would  find  their  way  on  late  afternoons. 

If  I  have  individualized  Mill,  Carlyle,  and  Ham- 
ilton as  the  persons  in  whom,  if  in  any,  there  was  the 
likelihood,  thirty  years  ago,  of  a  new  movement  in 
British  Philosophy,  I  have  not  done  so  without  good 
reason.  Whatever  other  men,  seniors  or  coevals  of 
these  three,  may  be  named  as  having  co-operated  with 
them,  either  as  urging  views  of  their  own,  or  as  con- 
tinuing the  older  philosophic  influences  (and  I,  for 
one,  think  that  the  beneficial  influence  of  Coleridge 
was  not  exhausted  at  his  death),  certain  it  is  that  it  is 
to  Carlyle,  Hamilton,  and  Mill  that  all  would  point 


as  having  been  the  most  prominent  leaders  of  free  or 
uncovenanted  British  speculation  during  the  last  thir- 
ty years.  Probably  first  in  the  order  of  effect  came 
Carlyle,  in  all  whose  writings,  historical  or  other, 
down  to  the  last,  there  have  been  veins  and  blasts  of 
that  philosophy  which  the  earliest  of  them  announced, 
and  the  resistless  diffusion  of  which,  and  even  of  the 
phrases  and  idioms  in  which  it  was  couched,  over  the 
entire  surface  and  through  the  entire  speech  of  these 
islands,  is  a  phenomenon  not  soon  to  be  forgotten. 
Hamilton's  influence  was  long  more  local  and  ob- 
scure. But,  for  twenty  years,  he  was  teaching  Logic 
and  Metaphysics  to  large  classes  in  the  University  of 
Edinburgh;  and  thus,  as  well  as  latterly  by  publi- 
cations bearing  his  name,  there  was  shed  through  edu- 
cated British  society  some  recognition  of  his  system 
of  thought,  and  a  certain  Hamiltonian  leaven  which  is 
still  working.  Mill,  too,  has  more  than  fulfilled  his 
promise.  To  his  Logic ^  published  in  1843,  there  have 
succeeded  his  other  well-known  works,  and  with  such 
accumulated  effect  that,  at  the  present  moment,  it 
may  be  said  that  it  is  Mill,  as  a  Philosopher,  that  is 
in  the  ascendant  in  Britain.  It  is  Mill  that  our 
young  thinkers  at  the  Universities,  our  young  legisla- 
tors in  Parliament,  our  young  critics  in  journals,  and 
our  young  shepherds  on  the  mountains,  consult,  and 
quote,  and  swear  by. 


18 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BEinsn   PHILOSOPHY. 


19 


I*: 
i  I 


But,  of  course,  in  every  year  since  these  three  men 
first  stepped  out  as  leaders,  there  have  been  additions 
to  the  procession  which  they  headed — ^in  some  cases, 
perhaps,  of  mere  recruits  to  one  or  other  of  them, 
but,  in  others,  of  independent  mind  reasserting  pre- 
vious forms  of  thought,  or  even  of  such  marked  origi- 
nality that  they  already  divide  attention  with  the 
leaders,  and,  when  the  head  of  the  column  has  wound 
round  the  hill,  they  in  their  turn  will  seem  the  chiefs. 

What  the  French  or  the  Germans  might  think  of 
these  late  efforts  of  ours,  if  presented  to  them  collective- 
ly, is,  indeed,  still  a  question.  Not  only  do  we  labour 
under  the  disadvantage  of  being  an  insular  people,  re- 
moved from  the  centre — a  thing  which  tells  in  phi- 
losophy more  than  it  once  did ;  but  it  can  hardly  be 
said  that  the  majority  of  those  among  us  who  have 
betaken  themselves  systematically  to  philosophy  have 
taken  the  necessary  pains  to  acquaint  themselves  with 
what  have  been  gone  through  and  settled  before, 
within  accessible  ground,  on  the  subjects  of  their  re- 
search. As  presenting  in  a  vivid  light  the  possible  ef- 
fects on  our  recent  philosophical  literature  of  these  two 
causes  in  combination — our  geographical  insularity 
and  our  deficiency  of  learning — I  will  quote  a  sen- 
tence or  two  from  one  of  the  last  metaphysical  works 
published  in  Britain.  "  What  we  shall  take  leave  to 
name  the  historic  jpdbulum^'*  says  this  resolute  writer, 


"  this  alone  is  the  appointed  food  of  every  successive 
generation,  this  alone  is  the  condition  of  the  growth  of 
spirit ;  and,  this  food  neglected,  we  have  a  generation 
that  but  vacillates — ^vacillates,  it  may  be,  even  into 
temporary  retrogression.  This  last  is  the  unfortunate 
position  now.  The  historic  pabulum,  passing  from  the 
vessel  of  Hume,  was  received  into  that  of  Kant,  and 
thence  finally  into  that  of  Hegel ;  but  from  the  ves- 
sels of  the  two  latter  the  generations  have  not  yet  eaten. 

m 

This  is  the  whole — ^Europe  (Germany  as  Germany 
is  itself  no  exception)  has  continued  to  nourish  itself 
from  the  vessels  of  Hume  long  after  the  historic  pab- 
ulum  had  abandoned  it  for  another  and  others. 
Hence  all  that  we  see.  Hume  is  our  Politics,  Hume 
is  our  Trade,  Hume  is  our  Philosophy,  Hume  is  our 
Eeliffion — it  wants  little  but  that  Hume  were  even 
our  Taste.  ...  In  short,  the  only  true  means  of  prog- 
ress have  not  been  brought  into  service.  The  his- 
toric jpahulum,  however  greedily  it  has  been  devoured 
out  of  Hume,  has  been  left  untouched  in  the  vessel  of 
Hesrel,  who  alone  of  all  mankind  has  succeeded  in 
eating  it  all  up  out  of  the  vessel  of  Kant."  * 

You  see  what  the  vsriter  means.    There  have  been 
three,  and  but  three,  all-comprehensive    European 

*  The  Secret  of  Hegel :  being  the  Hegelian  System  and  Origin,  Prin- 
ciple, Form,  and  Matter.  By  Jamea  Hutchison  Stirling.  2  vols.  Lon- 
don, 1865.    Introd.  pp.  Ixxiii.  Ixxiv. 


20 


RECEin'  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BEmsn  PHILOSOPHY. 


21 


rl 


thinkers  during  tlie  last  century— Hume  in  Britain, 
and  Kant  and  Hegel  in  Germany.    Tou  may  fancy 
them  as  three  buckets  or  reservoirs,  one  behind  the 
Other  in  a  line,  with  intervals  between  them— Hume 
stationed  in  his  completeness  at  about  the  year  1770, 
Kant  at  about  the  year  1800,  and  Hegel  at  about  1830. 
There  have  been  other  philosophers  in  all  countries 
during  the  century,  of  some  one  of  whom  the  histo- 
rian of  Philosophy  may  be  bound  to  take  account ; 
but,  as  respects  philosophic  result,  they  have,  one  and 
all  of  them,  been  but  as  saucers  and  pannikins  ranged 
by  the  sides  of  the  great  buckets  or  in  the  intervals 
between  them.     There  is  nothing  worth  having  in 
the  pannikins  that  is  not  in  the  buckets ;  and  there  is 
a  vast  deal  in  the  buckets— or,  at  least,  in  the  last 
two— that  has  never  got  into  the  pannikins.    Then 
why  go  to  the  pannikins  for  philosophy  ?    It  is  not 
only  Britain,  it  wiU  have  been  noted,  that  the  writer 
accuses  of  this  folly  of  not  drawing  its  philosophy 
from  the  main.    But  it  is  clearly  our  recent  British 
philosophizing  that  he  has  chiefly  in  view.   He  thinks 
it^  above  all,  inadequately  informed  with  the  true  he- 
reditary pabulum,  and  therefore  either  unconsciously 
retrogressive,  or,  at  best,  beside  the  point,  and  need- 
lessly repetitive.    He  thinks  it  made  up,  as  he  other- 
wise expresses  it,  of  "  contingent  crumbs  "  from  un- 
known  tables. 


To  all  this  what  shall  we  reply  ?  We  may  reply 
that  we  are,  or,  at  least  may  be,  fully  informed  from 
Hume,  and  that  this,  on  the  critic's  own  principle,  is 
something,  seeing  that  it  limits  the  distance  to  which 
we  need  go  back.  We  may  reply  that  surely  some 
sufficient  knowledge  of  Kant  has  been  possessed  by 
some  of  our  thinkers  and  scholars  since  Kant  lived, 
and  has  been  digested  in  recent  British  speculation. 
We  may  reply  that,  if  Hegel  remains  unknown,  save 
in  a  specimen-phrase  or  two,  by  reason  of  his  terrible 

• 

abstruseness,  one  or  two  of  the  intermediates  and  pur- 
veyors between  Kant  and  Hegel— such  as  Fichte  and 
Schelling— have  not  been  without  interpreters.  We 
may  reply  that,  as  HegePs  date  is  1830,  it  is  about 
time,  in  the  nature  of  things,  that  there  should  be 
a  fourth  European  bucket  somewhere,  superseding 
Hegel ;  that,  as  Britain  produced  the  first,  it  is  not 
out  of  possibility  that  she  may  repeat  her  feat  and 
produce  the  fourth;  and  that  towards  such  an 
achievement  a  knowledge  of  Hegel  may  be  essential, 
but  not  a  head-splitting  knowledge  of  Hegel,  or  a 
knowledge  of  all  Hegel,  or  even  a  worshipping  or 
believing  knowledge  of  Hegel.  No  disrespect  is 
implied  to  Hegel.  But,  whatever  Hegel  may 
have  been,  he  was  not  everybody  collectively. 
As  Mr.  Ai-temus  Ward  said  to  his  American  country- 
men about  the  Kegro,  we  ought  perhaps  to  think  of 


f1 


22 


EECENT  BEinsn   PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


23 


him  as  an  important  kinsman,  but  not  surely  as  our 
grandfather,  uncle,  aunt  in  the  country,  wife,  sisters 
and  brothers,  and  several  of  our  first  wife's  relations, 
all  in  one.  A  good  deal  of  the  world  of  mind  was  and 
is  to  be  seen  out  of  Hegel — a  good  deal  even  of  what 
went  to  make  Hegel.  May  not  British  thought,  start- 
ing as  it  can  do  from  Hume,  and  with  the  power  of 
taking  Kant  in  the  way,  make  a  leap  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  beyond  Hegel  without  actually  putting  both 
its  hands  on  Hegel's  bended  back  ?  Did  not  Hume 
evolve  his  abstract  philosophy  from  but  an  ounce  or 
so  of  transmitted  material  in  the  way  of  previous  sys- 
tem— chiefly,  indeed,  by  persistent  native  meditation 
on  one  final  doctrine  of  one  previous  thinker  ? 

Granted  that  larger  knowledge  is  necessary  now 
for  anything  really  relevant  to  present  intellectual 
needs,  and  the  very  largest  knowledge  for  anything 
thorough  and  complete.  Still  may  it  not  be  possible 
that  in  these  insular  British  mists,  in  these  sometimes 
clear  British  airs,  amid  the  suggestive  bustle  of  this 
rich  British  life,  and  under  British  stars  that  speak  of 
Infinity  no  less  than  do  the  German,  diligent  and  seri- 
ous British  minds  may  have  of  late  years  been  rumi- 
nating, without  any  express  aid  from  Hegel,  ideas  and 
conclusions  of  worth  to  us,  and  which  even  Hegel's 
countrymen  might  be  glad  to  get  ? 

All  this,  and  more  to  the  same  efiect,  might  be 


said  by  way  of  making  it  probable  beforehand  that 
our  recent  philosophy,  if  not  consummate,  need  not 
have  been  mainly  retrogressive,  or  all  merely  repeti- 
tive and  beside  the  point.  But,  after  all,  the  best 
method  is  to  examine  it.  If  saucers  and  pannikins  are 
all  that  we  have,  let  us  at  least  take  an  inventory  of 
our  saucers  and  pannikins. 

CONSPECTUS  OF  RECENT  WRITINGS  AND  WRITERS. 
[Not  brought  heyond  March^  1865.] 

Sir  Willliam  Hamhton  {nat.  1788— <?5.  1856) :— Article, 
Philosophy  of  the  Unconditioned^  in  the  Edinburgh  Eeview, 
Oct.  1829 ;  article,  Philosophy  of  Perception^  in  the  same  Re- 
view, Oct.  1830;  article,  Logic^  in  the  same  Review,  April, 
1833  ;  and  other  articles,  from  1829  onwards;— all  republished 
collectively  in  1852  as  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Discussions, — 
Edition  of  Reid's  Works  with  N'otes  and  Dissertations  (incom- 
plete), 1846. — Lectures  on  Metaphysics^  in  2  vols.,  1859,  edited 
from  Hamilton's  manuscripts  by  Mansel  and  Yeitch. — Lectures 
on  Logic,  2  vols.,  1860,  similarly  edited. 

Me.  Oaelyle  (nat.  1794) :— Articles,  State  of  German  Lit- 
erature and  Signs  of  the  Times,  in  the  Edmburgh  Review,  1827 
and  1829 ;  and  other  Essays,  from  that  date  downwards,  re- 
printed as  Miscellanies, — Sartor  Resartus,  1833-'4.  All  his  oth- 
er writings  to  the  present  time;  but,  perhaps  most  particularly, 
for  the  expression  of  theory,  or  for  criticism  of  theories,  his 
Eeroes  and  Hero-worship,  1840,  his  Past  and  Present,  1843,  his 
Latter-day  Pamphlets,  1850,  and  his  Life  of  Sterling,  1851. 

Me.  John  Sttjaet  Mill  (nat,  1806)  : — ^Articles  in  the  West- 
minster Review  and  other  periodicals  from  1832  onwards  (in- 
cluding a  celebrated  Essay  on  Bentham,  1838,  and  a  sequel  on 
Coleridge,  1840),  reprinted  as  Mill's  Dissertations  and  Discus- 
sions, 2  vols.,  1859. — A  System  of  Logic,  Patiocinative  and  In- 


i'. 


24 


RECENT   BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


ill 


!i 


duetive,  2  vols,  im.-Principles  of  Political  Bcorumy,  2  vols, 
1848.-Essay    On   Liberty,  1859.-E9say  On    mihtartanwn, 

^^^De  QmNCET  (nat.  1786-0&.  1859).    Through  many  of  De 
Qmncey'8  Essays  there  runs  a  subtle  vein  of  speculative  thought, 
■derived  from  Wordsworth  and  Coleridge,  or  on  the  whole  con- 
tinuing and  prolonging  their  philosophic  influence.  • 

AECHBisnop  Whately  (nat.  1787-ob.  1863).  Among  vari- 
ous writings,  subsequent  to  his  Logic,  published  in  1826,  may  bo 
noted  his  Annotations  to  Baconh  Essays,  1856,  and  his  ^»7U>«a- 

eions  <o  PaZey,  1859.  

Geobge  Combe  (na^.  178&-.&.  1858)  '.^The  ConMonof 
Man,  1S2S',  System  of  Phrenology,  im',  and  other  Phrenologi- 

'"'^i'^Isfro  Taylor  {nat.  1789)  -.^Natural  Hutory  of  Enthu- 
nasm,  1829 ;  and,  in  a  nnmerons  series  of  subsequent  works,  per- 
haps  more  particularly  his  FTiysical  Theory  of  Another  Life 
1839,  his  Elements  of  Thought,  1843,  his  Restoration  of  Belief 
1853  and  his  Ultimate  Civilization,  1860. 

Key.  De.  Whewell  {nat,  1794)  i^PhUosophy  of  the  Induc- 
tive Sciences,  1840;  ElemenU  of  Morality,  l^^^'^Lectu^^^^^ 
the  History  of  Moral  Philosophy  in  England,  1852 ;    ihe  Pla- 
tonic Diologuesfor  English  Readers,  1859—1861 ;  etc. 

De.  Aenold  {mit,  1795-0&.  1842).  The  influence  of  Arnold 
on  English  speculative  thought  may  be  still  traced  in  eminent 
disciples  or  admirers  of  his  in  the  English  Church. 

Me  Samuel  Bailey  (Author  of  "  Essays  on  the  Formation 
and  Publication  of  Opinions,"  1821,  and  of  "  Essays  on  the  Pur- 
suit  of  Truth,"  1831)  \—A  Review  of  BerTceley's  Theory  of  Vis- 
i(?7i,1842;  ATheory  of  Reasoning,  1S51',  Letters  on  the  Philoso- 
phVoftheEumanMind,lS56^lSm. 

De  John  Heney  Newman  {nat.  1801).  Of  the  speculative 
system  that  underlies  Dr.  Newman's  Theology  and  Ecclesiasti- 
cism,  and  reveals  itself  more  or  less  in  the  whole  series  of  his 
writings,  some  interesting  and  rather  precise  glimpses  are  given 
by  himself  in  his  la^t  publication,  Apologia  pro  vitd  sud,  1864. 
Miss  Haeeiet  mETiNEAir  {nat.  1802).    Two  of  Miss  Marti- 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


25 


neau's  works  to  be  pai'ticularly  noted  in  connexion  with  recent 
British  Philosophy  are  her  Correspondence  with  Mr.  Atkin- 
son On  the  Laics  of  Man^s  Nature  and  Development,  1851,  and 
her  condensed  Translation  of  Comte's  Positive  Philosophy,  2 
vols.,  1853. 

Eev.  F.  D.  Maubice  {nat.  1805).  In  the  long  series  of  Mr. 
Maurice's  works,  all  pervaded  by  his  characteristic  mode  of 
thought,  may  be  specially  noted  his  History  of  Moral  and  Meta- 
physical Philosophy  in  the  Encyclopaedia  Metropolitana,  reis- 
sued now  in  several  separate  volumes ;  his  Theological  Essays, 
1853 ;  and  his  two  volumes  of  controversy  with  Mr.  Mansel,  en- 
titled, What  is  Revelation?  (1%^^),  SiHil  Sequel  to  tlie  Inquiry, 
What  is  Revelation  f  (1860). 

Me.  F.  W.  Newman  {nat.  1805) : — The  Soul :  Her  Sorrows  and 
Aspirations,  1849  ;  Phases  of  Faith,  1850;  and  other  writings. 

Me.  Benjamin  H.  Smaet  : — Thought  and  Language :  an  Es- 
say, having  in  view  the  Revival,  Correction,  and  Exclusive  Es- 
tablishment of  LocTce''s  Philosophy,  1855. 

Peofessoe  De  Moegan  {nat.  1806)  : — Formal  Logic,  1849; 
and  occasional  parts  of  his  other  acknowledged  writings. 

SiE  Geoege  Coenewall  Lewis  {nat.  1806 — ol.  1863) : — Essay 
on  the  Influence  of  AutJhority  in  Matters  of  Opinion,  1849 ; 
On  the  Methods  of  Observation  and  Reasoning  in  Politics,  1852. 

Peofessoe  James  F.  Feeeieb  {nat.  1808 — ob.  1864).  Vari- 
ous Metaphysical  Papers  in  Blackwood's  Magjzine ;  and  Insti- 
tutes of  Metaphysic,  or  Theory  of  Knowing  and  Being,  1854. 

Peofessoe  Pateiok  0.  Macdougall  : — Contributions  to  Phi- 
losophy, 1852. 

Me.  Heney  Eogees  : — ^Essays  in  the  Edinburgh  Eeview  and 
other  periodicals,  republished  collectively  1850-55 ;  The  Eclipse 
of  Faith  (in  reply  to  Mr.  F.  W.  Newman),  1852 ;  and  Defence 
of  same  (in  rejoinder  to  Newman),  1854. 

Alfeed  Tennyson  {nat.  1810).  To  those  who  are  too  strong- 
ly possessed  with  our  common  habit  of  classifying  writers  into 
kinds,  as  Historians,  Poets,  Scientific  and  Speculative  Writers, 
and  so  on,  it  may  seem  strange  to  include  Mr.  Tennyson  in  this 
list.    But,  as  I  have  advisedly  referred  to  Wordsworth  as  one 


sssr 


26 


RECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


m 


of  the  represeBtatives  and  powers  of  British  Philosophy  in  the 
age  immediately  past,  so  I  advisedly  named  Tennyson  as  suc- 
ceeding him  in  the  same  character.    Though  it  is  not  power  of 
speculative  reason  alone  that  constitutes  a  poet,  is  it  not  felt  that 
the  worth  of  a  poet  essentially  is  measmred  hy  the  amount  and 
depth  of  his  speculative  reason?    Even  popularly  do  we  not 
speak  of  every  great  poet  as  the  exponent  of  the  spint  of  his 
age?    What  else  can  this  mean  than  that  the  philosophy  of  his 
2e,  its  spirit  and  heart  in  relation  to  aU  the  great  elemental  proh- 
lems,  finds  expression  in  his  verse?    Hence  I  ought  to  include 
other  poets  in  this  list,  and  more  particularly  Me.  Browning  and 
Mrs.  Beowking,  and  the  late  Mb.  Olotjgh.    But  let  the  mention 
of  Mr  Tennyson  suggest  such  other  names,  and  stand  as  a  sufli- 
cient  protest  against  our  ahsm-d  hahit  of  omitting  such  in  a  con- 
nexion like  the  present.    As  if,  forsooth,  when  a  writer  passed 
into  verse,  he  were  to  be  abandoned  as  utteriy  out  of  calculable 
relationship  to  all  on  this  side  of  that  boundary,  and  no  accomit 
were  to  be  taken  of  his  thoughts  and  doings  except  in  a  kind  of 
curious  appendix  at  the  end  of  the  general  register!    What  if 
Philosophy,  at  a  certain  extreme  range,  and  of  a  certain  kind, 
S  S  necessity  to  pass  into  poesy,  and  can  hardly  help  bemg 
passionate  and  metrical?   If  so,  might  not  the  omission  of  poet^ 
purely  as  being   such,  from  a  conspectus  of  the  speculative 
writers  of  any  time,  lead  to  erroneous  conclusions  by  giving  an 
Tnle  prominence  L  the  estimate  of  all  such  phUosophizmg  a. 
could  most  easii;,  by  its  nature,  refrain  from  P^ssio^ate  or  poetic 
expression?    Thus,  would  Philosophy,  or  one  kind  of  Plu  oso- 
phy  in  comparison  with  another,  have  seemed  to  have  been  in 
Buch  a  diminished  condition  in  Britain  about  the  year  1830  if 
critics  had  been  in  the  habit  of  comiting  Wordsworth  in  the  phil- 
osophic list   as  well  as  Coleridge,  Mackmtosh,  Bentham,  and 
Tmes  Mill?    Was  there  not  more  of  what  might  be  called 
Sozism  in  Wordsworth  than  even  in  Coleridge,  who  spoKe  more 
Jspfnoza"    But  there  hardly  needs  all  this  justification,  as  far 

as  Mr.  Tennyson  is  concerned,  of  -^^^'''^'''^^.^^1^'};'  ^^^ 
ent  list  He  that  would  exclude  In  Memortam  (1850),  and 
1^(1855),  from  a  conspectus  of  the  philosophicalliterature 


RECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


27 


of  our  time,  has  yet  to  leam  what  philosophy  is.  "Whatever  else 
In  Memoriam  may  be,  it  is  a  manual,  for  many,  of  the  latest 
hints  and  questions  in  British  Metaphysics, 

Mb.  Aethue  Helps: — Essays  written  in  the  Intervals  of 
Business,  1841 ;  Friends  in  Council,  first  series,  1847 ;  second 
series  1859 ;  etc. 

Mb.  William  Smith  (of  Edinburgh) : — ^Translations  of  various 
works  of  Fichte,  separately  published,  and  collected  in  two  vol- 
umes (with  a  Memoir)  as  The  Popular  WorJcs  of  Fichte,  1844. 

Me.  J.  D.  MoEELL : — History  of  Speculative  Philosophy  in 
the  Nineteenth  Century,  1846 ;  Lectures  on  the  Philosophical 
Tendencies  of  the  Age,  1848 ;  Philosophy  of  Eeligion,  1849 ; 
Elements  of  Psychology,  1853 ;  Introduction  to  Mental  Philos- 
ophy, 1862. 

Me.  G.  H.  Lewes: — Biographical  History  of  Philosophy, 
1845  (second  edition,  1857) ;  Comte's  Philosophy  of  the  Positive 
Sciences  (an  abridged  exposition  of  Oomte),  1847. 

De.  J.  Gabth  Wilkinson: — A  Popular  STcetch  of  Sweden^ 
dorg^s  Philosophical  WorTcs,  1847;  Emanuel  Swedenborg :  A  Bi- 
ography, 1849 ;  The  Human  Body  and  its  Connexion  with  Man^ 
1851. 

Aechbishop  Thomson  ; — An  Outline  of  the  Necessary  Laws 
of  Thought :  A  Treatise  on  Pure  and  Applied  Logic, 

Eev.  Ohaeles  Kingsley; — Phaethon,  or  Loose  Thoughts  for 
Loose  ThinTcers,  1852 ;  Alexandria  and  Her  Schools,  1854 ;  with 
speculative  views  in  his  Miscellanies  and  his  writings  gen- 
erally. 

Peofessob  M ANSEL : — Prolegomena  Logica,  1851 ;  Lecture  on 
the  Philosophy  of  Kant,  1856 ;  Limits  of  Eeligious  Thought 
(Bampton  Lecture),  1858,  and  Controversy  with  Mr.  Maurice 
thereon;  Metaphysics  (reprinted  from  the  Encyclopaedia  Bri- 
tannica),  1860. 

Heney  Thomas  Buokle  : — History  of  Civilization  in  Eng- 
land,  2  vols.,  1857,  1861. 

Peofessob  James  McCosh  (Belfast) : — Intuitions  of  the 
Mind  Inductively  Investigated,  1860  (new  edition,  1865). 

Me.  Heney  Oaldeewood: — ThQ  Philosophy  of  the  Infinite; 


28  EECENT  BBinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 

„m  special  reference  to  tie  neories  of  Sir  miliam  EamUton 

Professor  Alexandeb  Bain  (of  Aberoeen;      x 

tU  Internet,  1856  (2d  edition,  1864);  TUEraotm.  and  the 
wm  1859-  On  the  Study  of  Character,  IBbl. 
"^^^^ofioR  A.  0.  Fkaser  (Sir  William  HanuLWs  snccessor 
in  the  chair  of  Logic  and  Metaphysics  -  ^dinbur  J>  ;-f7g 
in  Philosophy,  1S56;  National  ^'^f ''f  ^  ;if  ^X" tr^ 
System,  1858;  and  various  philosophical  articles  in  theNortU 

^"e^D^Tohk  CAiBKs:-Article  Xanein  the  8th  edition  of 
theEncydop^dia  Britannica;  Examination  of  Professor  I  err  ^. 
^s  jZy  of  Knomn,  and  Being,  1856 ;  TheSeott^sh  PMloso- 
phv  YindieaUd,  1856 ;  and  various  occasional  Essays. 

Professor  Thomas  Spekoer  Baynes  (St.  Andrews)  :-An 
Es^ZZ  m.  Analytic  of  Logical  Forms,  ISf  5  J-nslaUon 
S  Port  Boyal  Logic,  with  Introduction,  1851 ;  S^r  Wdham 
Hamilton  ("Edinburgh  Essays  "),  1856. 

Professor  Johk  Veitoh  (Glasgow);  Joint-Editor  wHh  Br 
Hansel  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Lectures ;  author  of  Memotr 
T^gald  Stewart  in  collected  edition  of  Stewart's  Works;  also 

^'^rErntrt™:-^.  mtroductiomo  the  Philosophy 

'' iT^J^^clLsocial  Statics,  1851;  Pri^^es^^ 
Psvehohgy,  1855 ;  Essays,  reprinted  from  periodical  (1st  series 
fSs;  2dSries  1863);  Education,  1861;  First  Pnnc^plesit^e 
1st  volume  of  a  System  of  Philosophy  now  in  progress),  1862 

Mb   James  Hutohinsok  Stirling  :-n«  Secret  of  Hegel 
Being  'the  Hegelian  System  in   Origin,  Principle,  Form,  and 

^l^^Jif 'indeV  this  head  may  he  included  a  number  of 
items  of  which  it  is  difficult  to  take  account  in  a  more  specid 
mann^  (D  There  is  the  extensive  recent  literature  of  so-called 
"SpStualism"  or  »  Spirit-Manifestations  "_a  literature  partly 
of  native  production,  hut  to  a  great  extent  imported  from 
America     In  a  conspectus  like  the  present,  which  is  statistical 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHT. 


29 


and  not  critical,  at  least  a  reference  to  this  literature  is  demanded, 
in  order  to  bring  before  us  the  actual  state  of  affairs.  (2)  There 
have  been  importations  from  America  of  works  of  quite  a 
different  speculative  kind,  of  which  Draper's  History  of  the 
Intellectual  Development  of  Europe  (1863)  may  stand  as  an 
example,  (3)  Among  ourselves  there  is  a  large  quantity  of 
speculative  thought,  of  all  varieties  of  tendency,  diffused  through 
current  Essay-writing  in  periodicals,  or  through  much  of  our 
higher  prose-literature  not  professedly  philosophical.  Me. 
Feoude,  for  example,  who  might  have  been  named  specially 
in  the  list  with  reiference  to  some  of  his  earlier  writings  and 
to  more  recent  individual  Essays,  comes  into  the  list  not  less 
distinctly  through  his  "  History."  Criticisms  and  discussions 
recognisable  by  a  characteristic  mode  of  philosophical  thought, 
and  sometimes  of  expressly  philosophical  nature,  might  be 
brought  together,  with  but  little  trouble,  from  some  of  our 
leading  periodicals,  and  associated,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  with 
the  name  of  Me.  Fitzjames  Stephen.  Finally,  not  to  multiply 
names,  a  distinct  vein  of  philosophical  opinion,  and  of  criticism 
of  prevailing  opinion,  has  made  its  appearance  in  the  Essays  of 
Mb.  Matthew  Arnold. 

It  is  of  recent  British  Philosophy  as  represented 
to  the  eye  in  this  conspectus  of  recent  writers  and 
writings  that  I  mainly  propose  a  review  in  the  chapters 
which  follow.  The  nature  of  the  references  made 
will  indicate  on  what  writers  my  knowledge  enables 
me  to  lay  the  stress,  and  what  others  I  have  in  view 
but  slightly. 


I 


. 


. 


30 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY, 


RECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


31 


CHAPTER  II. 

THE  TRADmOKAL  DIFFERENCES  '.    HOW  REPEATED  IN 
CARLYLE,   HAMILTON,   AND  MILL. 

OtJR  conspectus  presents  us,  certainly,  with  a  siifla- 
cient  medley.    Tor  an  adequate  review  of  the  course 
of  recent  British  speculative  thought  as  it  is  there 
represented,  we  should  have  to  disentangle  those  sepa- 
rate tissues  or  movements  of  speculative  inquiry  which 
have  received  separate  names  according  to  the  ob- 
jects with  which  they  are  mainly  conversant.    We 
should  have  to    take  account  separately  of  recent 
British  Psychology,  of  recent  British  Logic,  of  recent 
British  Ethics,  of  recent  British  Jurisprudence,  of 
portions  of  recent  British  Theology,  and  of  what  haB 
been  done  under  such  heads  as  the  Philosophy  of 
Art,  the  Philosophy  of  History  and  Politics,  and  the 
Science  of  Education.    In  each  of  these  divisions  of 
Philosophy  certain  names  would  occur  as  peculiarly 
prominent;  nor,  in  pursuing  the  views  of  aU  thinkers 


in  each,  is  there  any  limit  to  the  subdivisions  that 
might  be  necessary. 

A  survey  of  this  kind  is  obviously  not  what  we 
can  attempt  here.  "We  must  employ  some  much  more 
summary  method.  Instead  of  trying  to  grasp  the 
extensive  body  of  recent  British  Speculation,  we  must, 
if  possible,  seize  it  at  the  very  nape,  where  the  trunk 
and  limbs  are  united  with  the  head.  That  such  a 
method  need  not  be  impossible  is  indicated  by  the 
fact  that  the  different  departments  of  speculative  in- 
quiry are  obviously  interconnected.  It  is  rare  to  find 
a  thinker  that  does  not  pass  from  one  department  to 
another;  and  he  only  is  spoken  of  as  a  systematic 
philosopher  whose  scheme  of  thought  has  taken  some 
account  of  them  all.  What  does  this  imply  but  that 
there  are  for  every  philosopher  certain  root-principles, 
the  thinking-out  of  which  in  all  directions  and  in  all 
kinds  of  conjunctions  constitutes  his  very  business  as 
a  philosopher?  Let  there  be  a  difference  between 
two  thinkers  as  to  their  root-principles,  and  this  dif- 
ference will  shoot  its  correspondences  into  all  the 
subjects  about  which  they  speculate.  Further,  if  any 
set  of  differences  as  to  root-principles  can  be  pointed 
out  as  repeating  itself  among  philosophers  generally, 
we  have  here  a  means  of  classifying  philosophers  into 
schools.  Our  concern,  then,  is  to  see  whether  we  can 
lay  our  hands  on  any  set  of  idtimate  differences  which 


t 


I 


i 


32 


EECENT  BErriSH  PHILOSOPHY, 


k 


seem  to  have  been  constant  or  recurring  in  pHlos- 
opliy.    If  we  can  do  so,  we  shall  have  an  instrument 

for  our  purpose. 

The  ultimate  diiferences  among  philosophers  hith- 
erto are  to  be  sought  in  Metaphysics  proper.    It  is  in 
the  views  they  take  of  certain  metaphysical  questions 
that  philosophers,  first  of  all,  or  most  essentially  of 
all,  part  company.     But  Metaphysics  is  a  terrible 
bugbear  of  a  word  in  these  days.     You  know  the 
popular  definition :  When  A  talks  to  B,  and  B  does 
not  know  what  A  is  saying,  and  A  himself  does  not 
very  well  know  either,  but  both  B  and  A  keep  up  the 
pretence  and  nod  to  each  other  wisely  through  the 
fog— that  is  Metaphysics.    We  are  all  dearly  in  love 
wkh  the  Physics ;  but  we  cannot  abide  the  Meta  pre- 
fixed to  them.    Perhaps  it  is  a  pity.    There  are  some 
who  would  not  object  to  see  the  beautiful  Greek  word 
dancing  out  again  in  its  clear  pristine  meaning,  and 
naming  thoughts  and  objects  of  thought  which  must 
be  eternal  everywhere  whether  there  is  a  name  for 
them  or  not,  but  which  it  is  an  obstruction  and  beg- 
garliness  of  spirit  not  to  be  able  to  name.    We  need 
not  go  farther  than  Shakespeare  for  our  warrant : 

"  The  golden  round 
Which  fate  and  metaphysical  aid  doth  seem 
To  have  thee  crowned  withal." 

Surely  a  word  that  Shakespeare  used,  and  used  so  ex- 


I 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


33 


actly  and  lightly,  need  not  ever  be  un-English.  But 
there  is  no  use  in  rowing  against  the  stream ;  and,  till 
there  is  a  restitution  of  the  word  Metaphysics  to  its 
English  estates,  perhaps  it  is  best  to  get  on  as  much 
as  possible  without  it.  I  wiU  try  to  do  so  at  present. 
And  yet  I  do  not  know  that  you  will  thank  me,  or 
think  I  have  hit  on  any  great  improvement  as  respects 
perspicuity,  when  you  hear  what  I  propose  to  substi- 
tute. I  believe,  then,  that  the  differences  among  plii- 
losophers  hitherto  may  be  resolved  ultimately  into  (1) 
a  difference  of  Psychological  Theory ^  SiCCompBmed  by 
(2)  certain  differences  of  Cosmological  Conce^ption^  all 
subject  to  or  ending  in  (3)  a  difference  in  respect  of 
OntologicdL  Faith.  Here  are  three  phrases,  each 
more  uncouth,  it  must  seem  at  present,  than  the  sin- 
gle term  "  Metaphysics,"  whose  meaning  I  distribute 
among  them.  But  I  will  do  my  best  to  explain  each, 
and,  in  doing  so,  to  make  the  reason  for  such  a  tri- 
plicity  of  terms  apparent. 


f, 
i 

I 


I 


f 


THE  PSYCHOLOGICAL    DIFFERENCE. 

All  that  we  know  comes  to  us  in  what  we  call 

Mind  or  Consciousness.    "We  may  differ  as  to  what 

Mind  is — as  to  the  origin  of  this  strange  thing,  or 

power,  or  organism,  or  mode  of  existence,  which  we 

call  Consciousness,  and  as  to  the  gradations  in  which 

2* 


34 


KECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


! 


m 


it  may  be  found  actually  appearing  up  to  Man,  or 
may  be  imagined  as  ascending  beyond  Man.    Nay, 
we  may  differ  even  as  to  the  ultimate  scientific  neces- 
sity of  that  distinction  between  Mind  and  Matter, 
Soul  and  Body,  which  has  come  down  sanctioned  by 
immemorial  usage,  and  pervades  all  our  language. 
But  we  all  talk  of  Mind ;  nor,  with  whatever  reserve 
of  liberty  to  speculate  what  it  is,  or  how  it  came  to 
be,  can  we  do  otherwise.    Nothing  is  known  to  us 
except  in  and  through  mind.    It  is  in  this  Conscious- 
ness, which  each  of  us  carries  about  with  him,  and 
which,  be  it  or  be  it  not  the  dissoluble  result  of  bodily 
organization,  is  thought  of  by  all  of  us  not  under  any 
image  suggested  by  that  organization,  but  rather  as  a 
great  chamber  of  aerial  transparency,  without  roof, 
without  walls,  without  boimds,  and  yet  somehow  en- 
closed within  us,  and  belonging  to  us— it  is  within 
this  chamber  that  all  presents  itself  that  we  can  know 
or  think  about.    Except  by  coming  within  this  cham- 
ber,  or  revealing  itself  there,  nothing  can  be  known. 
Whatever  may  exist,  only  as  much  as  can  break 
through  into  this  sphere,  or  send  a  glimmering  of 
itself  into  it,  exists  for  our  intelligence.    From  the 
farthest  ends  of  space,  from  the  remotest  moment  of 
time,  whatever  fact,  object,  or  event  would  be  known 
by  me  as  happening  or  existing,  or  as  having  ever 
happened  or  existed,  can  be  so  only  by  having  itself 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


36 


announced,  somehow  or  other,  within  this  present 
room  or  chamber  which  I  call  my  mind.     That  com- 
ets are  at  this  moment  pursuing  their  curves  at  mighty 
distances  unseen  from  our  Earth ;  that  there  was  a 
period  when  the  Earth  was  a  cooling  mass  of  hot  mat- 
ter not  yet  habitable  by  organisms  known  to  us ;  that 
there  came  a  later  period  when  it  was  possessed  by 
strange  saurians  and  other  animal  forms  now  extinct ; 
that  there  once  lived  a  Julius  Gsesar ;  that  the  Earth 
is  a  spheroid ;  that  there  is  an  Australian  Continent — 
for  any  of  these  conceptions  or  beliefs  my  sole  warrant 
lies  in  corresponding  facts  of  my  own  consciousness. 
The  Universe,  past,  present,  and  to  come,  rolls  into 
my  ken  only  through  my  mind.     On  this  ground  of 
Consciousness  then,  as  the  repository,  storehouse,  or 
conventicle  of  all  knowledge,  all  philosophers  take 
their  stand— even  those  who  end  by  explaining  Con- 
sciousness itself  as  a  temporary  result  or  peculiarly 
exquisite  juncture  of  the  conditions  which  it  employs 
itself  in  recalling  and  unravelling.     So  far  there  is  no 
difference  among  philosophers,  no  division  into  schools. 
Should  any  one  attempt  to  set  up  as  a  philosopher  on 
any  other  ground,  it  could  only  be  because  he  did  not 
understand  the  use  of  terms. 

But  let  us  advance  a  step.  What  is  the  origin  of 
all  those  multitudinous  ideas,  notions,  or  informations 
which  flutter  through  our  Consciousness— which  rise 


t: 


86 


BECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


I 


there,  at  our  bidding  or  without  our  bidding,  in  aU 
sorts  of  combinations,  and  out  of  which  we  construct 
our  knowledge  or  beliefs  as  to  what  has  been,  or  is,  or 
is  to  be  ?    Whence  come  the  ideas  into  our  minds  that 
we  find  there,  and  that  constitute  our  inteUectual 
stock  ?    Is  any  portion  of  our  knowledge  of  a  differ- 
ent origin  from  the  rest,  and  of  a  different  degree  of 
validity  in  consequence  of  that  different  origin  ?    On 
this  question  there  has  been   a   polar  antagonism 
among  philosophers  since  there  were  philosophers^  in 
the  world.    In  nothing  have  philosophers,  in  nothing 
have  men  at  large,  differed  so  essentially  as  in  the 
answers  they  have  given,  knowingly  or  implicitly,  to 
this  question.    Here  is  that  difference  oi  jpsyclwlogical 
theory  wherein,  as  I  have  said,  we  must  look  for  the 
first  split  among  philosophers,  and  the  explanation  of 
further  discrepancies.    The  history  of  Philosophy  hith- 
erto has  been  mainly  a  struggle,  varying  in  foi-m  from 
age  to  age,  but  not  in  substance,  between  two  radi- 
cally opposed  psychological  theories. 

According  to  one  school  or  series  of  philosophers 
hitherto,  all  our  knowledge,  all  our  notions,  all  our 
beliefs,  are  derived  solely  from  Experience.  There  is 
a  streaming  into  our  minds,  through  the  senses,  of 
multiform  impressions  from  the  external  world,  which 
are  combined  within  the  mind  by  laws  of  association, 
and  are  discriminated,  classified,  analysed,  recollected, 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


37 


grouped,  and  what  not,  till  they  form  the  entire  mis- 
cellany of  our  facts,  cognitions,  and  habits,  and  even 
our  highest  principles,  propositions,  axioms,  and  gen- 
eralizations. All  that  is  in  Man — all  that  he  calls 
Truth  (let  it  be  even  mathematical  truth,  or  his  high- 
est notions  of  right  and  wrong,  or  any  ideas  he  may 
have  of  beauty,  or  nobleness,  or  even  Deity) — ^is  but 
a  deposit  or  induction  from  the  circumstances  in 
which  Man  is  placed.  Had  these  conditions  been 
different,  the  deposit  would  have  been  different.  AU 
truth,  therefore,  is  contingent  or  historically  arrived 
at.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  innate  or  a  priori 
truth,  or  direction  to  truth ;  and  any  higher  certainty 
that  some  truths  may  possess  over  others  is  but  the 
consequence  of  a  wider,  more  perfect,  and  more  fre- 
quently repeated  induction.  Such,  more  or  less 
clearly  recognized,  avowed,  and  argued  from,  has 
been  the  theory  of  one  school  or  series  of  thinkers 
since  Philosophy  began.  It  is  usually  called  the 
Empirical  theory,  or  the  theory  of  Sensationalism. 
The  former  name  (though  it  unfortunately  has  re- 
proachful associations)  is  only  intended  to  imply  what 
the  philosophers  in  question  avow  when  they  say  that 
they  own  no  other  origin  of  our  knowledge  than  Ex- 
perience ;  and  the  latter  name  only  expresses  what 
has  also  been  admitted  by  the  most  thorough  of  these 
philosophers— to  wit,  that  the  assertion  that  all  our 


wm 


I- 1 


38 


BECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


I 


I 


I     I 


knowledge  originates  in  experience  is  tantamount  to 
the  assertion  that  it  all  comes  into  the  mind  through 
the  channels  of  the  senses.  "  Nihil  est  in  intellectu 
quod  non^ius  fuerit  in  sensu  "  ("  ITothing  is  in  the 
intellect  which  has  not  before  been  in  the  senses  ")  is 
the  formula  of  this  class  of  philosophers,  propounded 
by  some  of  themselves,  and  adopted  by  others  in  de- 
scribing them.  Another  of  their  phrases  is  that  the 
mind  is  to  be  conceived  as  originally  a  talula  rasa^  or 
white  paper,  containing  no  characters  whatever,  but 
receiving  whatever  is  inscribed  upon  it  wholly  from 

without.* 

To  this  view,  however,  there  has  been,  on  the  part 
of  other  philosophers,  a  continued  opposition.  There 
have  always  been  philosophers  who  maintained  that 
there  is  another  source  of  our  knowledge  than  Expe- 
rience or  Sense— that  there  are  notions,  principles,  or 
elements  in  our  minds  which  could  never  have  been 
fabricated  out  of  any  amount  of  experience,  but  must 

*  The  objection  to  the  word  Sensationalism,  as  defining  the  theory 
of  the  resolvability  of  all  Truth,  or  Knowledge,  or  Faculty,  mto  Expe- 
rience, is  that  some  who  hold  the  theory  would  repudiate  such  a  name 
for  it.  The  objection  to  the  name  Empirimm  is  that  it  imports  mere 
popular  prejudice  into  a  philosophical  question,  by  callmg  up  associations 
with  the  word  "  Empiric "  as  used  in  an  opprobrious  sense.  As  Mr. 
Mill  has  used  the  adjective  "  Experiential"  as  unexceptionably  conveys 
ing  the  meaning  for  which  a  word  is  sought  (Article  on  Comte  in  WesU 
minster  Review,  April,  1865),  perhaps  the  substantive  Experientialism, 
though  crude  to  the  ear,  might  be  brought  into  use. 


4 

1     il 


RECENT  BRrnSH  PHILOSOPHY, 


39 


have  been  bedded  in  tbe  very  structure  of  the  mind 
itself.  These  are  necessary  beliefs,  d  priori  notions, 
innate  ideas,  constitutional  forms  of  thought,  truths 
which  we  cannot  but  think. 

"  Yet  hath  the  soul  a  dowry  natural, 

And  sparks  of  light  some  common  things  to  see, 
Kot  being  a  blank  where  nought  is  writ  at  all, 
But  what  the  writer  will  may  written  be. 

"  For  Nature  in  Man's  Heart  her  laws  doth  pen, 
Prescribing  Truth  to  Wit,  and  Good  to  Will ; 
Which  do  accuse,  or  else  excuse,  all  men 
For  every  thought  or  practice  good  or  ill. 

"  And  yet  these  sparks  grow  almost  infinite, 
Making  the  world  and  all  therein  their  food, 
As  fire  so  spreads  as  no  place  holdeth  it, 
Being  nourished  still  with  new  supplies  of  wood."  * 

There  have  been  various  forms  of  this  doctrine,  some 
of  them  confused  and  mystical  enough.  But  amid  all 
the  diversities  there  is  recognisable  a  common  psycho- 
logical theory^  contradictory  of  that  of  Sensationalism. 
It  is  known  as  the  theory  of  a  priori  ideas,  necessary 
beliefs,  or  latterly  as  the  theory  of  Intuitionalism  or 
Transcendentalism.  By  this  last  name  is  implied  the 
supposition  that  there  are  elements  of  knowledge,  the 

*  Sir  John  Davies's  Poem  "  On  the  Soul,"  written  in  1592. 


I.r 


40 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


I 


l'» 


origin  or  reason  of  whicli  transcends  or  Kes  beyond 
the  horizon  of  historical  conditions. 

Discerned  in  the  ancient  world  in  the  form  of 
Aristotelianism  versus  Platonism,  traceable  through 
the  middle  ages  in  the  controversy  between  the  Nom- 
inalists and  the  Eealists,  this  opposition  of  philos- 
ophies has  been  bequeathed  into  our  modem  times, 
and  has  represented  itself  in  Britain  as  well  as  in 
other  countries. 

It  is  diflSicult  to  determine  certainly,  as  regards 
Bacon  (1561—1626),  on  which  side  he  would  have 
ranged  himself.    He  rather  abstained  from  grappling 
with  the  question  at  all,  as  too  recondite  for  his  pur- 
poses, and  preferred  going  out  with  his  whole  strength 
on  the  exposition  of  a  method  in  which  either  set  of 
thinkers  might  find  satisfaction.     Yet  the  general 
tenor  of  Bacon's  writings  leaves  an  impression  as  if 
he  had  given  a  splendid  impulse  to  Empiricism,  and 
tried  to  commit  the  British  nation  to  a  contented 
futurity  in  that  faith.    Among  Bacon's  British  con- 
temporaries, however,  there  were  not  wanting  re- 
spectable defenders  of  the  other  psychological  theory. 
And  if,  on  coming  on  to  the  next  generation,  we  find, 
in  the  powerful  figure  of  Hobbes  (1588 — 1679),  an  un- 
doubted and  avowed  champion  of  Empiricism  in  its 
most  pronounced  form,  it  is  only  to  see  around  him 
resolute  maintainors  of  the  contrary  philosophy  in 


I 


11' 


EECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


41 


Buch  men  aa  Sm  Thomas  Beowne  (1605—1682), 
Henet  Moee  (1614—1687),  Ctowoeth  (161Y— 1688), 
and  the  Cambridge  Platonists. 

But  then  there  arose  Locke  (1632— 1Y04),  the 
«  Father  of  EngKsh  Philosophy,"  as  he  has  so  gen- 
erally been  called.      Ee  certainly  did  pledge  his 
nation,  if  any  man  coxdd  do  such  a  thing,  to  a  fu-  • 
turity  that  should  reject  from  its  philosophic  faith 
every  rag  or  vestige  of  the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas. 
He  is  indeed  hazy  in  his  language  whenever  he  seeks 
to  define  what  he  means  by  his  cardinal  principle  that 
all  our  ideas  originate  in  experience— hazier,  consid- 
erably, even  than  Hobbes  had  been.    For  he  seems 
to  avoid  or  deny  the  conclusion  that  this  would  leave 
but  one  ultimate  original  of  our  knowledge— to  wit, 
sensations  of  external  objects  ;  and  he  expressly  con- 
stitutes another  source  of  knowledge  under  the  name 
of  "  Keflection,"  the  "  Internal  Sense,"  or  the  cog- 
nizance which  the  mind  has  of  its  own  proceedings. 
But  critics  of  his  language  on  this  point  have  shown, 
I  think,  that  it  can  have  no  meaning  unless  it  implies 
a  surrender  of  Locke's  own  principle.    By  self-con- 
sciousness, or  the  mind's  reflection  on  its  own  pro- 
ceedings, the  mind  certainly  knows  of  these  proceed- 
ings ;  but  the  very  question  is,  whence  these  proceed- 
ings proceed.   The  mere  knowledge  of  the  proceedings, 
if  this  is  all  that  Locke  means  by  "  Eeflection,"  can- 


4Q 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


V  'i 


not  be  a  source,  in  the  first  instance,  of  any  part  of 
tlie  proceedings.  If  material  is  once  brought  into 
the  mind,  the  mind  may  keep  a  register  of  what  it 
does  with  such  material ;  but  this  mere  keeping  of  the 
register  cannot  be  spoken  of  as  an  independent  source 
of  any  of  the  material.  In  short,  though  it  may  be 
against  Locke's  will,  his  Empiricism  cannot  stop  short 
of  Sensationalism,  and  this  has  been  seen  and  avowed 
by  his  most  consistent  disciples.  "The  mind  is  a 
blank  organism,  receiving  sensations  from  without, 
and  knowing  and  registering  what  it  does  with  them  " 
— ^in  some  such  form  as  this  must  the  radical  propo- 
sition of  Locke's  philosophy  be  expressed ;  and,  if  the 
phrase  "blank  organism"  be  unintelligible,  it  can 
only  be,  I  apprehend,  because  the  radical  proposition 
of  the  Empirical  philosophy,  as  hitherto  propounded, 
is  really  unthinkable.  If  knowledge  is  worked-up 
sensation,  then  quite  as  important  a  constituent  of 
knowledge  as  the  aggregate  of  sensation  that  has 
been  worked  up  is  the  mode  in  which  it  has  been 
worked  up ;  and  this  refers  us  to  the  structure  of  the 
working-up  machine,  or  mind  itself,  as  having  con- 
tributed its  pressure  to  the  result. 

Little  wonder,  then,  that,  notwithstanding  the 
power  with  which  Locke's  philosophy  has  transmitted 
itself  in  England — a  power  so  great  that  Lockism  and 
its  developments  have  been  recognized  abroad  as  pe- 


1 


RECENT  BBmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


43 


culiarly  the  English  philosophy — ^it  has  never  been 
without  assailants  in  England  itself.  "  The  question 
in  dispute  could  not,"  as  Mr.  Mill  well  says,  "  so  long 
have  remained  a  question,  if  the  more  obvious  argu- 
ments on  either  side  had  been  unanswerable."* 
Clakke  (1675—1729)  and  Butler  (1692—1753)  were 
English  representatives  of  the  d  jpriori  philosophy, 
contemporary  with  Locke,  or  near  his  time.  Abroad, 
in  Descartes  (1596—1650),  in  Spinoza  (1632—1677), 
and  in  Malebeanche  (1638—1715),  there  had  been 
more  systematic  and  illustrious  maintainors  of  the 
principle  of  such  a  philosophy ;  and  their  influence 
had  not  been  unknown  in  Britain.  But  what  was 
considered  the  staggering  blow  to  the  Lockian  philos- 
ophy for  the  time  came  from  the  German  Leibnttz 

(1646 1714).      "JVihil  est  in  intellectu  quod  non 

jprius  fuerit  in  sensu^^^  was  his  famous  retort  upon 
the  maxim  of  the  Sensationalists,  "nisi  intellectus 
ijpse : "  "  Nothing  is  in  the  intellect  which  has  not  be- 
fore been  in  the  senses— unless  it  be  the  intellect  it- 
self." This  epigram  of  Leibnitz  has  been  ridiculed  as 
meaningless ;  but  it  seems  to  me  to  have  been,  in  its 
time,  one  of  the  most  perfect  aphorisms  ever  uttered. 
At  all  events,  it  defined  with  surprising  exactness  the 
work  that  remained  to  be  accomplished  by  another 


«! 


*  Essay  on  Coleridge,  1840,  reprinted  in  Mill's  Dmertations. 


M 


RECENT  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


45 


W  I    I 


German,  and  a  greater  than  Leibnitz,  if  the  world 
were  not  to  be  given  over  to  Lockism  and  to  what 
Lockism  might  lead  to. 

In  Britain  there  had  arisen  a  beautiful-minded 
Bekkeley  (1684: — 1743),  who,  accepting  the  notion 
that  the  sole  furnishing  of  the  mind  consists  of  sensa- 
tions, but  alarmed  at  certain  consequences  which  he 
^  saw,  or  foresaw,  from  the  prevalent  use  of  that  notion, 
sought  to  set  matters  right  by  denying  that  the  mind 
had  any  right  to  pursue  its  sensations  beyond  its  own 
walls,  or  to  attribute  them  to  any  real  external  world 
of  matter.  What  I  am  conscious  of,  all  that  I  really 
know  of,  is  sensation  ^Vl  my  mind,  and  not  any  external 
material  world  beyond  my  mind ;  and  if  you,  for  your 
part,  adopt  the  gross  and  pm'ely  gratuitous  suppo- 
sition of  such  a  world,  I  feel  myself  both  far  more 
faithful  to  experience,  and  in  possession  of  a  creed  far 
more  glorious  and  solacing  when  I  reject  all  your  ex- 
ternal material  world — all  your  hills,  and  seas,  and 
trees,  and  stones,  and  stars — as  anything  more  than 
existences  or  motions  in  some  mind  or  minds !  Not 
that  these  images,  so  dear  to  all  of  us,  are  meaning- 
less !  What  if  they  are  possessed  so  familiarly  by  all  of 
us  in  common,  and  occur  over  and  over  again  with  such 
constant  regularity,  only  because  they  are  hieroglyphic 
and  sacramental  of  the  one  unseen  Spirit  and  Father 
of  all,  ceaselessly  communicating  His  nature  and  will 


to  His  creatures  in  such  well-chosen  and  sufficient 

symbols  ? 

But  hardly  had  Berkeley  thus  made  his  assertion 
of  Mind  or  Thought  as  the  only  legitimately  con- 
ceivable reality  in  the  Universe,  when  there  came  a 
HiJME  (1711— 17Y6),  with,  his  simple  ruthlessness,  to 
show  that,  on  the  principles  of  phUosophic  reason, 
even  this  reality  must  vanish  from  the  universe,  and 
not  a  rack  be  left  to  float  in  the  void.  This  succes- 
sion  of  ideas,  which  is  called  Mind  and  which  is  aU 
that  is  really  known,  has  it,  when  you  investigate  suf- 
ficiently, any  substratum  of  real  continuous  being  ?  Is 
not  Mind,  too,  if  you  come  to  that,  a  hypothesis  be- 
yond the  facts  ?  Is  there  any  certainty,  any  substan- 
tiality at  all,  anything  but  an  iUusive  series  of  phan- 
tasms flitting  in  a  vague  nothingness  of  Time  and 

Space? 

Doubt  had  in  Hume  reached  its  extreme  limits. 

Far  as  the  eye  could  reach,  there  was  nothing  but 
desolation,  or  at  the  utmost  a  phantasmagory  of 
merely  empirical  co-existences  and  successions  float- 
ing over  a  pit  of  Nonentity.  Aghast  at  this  result  of 
philosophy,  radical  thinkers  everywhere  set  them- 
selves, as  by  a  common  impulse,  to  a  re-examination 
of  that  psychological  theory  of  Empiricism  itself  to 
which,  it  was  generally  seen,  the  result  was  to  be  cred- 
ited.     On  Locke's  theory  of  Experience  as  the  one 


! 


46 


RECENT  BEmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


tdtimate  origin  or  reason  of  knowledge,  no  answer  to 
Hume  seemed  possibly  forthcoming ;  all  the  possibili- 
ties in  that  direction  seemed  to  have  been  exhausted 
and  evaporated  by  Hume's  criticism.  If  there  was  to 
be  a  rebuilding  at  all  of  any  edifice  of  human  certain- 
ty on  the  desolated  space  which  Hume  had  swept,  it 
could  only  be  on  a  foundation  laid  afresh  in  some  form 
of  the  psychological  theory  opposed  to  Locke's — ^the 
theory  of  necessary  beliefs,  or  of  d  priori  constituents 
of  knowledge.  This  is  what  makes  Hume's  name  so 
great,  and  his  epoch  so  important,  in  the  history  of 
European  philosophy — ^that,  having  exhibited  the  one 
of  the  two  competing  psychological  theories  in  its 
uttermost  developments,  and  these  such  as  the  soul 
could  not  abide  in,  he  occasioned  everywhere  a  dispo- 
sition to  revert  to  the  other  theory  and  take  it  on 

trial.  ' 

In  Hume's  own  country,  while  his  pliilosophy  was 
yet  flowing  fresh  and  cold  from  the  fountain-head, 
Keid,  who  was  his  senior  by  a  year  (lYlO — 1796),  but 
whose  philosophical  activity  was  first  called  forth  by 
him,  offered  that  sober,  and,  if  not  subtle,  yet  rich 
and  grave  "  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense,"  the  essen- 
tial character  of  which  was  that  it  fell  back  on  a  sup- 
posed equipment  of  necessary  beliefs  or  elements  of 
knowledge,  given  in  the  very  structure  of  the  mind 
itself,  and  not  historically  or  empirically  collected. 


EECENT  BEiriSH   PHILOSOPHT. 


47 


Keid  left  his  foundation  of  necessary  beliefs  in  a 
somewhat  chaotic  and  questionable  state ;  but  he  at 
least  established  in  E'orth  Britain,  while  Hume  was 
alive  or  well  remembered,  a  philosophy  of  some  sort, 
that  might  witness  to  the  possibility  of  a  theory  of 
necessary  beliefs  against  the  persevering  Lockism  of 
South  Britain.  For,  in  England,  the  Empirical  Phi- 
losophy of  Locke,  either  ignoring  its  seeming  sell-ex- 
plosions in  the  developments  given  it  by  Berkeley  and 
Hume,  or  else  voting  these  seeming  self-explosions  to 
be  no  self-explosions  at  all,  but  only  blazes  of  irrele- 
vant metaphysics  kindled  on  the  road  by  a  fantastical 
Irishman  and  a  dialectical  Scotchman,  but  not  inter- 
rupting the  road  anything  to  speak  of  for  practical 
purposes — ^in  England,  I  say,  Locke's  philosophy  had 
been  persevering  triumphantly  as  if  nothing  were 
the  matter.  Hartley  (1Y05— 1757),  Abraham  Txjck- 
ER  (1705—1774),  Priestley  (1733—1804),  and  Paley 
(1743_1805),  were  all  Lockians— differing  among 
themselves,  to  be  sure,  and  not  thinking  Locke's  views 
by  any  means  final,  but  accepting  his  main  princi- 
ple as  intact  by  anything  that  had  happened,  and  act- 
ing on  it  in  their  different  ways. 

Nay,  there  was  a  waft  into  England  of  a  more 
thorough-going  Sensationalism  than  it  might  have  of 
itself  been  able  to  excogitate  out  of  Locke.  This  was 
that  philosophy  of  the  French  Condillac  (1716— 


I 


M 


48 


EECENT  BKHISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


I;  I  '■ 


1780)  whcili  some  regard  as  only  Lockism  compelled 
to  know  itself,  and  which,  boldly  reducing  the  mind 
to  the  single  function  of  animal  sensibility,  declared 
aU  knowledge,  all  habit,  all  faculty,  all  belief,  to  be 
but  "  transformed  sensation."    With  but  Eeid's  sober 
bequest  of  a  so-caUed  Scottish  Philosophy  of  Common 
Sense  to  antagonize  all  this  mass  of  English  and  im- 
ported Sensationalism,  what  was  Great  Britain  to  do  ? 
The  help  which  British  Transcendentalism,  left  at 
such  odds,  was  calling  for,  was  to  come  to  it  from 
without— was  to  come  to  it  from  that  quarter  from 
which  the  entire  Europe  of  the  eighteenth  century 
was  to  derive  its  intellectual  refreshing.    Now  it  was 
that  there  arose  that  fellow-countryman  of  Leibnitz 
who  was  to  remember  his  famous  aphorism  against 
Locke,  "  nisi  intdlectus  ipse^^^  and  was  to  give  it  a 
significance  and  explication  still  wider  in  the  world. 

The  Critical  Philosophy  of  Kant  (1724—1804)  has 
been  spoken  of  as  that  one  event  of  modern  times 
which  is  comparable  for  the  dimensions  of  its  spirit- 
ual effects  to  the  French  Eevolution  in  the  political 
order  of  things.  Of  what  Kant  did  all  have  now 
some  general  idea.  Feeling,  as  Pteid  had  done,  that 
the  inanity  into  which  Hume  had  dissolved  every- 
thing was  a  dreariness  which  the  human  soul  could  not 
sustain,  he  addressed  himself  to  the  same  task  as  Keid, 
but  by  a  different  method,  in  an  atmosphere  freer 


4 


RECENT  BEmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


49 


from  prejudice,  and  with  a  profounder  reach  of 
spirit.  The  result  was  that  he  reported  the  mind  to 
be  no  mere  blank  organism,  receiving  sensations  and 
registering  its  ovm.  proceedings  with  them  (even  were 
such  a  representation  thinkable  in  its  very  terms),  and 
no  mere  concretion  of  transformed  sensations  round 
a  still-active  centre  of  mere  sensibility,  but  an  organ- 
ism of  very  definite  powers  and  structure,  flung  from 
a  fathomless  unknown  into  the  world  of  sensible  and 
historical  conditions,  and  seizing  and  interpreting  these 
conditions  according  to  "  forms  "  native  to  itself  and 
of  a  priori  origin.  Sensibility  itself  had  its  forms- 
Space  and  Time  not  being  external  existences,  but 
structural  habits  of  the  perceiving  mind ;  the  Under- 
standing proper  had  its  forms — certain  modes  in 
which,  and  in  which  alone,  it  could  think  of  things ; 
nay,  a-top  of  the  Understanding,  or  forming  its  su- 
preme part,  was  a  certain  highest  faculty,  which 
might  be  called  Eeason,  having  a  structural  relation 
to  three  boundless,  unknowable,  and  yet  necessarily- 
asserted  objects— the  World,  the  Soul,  and  God. 

But,  if  Kant  thus  substantially  reasserted  the 
theory  of  Transcendentalism  against  that  of  Empiri- 
cism, he  did  so  in  a  way  that  set  aside  much  of  the 
previous  philosophizing  of  the  Transcendentalists,  and 
prescribed  to  Transcendentalism   in  future  a  more 

modest  behaviour.     By  his  very  use  of  the  phrase 

S 


\]  I 


I- 


'i  ■  { 


.  I 


I 


w 

I 


50 


RECENT   BRITTSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


"  necessary  forms  of  thought,''  as  at  least  an  alterna- 
tive for  the  phrase  "  innate  ideas  "  till  then  generally 
in  use,  he  removed  a  stumbling-block.  He  thus 
brought  into  clearer  view  the  essential  assertion  of 
Transcendentalism — to  wit,  that  the  structure  or  a 
priori  capability  of  the  organism,  called  Mind, 
which  works  up  the  material  given  in  sensation,  has 
at  least  as  much  to  do  with  the  worked-up  result, 
called  Knowledge,  as  the  material  itself.  But,  by 
the  same  means,  he  disowned  and  cleared  away  the 
numerous  theosophic  and  metaphysical  systems  which 
previous  Transcenderitalists  had  offered  to  a  disgusted 
world  in  the  name  of  Transcendentalism — systems 
which  had,  in  many  cases,  consisted  in  first  asserting 
the  principle  of  "  innate  ideas,"  and  then  offering  as 
an  authentic  collection  of  these  "  innate  ideas "  some 
set  of  very  definite  and  locally-elaborated  propositions 
of  some  small  particular  person.  This  two-edged 
character  of  Kant's  Philosophy  has  been  sympathiz- 
ingly  remarked  upon  by  a  British  expositor.  "  The 
result  of  Kant's  Critical  Philosophy,"  he  says,  "  was 
that,  against  the  Sceptics,  a  whole  system  of  knowledge, 
underived  from  experience,  was  proved  to  exist  in 
the  mind,  and  that,  against  the  Dogmatists,  this 
knowledge  was  declared  to  give  no  hold,  at  least  so  far 
as  speculation  is  concerned,  over  the  nature  of  things, 
or  metaphysical  truth.     The  Kantian  Philosophy  thus 


1  -. 

1 


RECENT  BRHISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


51 


substitutes  for  positive  Metaphysics  a  criticism  of  pure 
Eeason,  explaining  why  there  can  be  none,  and  at  the 
same  time  vindicates  those  elements  of  knowledge 
that  beget  metaphysical  inquiry  from  sceptical  rejec- 
tion and  contempt."  ^ 

But  no  man  can  be  final  in  this  world ;  and  the 
German  followers  of  Kant  proceeded  less  on  the  re- 
stricting lesson  of  his  teaching  than  he  would  per- 
haps have  wished.  FicHTE  (1762—1814)  and  Schel- 
LiNG  (1775—1854),  not  to  speak  of  Hegel  (1770— 
1831),  went  on  certainly  into  varieties  of  a  tolerably 
positive  Metaphysics  in  the  name  of  Transcendental- 
ism, though  of  kinds  that  would  never  have  existed 
but  for  Kant,  and  that  referred  themselves  to  Kant ; 
and  it  is  the  aggregate  of  their  speculations  and  those 
of  others,  along  with  Kant's,  that  we  think  of  now  as 
the  German  Philosophy. 

This  Philosophy  had  been  long  in  progress  before 
any  influence  from  it  was  felt  within  our  islands. 
Such  easier  native  philosophizing  as  lay  in  the  con- 
tinuation and  further  development  of  the  hereditary 
Lockism  of  England,  partially  antagonized  by  the 
Scottish  Philosophy  of  Eeid,  had  sufficed  for  British 
purposes.  Surviving  Priestley  and  Paley  as  a  univer- 
sally recognized  representative  of  British  Empiricism, 

*  Dr.  Cairns :  Art.  Kant,  Encyc.  Britannica :  8th  edit. 


i 


o 


-i 


52  EECENT  BETTISH  PHaOSOPHY. 

though  a  representative  of  novel  and  unique  figure, 
was  Bentham  (1749-1834) ;  heside  whom,  with  more 
of  the  keen  faculty  of  the  pure  psychologist,  appeared 
James  Mill  (1Y73-1836).    Admired  and  respected 
through  the  island,  on  the  other  hand,  as  the  classic 
expositor  of  Eeid's  homely  Scottish  Philosophy  m  its 
own  territory,  was  Dugald  Stewakt  (1753— 1828) ; 
the  brilliant  aberration  from  whom  of  his   pupil 
Thomas  Browit  (1778-1820)  was  compensated  by 
the  greater,  though  eclectic,  consistency  of  Mack- 
intosh (1765—1832).      On  the  whole,  though  the 
meeting  of  the^wo  opposed  tides  was  visible,  it  was 
rather  in  a  kind  of  would  be  commingling  than  in 
any  very  violent  conflict ;  and,  but  for  the  appearance 
of  one  spokesman  for  TranscendentaHsm,  of  a  richer 
genius  constitutionally  than  the  thinkers  of  the  Scot- 
tish  School,  and  in  secret  correspondence  with  that 
new  German  Philosophy  of  which  they  knew  little 
or  nothing,  Benthamism  in  Britain  would  have  had 
no    adequate    counteractive.      This  was  Coleeidgb 
(1772—1834),  whose  philosophical  function  may  be 
defined  by  saying  that  through  him  there  was  trans- 
mitted an  opportune  suffusion  of  Kant  and  Schelling 
into  England,  as  of  light  softened  through  a  stained- 
glass  medium,  and  that  into  this  suffusion  he  also 
resumed  whatever  of  Anglo-Platonism  had  been  float- 
ing, long  neglected,  in  the  works  of  old  EngUsh 


iM. 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


53 


Divines.  At  the  back  of  Coleridge,  however,  in  all 
this,  if  one  looked  rightly,  was  to  be  seen,  abetting 
him  in  the  main,  if  criticising  him  in  particulars,  the 
massive  personality  of  "Woedswoeth. 


n. 


COSMOLOGICAL  DIFFERENCES. 


Thus  have  I  traced  down,  to  the  exact  point  of  its 
connexion  with  the  British  present,  that  struggle  of 
the  two  opposed  Psychological  Theories  in  which,  in 
Britain  as  in  every  other  country,  so  much  of  the  es- 
sence of  the  history  of  Philosophy  is  involved.  Let 
us  now  attend  to  that  second  difference,  or  set  of  dif- 
ferences, among  philosophers  which  I  described  as  a 
difference  or  differences  of  Gosmological  Conception. 
Not  the  less  because  the  view  which  I  want  here  to 
bring  out  is  susceptible  of  popular  exposition,  and 
may  be  invested  with  popular  associations,  am  I  dis- 
posed to  set  some  store  by  it. 

By  " cosmological  conception"  I  do,  in  effect, 
mean  very  much  that  general  image  of  the  to- 
tality of  things  which  each  one  carries  about  with 
him,  and  which  is  sometimes  spoken  of  more  grandly 
as  his  "  theory  of  the  universe."  The  beauty  of  the 
thing  for  our  purposes  is  that  every  one  has  it.  A 
"psychological  theory"  is  a  learned  luxury,  which 


■HP 


54 


BECENT  BKrnSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


<'  ( 


r! 

I 

^    i 


the  immense  majority  of  people  may  go  from  tlieir 
cradles  to  tlieir  graves  without  consciously  possessing ; 
but    every  one    has    a   "  cosmological  conception," 
though  he  may  not  be  aware  of  it  under  that  pe- 
dantic-looking name.    Yon  cottager  who  spins  at  her 
own   door  has  her  "  cosmological  conception,"  her 
working-image  of  the  world  she  lives  in.     There  is 
a  past  of  mystery,  all  opaque  beyond  her  own  imme- 
diate memory  or  the  traditions  of  her  kith  and  kin, 
save  where  the  Bible  lights  up  a  gleaming  islet  or 
two  in  the  distant  gloom ;  there  is  a  present  of  toil 
and  care,  not  without  help  from  on  high ;  and  a  little 
way  on  the  hour  is  thought  of  when  body  and  soul 
shall  be  severed— the  one  to  its  rest  under  the  church- 
yard-gi-ass,  the  ocher  to  that  heaven  above  the  stars 
where  loved  ones  that  have  gone  before  will  mayhap 

be  seen  again : 

"  We'll  meet  and  aye  be  fain 
In  the  land  o'  the  leal." 

And,  from  the  cottager  upwards,  we  have  endless  va- 
riations of  the  cosmological  conception,  according  to 
character  and  knowledge,  and  yet  with  wondrously 
little  difference  in  the  main.  Not  that  the  variations 
are  without  significance.  That  image  of  the  totality 
of  things  which  any  one  carries  about  with  him,  and 
under  the  power  of  which  he  is  continually  living  and 
acting,  is,  all-in-all,  the  most  comprehensive  expression 


BECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


55 


of  his  whole  being  and  its  acquisitions.  It  embodies 
more  of  himself  than  his  utmost  reason,  however 
trained  it  may  be,  can  reduce  into  thesis  or  propo- 
sition. For  every  thing  in  him  goes  to  make  it — 
the  very  feelings,  and  longings,  and  last  impressions 
or  inspirations  which  his  reason  has  not  yet  organized ; 
it  is  tremulous  to  every  touch  of  new  fact,  or  reading, 
or  meditation.  The  "cosmological  conception"  of 
any  man,  his  sensuous  image  of  the  world,  would  be, 
if  we  could  get  at  it,  the  truest  abstract  or  representa- 
tion of  his  whole  mind  or  philosophy. 

It  is  to  be  expected,  in  the  case  of  philosophers, 
that  the  cosmological  conception  shall  be  visibly  in 
accord  with  the  psychological  theory.  This,  however, 
has  not  always  happened.  The  history  of  philosophy 
presents  curious  instances  in  which  the  cosmological 
conception  of  a  philosopher  has  seemed  to  be  grander 
than  his  set  of  avowed  principles ;  or,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  propagandist  of  propositions  of  glorious  ca- 
pability has  been  seen  dwelling  personally  in  a  cos- 
mological conception  little  better  than  a  hut.  Hence, 
in  the  case  of  any  philosopher,  the  necessity  of  taking 
account,  if  possible,  of  his  cosmological  conception  as 
well  as  of  his  psychological  theory ;  and  hence,  again, 
the  necessity  of  having  at  least  some  general  classi- 
fication of  the  cosmological  conceptions  that  have  pre- 
vailed among  philosophers,  wherewith  to  supplement 


56 


EECENT  BBinSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


t 


1!'  ' 


I 


h 


r- 


I ; 


w 


or  correct  our  mere  distribution  of  them,  on  the 
grounds  of  psychological  theory,  into  the  two  schools 
of  Transcendentalists  and  Empiricists. 

A  classification  of  systems  of  philosophy  accord- 
ing to  the  cosmological  conceptions  governing  them 
has  actually  been  made.  It  is  founded  on  a  consider- 
ation of  the  differences  among  philosophers  as  to  what 
that  totality  of  existence  is  which  is  to  be  accepted  as 
really  vouched  for  by  Mind.  All  agree,  as  we  have 
said,  that  mind  is  the  sole  voucher  for  anything ;  but 
pliilosophers  are  divisible  into  schools  according  to 
the  various  views  they  have  taken  of  the  constitution 
of  that  phsenomenal  Universe,  that  Cosmos,  that  total 
round  of  things,  of  which  we  have  a  recurring  assw- 
ance  in  every  act  of  perception,  and  which  is  orbed 
forth  more  or  less  fully  for  each  man  in  his  wider  con- 
templations. 

The  popular  or  habitual  conception  of  mankind  in 
general  is  that  there  are  two  distinct  worlds  mixed  up 
in  the  phsenomenal  Cosmos— a  world  of  Mind,  con- 
sisting of  multitudes  of  individual  minds,  and  a  world 
of  Matter,  consisting  of  all  the  extended  immensity 
and  variety  of  material  objects.  Neither  of  these 
worlds  is  thought  of  as  begotten  of  the  other,  but 
each  of  them  as  existing  independently  in  its  own 
proper  nature  and  within  its  own  definite  bounds, 
though  they  traffic  with  each  other  at  present.    Sweep 


..  J 


EECEIST  BRrnSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


57 


away  all  existing  minds,  and  the  deserted  Earth  would 
continue  to  spin  round  all  the  same,  still  whirling  its 
rocks,  trees,  clouds,  and  all  the  rest  of  its  material 
pomp  and  garniture,  alternately  in  the  sunshine  and 
in  the  depths  of  the  starry  stillness.  Though  no  eye 
should  behold  and  no  ear  should  hear,  there  would  be 
evenings  of  silver  moonlight  on  the  ocean-marge,  and 
the  waves  would  roar  as  they  broke  and  retired.  On 
the  other  hand,  suppose  the  entire  fabric  of  the  mate- 
rial Universe  abolished  and  dissolved,  and  the  dis- 
housed  population  of  spirits  would  still  somehow 
survive  in  the  imaginable  vacancy.  If  this  second 
notion  is  not  so  easy  or  common  as  the  first,  it  still 
virtually  belongs  to  the  popidar  conception  of  the 
contents  or  constitution  of  the  Cosmos.  The  concep- 
tion is  that  of  a  ISTatural  Dualism,  or  of  the  contact 
in  every  act  of  perception  of  two  distinct  spheres,  one 
an  internal  perceiving  mind,  and  the  other  an  exter- 
nal world  composed  of  the  actual  and  identical  objects 
which  this  mind  perceives. 

On  the  first  exercise  of  philosophic  thought,  how- 
ever, this  conception  is  blurred.  An  immense  quan- 
tity of  what  we  all  instinctively  think  of  as  really  ex- 
isting out  of  ourselves  turns  out,  on  investigation,  not 
to  exist  at  all  as  we  fancy  it  existing,  but  to  consist 
only  of  affections  of  the  perceiving  mind.  The  red- 
ness of  the  rose  is  not  a  real  external  thing,  immutably 

8* 


i 


M 


\i 


>i 


58  BECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 

the  same  in  itself;  it  is  only  a  certain  peculiar  action 
on  my  physiology  wMch  the  presence  of  an  external 
cause  or  ohject  seems  to  determine.    Were  my  physi- 
ology diiFerent,  the  action  would  he  different,  though 
the  cause  or  object  remained  the  same.    Indeed,  there 
are  persons  in  whom  the  presence  of  a  rose  occasions 
no  sensation  of  redness  such  as  is  known  to  me,  but  a 
much  yaguer  sensation,  not  distinguishable  from  what 
I  should  at  once  distinguish  as  greenness.    And,  as 
colour  is  thus  at  once  detected  as  no  external  inde- 
pendently-existing reality,  but  only  a  recurring  phys- 
iological affection  of  myself  and  other  sentient  beings 
like  myself,  so  with  a  thousand  other  things  which,  by 
habit  or  instinct,  I  suppose  as  externally  and  inde- 
pendently existing.    When  I  imagine  the  depopulated 
Earth  still  wheeling  its  inanimate  rotundity  through 
the  daily  sunshine  and  the  nocturnal  shadow,  or  one 
of  its  bays  still  resonant  in  moonlit  evenings  with  the 
roar  of  the  breaking  waves,  it  is  because,  in  spite  of 
myself,  I  intrude  into  the  fancy  the  supposition  of  a 
listening  ear  and  a  beholding  eye  analogous  to  my " 
own.    It  is  only  by  a  strong  effort  that  I  can  reaHze 
that  a  great  deal  at  least  of  what  I  thus  think  of  as 
the  goings-on  of  things  by  themselves  is  not  and  can- 
not be  their  goings-on  by  themselves,  but  consists  at 
the  utmost  of  effects  interbred  between  them  and  a 
particular  sentiency  in  the  midst  of  them.    But  the 


^  1 


RECENT   BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


59 


effort  may  be  made ;  and,  when  it  is  made  repeatedly, 
in  a  great  many  directions,  and  with  reference  to  a 
great  many  of  the  so-called  properties  of  matter,  the 
inevitable  result  for  the  philosophic  mind  is  that  the 
popularly-imagined  substance  of  a  real  external  world 
finds  itself  eaten  away  or  corroded,  at  least  to  a  cer- 
tain depth.  So  far  philosophers  are  agreed.  It  is 
when  they  proceed  to  consider  to  what  depth  the 
popularly-imagined  substance  of  the  real  external 
world  is  thus  eaten  away,  or  accounted  for,  that  they 
begin  to  differ. 

Some  philosophers,  departing  as  little  as  may  be 
from  the  popular  judgment,  suppose  that,  however 
much  of  the  apparent  external  world  may  be  resolved 
into  affections  of  the  subjective  sentiency,  there  still 
remains  an  objective  residue  of  such  primary  qualities 
as  extension,  figure,  divisibility,  mobility,  etc.,  belong- 
ing to  external  matter  itself,  and  by  the  direct  and 
immediate  cognizance  of  which  the  mind  is  brought 
face  to  face  with  external  substance  and  knows  some- 
thing of  its  real  goings-on.  Philosophers  of  this 
school  are  known  generally  as  Eealists.  More  nu- 
merous, however,  are  those  who,  not  allowing  an  ob- 
jective and  independent  reality  even  to  the  so-called 
primary  qualities  of  matter,  but  believing  them  as 
well  as  colour,  odour,  or  savour,  to  be  only  affections 
of  the  sentiency,  deny  that  the  mind  is  in  any  sense 


\l\ 


■■";• 


60 


RECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BBinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


61 


brought  face  to  face  with  real  external  things  such  as 
they  seem  in  the  act  of  perception.  To  thinkers  of 
this  school  there  has  been  given  the  general  name  of 

Idealists. 

This  broad  distinction  of  Philosophers  cosmologi- 
cally  into  Eealists  and  Idealists  is  so  far  convenient 
enough.     Cosmologically,  or  in  respect  of  this  present 
Universe  of  ours,  with  its  dualism  of  Mind  and  Mat- 
ter, every  man  must  declare  himself  either  a  Kealist 
or  an  Idealist,  if  he  understands  the  meanings  at- 
tached to  these  terms.    The  distinction  has  reference 
solely  to  his  notion  of  the  so-called  external  or  mate- 
rial world  in  its  relations  to  the  perceiving  mind.    If 
he  abides,  though  only  in  part,  by  the  popular  con- 
ception, and  regards  the  material  world  as  a  substantial 
reality  independent  of  the  perceiving  mind,  and  which 
the  mind,  according  to  its  powers,  presses  against  and 
directly  apprehends  in  every  act  of  perception,  then 
he  is  a  Eealist.    If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  cannot  see 
that  there  need  be  asserted  any  external  material 
world  with  such  characters  as  we  attribute  to  it,  but 
supposes  that  our  unanimous  agreement  in  the  imagi- 
nation of  such  an  external  world  is  merely  a  habit  of 
our  own  sentiency,  projecting  its  own  ideas  or  affec- 
tions outwards  and  giving  them  a  body,  then  he  is  an 

Idealist. 

The  mere  distribution  of  Philosophers,  however, 


into  the  two  great  orders  of  Eealists  and  Idealists 
does  not  answer  all  the  historical  requirements.    Each 
order  has    been    subdivided,  still    on    cosmological 
grounds,  into  two  sections.    Among  Eealists,  the  Ma- 
terialists  or  MaterialistiG  RealisU  have  been  distin- 
guished strongly  from  the  DualistiG  Realists^  called 
also  Natural  Realists.    Similarly,  among  Idealists, 
there  has  been  a  large  group  of  what  may  be  called 
Const/ructwe  Idealists^  distinguishable  from  the  Pure 
Idealists.    But  this  is  not  all.    jN"ot  only  by  this  sub- 
division of  each  of  the  orders,  still  on  cosmological 
grounds,  into  two  sects,  are  we  provided  with  the  four 
sects  of  Materialists^  Natural  Realists^  Constructive 
Idealists^  and  Pure  Idealists ;  but  (by  bringing  con- 
siderations into  the  classification  which,  I  think,  are 
not    exclusively  cosmological)  these  four  sects  have 
been  flanked  by  two  extreme  sects,  called  respectively 
Nihilists  and  Pantheists.    The  doctrine  of  these  last 
is  called  also,  in  recent  philosophical  language,  the 
doctrine  of  Absolute  Identity. 

Thus  six  systems  in  all,  professedly  cosmological, 
have  figured  in  the  past  history  of  Philosophy.  Let 
us  re-enumerate  them  in  the  arrangement  which  will 
be  most  convenient  for  us  in  the  sequel,  adding  such 
further  explanations  as  may  seem  necessary. 

(1.)  There  is  the  system  of  Nihilism^  or,  as  it  may 
be  better  called,  Non-Sulstantialism.    According  to 


i 


62 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


63 


this  system,  the  Phsenomenal  Cosmos,  whether  re- 
garded as  consisting  of  two  parallel  successions  of 
phenomena  (Mind  and  Matter),  or  of  only  one  (Mind 
or  Matter),  resolves  itself,  on  analysis,  into  an  absolute 
Nothingness,-mere  appearances  with  no  credible  sub- 
stratum of  Keality ;  a  play  of  phantasms  in  a  void. 
If  there  have  been  no  positive  or  dogmatic  Nihilists, 
yet  both  Hmne  for  one  purpose,  and  Fichte  for  an- 
other, have  propounded  Nihilism  as  the  ultimate  issue 
of  all  reasoning  that  does  not  start  with  some  d:pT^OT^ 

postulate. 

(2.)  There  is  the  system  of  Materialism,  or  Male' 
Halistic  Sealism.    According  to  this  system,  a  cer- 
tain sum-total  of  real  existence  is  assumed  as  underly- 
ing the  conscious  succession  of  ideas,  but  the  seeming 
dualism  or  co-ordinate  independence  of  two  worlds, 
one  of  Mind  and  the  other  of  Matter,  is  got  rid  of  by 
supposing  Matter  to  be  the  primordial  unity,  and 
Mind  to  be,  or  have  been,  educed  from  it.     There 
have  been  avowed  Materialists  among  philosophers, 
of  whom  Hobbes  is  an  early  English  example.    But 
many  have  been  called  Materialists  who  have  really 
not  been  such ;  nor,  if  we  consider  the  contradictory 
varieties  of  thought  which  may  exist  within  one  ap- 
parent drift  of  speculation,  ought  the  name,  while 
odium  attaches  to  it,  ever  to  be  applied  to  any  one 
without  his  own  permission. 


(3.)  There  is  the  system  of  Natural  Realism  or 
Natural  Dualism.    According  to  this  system,  while 
Mind  or  Spirit  is  regarded  as  an  undoubtedly  real 
essence,  or  substance,  or  energy  of  one  origin   and 
nature,  the  extended  Material  World  in  the  midst  of 
which  this  Mind  or  Spirit  seems  to  find  itself,  and  with 
which  it  seems  to  have  commerce,  is  also  assumed  as 
a  distinct  reality,  and  not  as  a  distinct  reality  of  some 
highly-removed  sort,  acting  upon  us  illusively  through 
mediate  signs  and  impulses,  but  as  actually  very  much 
that  solid  and  substantial  world  which   we  get  at 
through  our  senses.     There  have  been  varieties,  how- 
ever,  cruder  and  finer,    of   this   Natural  Eealism. 
What  do  mankind  in  general  believe  ?    They  believe 
that  the  material  world  is  exactly  and  in  every  respect 
the  world  which  our  senses  report  to  us  as  external  to 
ourselves.      They  believe  that   the   rocks,  the  hills, 
the  trees,  the  stars,  that  we  all  see,  are  not  mere  hie- 
^^glyP^^cs  of  a  something  difierent  from  themselves 
and  from  us,  but  are  really  what  is  there.     That  outer 
vastness  of  space  in  which  orbs  are  shining  and  wheel- 
ing is  no  mere  representation  or  visionary  allegory  of 
something ;  it  is  the  thing  itself.     This  is,  and  always 
has  been,  the  popular  belief  of  mankind  in  general. 
All  mankind  may  therefore  be  described,  generally,  as 
Natural  Eealists.    But,  strange  to  say.  Natural  Eeal- 
ism has  been  the  system  of  but  one  or  two  modem 


64 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


philosophers — among  whom  Eeid  is  named  as  a  type. 
ITay,  more,  among  these  philosophers  it  is  not  the 
popular  form  of  the  belief  that  is  entertained.    Man- 
kind in  general  suppose  sweetness,  shrillness,  colour, 
etc.,  to  be  qualities  inherently  belonging  to  the  objects 
to  which  they  are  attributed,  while  the  philosophers 
who  are  Natural  Eealists  admit  that  at  least  these  so- 
called  "  secondary  qualities  "  of  objects  have  no  proper 
outness,  but  are  only  physiological  affections — affec- 
tions of  the  organs  of  taste,  hearing,  sight,  &c.,  pro- 
duced by  particular  objects.    Thus  the  Natural  Ke- 
alism  of  philosophers  is  itself  a  considerable  remove 
from  the  Natural  Eealism  of  the  crude  popular  be- 
lief.   It  does  not,  with  the  crude  popular  belief,  call 
the  whole  apparent  external  world  of  sights,  sounds, 
tastes,  tacts,  and  odom-s,  the  real  world  that  would 
be  there  whether  man   were  there  or  not ;  but  it 
descries  in  that  apparent  world  a  block  or  core,  if  I 
may  so  say,  which  would  have  to  be  thought  of  as 
really  existing,  even  if  there  were  swept  away  all  that 
consists  in  our  rich  physiological  interactions  with  it. 
(4.)  There  is  the  system  of  Constructive  Idealism. 
It  may  be  so  called  to  distinguish  it  from  the  more  de- 
veloped and  extreme  Idealism  presently  to  be  spoken 
of.    According  to  this  system,  we  do  not  perceive  the 
real  external  world  immediately,  but  only  mediately 
— ^that  is,  the  objects  which  we  take  as  the  things  act- 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


65 


ually  perceived  are  not  the  real  objects  at  all,  but 
only  vicarious  assurances,  representatives,   or  niintii 
of  real  unknown  objects.    The  hiUs,  the  rocks,  the 
trees,  the  stars,  all  the  choir  of  heaven  and  earth,  are 
not,  in  any  of  their  qualities,  primary,  secondary,  or 
whatever  we  choose  to  call  them,  the  actual  existences 
out  of  us,  but  only  the  addresses  of  a  "  something  "  to 
our  physiology,  or  eductions  by  our  physiology  out 
of  a  "  something."    They  are  all  Thoughts  or  Ideas, 
with  only  this  peculiarity  involved  in  them,  that  they 
will  not  rest  in  themselves,  but  compel  a  reference  to 
objects  out  of  self,  with  which,  by  some  arrangement 
or  other,  they  stand  in  relation. 

Difficult  as  this  system  may  be  to  understand,  and 
violently  as  it  wrenches  the  popular  common  sense,  it 
is  yet  the  system  into  which  the  great  majority  of  phi- 
losophers in  all  ages  and  countries  hitherto  are  seen, 
more  or  less  distinctly,  to  have  been  carried  by  their 
speculations.    While  the  Natural  Eealists  among  phi- 
losophers have  been  very  few,  and  even  these  have 
been  Eealists  in  a  sense  unintelligible  to  the  popular 
mind,  quite  a  host  of  philosophers  have  been  Con- 
structive Idealists.    These  might  be  farther  subdi- 
vided according  to  particular  variations  in  the  form  of 
their  Idealism.     Thus,  there  have  been  many  Con- 
structive Idealists  who  have  regarded  the  objects  ris- 
ing to  the  mind  in  external  perception,  and  taken  to 


h' 


66 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


be  representative  of  real  unknown  objects,  as  some- 
thing  more  than  modifications  of  the  mind  itself— as 
having  their  origin  without.    Among  these  have  been 
reckoned  Malebranche,  Berkeley,  Clarke,  Sir  Isaac 
Newton,  Tucker,  and  possibly  Locke.    But  there  have 
been  other  Constructive  Idealists,  who  have  supposed 
the  objects  rising  in  the  mind  in  external  perception 
to  he  only  modifications  of  the  mind  itself,  but  yet,  by 
some  arrangement,  vicarious  of  real  unknown  objects, 
and  intimating  their  existence.    Among  such  have 
been  reckoned  Descartes,  Leibnitz,  Condillac,  Kant, 
and  most  Platonists.    The  general  name  "  Idealists," 
it  will  be  seen,  properly  enough  includes  both  the 
classes  as  distinct  from  the  Natural  Kealists,  inasmuch 
as  both  classes  hold  that  what  the  mind  is  directly 
cognizant  of  in  external  perception  is  only  ideas. 
But,  inasmuch  as  these  ideas  are  held  by  both  classes, 
though  under  divers  hypotheses,  to  refer  to  real  exist- 
ences beyond  themselves,  and  distinct  from  the  per- 
ceiving   mind,  the  thinkers  in  question   may    also 
properly  enough  be  called  Kealists  or  Dualists,  though 
not  "  Natural "  Eealists  or  Dualists.     They  occupy  a 
midway  place  between  the  Natural  Kealists  and  the 
philosophers  next  to  be  mentioned. 

(5.)  There  is  the  system  of  Pure  Idealism^  which 
abolishes  Matter  as  a  distinct  or  independent  exist- 
ence in  any  sense,  and  resolves  it  completely  into 


RECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


67 


Mind.  Though  this  system  is  named  in  the  scheme, 
for  the  sake  of  symmetry,  and  as  the  exact  antithesis 
to  Materialism,  it  is  difficult  to  cite  representatives 
that  could  be  certainly  discriminated  from  the  merely 
Constructive  Idealists  just  mentioned  on  the  one  hand 
and  from  the  school  of  philosophers  next  following  on 
the  other.    Fichte  is,  perhaps,  the  purest  example. 

(6.)  There  is  the  system  of  Absolute  Identity. 
According  to  this  system.  Mind  and  Matter  are  phse- 
nomenal  modifications  of  one  common  Substance. 
The  whole  Cosmos,  both  of  Matter  and  of  Mind,  is 
referred  to  a  one  Absolute  Entity,  of  which  it  is  to 
be  conceived  as  but  the  function,  activity,  manifesta- 
tion, or  forthrushing.  This  system,  it  will  be  noted,  is 
at  the  opposite  extreme  from  Nihilism.  It  is  the  sys- 
tem of  Spinoza,  and  also,  though  with  a  difference,  of 
Schelling. 

In  this  classification  of  Philosophical  Systems  from 
one  point  of  view  I  have  followed,  with  some  little 
liberty  of  rearrangement  and  change  of  expression, 
the  best  recent  authority  on  the  subject.*    Objections 


*  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Dwcwmo/w  (Articles  "  Philosophy  of  Per- 
ception" and  "Idealism");  also  his  Lectures  on  Metaphysics  (i.  293 

297);  but  particularly  his  Dissertations  on  Jieid  {I^S,  '749,  and  816— 
819).  In  these  portions  of  Sir  William's  writings,  his  classification  of 
Philosophical  Systems  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Doctrine  of  Ex- 
ternal Perception  is  turned  over  and  over  again  in  all  sorts  of  ways, 
and  with  all  sorts  of  side-lights.    I  have  taken  his  authority  for  the 


68 


BECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


M 


may  be  taken  to  the  classification  even  in  respect  of 
what  it  was  intended  for ;  nor,  whatever  may  be  its 
worth  as  respects  the  past,  do  I  think  that  it  provides, 
as  it  stands,  a  sufficient  means  of  recognizing  and 
naming  the  various  working  cosmological  concep- 
tions now  extant  among  philosophers,  and  of  which 
it  might  be  desirable  to  take  account.^  But  it  goes 
so  far.  It  brings  out,  at  all  events,  what  I  wished  to 
bring  out— to  wit,  that  we  can  have  by  no  means  an 
adequate  collective  view  of  the  philosophers  of  our 
time,  so  long  as  we  trust  to  a  mere  preliminary  divis- 
ion of  them,  however  accurate,  into  Empiricists  and 
Transcendentalists.  Behold  what  crossings  and  match- 
ings,  both  of  Empiricism  and  Transcendentalism,  in- 

facts,  but  have  modified  and  rearranged  the  classification  to  suit  it  to 

my  purpose  in  the  text. 

*  For  example,  a  very  prevalent  form  of  cosmological  conception 
among  thinkers  of  the  present  day  is  one  which,  if  I  am  not  mistaken, 
it  would  be  difficult  to  assign  to  any  one  of  the  six  systems  enumera-ted. 
It  is  a  compound  of  Materialism  with  Constructive  Idealism.  A  very 
large  number  of  thinkers,  if  I  am  not  mistaken,  always  think  of  Mind 
as  bred  out  of  Matter,  and  yet,  when  they  study  this  Mind  as  perceiving 
and  takmg  cognizance  of  that  World  of  Matter  out  of  which  it  has 
been  bred,  do  not  allow  that  it  grasps  the  reality  at  all,  but  only  that  it 
substitutes  for  the  reality  a  hypothetical  construction  of  its  own  afiec- 
tions.  Sentiency,  they  think,  is  the  child  of  Matter,  but  has  never  be- 
held, nor  can  behold,  the  real  face  of  its  mother.  Are  there  not  also 
millions  of  forms  and  degrees  of  sentiency,  from  the  lowest  of  living 
creatures  up  to  man,  each  apprehending  the  world  according  to  a  dif- 
ferent measure  of  capacity  ?  Is  the  dog's  world— t.  e,  the  construction 
of  his  own  affections  to  which  the  dog  attributes  an  external  reality — 
the  same,  even  so  far  as  it  goes,  as  his  master's  ? 


EECEKT  BETIISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


69 


M 


calculable  beforehand,  in  even  the  cosmological  classi- 
fication so  suggested  to  us  !    Empiricists  among  the 
Idealists,  side  by  side  with  Transcendentalists !     On 
the  other  hand,  Transcendentalists  in  almost  all  the 
six  classes,  and  even  in  those  where  we  should  expect 
only  Empiricists !    What  if  there  should  be  such  a 
thing  even  as  a  Transcendental  Materialist,  or  a  Ma- 
terialistic Transcendentalist  ?     I  am  not  concerned 
here  with  what  ought  to  be  possible  or  impossible  in 
cosmological  conception  consistently  with  either  of 
the  two  psychological  theories.     My  statement  is  that 
a  philosopher  may  have  a  working  cosmological  con- 
ception which  could  not  be  reconciled  with  his  avowed 
psychological  theory  if  he  would  think  that  theory 
consistently  out,  or  respecting  which,  at  all  events, 
his  opponents  give  him  this  assurance.     In  short,  as 
there  have  been  strange  crossings  and  matchings  of 
the  psychological  theories  with  the  prevailing  cosmo- 
logical conceptions  in  the  past,  so  there  may  be  in  the 
future.     And  what  if  we  were  still  farther  to  compli- 
cate the  intertexture  by  introducing,  even  at  this  point, 
the  theological  element  ?     There  have  been  Atheistic 
as  well  as  Theistic  Idealists ;  there  have  been  Theistic 
as  well  as  Atheistic  Empiricists ;  there  are  in  the  world 
some  whom  rough  popular  speech  does  not  hesitate  to 
describe  as  Transcendental  Atheists;  and,  as  there 
have  been  examples  of  what  might  be  called  Theistic 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY, 


70  RECENT   BKinSH   PHILOSOPUl. 

Materialism  in  the  past,  what  if  something  still  de- 
Bcrihable  by  that  name  should  exist  somewhere  at 
present,  throwing  stones  both  at  Atheism  and  Pan- 
theism  1 

m. 

THE  OKTOLOGICAL  DUTEREKCE. 
Mind  or  Consciousness,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  that 
organism  in  the  midst  of  all  things  through  which  all 
our  knowledge  of  aU  things  must  come.    Philosophers, 
therefore,  may  make  a  study  of  that;  and  they  have 
done  so  under  the  name  of  Psychology.    Bound  this 
organism,  howsoever  related  to  it,  is  the  vast  and  va- 
ried Cosmos,  or  phaenomenal  and  historical  Universe, 
which  the  organism  reports  to  us  as  hung  in  Space 
and  voyaging  through  Time.   Philosophers  may  make 
a  study  of  that ;  and  such  a  study  would  be  Cosmol- 
o<ry     But,  beyond  this  whole  phaenomenal  Universe 
or  Cosmos  which  has  the  Mind  of  Man  in  its  midst, 
it  has  been  the  passion  of  Philosophy  to  assert  or 
speculate  a  transcendent  Universe,  or  Empyrean  of 
Things  in  Themselves,  of  Essential  Causes,  of  Abso- 
lute or  Koumenal,   as  distinct  from  Phaenomenal, 
Existence.    What  enspheres  the  Cosmos,  what  sup- 
ports it,  of  what  absolute  reality  underneath  and  be- 
yond it^plf  is  it  significant,  of  what  Absolute  Mean- 
ing is  it  the  expression,  the  aUegory,  the  poem  ? 


/ 


RECENT  BEITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


n 


May  not  the  entire  Plisenomenal  Cosmos,  hung  in 
Space  and  voyaging  tlirougli  Time,  be  but  an  illu- 
sion— and  this  wbetber  we  consider  it  to  be,  within 
itself,  a  play  of  Matter  alone,  or  of  Spirit  alone,  or 
of  both  Matter  and  Spirit  ?  If  we  feel  that  it  is  not, 
on  what  warrant  do  we  so  feel  ?  In  what  tissues  of 
facts  and  events,  material  or  moral,  in  this  phaenom- 
enal Space-and-Time  "World  shall  we  trace  the  like- 
liest filaments  of  that  golden  cord  by  which  we  then 
suppose  it  attached  to  a  World  not  of  Space  and 
Time;  and  how  shall  we,  denizens  of  Space  and 
Time,  succeed  in  throwing  the  end  of  the  cord  be- 
yond our  Space-and-Time  World's  limits  ?  Is  the 
Cosmos  a  bubble  ?  Then,  what  breath  has  blown  it, 
and  into  what  Empyrean  will  it  remelt  when  the  sep- 
arating film  bursts?  Asking  these  questions  in  all 
varieties  of  forms.  Philosophy  has  debated  the  possi- 
bility of  an  Ontology^  or  science  of  things  in  them- 
selves, in  addition  to  a  Psychology  and  a  Cosmology. 
These  two  are  sciences  of  the  Phsenomenal,  but  that 
would  be  a  science  of  the  Absolute.  It  would  be  the 
highest  Metaphysic  of  all,  and,  indeed,  in  one  sense, 
the  only  science  properly  answering  to  that  name.  It 
would  be  the  science  of  the  Supernatural.  Can  there 
be  such  a  science  ?  A  question  this  which  seems  to 
break  itself  into  two — ^Is  there  a  Supernatural  ?  and 
can  the  Supernatural  be  known  ?    It  is  the  differences 


'  >n 


<i 


n 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


73 


.  ii 


that  have  shown  themselves  among  philosophers  in 
their  answers,  express  or  implied,  to  these  questions 
that  I  have  in  view  under  the  name  of  their  differ- 
ences in  respect  of  Ontological  Faith. 

The  Ontological  difference  is  intertangled  with 
the  Psychological  and  Cosmological  differences,  and 
a  discussion  of  them  always  brings  it  into  sight.    Most 
probably,  if  matters  were  fully  reasoned  out,  all  the 
three  sets  of  differences  might  be  knit  together,  and 
it  might  be  shown  that  adhesion  to  one  of  the  two 
psychological  theories  involved,  in  strict  consistency, 
an  obligation  to  a  particular  mode  of  cosmological 
conception,  and  that  this  again  involved  obligation  to 
a  particular  form  of  ontological  faith.    But  the  minds 
even  of  philosophers,  coming  at  separate  times  on 
questions  which  are  really  inter-related,  do  not  al- 
ways march  up  to  them  in  the  same  state  of  feehng, 
but  sometimes  bring  forces  to  the  front  in  one  case 
which  remain  in  the  background  in  others.    Hence, 
just  as  it  seemed  impossible  to  infer  with  any  precis- 
ion from  our  knowledge  of  a  philosopher's  theory  of 
the  Origin  of  our  Ideas  in  which  of  the  six  systems 
of  conception  as  to  the  constitution  of  the  Phsenom- 
enal  Universe  he  might  be  found  ranking  himself,  so 
neither  from  a  philosopher's  psychological  theory  nor 
from  his  cosmological  system  would  it  be  safe,  as 
things  go,  to  infer  his  ontological  faith. 


I 


Take  the  first  ontological  question.    Is  there  an 
Absolute,  a  Supernatural,  or  is  the  Phaenomenal  Uni- 
verse all  that  exists?    It  might  seem  that  only  the 
Transcendentalist  would  be  entitled  to  a  strong  affirm- 
ative to  this  question.     His  very  theory  of  the  Mind 
of  Man,  as  an  organism  bringing  with  it  into  the  Phae- 
nomenal World  ideas  or  structural  forms  of  a  priori 
origin,  refers  one,  if  it  has  any  meaning,  to  a  Super- 
natural World  or  Empyrean,  out  of  which  the  Mind 
of  Man  is  to  be  conceived  as  having  proceeded,  and 
from  which  it  still  carries  recollections  or  shreds  of  af- 
finity.     Prom  the  Empiricist  on  the  other  hand  it 
might  seem  that  the  only  answer  to  be  expected  to 
the  question  is,  « I  do  not  know,  nor  can  any  man 
know."    As  all  knowledge,  according  to  the  Empiri- 
cist, is  the  product  of  experience,  and  as  there  cannot 
have  been  and  never  can  be  experience  of  anything 
beyond  the  bounds  of  Experience,  the  assertion  of  an 
Absolute  or  Supernatural,  save  in  the  sense  of  "  the 
yet  unknown  "  or  "all  that  nobody  yet  knows  any- 
thing about,"  would  seem  to  be  incompetent  to  the 
Empiricist.    And  yet  there  have  been  most  positive 
Theists  and  Theologians  among  the  Empiricists— firm 
and  even  dogmatic  behevers  in  an  Absolute;   and 
there  is  nothing  that  such  Theistic  and  Theological 
Empiricists  have  resented  more  than  the  assertion  of 
Transcendentalists  that  their  Theism  \vas  irreconcile- 


■« 


74  RECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 

able  with  their  Empmcism,  and  that  they  had  no 
right  to  leap  to  the  conclusion  of  an  Infinite  Intelli- 
gence beyond  the  world  or  in  it  from  the  observation 
of  ever  so  much  of  worldly  watch-making. 

If  thus,  practically,  the  ontological  creed  of  a 
philosopher,  even  in  its  first  article,  cannot  be  always 
inferred  from  his  psychological  theory,  neither  can  it 
be  safely  inferred  from  the  form  of  his  cosmological 
conception.    If  any  one  could  assert  «  There  is  no 
Absolute,"  surely  it  might  be  the .  Nihilist,  who  has 
analysed  away  both  Matter  and  Thought,  and  attenu- 
ated the  Cosmos  into  vapour  and  non-signifi-cance. 
Yet,  from  the  abyss  of  a  speculatively  reasoned  Nihil- 
ism more  void  than  Hume's,  Fichte  returned  by  a 
convulsive  act  of  soul— which  he  termed  faith-a.n  in- 
tense, a  burning,  a  blazing  Ontologist.    A  fortioH, 
the  Materialist  has  not  seen  that  he  need  deny  an  Ab- 
solute.   Kegarding  the  Cosmos,  considered  within  it- 
self, as  wholly  a  development  of  Matter,  he  has  not 
always  thought  himself  debarred,  any  more  than  oth- 
er people,  from  assuming  an  Absolute  from  which 
this  Cosmos  of  developed  matter  may  have  its  meta- 
physical tenure.    For  Natural  Kealists,  again,  and 
for  either  Constractive  Idealists  or  Pure  Idealists,  the 
belief  in  a  supernatural  is  obviously  easy  and  conge- 
nial.    Analysing  the  double  series  of  phaenomena 
which  he  finds  in  the  Cosmos,  and  coming  in  each 


EECEOT  BEITISn  PHILOSOPHY.  ^g 

case  upon  a  substratum  of  ultimate  reality-in  the  one 
T'pon  a  Thinking  Substance  constituted  in  such  and 
Buch  a  manner,  and  in  the  other  on  an  extended  and 
resisting  Substance  of  Matter  diversely  constituted- 
the  Natural  Eeahst  feels  as  if  at  both  points  he  were 
actually  grating  on  the  rock  of  the  Absolute.    He 
feels  himself  at  both  points  in  contact  with  some  im- 
measurable Eeal  Existence,  beyond  all  phenomenal 
Natm-e,  and  yet  determining  it  and  projected  into  it 

With  the  Constructive  Idealist  it  is  the  same,  save 
that,  as  his  notion  of  Matter  is  more  impalpable  and 
hypothetical  than  that  of  the  Realist,  his  sense  of 
contact  with  the  Supernatural  is  concentrated  rather 
in  his  notion  of  the  necessity  of  a  real  noumenal  origin 
for  the   grand  phaenomenon  of  Consciousness.     In 
this,  the  Pure  Idealist,  for  whom  the  Univeree  re- 
solves itself  wholly  into  this  single  phsenomenon,  may 
well  outdo  his  more  hesitating  brother.    AH  that  is, 
was,  or  will  be  in  this  Space-and-Time  World  is  ac' 
cording  to  the  Pure  Idealist,  but  the  organized,  con- 
sohdated,  and  transmitted  aggregate  of  the  thoughts 
of  the  Minds  within  it.    All  the  more,  therefore,  must 
that  power  of  thinking  which  hag  involved  itself  in 
such  a  vast  cocoon  of  wonders  be  itself  conceived  as 
originating  in  the  fiat  of  some  Absolute  Cause.    And 
yet,  as  in  the  end,  it  is  only  a  felt  necessity  or  compul- 
sion of  thought  that  either  Realists  or  Idealists  can 


76 


BECENT  BETXISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


EECEIIT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHT- 


77 


plead  when  they  assert  a  Supernatural  beyond  the 
Phenomenal,  and  as  this  feeling  of  necessity  or  com- 
pulsion is  itself  liable  to  alternations  of  strength  and 
weakness,  both  Eealists  and  Idealists  will  be  found  to 
have  wavered  greatly  in  respect  even  of  that  first  ar- 
ticle of  any  ontological  faith  which  would  simply  aver 
a  Supernatural  and  stop  there. 

Thus  Shelley,  the  very  principle  of  whose  life  and 
poetry  was  philosopHcal  Idealism,  seemed  willing, 
throughout  a  great  part  of  his  life,  not  only  to  be 
thought  of,  but  to  think  of  himself,  as  an  Atheist. 
And  so  it  is  quite  conceivable  that  a  Natural  Kealist, 
even  when  grappling  the  rock  of  an  Absolute  through 
his  ultimate  investigations  of  the  two  orders  of  cos- 
mical  phenomena  whose  distinctness  he  recognizes, 
should  have  moments  of  doubt  whether  it  is  a  rock  he 
is  grappling,  or  only  an  illusion.    In  short,  only  those 
whose  interpretation  of  the  Cosmos  merges  in  a  meta- 
physical doctrine  of  Absolute  Identity  would  seem  to 
have  got  hold  of  a  cosmological  principle  which,  in 
itself,  and  without  aid  from  any  act  of  the  soul  not 
allowed  for  by  its  own  terms,  would  positively  and 
continuously  presuppose  and  assert  a  Supernatural. 
With  them.  Nature  is  the  Supernatural  in  one  of  its 
moments.    The  Cosmos  does  not  swim  in  an  Empy- 
rean from  which  it  is  divided  by  any  film,  but  is  that 
very  state  or  embodiment  of  the  entire  Empyrean 


which  has  been  attained  up  to  this  instant.    The 
Phsenomenal  is  the  life  of  the  Absolute. 

It  is  when  we  pass,  however,  to  the  second  ques- 
tion propounded  towards  an  Ontology  that  the  inter- 
est grows  most  vivid.    It  being  supposed  that  an 
Absolute  exists,  is  any  knowledge  thereof  possible  to 
Man  ?    Here,  of  course,  leaving  out  of  sight  all  who 
would  actually  deny  that  there  is  an  Absolute,  and 
also  all  whose  position  in  respect  to  that  prior  ques- 
tion is  that  they  think  an  Ay  or  a  M  to  it  equally  ab- 
surd, we  need  attend  only  to  those  who,  in  whatever 
manner,  stand  by  an  aflSrmative  to  that  prior  ques- 
tion.   What  has  been  the  history  among  them  of  the 
farther  question  as  to  the  cognisability  of  this  affirmed 
Absolute  of  things  ?    The  history  of  the  question,  we 
may  say  confidently,  has  consisted  in  a  continuous, 
emphatic,  and  nearly  unanimous  iteration  of  a  nega- 
tive answer  to  the  question,  accompanied  all  the 
while  by  modes  of  thought,  speech,  and  conduct,  in 
which  a  positive  answer  to  it,  and  very  definite  forms 
of  a  positive  answer,  have  been  practically  assumed. 

The  almost  unanimous  assertion  of  philosophers, 
since  philosophy  began,  has  certainly  been  to  the' 
effect  that  in  no  form  is  an  Ontology,  or  knowledge  of 
things  in  themselves,  possible  to  Man.  It  has  been 
the  assertion  not  only  of  philosophers,  but  of  the  most 
devout  and  most  dogmatic  of  theologians.    That  the 


78 


KECENT  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


II 


^ 


t 

I 


I 


finite  cannot  apprehend  or  conceive  the  Infinite ;  that 
neither  matter  nor  mind  can  be  known  in  its  essence ; 
that  all  man's  knowledge  can  only  be  relative  and 
according  to  the  measure  and  mode  of  his  intelli- 
gence ;  that  any  attempt  of  human  thought  to  trans- 
cend the  phsenomenal  world  is  only  as  if  a  bird 
should  hope  to  soar  above  that  element  the  beating  of 
its  wings  in  which  is  the  very  cause  of  its  soaring  at 
all ;  that  it  is  blasphemy  to  think  that  God  is  as  we 
can  think  Him  to  be— in  these  and  a  thousand  other 
ways  the  thing  has  been  stated.     The  Socratic  defi- 
nition of  the  highest  human  wisdom— that  it  is  the 
most  assured  knowledge  of  our  own  inevitable  igno- 
rance—has been  repeated,  in  this  connexion,  till  it  is 
the  best-kno^vn  of  philosophical  maxims. 

The  only  loudly-heard  voice  from  antiquity  pro- 
claiming the  possibility  of  an  Ontology  seems  to  be 
that  of  Socrates's  disciple,  Plato.  The  far-famed  Ideal- 
ism of  Plato  is,  in  fact,  a  theory  of  the  cognisability 
of  the  Absolute.^    Our  Phsenomenal  "World,  Plato 

*  Here  we  may  note  the  confusion  of  practice  in  the  use  of  the 
word  Idealimt,  It  is  used  in  three  different  senses,  and  m  com- 
binations of  these.  First,  Transcendentalism  in  Psychology,  inas- 
much as  it  avows  a  beUef  in  innate  ideas,  or  necessary  forms  of 
thought,  is  sometimes  called  Idealism.  Secondly,  there  is  the  more 
accurate  and  now  the  philosophically  accepted  use  of  the  term,  which 
identifies  Idealism  with  a  particular  form  of  Cosmological  Conception— 
that,  to  wit,  which  resolves  all  material  phaenomena  into  subjective 
affections,  or    affections  or  ideas  of   Consciousness.      This  is  the 


I 


EECENT  BEITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


79 


loves  to  fancy,  is  not  so  utterly  and  hopelessly  discon- 
nected from  the  Absolute  World  of  mumena,  Ideas, 
or  Things  in  Themselves,  but  that  for  the  pxire  and 
persevering  reason  a  passage  from  the  one  to  the 
other  may  be  possible.    He  taxes  his  gorgeous  imag- 
ination for  ways  of  representing  his  notion  of  this 
transcendent  possibility.     Human  Life  or  the  Cosmos 
of  Man,  he  says  in  one  place,  may  be  Hkened  to  a 
dungeon  or  cave,  the  inmates  of  which  are  chained, 
with  their  faces  towards  the  interior  wall,  and  inca- 
pable of  turning  round.    Lo !  on  the  wall  on  which 
they  gaze  there  flit  strange  shapes  and  phantasmar 
gories— the  phenomena  of  this  world.    Voices  also 
are  heard  which  they,  the  beholders  of  the  phantasma- 
gories,  attribute  to  the  phantasmagories,  and  connect 
with  them  as  well  as  they  can.    For  the  phantasma- 
gories on  the  wall,  and  the  accompanying  voices,  are 

sense  in  which  the  term  has  been  employed,  unless  where  there  is 
mdication  to  the  contrary,  throughout  the  text.    But,  thirdly,  there  is 
Plato's  Idealism,  which  includes  much  more  than  mere  Psychological 
Idealism,  and  is  quite  different  from  Cosmological  IdeaUsm.    Ic  is  an 
Ontological  Idealism,  or  a  theory  how  the  phajnomena  of  Mi  world 
njay  be    but    reproductions  or  disguises  of  the  ideas  or  essential 
reaUties  of  a  Supernatural  World,  or  Empyrean  of  things  in  them- 
selves.    There  has  been  no  end  of  misstatements  arising,  even  in 
histories  of  Philosophy,  from  inattention  to  these  different  mcanin-s 
of  the  word  Idealist.    Philosophers  have  been  spoken  of  as  Idealists 
who  were  Idealists  only  in  one  of  the  senses  and  by  no  means  in  tiie 
others.    Nay,  when  a  thmker  declares  of  himself  that  he  is  an  Idealist 
It  IS  still  necessary  to  ask  m  which  of  the  three  senses,  or  in  what 
combination  of  them,  he  uses  the  term. 


f 

I 


I 


i 


80 


EECENT   BEmSn   PHILOSOPHY. 


the  sole  realities  to  these  tenants  of  the  cave.  But 
what  if  they  could  turn  their  faces  round  towards  the 
entrance  to  the  cave,  where  it  communicates  with  a 
larger  and  freer  world  ?  Then  would  they  begin  to 
surmise  differently.  For  along  the  mouth  of  the  cave, 
though  separated  from  it  by  an  embankment,  there 
lies  a  bit  of  roadway,  on  which  persons  belonging  to 
that  freer  world  are  ever  passing  and  repassing,  carry- 
ing images  or  what  not,  and  talking  to  each  other  the 
while;  and  beyond  the  roadway  there  is  a  blading 
light ;  and  the  phantasmagories  on  the  inner  wall  of 
the  cav^  are  but  shadows  of  the  tops  of  the  images 
which  the  pedestrians  on  the  bit  of  roadway  in  front 
of  the  cave  are  carrying  past  it ;  and  the  voices  heard 
and  attributed  to  the  shadows  are  the  voices  of  the  in- 
visible bearers  of  these  images. 

Thus  in  our  World  of  Sense,  all  those  phsenomena 
whi  h  seem  realities  to  us,  are  but  the  shadows  and 
echoes  of  real  objects  and  ongoings  in  an  unseen  World 
of  'Archetypes,  Ideas,  or  Self-subsisting  Intelligences. 
If  we  could  but  turn  round !  Nay,  what  are  philoso- 
phers but  those  who  do  contrive  somehow  to  turn 
round,  and  even  though  dazzled  at  first,  to  work  their 
way  to  such  a  full  glimpse  of  the  Archetypal  World 
as  that  they  can  bring  back  a  report  of  it  to  the  other 
dwellers  in  the  cave,  and  press  upon  them  that  expla- 
nation of  the  phenomena  of  the  cave  which  the  re- 


I 


RECENT  BRmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


81 


port  furnishes  ?    Or,  again,  as  an  alternative  to  this 
theory  of  Archetype  and  Shadow,  expounded  in  some 
parts  of  Plato's  writings,  we  have,  in  others,  his  theory 
of  Eeminiscence.    Man,  though  now  the  denizen  of 
this  World  of  Sense,  has  had  a  former  and  grander 
life  in  the  Empyrean  of  Ideas,  and  when  here  he  in- 
vestigates truth  and  arrives  by  contemplation  at  the 
pure  ideas  or  forms  of  phaenomena,  these  are  but  rec- 
ollections or  recoveries  more  or  less  faint,  of  the  knowl- 
edge familiar  to  him  in  his  former  existence.     Those 
a  priori  elements  of  knowledge,  which  Plato,  as  the 
supreme  Transcendentalist  of   antiquity,  contended 
for  so  strongly  under  the  name  of  Ideas,  were,  there- 
fore, in  his  language,  a  priori  in  a  very  special  sense. 
They  were  fragments  of  a  former  Absolute  Existence, 
actually  shivered  through  our  life  amid  the  phsenom- 
ena  of  sense ;  and  it  was  the  very  business  of  Philos- 
ophy to  seek  for  the  fragments  and  to  piece  them  to- 
gether.   Wordsworth  here  is  but  a  renderer  of  the 
Transcendentalism  of  Plato : 

"  Our  birth  is  but  a  sleep  and  a  forgetting : 

The  Sonl  that  rises  with  us,  our  life's  Star, 

Hath  had  elsewhere  its  setting, 

And  Cometh  from  afar ; 

Not  in  entire  forgetfuhiess, 

And  not  in  utter  nakedness, 

But  trailing  clouds  of  glory  do  we  come 

Frpm  God,  who  is  our  home." 
4* 


82 


EECENT   BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


Allowance  being  made   for  the    exuberance  of 
Plato,  and  for  the  perplexity  as  to  some  parts  of  his 
final  meaning  arising  from  bis  very  exuberance,  it 
seems  inevitable  to  conclude  that  he  did  not  limit  the 
possibilities  of  Philosophy  to  a  Psychology  and  a  Cos- 
mology, but  regarded  it  as  the  very  work  of  Philos- 
ophy to  push  on  through  these  to  an  Ontology,  or 
Science  of  Absolute  Truth.    Kow,  in  this  matter,  men 
in  all  time,  or  at  least  Transcendentalists  in  all  time, 
have  felt  with  Plato,  even  while  reasoning  with  Aris- 
totle.    If  an  Ontology  is  an  impossibility  for  the  hu- 
man spirit,  a  Transcendentalism  that  should  not  root 
itself  in  an  assumed  Ontology  seems  equally  an  impos- 
sibility.   "What  has  been  the  history  of  the  Soul  of  the 
"World  but  a  rage  of  Ontology?     Why  have  there 
been  wars,  why  have  there  been  martyrdoms,  but  be- 
cause one  Supematuralism  sought  to  put  down  an- 
other?    What  has   genius  been,  what  has  religious 
propagandism  been,  but  a  metaphysical  drunkenness  ? 
Conceive  a  spiritual  teacher  coming  forward,  and,  in 
reply  to  questions  as  to  the  certainty  of  his  doctrine, 
owning  that  he  knew  it  only  to  be  cosmologically 
true,  but  whether  true  absolutely  he  could  not  tell. 
Would  not  his  virtue  seem  to  be  gone  from  him  in 
the  very  act  of  the  confession  ? 

Above  all,  if  he  were  a  Transcendentalist,  con- 
tending for  necessary  and  universal  elements  or  ideas 


I 


*  I 


RECENT   BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


83 


in  the  human  reason,  and  if,  when  put  to  it,  he  were 
to  admit  that  he  knew  even  this  mental  organism,  this 
Soul  with  its  necessary  ideas  of  God  and  Eight,  only 
and  exclusively  as  a  phsenomenon,  and  dared  not  af- 
firm whether  its  necessary  ideas  had  a  basis  in  the 
eternal  nature  of  things  or  not,  would  not  this  diffi- 
dence be  his  ruin  ?    But  it  never  so  happens.    Men 
do  proceed  on  the  notion  that  what  they  know  to  be 
true  has  a  foundation  in  the  nature  of  things.     Tran- 
scendentalists   cannot    use  their  phrase    "  a  priori 
elements  of  the  human  soul "  without  implying  strenu- 
ously not  only  that  these  elements  come  out  of  some 
priority,  but  that  they  are  honafide  intentions  of  that 
priority,  and  not  deceptions.     But  what  is  this  but  to 
profess  to  know  something  about  the  Absolute  ?    It  is 
not  only  to  assert  that  there  is  an  Absolute  and  stop 
there  (which  would  itself  be  something) ;  it  is  also  to 
assert  something  very  specific  of  the  Absolute — to  as 
sort  a  something  equivalent  to  what,  in  human  speech, 
IS  called  veracity. 

And  yet,  rationally,  the  Absolute  is  incognisable, 
unthinkable  !  How  is  this  ?  What  is  the  reconcilia- 
tion ?  There  has  been  one  almost  invariable  answer. 
"  The  sphere  of  Faith  transcends  the  sphere  of  Eea- 
son."  There  is,  it  is  said,  an  organic  necessity  of 
man's  nature,  or  of  his  nature  in  certain  moods,  which 
compels  him  to  believe  much  that  he  cannot  know. 


■I 


84 


EECENT  BEITISH    PHILOSOPHT. 


n 


It  is  by  Faith,  it  is  said,  and  not  by  Keason,  tbat  we 
can  refer  tbe  laws  of  our  own  consciousness,  or  tbe 
constitution  of  tbe  material  world  around  us,  to  a  valid 
origin  or  purpose  in  Absolute  Being ;  it  is  by  Faith,  and 
not  by  Reason,  that  we  can  even  assert  an  Absolute 
at  all,  except  as  a  mere  blank,  or  negative,  or  paraly- 
sis of  knowledge*  Faith,  and  not  Reason,  is  that  con- 
dition of  spirit  in  which  Man,  by  his  nature,  must 
ever  ponder  the  ultimate  problems.  And  so  it  is  at 
this  point  that  Christian  Theology  comes  in,  and, 
showing  her  credentials,  offers  instruction.  But  even 
she  presents  herself  not  as  capable  of  theorizing  the 
Absolute  for  human  reason,  but  only  as  the  bearer  of 
a  special  message.  Whatever  authority  she  may  as- 
sinne  as  she  proceeds  with  her  teachings,  her  opening 
address  to  man,  when  he  first  questions  her  metaphys- 
ically, is  but  as  that  of  Raphael  to  Adam,  when  he 
began,  at  Adam's  request,  the  narrative  of  the  events 
of  that  supra-mundane  Universe  which  had  preceded 
Man's : — 

4 

"  Higli  matter  thou  enjoinst  me,  0  prime  of  Men, 
Sad  task  and  hard  1    For  how  shall  I  relate 
To  hnman  sense  the  invisible  exploits 
Of  warring  Spirits ;  how,  without  remorse, 
The  ruin  of  so  many,  glorious  once 
And  perfect  while  they  stood ;  how,  last,  unfold 
The  secrets  of  another  World,  perhaps 


1' 


EECEOT  BKmSH  PHILOSOPHT.  85 

Not  lawful  to  be  revealed  ?    Yet,  for  thy  good. 

This  is  dispensed ;  and  what  surmounts  the  reach 

Of  human  sense  I  shall  delineate  so, 

By  likening  spiritual  to  corporal  forms, 
As  may  express  them  best-though  what  if  Earth 
Be  but  the  shadow  of  Heaven,  and  things  therein 
Each  to  other  like  more  than  on  Earth  is  thought  ? " 

In  no  modem  pHlosoplier  is  the  attitude  of  Psy- 
chological Transcendentalism  to  the  question  of  the 
possibility  of  an  Ontology  presented  more  interesting- 
ly than  in  Kant.    He  was,  as  we  have  seen,  the  re- 
founder  of  Transcendentalism  in  modern  Europe.    In 
an  age  when  Empiricism  seemed  to  have  taken  uni- 
versal possession,  and  killed  out  its  opposite,  he  re- 
proclaimed  that  opposite.    As  the  result  of  an  inves- 
tigation of  the  human  mind  more  exact  and  profound 
than  had  ever  been  undertaken  before,  he  reasserted 
the  mind  to  be  an  organism  of  certain  structural  or  d 
priori  capabilities,  or  forms  of  operation,  which  neces- 
sitated its  mode  of  commerce  with  all  matter  of  expe 
rience,  and  the  notions,  thinkings,  and  beliefs  that 
might  accrue  from  that  commerce.    N'ay,  as  the  su- 
preme d  priori  elements  of  human  reason,  he  recog- 
nised the  ideas  of  three  supra-sensuous  or  trans-con- 
scious objects— God,  the  Soul,  and  the  "World.    In  the 
Soul  of  Man,  at  its  very  highest,  what  was  perceived, 
as  structural  and  connate,  was  a  straining  after  these 


4^ 


86 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


ttree  objects  of  trans-conscious  enormity.    And  yet, 
in  answer  to  the  question  whether,  after  all,  this 
might  not  be  a  mere  straining  into  vacuum,  a  delusive 
grappling  towards  objects  in  an  ocean  of  no  objects, 
Kant  declared    speculative  reason  to   be  impotent. 
Here  was  the  sceptical  side  to  his  Transcendental 
Philosophy.    As  to  the  fact  of  an  organic  and  neces- 
sary grappling  of  the  mind  in  search  of  an  Absolute 
he  had  no  doubt ;  but  as  to  the  positive  existence  of 
an  Absolute  to  answer  the  grappling,  and  much  more 
as  to  the  nature  of  the  being  of  such  an  absolute,  if  it 
existed,  he  had  nothing  to  say,  in  the  name  of  Eeason, 
but  that  Eeason  could  say  nothing.    A  rational  On- 
tology or  Metaphysic  was  impossible.      Only  in  the 
phsenomenal  world  did  Man's  reason  live,  move,  and 
have  its  being ;  not  an  inch  beyond  that  world  could 
it  chase  any  phsenomenon  whatever — ^not  even  the 
momentous  phsenomenon  of   its    own    constitution. 
Objectively,  therefore,  the  Absolute  was  nothing  more 
than  a  name  for  XJnknowableness— Inconceivability. 
Subjectively,  however,  or  as  a  regulative  principle  or 
fact  of  the  mental  organism  itself,  the  notion  of  an 
Absolute,  or  the  instinctive  straining  towards  the  Un- 
knowable, was  to  be  considered  as  something  more 
for  Man  than  mere  nescience.     In  this  position  Kant 
left  the  question,  appending  to  his  philosophy  of  the 
Pure  Reason  a  philosophy  of  the  Practical  Eeason, 


EECENT  BBmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


87 


wherein  Man,  returning  from  his  hopeless  attempt  to 
outfly  the  phsenomenal,  might  take  consoling  refuge. 
Here  it  is  that  the  post-Kantian  philosophers  of 
Germany  refused  to  abide    with  Kant.     The  post- 
Kantian  movement,  as  represented  in  Fichte,  Schel- 
ling,  and  Hegel,  was  ">a  strenuous  exertion  for  the  re- 
covery of  Ontology  as  that  without  which  all  the  Psy- 
chology and  all  the  Cosmology  in  the  world  would  be 
little   better  than  bhndman's   buff.     Thus,  in    the 
speculative  philosophy  of   Fichte,  there  were  two 
stages.     The  first  landed  him  in  pure  Subjective  Ideal- 
ism, or  that  system  which,  annihilating  the  Cosmos, 
save  as  the  externalizing  of  one's  own  thoughts,  may 
be  said  to  have  merged  Cosmology  utterly  in  Psy- 
chology.    Ontology  itself,  if  there  could  be  such  a 
science,  was  also  merged  in  Psychology— for  either 
the  only  all-in-aU  or  Absolute  was  that  Self  of  which 
the  Cosmos  was  a  poem,  or,  if  there  was  a  transcend- 
ent Absolute  which  had  spun  the  Self  which  spun 
the  Cosmos,  Self  could  not  mount  back  to  it.    Dissat- 
isfied,  however,   with  this  state  of  things,  or  with 
the  resolution  which  he  began  to  think  inevitable  of 
his  Subjective  Idealism  into  mhilism,  Fichte  was  lat- 
terly ravished  with  the  notion  of  a  doctrine  which 
should  start  with  an  Ontology  from  which  Psychology 
and  Cosmology  should  be  derivatives.    If  there  were 
assumed  a  one  Absolute  existence,  identical  both  with 


SI 


88 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


# 


H 


F'fl 


^ 


Self  and  ITot-self— a  kind  of  Neutnim  of  Self  and 
Kot-self,  and  of  which  the  two  together  constituted 
the  life  or  manifestation— here  Psychology  might 
have  a  real  ontological  beginning.  It  remained,  how- 
ever, for  Schelling  and  Hegel  to  work  out  this  famous 
Identity  doctrine,  if,  indeed,  it  did  not  belong  to  them, 
or  to  one  of  them,  originally  more  than  to  Fichte. 
As  Schelling  first  distinctly  published  the  doctrine, 
and  as  he  outlived  Hegel  for  many  years,  it  is  with 
Schelling's  name  that  the  doctrine  has  been  universal- 
ly associated,  and  the  place  usually  assigned  to  Hegel 
has  been  that  of  an  Aristotle  contemporary  with  this 
Plato  in  the  most  important  part  of  his  career,  and 
subjecting  all  his  views,  the  Identity  doctrine  in- 
cluded, to  a  vigorous  logical  grasp  *  Taking  the  Iden- 
tity doctrine,  therefore,  as  Schelling's,  and  leaving 
Hegel  out  of  account  in  the  meantime,  we  can  see 
how,  in  the  Schellingian  doctrine,  the  world  was  made 
aware  of  a  form  in  which  the  possibility  of  an  On- 
tology might  be  vindicated.  The  Absolute,  accord- 
ing to  this  doctrine,  is  the  one  Infinite  Existence  or 


*■• 


*  For  some  very  interesting  observations  on  the  relations  of  Hegel 
to  Schelling  in  respect  of  the  Identity  doctrine,  and  on  the  relations  of 
both  generally  to  Fichte,  and  of  all  three  to  Kant,  see  Mr.  Stirling's 
"  Secret  of  Hegel,"  vol.  L  pp.  20 — 31.  Mr.  Stirling  holds  that  the  ouU 
come  of  the  German  Philosophical  movement  was  in  Kant  and  Hegel, 
and  that  Fichte  and  Schelling,  though  interesting  historically,  may  be 
neglected  by  the  student  of  results. 


RECENT  BRmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


89 


Essence  of  which  both  Mind  and  ISTature  are  the 
manifestations.    The  Absolute  going  forth  expansive- 
ly, or  embodying  itself  in  the  finite  or  phsenomenal, 
is  Ifature ;  the  regressive  or  contractive  movement  of 
the  Absolute  out  of  the  finite  or  phsBnomenal  back 
into  itself,  is  the  sum-total  of  Mind  or  Consciousness. 
Being  and  Knowing  are  coincident;    all    that    is 
known  is,  and  nothing  is  that  is  not  known ;  the  uni- 
verse of  Knowledge  and  the  universe  of  Existence  are 
the  same ;    Ontology  is  the  self-consciousness  of  the 
Absolute.    But  how  can  individual  men  rise  to  such 
an  ontology  ?    By  participation  in  the  self-conscious- 
ness of  that  Absolute  of  which  they  are  items !    How 
is  this  possible  ?    By  an  act  of  "  intellectual  intuition  " 
the  soul  of  man  may  swoon  beyond  the  bounds  of 
mere  individual  consciousness,  and  may  behold  and 
know  the  Eternal  Essence  of  things !    It  is  on  this 
power  in  the  reason  of  each  of  us  to  participate  in  the 
self-knowledge  of  the  Absolute,  and  to  know  itself  as 
a  fibre  in  that  Absolute,  that  the  Universe  proceeds 
and  holds  together.    It  is  this  certain  intuition  of  Ab- 
solute Truth,  and  not  any  spasmodic  action  of  the  soul 
in  the  shape  of  a  faith  straining  into  a  void,  that  has 
been,  is,  and  ever  will  be,  the  sustenance  of  mankind, 
the  basis  of  religion  and  of  all  great  action.     So,  in 
brief  terms,  I  interpret  the  ontological  doctrine  of 
Schelling. 


,t 


.t 


90 


EECENT  BEmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


Having  thus  expounded  severally  tlie  three  great 
differences,  or  sets  of  differences,  that  have  been  found 
appearing  and  re-appearing  hitherto  in  the  history  of 
Philosophy — and  having  named  them,  for  the  sake  of 
easier  reference,  the  Psychological  Difference^  the 
Cosmological  Difference^  and  the  Ontological  Differ- 
ence— ^let  me  proceed  to  inquire  how  far,  and  in  what 
forms,  these  differences  have  repeated  themselves  in 
our  British  Philosophy  of  the  last  thirty  years.  In 
this  inquiry,  as  has  been  already  explained,  it  is  with 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  Mr.  Carlyle,  and  Mr.  John 
Stuart  Mill,  that  we  must  first  concern  ourselves : 


I.  In  respect  of  the  Psychological  Difference. 
Here  Mr.  Carlyle  and  Sir  William  Hamilton  obvious- 
ly range  themselves  on  one  side,  and  Mr.  Mill  as  obvi- 
ously on  the  other. 

Take  Mr.  Carlyle.  "  Our  whole  Metaphysics  it- 
self,'' he  wrote  in  1829,  in  that  essay  from  which  we 
quoted  his  complaint  as  to  the  miserable  condition  in- 
to which  Philosophy  had  fallen  in  Britain, "  our  whole 
Metaphysics  itself  from  Locke's  time  downwards  has 
been  physical — ^not  a  spiritual  philosophy,  but  a  ma- 
terial one.  The  singular  estimation  in  which  his  Es- 
say was  so  long  held  as  a  scientific  work  (an  estima- 
tion grounded,  indeed,  on  the  estimable  character  of 
the  man)  will  one  day  be  thought  a  cmious  indication 


RECENT   BEniSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


91 


of  the  spirit  of  these  times."    This  is  surely  an  abju- 
ration of  Lockism.    Again,  in  the  same  Essay,  he 
writes,  "  To  speak  a  little  pedantically,  there  is  a  sci- 
ence of  Dynamics  in  Man's  fortunes  and  nature,  as 
well  as  of  Mechanics.     There  is  a  Science  which 
treats  of,  and  practically  addresses,  the  primary,  un 
modified  forces  and  energies  of  Man,  the  mysterious 
springs  of  Love,  and  Fear,  and  Wonder,  of  Enthusi- 
asm, Poetry,  and  Eeligion,  all  which  have  a  truly  vital 
and  injmite  character,  as  well  as  a  Science  which 
practically  addresses  the/zzzfe,  modified  developments 
of  these,  when  they  take  the  shape  of  immediate  ^  mo- 
tives,' as  hope  of  reward,  or  as  fear  of  punishment. 
ISTow  it  is  certain  that  in  former  times  the  wise  men, 
the  enlightened  lovers  of  their  kind,  who  appeared 
generally  as  moralists,  poets,  and  priests,  did,  without 
neglecting  the  Mechanical  province,  deal  chiefly  with 
the  Dynamical.""^    This  also  is  an  assertion  of  the 
principle  of  Transcendentalism.     Indeed,  in  a  previ- 
ous Essay,  Mr.  Carlyle  had  approvingly  expounded 
the  Transcendentalism  of  Kant's  philosophy  in  oppo- 
sition to  the  Empiricism  of  Locke  and  Hume.     "  The 
Germans,"  he  had  said, "  take  up  the  matter  different- 
ly, and  would  assail  Hume,  not  in  his  outworks,  but  in 
his  citadel.    They  deny  his  first  principle,  that  Sense 


1' 

'J 


»  Art.  "  Signs  of  the  Times,"  in  Edin.  Rev.  1829  ;  reprinted  in  Car- 
lyle's  Miscellanies. 


I 


1. 1 


92 


BEOENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


is  the  only  inlet  of  knowledge,  that  Experience  is  the 
primary  ground  of  belief.  Their  pure  truth,  however, 
they  seek,  not  historically  and  by  experiment,  in  the 
universal  persuasions  of  men,  but  by  intuition,  in  the 
deepest  and  purest  nature  of  Man.''  ^  But  what  need 
of  proving  by  particular  quotations  that  Mr.  Carlyle 
then  was,  and  since  then  has  always  continued  to  be, 
a  champion  of  the  doctrine  of  necessary  or  d  priori 
truth  or  elements  of  truth  ?  "What  else  mean  his  weU- 
known  phrases  "Eternal  Justice,"  "  the  Eternal  Ye- 
racities,"  and  the  like  ?  In  short,  if  words  have  any 
meaning,  Mr.  Carlyle,  since  Coleridge  died,  and  with 
an  energy  of  genius  more  vehement  and  tumultuous, 
has  been  the  most  conspicuous  Transcendentalist,  the 
most  conspicuous  anti-Lockist,  anti-Benthamist,  in  the 
Literature  of  Britain. 

What  Mr.  Carlyle  has  been  implicitly,  and  for  the 
mind  of  the  nation  at  large,  in  this  aspect.  Sir  William 
Hamilton  has  been  explicitly,  and  for  our  philosophic 
scholars.  He  has  been  the  founder  of  a  philosophy 
which,  though  it  offered  itself  primarily  as  a  continu- 
ation and  improvement  of  that  previously  known  (and 
though  old-fashioned)  as  the  Scottish,  and  though  it 
might  be  properly  enough  called  "  Scoto-German,"  is 
described  most  truiy  of  all  as  the  Hamiltonian.     And 

*  Art.  "  State  of  German  Literature,"  in  Edin.  Rev.  1827 ;  reprinted 
in  Carlyle's  Miscellanies. 


.:  4 


RECENT  BRTHSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


93 


from  j&i-st  to  last  in  this  philosophy,  and  in  almost 
every  scrap  of  writing  that  came  from  Hamilton's 
pen,  we  mark  the  strength  of  his  conviction  that  only 
on  the  theory  of  necessary  ideas,  a  priori  forms  of 
thought,  could  philosophy  establish  itself,  or  the  spirit 
of  man  find  satisfaction.  "A  very  able  disquisition,'^ 
he  would  say  again  and  again,  commenting  upon  some 
treatise  or  essay  of  the  opposite  school  which  he 
thought  worthy  of  praise ;  "  but  I  do  not  see  how  you 
can  fabricate  this  notion  (naming  it),  out  of  experi- 
ence !  "  A  reduction  of  what  was  to  be  taken  as  rveces- 
sary  in  our  beliefs  to  the  smallest  compass  in  which 
it  could  be  expressed — an  essence  of  the  fewest  and 
deepest  propositions — ^was  a  task  in  the  achievement 
of  which  he  foresaw  results  that  might  have  made 
Eeid  groan,  and  Kantists  uncomfortable.^  He  did 
not  live  to  accomplish  the  task.  But  the  whole  tenor 
of  his  labours  was  towards  an  assertion,  purification, 
and  redefinition  of  Transcendentalism ;  and,  when  he 
died,  he  left  the  flag  of  Transcendentalism  waving 
anew  over  more  than  one  citadel  of  the  land. 

It  will  be  a  dreary  day  for  the  world  when  dis- 
agreements cease,  when  there  are  not  even  funda- 
mental differences.  There  is  an  old  Wiltshire  song, 
which  has  this  remarkable  stanza : — 

*  See  Dissertation  A.  appended  to  Edition  of  Reid,  p.  HZ :  foot- 
note. 


t      u 


94  RECENT  BEITISH    PHILOSOPHY. 

*'  If  all  the  world  were  of  one  Eeligion, 
Many  a  living  thing  should  die ; 
But  I  will  never  forget  my  true  love, 
!N'or  in  any  way  his  name  deny." 

Now,  if  there  is  any  man  among  us  who  has  pre- 
eminently helped  to  keep  Britain  from  that  danger 
of  intellectual  death  to  many  which  would  arise  from 
her  being  of  one  Eeligion  in  Philosophy,  it  is  Mr. 
Mill.  Se  has  never  forgotton  his  true  love,  the 
principle  of  Empiricism,  nor  in  any  way  denied 
its  name — though  the  name  "  Empiricism  "  is  one 
which  he  would  not  himself  choose,  and  for  which 
he  would  probably  substitute  MoperientiaUsm.  In 
stating  the  question  between  the  two  metaphysical 
schools  in  that  essay  on  Coleridge  which  was  so  ad- 
mirable an  example  in  its  time  of  the  sympathetic 
appreciation  of  a  system  of  opinions  diflFerent  from 
one's  own,^  Mr.  Mill  thought  it  right  to  record  his 
own  view,  even  when  refraining  from  arguing  for  it. 
"  It  is,"  he  said,  "  that  the  truth,  on  this  much  de- 
bated question,  lies  with  the  school  of  Locke  and 
Bentham."  And  his  writings  before  this,  and  in  all 
his  writings  after  this,  the  same  assertion  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  his  philosophical  faith  is  continually  made. 
But,  indeed,  not  only  is  this  principle  continually 

*  Essay  on  Coleridge,  London  and  Westminster  Review,  1840 ;  re- 
printed in  Mill's  Dissertations, 


-^mn 


■  ^ 


EECENT  BEITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


95 


avowed  in  Mr.  Mill's  writings ;  it  is  the  key  to  the 
nature  of  the  writings  themselves.    Mr.  Mill's  Zogio 
corresponds  with  what  the  science  of  Logic  could 
alone  be  consistently  with  his  fundamental  psycho- 
logical principle.    It  could  not  be,  like  the  old  Losic 
and  Hamilton's  Logic,  a  Science  of  the  l^Tecessary 
Laws  of  Thought,  but  only  a  Science  of  the  method 
of  quest  after  experimental  truth  or  probability.     So, 
in  his  fine  Essay  on  Ztherii/  the  radical  idea  is  that  one 
can  never  be  surer  of  anything,  be  it  even  the  forty- 
seventh  proposition  of  the  first  book  of  EucHd,  than 
in  proportion  as  the  chances  of  contradiction  are 
exhausted ;  and  the  high  value  set  there  upon  human 
freedom,  and  even  upon  eccentricity  of  thought  or 
action,  seems  to  be  grounded  on  the  conviction  that 
the  human  race  can  never  know  what  it  may  attain 
to,  in  the  shape  either  of  knowlege  or  of  power,  until 
it  has  sent  out  a  rush  of  the  largest  number  of  indi- 
vidual energies  simultaneously,  and  with  the  least  re- 
straint from  law  or  custom  or  mutual  disparagement, 
on  actual  experiments  and  investigations  in  all  di- 
rections.   As  for  the  Essay  on  Utilitarianism,  it  is 
expressly  a  restatement  of  Paley's  and  Bentham's  the- 
ory of  expediency  as  the  sole  possible  foundation  of 
morals,  but  with  a  suggestion  of  this  higher  and 
more  exquisite  definition  of  expediency,  characteristic 
of  Mr.  Mill,  that  it  means  the  largest  possible  amount 


^ 


93 


RECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BIUTISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


97 


of  pleasure,  and  the  least  possible  amount  of  pain, 
not  to  you  or  me,  or  this  age,  or  all  mankind  only, 
but  to  the  sum-total  of  sentient  existence.  In  short, 
if  I  am  not  mistaken,  Mr.  Mill's  writings  prove  that, 
if  he  thinks  of  any  one  particular  mode  of  thought 
among  his  contemporaries  as  being  more  than  any 
other  chargeable  with  the  total  mass  of  obstruction, 
fallacy,  and  misery  that  yet  rolls  in  the  heart  of 
society — as  being  more  than  any  other  the  False 
God,  or  Baal,  or  Moloch,  of  the  human  mind — it  is 
of  the  theory  of  necessary  beliefs.  One  marks  almost 
an  impatience  of  manner  in  his  writings  whenever 
this  word  "necessary"  comes  across  him.  "ITever 
name  to  me,"  he  seems  to  say,  "  that  brute  of  a  word." 
It  required,  indeed,  that  the  cause  of  British 
Empiricism  should  have  no  ordinary  standard-bearer. 
The  learning  and  speculative  profundity  of  a  Hamil- 
ton, and  the  great  spiritual  energy  of  a  Carlyle,  were 
a  formidable  conjunction  of  opposite  forces.  Even 
numerically,  in  respect  of  the  leaders,  the  odds  were 
as  two  to  one.  And,  curiously  enough,  this  is  about 
the  numerical  odds  in  which,  if  we  take  the  whole 
list  of  our  recent  philosophical  writers,  British  Tran- 
scendentalism has  continued  to  stand  to  British  Em- 
piricism to  the  present  day.  It  is  difficult  to  be  exact 
in  such  a  matter,  and  I  will  not  specialize  at  present ; 
but  the  names  of  Whewell  and  Tennyson  at  once  sug- 


gest themselves  on  the  one  side,  and  that  of  the  late 
Mr.  Buckle  on  the  other. 

II.  In  resjpeet  of  the   Cosmological  Differences. 
To  think  we  had  laid  sufficient  hold  of  the  move- 
ment of  British  philosophical  thought  during  the  last 
thirty  years  merely  by  the  division  of  its  represent- 
atives into  two  schools  according  to  their  difference 
in  respect  of  Psychological  Theory,  would  (it  must 
be  felt  now,  if  it  was  not  felt  before)  be  the  very 
greenness  of  innocence.     Hamilton,   Carlyle,  Whe- 
well,  and   Tennyson — ^we  may  bracket   these  men 
together  and  have  a  reason  for  it ;  but  what  would 
the  men  themselves  say?    Methinks  I  see  strange 
mutual    glances    passing    among    them  —  in    part, 
glances  of  mutual  liking,  but  not  all  of  that  char- 
acter.   JSTor,  though  the  conjunction  of  Buckle  and 
Mill  might  be    less   amiss,  in  respect  of  reputed 
affinity,  would  that  conjunction  be  beyond  criticism. 
In  short,  we  must  complicate  matters  by  having  re- 
course to  the  second  means  of  distributing  philoso- 
phers— ^the  recognition  of  the  differences  of  their 
cosmological    conceptions.      But  here  we   are  con- 
fronted with  difficulty  and  chances  of  error.     "  Who 
told  you  my  cosmological  conception,  pray  ? "  is  what 
many  a  man,  and  even  many  a  writer,  might  say  to  a 

critic  professing  to  fasten  one  upon  him  and  to  ex- 

5 


«' 


<    i 


98 


EECENT   BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT   BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


99 


pound  it.  What  a  man  generally  keeps  to  himself  is 
precisely  his  cosmological  conception.  In  this  country 
especially  that  which  most  men  avoid,  even  when  they 
are  our  public  teachers  and  writers — ^that  which  they 
are  compelled  to  avoid  by  the  tyranny  of  a  many- 
voiced  multitude,  whose  own  cosmological  concep- 
tion was  made  for  them  long  ago,  and  might  be  hung 
up  in  the  British  Museum  as  a  curiosity  to-morrow — 
nay,  worst  of  all,  that  which  the  cynicism  of  a  hlase 
literature  of  wit,  and  mutual  chaff,  and  a  cultivated 
antipathy  to  the  large  or  grand,  compels  them  to 
avoid — ^is  the  attempt  to  present,  in  any  approach 
to  complete  form,  systematic  or  poetical,  their  real 
and  total  conception  of  the  world.  The  more  the 
pity !  Never  was  there  a  great  book  in  the  world 
that  did  not  flash  out,  and  burn  into  the  minds  of  its 
readers,  some  outline  of  its  author's  cosmological  con- 
ception. Nor,  under  all  the  discom-agements  of  our 
time,  have  our  best  and  greatest  forgotten  the  duty, 
nor  their  right  hands,  in  performing  it,  the  true  and 
ancient  cunning.  What — and,  here  surely,  if  any- 
where, we  may  name  him— what  of  our  laureate  Ten- 
nyson ?  Or,  again,  of  Mr.  Carlyle  ?  What  is  it  that 
breaks  through  upon  us  from  all  Mr.  Carlyle's  writings, 
and  seems  to  constitute,  when  we  investigate  through 
all  the  rest,  their  distinguishing  peculiarity?  What 
but  a  pervading,  continually  presented,  cosmological 


conception  of  surpassing  vastness,  intense  and  stem  at 
the  centre,  where  the  moral  forces  meet  round  a  solid 
ten-estrial  core,  but  otherwise  astronomically  bound- 
less ?  Nay,  is  it  not  his  habit  to  have  faith  in  this  pre- 
sentation again  and  again  of  a  cosmological  conception, 
constant  or  slightly  varying,  as  better  than  formal  phi- 
losophizing ?  Keconceive  if  you  can,  my  cosmological 
conception,  he  seems  to  say ;  let  it  burst  the  obstruc- 
tions and  boundaries  it  meets  with  in  your  mind; 
and  from  the  new  mental  heaven  there  will  doubt- 
less be  a  rain,  as  far  as  is  necessary,  of  the  right 
propositions ! 

Just  because  Mr.  Carlyle's  philosophy  takes  so 
much  the  form  of  the  incessant  presentation  of  his 
general  cosmological  conception  that  it  refuses  to  ar- 
gue about  the  conception  itself,  it  is  difficult  to  bring 
him  into  a  place  in  any  of  those  six  philosophical  sys- 
tems which  have  been  enumerated  as  resulting  from 
the  attempt  to  classify  philosophers  by  attending  to 
their  points  of  attachment  to  different  theories  of  the 
act  of  external  perception.    It  might  not  be  really  im- 
possible so  to  place  him;  but  it  would  be  difficult. 
Let  us,  therefore,  take  leave  of  him,  and  attend  to  the 
other  two.    In  regard  to  them,  from  the  nature  of 
their  writings,  there  is  not  the  same  difficulty. 

Six  philosophical  systems,  we  said,  have  been  rec- 
ognised as  arising  out  of  the  different  known  interpre- 


1 


% 

r' 


100 


RECENT  BEmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


101 


tations  6f  the  so-called  act  of  external  perception — 
MhiUsrn  or  JVon-Substantialism^  Materialism^  Natvr 
Tol  Bealism^  Constructive  Idealism^  Pure  Idealism^ 
and  the  Identity  System.  Of  these  six  systems,  I  may 
now  say,  only  the  middle  four  seem  to  me  purely  cos- 
mological.  The  two  extreme  systems, — Nihilism 
and  Absolutism^ — ^involve  ontological  considerations. 
They  are  not  solely  theories  of  the  contents  of  the 
Cosmos,  considered  in  itself,  but  also  theories  on  the 
subject  of  the  relatedness  or  non-relatedness  of  the 
Cosmos,  whatever  may  be  the  conception  of  its  con- 
tents, to  an  essence  of  things  beyond.  The  middle 
four,  however — Materialism^  Natural  Realism^  Con- 
structive  Idealism^  and  Pure  Idealism — are  more 
strictly  cosmological.  Now,  each  of  these  four  sys- 
tems has  had  a  footing  in  Britain,  and  the  present 
question  is,  to  which  of  them  Sir  William  Hamilton 
and  Mr.  Mill  respectively  adhere. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  is  a  Natural  Realist.  He 
regarded  it,  indeed,  as  perhaps  the  chief  distinction  of 
his  speculative  philosophy  that,  in  opposition  to  the 
tradition  of  all  former  modern  philosophers,  save  one 
or  two,  it  proclaimed  the  cosmological  doctrine  of 
ITatural  Eealism  to  be  the  true  one.  His  views  on 
the  subject  are  expressed  in  his  Edinburgh  Review 
articles— "  The  Philosophy  of  Perception"  and 
"Idealism"  (reprinted  in  his  Discussions)]  also  in 


his  Lectures  on  Metaphysics  (Lectures  XY.  XYI.); 
but  they  are  to  be  gathered,  with  greatest  abundance 
of  illustration  and  detail,  from  his  Notes,  B,  C,  D  and 
D*,  appended  to  his  edition  of  Eeid.    In  these  Kotes 
he  first  expounds,  as  all-important  to  his  purpose,  the 
distinction  between  Presentative,  Immediate,  or  In- 
tuitive Knowledge,  and  the  knowledge  called  Repre- 
sentative or  Mediate.      Presentative  Knowledge  is 
that  in  which  the  mind  apprehends  a  thing  directly, 
in  itself,  and  as  it  were  face  to  face ;  Representative 
Knowledge  is  that  in  which  the  mind  apprehends  a 
thing  not  directly,  but  through  some  sign,  image,  or 
suggestion  distinct    from  the    thing  itself.      Now, 
though  the  great  mass  of  our  accumulated  knowledge 
is  undeniably  Representative — all  our  knowledge,  for 
example,  of  the  past  and  the  distant — ^yet,  in  the  cen- 
tre of  all,  as  the  ever-welling  momentary  supply  out 
of  which  all  the  rest  is  evolved  or  woven,  there  is  a 
Presentative  Knowledge  in  every  act  of  present  con- 
sciousness.   More  particularly  in  what  is  called  the 
act  of  external  perception  we  have  a  direct,  immedi- 
ate, face-to-face  knowledge  of  objects  in  an  external 
world.    Most  philosophers.  Sir  William  proceeds  to 
say,  have  denied  this,  and  have  maintained  that  our 
knowledge  of  an  external  world  is  only  representa- 
tive, or  a  bundle  of  inferences  from  certain  signs  in 
our  own  affections,  which  may,  or  may  not,  be  in 


I 


102 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY* 


analogy  with  the  things  they  represent.  Eeid  alone 
had  got  hold  of  the  doctrine  of  an  immediate  face-to- 
face  cognition  of  external  nature  in  every  act  of  per- 
ception. But  Keid's  use  of  the  doctrine  had  been 
vacillating,  confused,  and  incomplete,  insomuch  that 
he  had  been  misunderstood  in  all  that  depended  upon 
it  by  his  critics,  and  most  of  all  by  Brown.  Hence, 
vindicating  Eeid,  and  at  the  same  time  avowing  his 
own  acceptance  of  Keid's  doctrine,  though  he  should 
be  left  in  a  minority  of  one  in  supporting  it,  Hamil- 
ton does  all  he  can  to  put  the  doctrine  in  proper 
shape.  "  The  developed  doctrine  of  Eeal  Presenta- 
tionism,  the  basis  of  ISTatural  Eealism,"  he  says, 
"  asserts  the  consciousness  or  immediate  perception  of 
certain  essential  attributes  of  matter  objectively  exist- 
ing ;  while  it  admits  that  other  properties  of  body  are 
unknown  in  themselves,  and  only  inferred  as  causes 
to  account  for  certain  subjective  affections  of  which 
we  are  cognizant  in  ourselves.''  The  attributes  of 
matter  thus  alleged  to  be  immediately  perceived  as 
really  and  objectively  existing  are  mainly  those  which 
since  Locke's  time  had  been  generally  known  as  the 
"primary  qualities," — ^to  wit,  solidity  or  extension, 
impenetrability,  number  or  divisibility,  size,  figure, 
mobility,  and  position  in  space.  In  addition  to  these 
qualities  Sir  William  discriminates  two  other  classes 
— ^the  "  secundo-primary  qualities  "  (such  as  gravity, 


EECENT  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


103 


cohesion,  repulsion,  &c.),  in  which  he  recognizes 
modifications  of  the  primary  by  conjunction  with  a 
subjective  element;  and  the  "secondary  qualities" 
proper  (colour,  sound,  flavour,  heat,  &c.),  which  he  al- 
lows to  consist  merely  in  determinations  of  the  sub- 
jective sentiency. 

Such  is  Sir  William  Hamilton's  system  of  Natural 
Dualism  or  Natural  Realism.  In  the  course  of  his 
expositions  of  his  own  system  he  has  some  criticisms 
of  the  rival  systems.  If  he  were  not  a  ISTatural  Eeal- 
ist,  then,  he  avows,  he  would  be  a  Pure  Idealist. 
"  JN^atural  Eealism  and  Absolute  Idealism,"  he  says 
emphatically,  "  are  the  only  systems  worthy  a  philos- 
opher." ^  On  the  other  hand,  the  rival  system  which 
he  liked  least,  and  which  he  pronounced  "  the  most 
inconsequent  of  all  systems,"  was  that  half-way  kind 
of  Idealism  which  we  have  called  Constructive  Ideal- 
ism. He  admitted,  nevertheless,  that  this  was  the 
system  which  had  been  "  embraced .  in  various  forms 
by  the  immense  majority  of  philosophers."  f  ITow, 
as  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  ascertain,  it  is  precisely 
to  this  system  that  Mr.  Mill  would  confess  his  allegi- 
ance. I  make  the  statement  somewhat  diffidently. 
It  has  seemed  to  me  doubtful  whether  some  of  his 
views  might  not  be  susceptible  of  an  interpretation 

*  Note  C  to  Edition  of  Reid,  p.  817,  footnote. 

f  Art.  Philosophy  of  Perception,  Discussions,  p.  56. 


104 


BECENT   BEinSH   PHILOSOPHT. 


i 

\ 


into  Pure  Idealism.  On  the  whole,  however,  I  am 
inclined  to  think  that,  if  any  of  the  existing  cosmo- 
logical  systems  might  claim  him,  it  is  that  of  Con- 
stricctive  Idealism. 

In  his  Logic  there  is  a  chapter  devoted  to  an  enu- 
meration or  classification  of  "  the  Things  denoted  by 
names."  It  results  in  the  conclusion  that  there  are 
four  classes  of  nameable  things — (1)  "Feelings,  or 
States  of  Consciousness ; "  (2)  "  The  Minds  which  ex- 
perience these  feelings ; "  (3)  "  The  Bodies,  or  exter- 
nal objects,  which  excite  certain  of  these  feelings ; " 
and  (4)  "  The  Successions  and  Coexistences,  the  Like- 
nesses and  ITnlikenesses,  between  feelings  or  States  of 
Consciousness."  This  is  so  far  a  cosmological  classifi- 
cation ;  but,  from  the  paragraphs  through  which  it  is 
arrived  at,  it  distinctly  appears  that  it  is  not  Mr. 
Mill's  idtimate  classification  of  the  contents  of  the 
Cosmos  as  given  in  consciousness,  but  a  classification 
deferring,  partly  at  least,  and  for  the  practical  pur- 
poses of  Logic,  to  popular  habits  of  speech  and 
thought.  In  reading  these  paragraphs  it  is  distinct- 
ly seen  that,  according  to  Mr.  Mill,  the  one  and  only 
reality  of  the  Cosmos  for  our  knowledge  consists  in  the 
existence  of  the  first  of  the  four  classes  of  nameable 
things,  or  of  the  first  compounded  with  the  fourth. 
All  that  we  really  know,  or  are  in  any  way  aware  of, 
is  a  series  of  feelings  or  states  of  consciousness,  a 


RECENT  BRmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


105 


stream  or  succession  of  sensations,  thoughts,  emotions, 
and  volitions.    When  we  speak  either  of  Mind  as  a 
substance  undergoing  these  successive  states,  or  of 
Matter  or  Body  as  an  external  cause  of  some  of  them, 
we  go  beyond  what  we  know.      Thus,    of  Mind: 
"  There  is  a  something  I  call  Myself,  or  by  another 
form  of  expression,  my  mind,  which  I  consider  as  dis- 
tinct from  these  sensations,  thoughts,  cfec. — a  some- 
thing which  I  conceive  to  be  not  the  thoughts,  but 
the  being  that  has  the  thoughts,  and  which  I  can  con- 
ceive as  existing  for  ever  in  a  state  of  quiescence  with- 
out any  thoughts  at  all.     But  what  this  being  is,  al- 
though it  is  myself,  I  have  no  knowledge  further  than 
the  series  of  its  states  of  consciousness."  *    So  of  Mat- 
ter or  Body :  "  A  body,  according  to  the  received  doc- 
trine of  modern  metaphysicians,"  says  Mr.  MiU,  "  may 
be  defined  the  external  cause  to  which  we  ascribe  our 
sensations.  .  .  The  sensations  are  all  of  which  I  am  di- 
rectly conscious ;  but  I  consider  them  as  produced  by 
something  not  only   existing   independently  of  my 
will,  but  external  to  my  bodily  organs  and  to  my 
mind.     This  external  something  I  call  a  Body.     It 
may  be  asked.  How  came  we  to  ascribe  our  sensations 
to  any  external  cause  ?  and  is  there  sufficient  ground 
for  so  ascribing  them  ?    It  is  known  that  there  are 
metaphysicians  who  have  raised  a  controversy  on  this 


5* 


*  Logic :  1st  Edit.  vol.  L  p.  82. 


106 


.EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


107 


point,  maintaining  the  paradox  that  we  are  not  war- 
ranted in  referring  our  sensations  to  a  cause  such  as 
we  understand  by  the  word  Body,  or  to  any  cause 
whatever,  unless,  indeed,  the  First  Cause.  ...  A 
fixed  law  of  connexion,  making  the  sensations  occur 
together,  does  not,  say  these  philosophers,  necessarily 
require  what  is  called  a  substratum  to  support  them. 
The  conception  of  a  substratum  is  but  one  of  many 
possible  forms  in  which  that  connexion  presents  itself 
to  our  imagination — a  mode  of,  as  it  were,  realizing 
the  idea.  If  there  be  such  a  substratum,  suppose  it 
this  instant  annihilated  by  the  fiat  of  Omnipotence, 
and  let  the  sensations  continue  to  occur  in  the  same 
order,  and  how  would  the  substratum  be  missed  ?  By 
what  siffns  should  we  be  able  to  discover  that  its  exist- 
ence  had  terminated  ?  Should  we  not  have  as  much 
reason  to  believe  that  it  still  existed  as  we  now  have  ? 
and,  if  we  should  not  then  be  warranted  in  believing 
it,  how  can  we  be  so  now  ?  A  body,  therefore,  ac- 
cording to  these  metaphysicians,  is  not  anything  in- 
trinsically different  from  the  sensations  which  the 
body  is  said  to  produce  in  us ;  it  is,  in  short,  a  set 
of  sensations  joined  together  according  to  a  fixed 
law.  .  .  .  These  ingenious  speculations  have  at  no 
time  in  the  history  of  philosophy  made  many  prose- 
lytes ;  but  the  controversies  to  which  they  have  given 
rise,  and  the  doctrines  which  have  been  developed  in 


the  attempt  to  find  a  conclusive  answer  to  them,  have 
been  fruitful  of  important  consequences  to  the  Science 
of  Mind.  ...  It  was  soon  acknowledged  by  all  who 
reflected  on  the  subject,  that  the  existence  of  matter 
could  not  be  proved  by  extrinsic  evidence.  The 
answer,  therefore,  now  usually  made  to  Berkeley  and 
his  followers  is,  that  the  belief  is  intuitive — ^that  man- 
kind, in  all  ages,  have  felt  themselves  compelled,  by  a 
necessity  of  their  nature,  to  refer  their  sensations  to  an 
external  cause ;  that  even  those  who  deny  it  in  theory 
yield  to  the  necessity  in  practice,  and,  in  speech, 
thought,  and  feeling  do,  equally  with  the  vulgar,  ac- 
knowledge their  sensations  to  be  the  effects  of  some- 
thing external  to  them.  .  .  .  But,  though  the  extreme 
doctrine  of  the  Idealist  metaphysicians,  that  objects 
are  nothing  but  our  sensations  and  the  laws  which 
connect  them,  has  appeared  to  few  subsequent  think- 
ers to  be  worthy  of  assent,  the  only  point  of  much 
real  importance  is  one  on  which  these  metaphysicians 
are  now  very  generally  considered  to  have  made  out 
their  case — ^viz. :  that  all  we  Icnow  of  objects  is  the  sen- 
sations which  they  give  us,  and  the  order  of  the  oc- 
currence of  these  sensations.  .  .  .  There  is  not  the 
slightest  reason  for  believing  that  what  we  call  the 
sensible  qualities  of  an  object  are  a  type  of  anything 
inherent  in  itself,  or  bearing  any  affinity  to  its  own 
nature.    A  cause  does  not,  as  such,  resemble  its  ef- 


108 


EECEIIT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


K 


I 


fects ;  an  east  wind  is  not  Kke  the  feeling  of  cold,  nor 
is  heat  like  the  steam  of  boiling  water :  why  then 
should  matter  resemble  our  sensations?  why  should 
the  inmost  nature  of  fire  or  water  resemble  the  im- 
pressions made  by  these  objects  upon  our  senses? 
And,  if  not  on  the  principle  of  resemblance,  on  what 
other  principle  can  the  manner  in  which  objects  af- 
fect us  through  the  senses  afford  us  any  insight  into 
the  inherent  nature  of  these  objects  ?    It  may  there- 
fore safely  be  laid  down  as  a  truth,  both  obvious  in 
itself,  and  admitted  by  all  whom  it  is  at  present  nec- 
essary to  take  into  consideration,  that  of  the  outward 
world  we   know  and  can  know   absolutely  nothing 
except  the  sensations  which  we  experience  from  it."  * 
!N*ow,  so  far  as  these  quotations  indicate  Mr  Mill's 
cosmological  system,  it  is  certainly  not  the  Natural 
Realism  of  Eeid  and  Sir  William  Hamilton.    But, 
when  we  inquire  with  which  of  the  other  systems 
Mr.  Mill's  views  are  to  be  identified,  the  atmosphere 
does  not  seem  so  clear.     There  is  evident,  indeed,  a 
broad  general  preference  for  the  ideahstic  manner  of 
thought.     The  sole   cosmical  certainty  for  us,  Mr. 
Mill  avows,  is  a  certain  succession  of  ideas,  or  states 
of  consciousness ;  this  is  the  one  phsenomenon  which 
we  cannot  transcend  in  knowlege,  do  what  we  will ; 
all  else  is  faith,  hypothesis,  or  inference.    Now  this, 

*  Logic :  1st  Edit,  vol  i.  pp.  74—81. 


\ 


RECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


109 


at  first  sight,  looks  like  Pure  Idealism,  It  goes  be- 
yond even  the  Idealism  of  Berkeley,  which  only 
abohshed  Matter  or  Body  as  an  Independent  cos- 
mical factor,  and  retained  Mind ;  and  it  approaches 
the  extreme  Idealism  of  Hume  and  Fichte,  which, 
by  abrogating  all  knowledge  of  a  substance  of  Mind 
as  well  as  all  knowledge  of  a  substance  of  Matter,  left 
nothing  between  one  and  Nihilism  or  Non-Syhstan- 
tiation^  save  an  act  of  ontological  faith,  which  one 
might  experience  or  not,  or  wish  to  experience  or  not. 
But  Mr.  MiU's  language  seems  to  show  that,  more  will- 
ingly and  easily  than  Hume,  if  not  with  such  vehe- 
mence and  passion  as  Fichte,  he  would  allow  as  much  of 
ontological  faith  in  Philosophy  as  would  keep  it  from 
the  Nihilistic  conception  of  the  Cosmos  as  a  mere  base- 
less succession  of  ideas.  True,  all  that  we  really  know  is 
a  succession  of  ideas  or  states  of  consciousness,  and  our 
imagination  either  of  a  substance  of  Mind  undergoing 
these,  or  of  an  external  world  of  Matter  implicated  in 
some  of  them,  may  be  purely  illusive.  But,  as  all 
mankind  proceed  on  the  imagination,  and  can  no 
more  shake  themselves  clear  from  it  than  they  can 
leap  off  their  own  shadows.  Philosophy  must  risk  the 
illusion,  especially  as  the  character  of  orderliness  in  the 
succession  of  ideas  conveys  to  Philosophy  itself  (legiti- 
mately or  illegitimately  ?)  a  notion  of  ulterior  law.  In 
short,  some  mystery,  some  hypothesis  of  an  unknown, 


i 


■ 


110 


EECENT  BBmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


I? 


must  be  allowed  in  Philosophy,  and  the  question  is, 
how  much  ?   Allow  the  minimum,  and  we  are  brought 
back  to  Pure  Idealism.^  recovering  itself  from  N'ihil- 
ism,  and  positing  in  the  Cosmos  at  least  a  something 
nameable  as  Mind,  an  unknown  something  that  feels 
and  thinks.     Mr.  Mill  is  willing,  however,  to  go 
farther,  and,  always  with  the  proviso  that  we  are 
talking  in  the  dark,  to  allow  another  unknown  some- 
thing in  the  Cosmos,  external  to  the  mind,  and  which 
is  the  determining  cause  of  some  of  the  mind's  feel- 
ings.   Accordingly  he  sums  up  thus :     "  As  Body  is 
the  mysterious  something  which  excites  the  mind  to 
feel,  so  mind  is  the  mysterious  something  which  feels 
and  thinks."    Again,  "As  Body  is  the  unsentient 
cause  to  which  we  are  naturally  prompted  to  refer  a 
certain  portion  of  our  feelings,  so  Mind  may  be  de- 
scribed as  the  sentient  subject  (in  the  German  sense 
of  the  term)  of  all  feelings — that  which  has  or  feels 
them.    But  of  the  nature  of  either  body  or  mind, 
further  than  the  .feelings  which  the  former  excites, 
and  which  the  latter  experiences,  we  do  not,  accord- 
ing to  the  best  existing  doctrine,  know  any  thing.''  * 
Of  Body,  indeed,  we  may  assume  (so  Mr.  Mill  has 
already  argued)  that  we  know  something  negatively. 
Whatever  it  is,  it  can  hardly  be,  in  any  way  or  to 
any  degree,  that  which  we  are  in  the  constant  habit 

*  Logic :  1st  Edit  i.  pp.  81,  82. 


■■\ 


RECENT  BRmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


Ill 


of  supposing  it  to  be.  "When  we  speak  of  solidity, 
impenetrability,  size,  figure,  &c.,  as  primary  qualities 
of  bodies,  and  of  colour,  roughness,  hardness,  sour- 
ness, &c.,  as  secondary  qualities  of  the  same  bodies, 
we  but  skeletonize  an  unknown  and  unknowable  cause 
in  the  form  of  some  of  its  effects,  and  then  clothe  the 
skeleton  with  a  garment  of  others  of  its  effects.  And 
so,  Mr.  Mill's  cosmological  doctrine,  as  he  seems  will- 
ing that  it  should  stand,  after  sufficient  caveats  and  ex- 
planations, seems  to  be  that  of  Constructive  IdealismJ^ 

♦  Of  attachment  on  Mr.  Mill's  part  to  the  Identity-system  there  is 
no  hint ;  and  the  only  other  of  the  six  systems  to  which  his  views  are 
not  adjusted  in  the  text  is  Materialism,  Now  it  is  quite  conceivable 
that  a  Constructive  Idealism  such  as  has  been  described  might  resolve 
itself  scientifically  into  Materialism,  Might  not  Science,  starting  with 
the  conception  of  o.  present  Cosmos  consisting  of  a  sentient  something 
called  Mind  and  an  unsentient  something  else  called  Matter,  and  re- 
garding both  as  apprehensible  only  in  the  successive  states  of  the  sen- 
tient something,  reach  the  conclusion,  through  the  manipulation  of 
these  states  themselves,  that  the  unsentient  is  the  more  ancient  of  the 
two,  and  that  the  sentient,  which  is  thus  finding  out  its  own  ancestry, 
is  but  a  development  of  the  unsentient  ?  Such  a  suicide  of  Construc- 
tive Idealism,  or  translation  of  itself  into  Materialism,  is,  as  I  have 
hinted  in  a  previous  footnote,  so  far  from  impossible  that  it  is  the  com- 
monest of  processes  in  the  present  state  of  Philosophy.  The  reason 
why  I  note  the  fact  again  here  is  not  that  Mr.  Mill  is  ever  found  for- 
swearing  his  Idealism,  but  because  the  fact  is  interesting  in  connexion 
with  his  great  liking  for  the  speculations  of  other  philosophers  who, 
without  denying  that  a  succession  of  states  of  consciousness  is  the 
sole  known  reality  of  the  Cosmos,  are  yet  conspicuous  for  the  resolute- 
ness with  which  they  leave  that  contemplation  behind,  and  assume  a 
material  Cosmos  of  good  thumping  realities,  mineral  and  other,  as 
having  existed  for  ages  before  it  had  bred  nerve  or  learnt  any  trick  of 
self-sentiency. 


i 


112 


RECENT  BRITISH   PHTLOSOPHT. 


m.  In  respect  of  the  Ontological  Difference. — So 
far  as  we  have  gone,  tlie  result  is  that,  compounding 
the  Psychological  doctrine  with  the  Cosmological  in 
the  case  of  each  of  the  two  philosophei-s,  and  throw- 
ing out  what  alone  seems  to  be  doubtful  in  Mr.  Mill's 
case  (to  wit,  whether  under  the  latter  doctrine  he  is  a 
Pure  Idealist  or  only  a  Constructive  Idealist),  we  may 
define  Sir  "William  Hamilton's  philosophy  as  a  system 
of  Transcendental  Natural  Heali'Sm  or  Dualistic 
Transcendentalism^  and  Mr.  Mill's  as  a  system  of 
Empirical  Idealism  or  Idealistic  Empiricism.  There 
remains  to  be  applied  to  each  of  the  philosophers, 
however,  the  third  of  the  traditional  differences — 
that  which  we  have  called  the  Ontological.  Here,  at 
first  sight,  the  two  philosophers  seem  to  meet  and 
shake  hands.  The  agreement,  however,  even  here,  is 
more  apparent  than  real. 

There  are  no  portions  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
writings  better  known  than  those  in  which  he  pro- 
claimed his  conviction  of  the  utter  impossibility  of  an 
Ontology.  The  very  first  of  his  contributions  to  the 
Edinburgh  Review  was  his  now  famous  Article  "  On 
the  Philosophy  of  the  Unconditioned,"  criticising 
more  particularly  Cousin's  doctrine  of  the  Infinito- 

* 

Absolute.  In  all  his  subsequent  writings  he  assumes 
this  article  as  lying  in  the  background,  to  be  referred 
to,  if  necessary,  for  the  correct  interpretation  of  what- 


RECENT  BRmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


113 


ever  new  exposition  he  may  be  engaged  in ;  and  on 
several  occasions — as,  for  example,  in  the  eighth  and 
ninth  of  his  Lectures  on  Metaphysics — ^he  recurs  to 
the  topic  for  a  fresh  treatment  of  it.  The  result  has 
been  that  there  is  no  doctrine  more  strongly  identified 
at  the  present  day  with  Sir  William  Hamilton's  name 
than  the  doctrine  which  he  expressed  most  generally 
by  calling  it  "  The  Eelativity  of  Human  Knowledge." 
Thousandfold  as  might  be  the  differences  of  sys- 
tem among  philosophers,  and  of  vast  importance  as 
might  be  not  a  few  of  these  differences,  yet  all  philos- 
ophers. Sir  William  Hamilton  held,  were  bound,  if 
they  really  understood  what  they  were  talking  about, 
to  agree  in  one  proposition — ^to  wit,  that  our  knowl- 
edge is,  and  can  be,  only  of  the  relative  or  phsenom- 
enal.  This,  which  he  called  "  the  great  axiom,"  he 
asserted  in  many  varieties  of  form  and  with  many 
varieties  of  illustration.  "  Omne  quod  cognoscitur^'^ 
he  says,  quoting  with  approbation  the  celebrated 
maxim  of  Boethius,  ^^non  secundum  sui  mm^  sed 
secundum  cognoscentium  potius  comprehenditur  fac- 
ultatem : "  "  All  that  is  known  is  comprehended,  not 
according  to  the  force  of  itself,  but  according  rather 
to  the  faculty  of  those  knowing."  Hence,  not  only  is 
human  knowledge  relative,  but,  even  in  its  quality  as 
relative,  it  may  be  far  inferior  to  such  relative  knowl- 
edge as  might  be  attainable  through  an  extension  of 


114 


RECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


our  faculties,  or  as  may  be  even  now  in  the  possession 
of  beings  witb  faculties  more  extended  than  ours. 
Just  as  to  a  man  who  has  been  blind  from  his  birth 
the  phsenomenal  world  or  Cosmos  of  his  conceptions 
cannot  be  the  same  as  that  figured  forth  in  the  con- 
ceptions of  his  seeing  fellow-creatures,  but  must  lack 
all  those  attributes  which  depend  on  the  direct  co- 
operation of  Sight  with  the  other  senses,  so,  if  a  new 
sense  or  two  were  added  to  the  present  normal  num- 
ber in  man,  that  which  is  now  the  phsenomenal  world 
for  all  of  us  might,  for  all  we  know,  burst  into  some- 
thing amazingly  wider  and  different  in  consequence 
of  the  additional  revelations  through  these  new  senses. 
"  The  universe  may  be  conceived  as  a  polygon  of 
a  thousand,  or  a  hundred  thousand  sides  or  facets — 
and  each  of  these  sides  or  facets  may  be  conceived  as 
representing  one  special  mode  of  existence.  Now, 
of  these  thousand  sides  or  modes  all  may  be  equally 
essential,  but  three  or  four  only  may  be  turned  towards 
us  or  be  analogous  to  our  organs.  One  side  or  facet 
of  the  Universe,  as  holding  a  relation  to  the  organ  of 
sight,  is  the  mode  of  luminous  or  visible  existence ; 
another,  as  proportional  to  the  organ  of  hearing,  is  the 
mode  of  sonorous  or  audible  existence ;  and  so  on."  * 
But,  even  were  our  organs  or  senses  to  be  made  co- 
numerous  with  the  modes  of  existence,  our  knowledge 

*  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  p.  142. 


RECEKT  BETnSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


116 


would  still  be  only  of  the  phsenomenal,  though  of  a 
phsenomenal  totality  far  more  multiplex  than  the 
present.  Had  we  faculties  equal  in  number  to  all 
the  possible  modes  of  existence,  whether  of  mind  or 
matter,  still  would  our  knowledge  of  mind  or  matter 
be  only  relative."  ^  In  every  way,  therefore,  an  On- 
tology, or  knowledge  of  things  in  themselves,  of  ISTou- 
mena  or  Self-subsisting  Actualities,  as  distinct  from 
Phsenomena,  must  be  declared  impossible.  More  ex- 
pressly, in  human  Philosophy,  must  Ontology,  or 
speculation  of  the  Absolute,  be  ah  initio  given  up. 
"  As  the  conditionally  limited  (which  we  may  briefly 
call  the  conditioned)  is  the  only  possible  object  of 
knowledge  and  of  positive  thought,  thought  necessari- 
ly supposes  conditions.  To  think  is  to  condition  ;  and 
conditional  limitation  is  the  fundamental  law  of  the 
possibility  of  thought.  For,  as  the  greyhound  can- 
not outstrip  his  shadow,  nor  (by  a  more  appropriate 
simile)  the  eagle  outsoar  the  atmosphere  in  which  he 
floats,  and  by  which  alone  he  may  be  supported, 
so  the  mind  cannot  transcend  that  sphere  of  limitation 
within  and  through  which  exclusively  the  possibility 
of  thought  is  realized."  f  ^U  Science,  in  short,  is  the 
science  of  the  phsenomenal,  or  conditioned,  or  rela- 
tive, and  Philosophy  is  the  science  of  this  Science. 

*  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  p.  146. 

f  Art.  "  Philosophy  of  the  Unconditioned  : "  Discussions,  p.  14. 


116 


BECENT   BKinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


117 


i 


In  expounding  so  emphatically  this  great  doctrine 
of  the  Eelativity  of  Knowledge,  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton professed  only  to  be  bringing  out  into  distinctness 
a  proposition  which  philosophers  of  all  schools  and 
times,  with  hardly  an  exception,  had  announced  or 
assumed.  "  This  is,  indeed,  a  truth,"  he  said,  "  in  the 
admission  of  which  philosophers,  in  general,  have 
been  singularly  harmonious,  and  the  praise  that  has 
been  lavished  on  Dr.  Keid  for  this  observation  is 
wholly  unmerited.  In  fact,  I  am  hardly  aware  of  the 
philosopher  who  has  not  proceeded  on  the  supposition, 

0 

that  there  are  few  who  have  not  explicitly  enounced 
the  observation.  It  is  only  since  Keid's  death  that 
certain  speculators  have  arisen  who  have  obtained 
celebrity  by  their  attempt  to  found  philosophy  on  an 
immediate  knowledge  of  the  Absolute  or  Uncondi- 
tioned." *  The  spec&lators  here  referred  to  are  the 
post-Kantian  philosophers  of  Germany,  Schelling  and 
Hegel,  and  their  French  disciples,  more  especially 
Cousin.  It  is  against  the  attempts  of  these  modern 
philosophers  to  establish  an  Ontology  as  a  develop- 
ment or  consummation  of  Philosophy,  that  Sir  Will- 
iam's article  "On  the  Philosophy  of  the  Uncondi- 
tioned "  is  from  first  to  last  directed.  Cousin,  as  hav- 
ing made  the  most  elaborate  attempt  to  bring  On- 
tology within  the  domain  of  reason,  bears  the  brunt 

♦  Lectures  on  Metaphysics,  voL  I.  pp.  138,  139 


of  the  attack.  Defining  Cousin's  opinion  to  be  that 
"the  Unconditioned  or  Absolute  is  cognizable  and 
conceivable  by  consciousness  and  reflection,  under  re- 
lation, diiference,  and  plurality,"  Sir  William  argues 
that  it  is  self-contradictory  and  in  fact  consists  in  call- 
ing Absolute  that  which  is  at  the  same  time  spoken 
of  in  terms  which  are  meaningless  except  as  implying 
relativity.  More  briefly  Schelling's  opinion  is  set 
aside — ^that  opinion  being  thus  defined :  "  The  Uncon- 
ditioned is  cognizable,  but  not  conceivable ;  it  can  be 
known  by  a  sinking  back  into  identity  with  the  Ab- 
solute, but  is  incomprehensible  by  consciousness  and 
reflection,  which  are  only  of  the  relative  and  the  dif- 
ferent." Of  this  theory  of  Schelling's,  and  of  that 
act  of  Intellectual  Intuition  by  which  he  supposed  the 
cognition  of  the  Absolute  to  be  possible,  Sir  William 
speaks  all  but  derisively.  "  Out  of  Laputa  or  the 
Empire,"  he  says,  "  it  would  be  idle  to  enter  into  an 
articulate  refutation  of  a  theory  which  founds  Philos- 
ophy on  the  annihilation  of  consciousness  and  the 
identification  of  the  unconscious  philosopher  with 
God."  But  even  Kant,  whose  sobriety  had  kept  him 
far  on  this  side  of  any  such  dreamy  assertion,  and  one 
of  whose  great  services  to  the  world  had  been  that  he 
had  most  emphatically  proclaimed  or  re-proclaimed 
the  proposition  that  all  human  knowledge  can  only  be 
of  the  Phsenomenal  or  Eelative— even  he,  according 


118 


EECENT  BEITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


to  Sir  William,  had  inadvertently  left  in  Ws  Philos- 
ophy a  stump  of  that  Ontology  of  -which  he  believed 
himself  to  have  cleared  the  rational  world.  Kant's 
statement  had  been,  according  to  Sir  William's  sum- 
mary of  it,  that  the  Unconditioned  or  Absolute  "  is 
not  an  object  of  knowledge,  but  its  notion,  as  a  regu- 
lative principle  of  the  mind  itself,  is  more  than  a  mere 
negation  of  the  Conditioned.'^^  In  other  words,  though 
the  Supernatural,  as  an  objective  reality,  was  beyond 
all  cognisance  or  conception,  and  could  be  nothing 
more  to  Philosophy  than  a  name  for  Yoid  XJnknow- 
ableness,  or  the  cessation  of  all  power  of  apprehension 
or  predication,  yet  the  psychological  fact  of  a  strain- 
ing, in  man's  spirit,  towards  this  vacuum,  as  if  tow- 
ards objects  which  might  or  might  not  be  there,  was 
to  have  some  allowance  made  for  it  in  positive  specu- 
lation, l^ot  even  this,  however,  would  Sir  William 
allow ;  and  accordingly,  his  own  doctrine  in  respect 
of  the  Philosophy  of  the  Absolute  outgoes  even 
Kant's.  "  The  Unconditioned  is  incognizable  and  in- 
conceivable, its  notion  being  only  negative  of  the  con- 
ditioned, which  last  can  alone  be  positively  known  or 
conceived."  *  Such,  in  contrast  with  the  diverse 
opinions  of  Kant,  Schelling,  and  Cousin,  is  Sir  Will- 
iam  Hamilton's  statement  of  his  own  opinion  on  the 
question  of  the  Absolute.     To  the  Ontology  of  Plato's 

•  Art.  "  Philosophy  of  the  Unconditioned  : "  Dwotwwoiw,"  p.  12. 


RECENT   BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


119 


philosophy,  or  of  Spinoza's,  or  of  the  Oriental  systems, 
little  reference  is  made  in  the  course  of  the  discussion. 
How  is  Sir  William  Hamilton's  ontological  doc- 
trine, if  we  may  so  call  a  doctrine  which  simply  repu- 
diated Ontology,  to  be  reconciled  with  those  parts  of 
his  Philosophy  which  we  have  had  already  before  us 
— i.  e,  with  the  transcendentalism  of  his  Psychologi- 
cal theory,  and  with  the  IsTatural  Eealism  of  his  cos- 
mological  conception  ?    Here  I  am  not  sure  but  he 
would  have  avoided  certain  chances  of  misapprehen- 
sion if  he  had  persistently  employed  some  such  dis- 
tinct triplicity  of  terms,  in  describing  the  main  divis- 
ions of  philosophical  inquiry,  as  that  which  we  have 
ventured  to  think  desirable.     Thus,  at  first  sight,  it 
seems  difficult  to  reconcile  his  strongly  asserted  prin- 
ciple that  all  our  knowledge  can  only  be  of  the  rela- 
tive or  phaenomenal,  and  can  never  reach  substances  or 
things  in  themselves,  with  his  resolute  ISTatural  Eealism. 
Has  he  not  spoken,  for  example,  of  a  direct,  immedi- 
ate presentative,  or  face-to-face  knowledge  of  the  ex- 
ternal world  of  matter  as  given  in  every  act  of  con- 
sciousness ?    Has  he  not  even  spoken  of  solidity,  fig- 
ure, size,  and  other  so-called  "  primary  qualities  "  of 
matter,  as  being  qualities  to  be  attributed  to  natural 
objects,  considered  in  themselves,  or  in  their  own 
proper  nature,  and  as  herein  distinguishable  fi'om  the 
so-called  "  secondary  "  or  "  secundo-primary  "  qualities, 


120 


RECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


121 


whicli  have  their  origination  more  or  less  witldn  the 
sentiency  ?  Does  he  not  here  seem  to  imply  that  our 
knowledge  of  matter  is,  to  a  considerably  large  ex- 
tent, real  and  not  phaenomenal — a  knowledge  of  the 
very  thing  itself?  Sir  William  seems  to  have  been 
aware  that  there  might  be  this  apparent  inconsistency 
between  those  portions  of  his  writings  in  which  he  ex- 
pounded his  disbelief  in  the  possibility  of  an  Ontology. 
He  several  times  incidentally  guards  himself  by  antici- 
pation against  the  objection.  Thus, "  I  have  frequent- 
ly asserted  that  in  perception  we  are  conscious  of  the 
external  object  immediately  and  in  itself.  This  is  the 
doctrine  of  Natural  Kealism.  But,  in  saying  that  a 
thing  is  known  in  itself,  I  do  not  mean  that  this  ob- 
ject is  known  in  its  absolute  existence — ^that  is,  out 
of  relation  to  us.  This  is  impossible ;  for  our  knowl- 
edge is  only  of  the  relative.  To  know  a  thing  in  it- 
self or  immediately  is  an  expression  I  use  merely  in 
contrast  to  the  knowledge  of  a  thing  in  a  representa- 
tion "  or  mediately,"  *  Perhaps  it  might  have  been 
well  if  Sir  William  had  more  strongly  and  repeatedly 
discriminated  that  sense  of  the  phrase  "  knowledge  of 
a  thing  in  itself"  in  which  he  maintained  that  we  pos- 
sess such  knowledge,  and  that  other  sense  of  the 
phrase  in  which  he  denied  such  knowledge  to  be  pos- 
sible.   He  might  have  done  so  by  declaring  that  in 

*  Edition  of  Reid,  p.  866,  footnote. 


the  former  case  he  was  speaking  cosmologically^  in  the 
latter  ontologically.  His  meaning,  at  all  events,  may 
be  explained  as  follows :  Gosmologically^  or  in  respect 
of  that  conception  of  the  phaenomenal  Cosmos  which 
is  to  be  taken  as  the  ultimate  revelation  of  conscious- 
ness, I  am  a  Natural  Eealist ;  that  is,  I  believe  the 
ultimate  and  universal  fact  of  consciousness,  as  given 
in  every  act  of  external  perception,  to  be  the  antithe- 
sis of  two  independent  but  mutually-related  factors — 
an  Ego  or  Percipient,  and  a  Non-Ego  or  Percept. 
Firmly  to  distinguish  between  these  two,  so  that 
neither  may  be  merged  in  the  other,  I  hold  to  be  of 
extreme  importance  in  view  of  various  philosophical 
consequences.  Now,  though,  on  analysis,  I  find  cer- 
tain of  the  qualities  popularly  attributed  to  material 
objects  to  be  only  affections  of  the  sentient  Ego  some- 
how occasioned  by  the  objects,  yet  there  are  others  of 
the  qualities  of  matter — ^the  so-called  primary  quali- 
ties— ^which  I  consider  to  belong  really  to  the  external 
material  objects  apart  from  the  perceiving  mind.  In 
respect  of  these  I  say  that  we  have  a  direct  and  imme- 
diate knowledge  of  matter  as  it  is  in  itself.  But,  in 
talking  so,  I  am  still  talking  only  cosmologically — ^.  e. 
I  am  only  settling  accounts  between  the  two  cosmi- 
cal  factors.  When  I  proceed  to  talk  ontologically^  my 
language  must  be  different.  From  this  point  of  view, 
both  the  factors  are  phaenomenal ;  that  antithesis  of 


■IBWHil— i"irii 


122 


EECENT   BKmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


the  two  wldcli  I  hold  to  be  revealed  in  every  act  of 
perception  is  but  a  phsenomenon ;  consciousness  itself 
is  bnt  a  phsenomenon ;  the  Cosmos  is  a  stupendous 
phaenomenon,  with  a  character  of  duality.  By  my 
constitution  I  feel  myself  constrained  to  believe  that 
these  phsenomena,  are  phsenomenal  of  a  Somewhat ; 
but,  when  you  ask  me  of  what  they  are  phsenomenal, 
I  can  only  say  "  of  an  Unknown."  Here  I  confront 
an  impenetrable  mystery,  for  my  knowledge  is  and 
can  be  only  of  the  relative.  Thus  I  who,  talking  cos- 
mologically,  maintained  that  we  have  to  some  extent 
a  knowledge  of  matter  "  as  it  is  in  itself,"  meaning 
thereby  only  to  partition  rightly  between  the  phae- 
nomenal  Percipient  and  the  phsenomenal  Percept, 
must  now,  while  talking  ontologically,  declare  all 
knowledge  of  Mind  in  itself,  or  of  Matter  in  itself,  or 
of  the  cause  of  their  phsenomenal  antithesis,  to  be  equal- 
ly impossible.  Kightly  to  characterize  the  Phsenom- 
enal is  the  business  of  philosophy,  and  a  sufficiently 
important  and  difficult  business;  but  beyond  the 
Phsenomenal  all  possible  philosophy  sums  itself  up  in 
one  word — ^mystery,  incogitability,  inconceivability, 

nescience. 

Such  I  believe  to  be  a  fair  statement  of  Sir  Will- 
iam Hamilton's  ontological,  or  rather  anti-ontological 
doctrine,  in  connexion  with  his  cosmological  system 
of  Natural  Kealism.    Without  discussing  objections 


'1 


EEOENT  BEmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


123 


that  may  present  themselves — ^the  objection,  for  ex- 
ample, which  some  might  feel,  of  the  strangeness  of 
such  a  notion  of  the  phsenomenal  as  would  bind  us  to 
think  of  Matter  as  a  multiplex  phsenomenon  that 
would  persist  the  same  in  space,  multiplex  on  its  own 
account,  even  were  all  created  sentiency  abolished  to 
which  it  could  be  phsenomenal — ^let  us  attend  to  Sir 
William  Hamilton's  declarations  of  his  views  on  ques- 
tions of  Theology. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  was  a  Theist,  a  Supematu- 
ralist— no  philosopher  of  modem  times  more  strenu- 
ously, more  passionately  so.  Not  only  did  he  answer 
with  a  passionate  affirmative  the  first  question  of  all 
Ontology,  '^Is  there  a  Supernatural,  or  an  Absolute 
beyond  the  Phsenomenal,  and  on  which  the  Phsenom- 
enal depends  ? "  he  went  on,  not  a  whit  the  less  ve- 
hemently because  of  his  speculative  doctrine  of  the 
utter  unknowableness  of  the  Absolute,  to  assume  for 
himself,  and  to  avow  as  assumed  by  him,  certain  defi- 
nite beliefs  as  to  this  Absolute  in  relation  to  the  Uni- 
verse and  Mankind.  It  might  be  improper  to  refer  at 
any  length  to  what  is  known  in  this  connexion  of  Sir 
William  Hamilton  personally.  Suffice  it  to  declare 
that  this  thinker  of  most  severe  and  catholic  reason — 
to  whom  all  speculation  was  welcome  if  only  it  was 
sincere  and  able,  who  defended  philosophic  scepticism 
and  wished  there  were  more  of  it,  who  boldly  upheld 


m 


124 


EECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


the  fame  of  Hume  as  a  good  man  and  a  great  philos- 
opher, and  whose  respect  for  the  clergy  was  avowedly 
far  from  great — ^was  himself  liable  to  fits  of  theistic 
fervour  such  as  the  Church  seldom  hears  of  in  a 
modem  bishop.  There  are  writings  of  his  also  which 
prove  his  interest,  and  something  more  than  his 
scholarly  interest,  in  Christian  Theology.  He  found 
noble  men,  and  spirits  with  whom  he  could  sym- 
pathize, in  the  old  theologians,  from  Tertullian 
and  St.  AugTistine  downwards.  He  had  a  special 
admiration  of  Calvin,  and  he  would  have  laughed 
to  scorn  that  wretched  appreciation  of  this  great 
ecclesiastic  which  ignorance,  namby-pambyism,  and 
the  power  of  modern  theology,  have  of  late  joined 
to  make  current.  But  let  us  not  go  beyond  his  pure- 
ly philosophical  writings.  Even  there  we  shall  find 
expressions  predicating,  in  Sir  William's  own  name, 
certain  attributes  of  that  ultra  phsenomenal  Existence 
of  which  he  protests  that,  in  the  name  of  reason,  noth- 
ing whatever  can  be  predicated.  To  aver  such  an  ex- 
istence at  all,  to  assume  that  the  Phaenomenal  Uni- 
verse is  not  all  that  exists,  is  already  the  planting  of 
one  huge  predication  in  the  region  into  which  it  was 
declared  the  mood  of  predication  could  not  rationally 
go.  It  is  the  conversion  of  what  was  declared  to  be 
a  zero  into  a  vast,  if  vague,  positive.  But  the  appar- 
ent contradiction  does  not  stop  here.    "  To  suppose 


i 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


125 


their  falsehood,"  says  Sir  "William  in  one  place,  where 
he  is  speaking  of  these  primary  beliefs,  or  elements, 
or  consciousness,  for  which,  as  a  Transcendentalist  in 
Psychology,  he  contends,  "  is  to  suppose  that  we  are 
created  capable  of  intelligence  in  order  to  be  made  the 
victims  of  a  delusion,— that  God  is  a  deceiver,  and  the 
root  of  our  nature  a  lie.  But  such  a  supposition,  if 
gratuitous,  is  manifestly  illegitimate."*  Again, 
speaking  of  the  Constructive  Idealists  (called  by  him 
the  Cosmothetic  Idealists),  he  says,  "  The  Deity  on 
their  hypothesis  is  a  deceiver;  for  that  hypothesis 
assumes  that  our  natural  consciousness  deludes  us  in 
the  belief  that  external  objects  are  immediately,  and 
in  themselves,  perceived.  Either,  therefore,  maintain- 
ing the  veracity  of  God,  they  must  surrender  their  hy- 
pothesis ;  or,  maintaining  their  hypothesis,  they  must 
surrender  the  veracity  of  God."  t  l^othing  is  more 
characteristic  of  Sir  William  Hamilton  than  the  oc- 
currence of  such  hot  theistic  phrases  in  his  purely 
speculative  discussions.  They  never  occur  irrelevant- 
ly and  certainly  never  in  the  form  of  those  disgusting 
jpetitiones  prineipii  which  are  so  rife  in  the  argumen- 
tations of  clerical  and  other  writers,  who  in  their  viru- 
lent eagerness  to  blaspheme  an  opponent  whom  they 

*  "  On  the  Philosophy  of  Common  Sense."    Note  A ;  Edition  of 
Held,  p.  743. 
t  Ibid,  p.  751. 


126 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


127 


cannot  answer,  clutch  at  tlie  word  Atheist  and  its  cog- 
nates as  a  street  blackguard  does  at  stones  or  mud. 
Their  occurrence  is  very  differently  significant.  It  is, 
I  think,  nobly,  and  at  the  same  time  puzzlingly,  signifi- 
cant. For  are  not  these  phrases  most  intensely  and 
definitely  ontological,  and  has  not  Sir  William  for- 
sworn Ontology?  What  is  the  explanation?  How 
can  one  be  consistent  who  first  maintains  that  nothing 
can  be  predicated  speculatively  of  the  Absolute,  and 
then  proceeds  straightway  not  only  to  predicate  exist- 
ence of  the  Absolute,  but  to  speak  as  if  the  human  vir- 
tue of  veracity  must  also  be  predicated  of  the  same  ? 

From  Sir  William  here  we  have  substantially  the 
same  answer  as  from  Kant,  Fichte,  and  others.  Faith 
is  the  word  that  sums  up  the  answer.  "  The  sphere 
of  our  belief,"  says  Sir  William  Hamilton,  "  is  much 
more  extensive  than  the  sphere  of  our  knowledge; 
and  therefore  when  I  deny  that  the  infinite  can  by 
ns  be  Tcnown^  I  am  far  from  denying  that  by  us  it  is, 
must,  and  ought  to  be,  hdieved.^^  ^  !Now  I  am  pretty 
sure  that  I  express  the  general  feeling  of  all  who  are 
acquainted  with  Sir  William  Hamilton's  writings 
when  I  say  that,  of  all  the  gaps  which  they  leave  in 
the  interpretation  of  his  entire  system,  there  is  none 
which  it  would  have  been  so  interesting  to  see  filled 

*  Letter  to  Mr.  Henry  Calderwood,  appended   to   Lectures  on 
Metaphysics,  vol.  ii. 


Up  by  himself  as  that  which  the  above  extract  brings 
to  mind.    A  full  exposition  of  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton's views  of  Faith  in  its  connexion  with  Philoso- 
phy would  have  supplied  the  missing  keystone  to  the 
total  arch.    How  would  he  have  discriminated  Be- 
lief from  Knowledge  ?     How  would  he  have  distin- 
guished between  that  faith  in  the  Infinite  the  neces- 
sity and  obligation  of  which  he  so  strongly  upheld  and 
either  of  those  metaphysical  doctrines  which  he  dis- 
owned—Kant's supposition  of  "  the  notion  of  the  Un- 
conditioned as  being,  in  its  character  of  a  regulative 
principle  of  the  mind  itself,  more  than  a  mere  nega- 
tion of  the  Conditioned,"  or  Schelling's  doctrine  of  an 
"  intellectual  intuition  of  the  Absolute  "  ?     One  can 
divine,  or  infer  fi-om  expositions  of  his  disciples,  what 
might  have  been  the  nature  of  his  replies ;  but  the 
absence  of  a  full  exposition  from  himself  is  felt  as  a 
serious  blank.    Here,  in  the  shape  of  a  passing  note 
on  the  word  Belief  or  Faiih  as  one  of  the  terms  of  the 
philosophic  vocabulary,  is  perhaps  the  most  express 
statement  on  the  subject  which  he  has  left;— "Be- 
lief or  Faiih  (jriarLg,  Fides,  Croyance,  Foi,  Glaube, 
&c.),  simply  or  with  one  or  other  of  the  epithets,  nat- 
ural, ^primaryy  instinctive,  &c.,  and  some  other  ex- 
pressions of  a  similar  import,  as   Conviction,  Assent, 
Trust,  Adhesion,  Holding  for  true   or  real,  &c. 
{^vynarddeGig,  Assensus,  Fuerwahr-und-wirJclichhalten 


128 


EECENT  BEITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


P 


I" 


&c.),  have,  thougli  not  unobjectionable,  found  favour 
with  a  great  number  of  philosophers,  as  terms  where- 
by to  designate  the  original  warrants  of  cognition. 
Among  these  may  be  mentioned  Aristotle,  Lucretius, 
Alexander,  Clement  of  Alexandria,  Proclus,  Algazel, 
Luther,  Hume,  Eeid,  Beattie,  Hemsterhuis,  Kant, 
Heidenreich,  Fichte,  Jacobi,  Bouterweck,  Koppen, 
Ancillon,  Hermes,  Biunde,  Esser,  Elvanich,  &c.,  &c. 
IsTor  can  any  valid  objection  be  taken  to  the  express- 
ion. St.  Austin  accurately  says,  'We  Tcnow  what 
rests  upon  reason  /  we  helieve  what  rests  upon  author- 
ity.^ But  reason  itself  must  rest  at  last  upon  authority ; 
for  the  original  data  of  reason  do  not  rest  on  reason, 
but  are  necessarily  accepted  by  reason  on  the  author- 
ity of  what  is  beyond  itself.  These  data  are,  there- 
fore, in  rigid  propriety.  Beliefs  or  Trusts.  Thus  it  is 
that,  in  the  last  resort,  we  must,  perforce,  philosophi- 
cally admit  that  belief  is  the  primary  condition  of 
reason,  and  not  reason  the  ultimate  ground  of  belief. 
"We  are  compelled  to  surrender  the  proud  Intellige  ut 
credas  of  Abelard,  to  content  ourselves  with  the  hum- 
ble Crede  ut  intelUgas  of  Anselm."  ^  The  briefer 
definition  of  Faith  by  the  Apostle  f  would  probably 
have  been  accepted  by  Sir  William  as  conveying, 
quite  as  unexceptionable  as  any  words  of  his  own,  his 
whole  intended  meaning : — "  JSTow  faith  is  the  Bub- 


•  Edition  of  Reid,  p.  760. 


t  Heb.  xl  1—3. 


1 


EEOEirr  BRTTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


129 


stance  of  things  hoped  for,  the  evidence  of  things  not 
seen  (eori  6e  marig  eXm^ofJLevcjv  vTrooTaaig,  Trpayjtiarcov 
eXeyxog  ov  pXeno[ievG)v).  For  by  it  the  elders  obtained 
a  good  report.  Through  faith  we  understand  that  the 
worlds  were  framed  by  the  word  of  God,  so  that  things 
which  are  seen  were  not  made  of  things  which  do 
appear  {elg  rb  iif]  etc  tpaLvofievcov  ra  pXe7:6[ieva  yeyovevaiy^ 

In  respect  of  that  difierence  among  philoso- 
phers, therefore,  which  we  have  named  the  Ontolog- 
ical  Difference,  Sir  William  Hamilton  may,  on  the 
whole,  be  described  as  a  philosopher  who,  while 
denying  speculatively  in  the  strongest  terms  the 
possibility  of  an  Ontology,  was  himself  endowed  in 
an  almost  inordinate  degree  with  the  ontological  feel- 
ing or  passion.    Let  us  now  turn  to  Mr.  Mill. 

Fortunately,  while  these  pages  have  been  passing 
through  the  press,  there  has  been  published  an  essay 
of  Mr.  Mill's,  in  which,  while  characterizing  another 
philosopher  with  whom  he  has  a  general  and  admir- 
ing sympathy,  he  has  digested,  in  a  more  summary 
and  exact  form  than  it  would  be  easy  for  a  reader  of 
his  earlier  works  to  do,  his  views  on  the  metaphysical 
questions  at  present  concerning  us.*  I  avail  myself 
the  more  readily  of  this  essay,  because,  though  M. 
Comte  is  the  philosopher  criticised  in  it,  the  language 

*  Art.,    The  Positive  FUlosopTiy  of  Augmte  ComU  (signed  J.  S. 
M.),  in  the  Westminster  Keview,  April,  1865. 

6* 


|i 


I'  1' 


130 


EECENT  BEITTSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


1:> 


in  the  passages  wliich  I  shall  quote  is  evidently  ad- 
justed to  the  state  of  the  controversy  with  Sir  Will- 
iam Hamilton : — ^Mr.  Mill  hardly  likes  Comte's  terms 
"Positive"  and  "Positivism''  as  names  expressing 
the  character  of  his  Philosophy.  Thinking  that  the 
essential  principle  of  this  philosophy  is  its  thorough 
adhesion  to  the  Empirical  or  Experiential  theory  in 
Psychology,  as  opposed  to  the  theory  of  Transcen- 
dentalism, he  hints  that,  in  its  subjective  aspect,  it 
might  be  more  intelligibly  described  as  the  JExperi- 
ential  Philosophy,  or  the  Philosophy  of  JExperien- 
tialism^  and  that  in  its  objective  aspect,  the  synonyms 
for  it  might  be  the  PIiCBnomenal  Philosophy,  or  the 
Philosophy  of  PhcBnomenalism.  The  fundamental 
maxim  of  the  Philosophy,  at  all  events,  is  that  all  we 
know  or  can  know  anything  about  is  phaenomena. 
"  We  have  no  knowledge  of  anything  but  Phaenom- 
ena ;  and  our  knowledge  of  phaenomena  is  relative, 
not  absolute.  We  know  not  the  essence,  nor  the  real 
mode  of  production,  of  any  fact,  but  only  its  relations 
to  other  facts  in  the  way  of  succession  or  of  simili- 
tude. These  relations  are  constant — ^that  is,  always 
the  same  in  the  same  circumstances.  The  constant 
resemblances  which  link  phaenomena  together,  and 
the  constant  sequences  which  unite  them  as  antece- 
dent and  consequent,  are  termed  their  laws.  The 
laws  of  phaenomena  are  all  we  know  respecting  them. 


*■,* 


i 


EECENT  BBITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


131 


Their  essential  nature  and  their  ultimate  causes, 
either  efficient  or  final,  are  unknown  and  inscrutable 
to  us."  This  conception  of  human  knowledge,  Mr. 
Mill  goes  on  to  say,  does  not  belong  originally  to 
Comte,  or  to  any  thinker  in  particular.  It  has 
been  the  growing  conception  of  the  scientific  mind  of 
Europe  froin  the  time  of  Bacon,  Descartes,  and  Gali- 
leo. These  thinkers  had  it,  but,  almost  inevitably 
in  their  circumstances,  not  in  its  fuU  clearness.  "  It 
was,  however,  correctly  apprehended  by  Ifewton. 
But  it  was  probably  first  conceived  in  its  entire  gen- 
erality by  Hume."  Hume,  indeed,  carried  it  to  the 
uttermost,  "maintaining  not  merely  that  the  only, 
causes  of  Phaenomena  which  can  be  known  to  us 
are  other  phsenomena,  their  invariable  antecedents, 
but  that  there  is  no  other  kind  of  causes :  cause,  as 
he  interprets  it,  means  invariable  antecedent.  This 
is  the  only  part  of  Hume's  doctrine  which  was  con- 
tested by  his  great  adversary,  Kant.  .  .  .  Among  the 
direct  successors  of  Hume,  the  writer  who  has  best 
stated  and  defended  Comte's  fundamental  doctrine  is 
Dr.  Thomas  Brown.  The  doctrine  and  spirit  of 
Brown's  Philosophy  are  entirely  Positivist,  and  no 
better  introduction  to  Positivism  than  the  early 
part  of  his  Lectures  has  yet  been  produced.  Of 
living  thinkers  we  do  not  speak ;  but  the  same  great 
truth  formed  the  groundwork  of  all  the  speculative 


132 


EECENT  BltrnSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


' 


fi. 


^ 


philosophy  of  Bentham,  and  pre-eminently  of  James 
Mill.  Sir  William  Hamilton's  famous  doctrine  of 
the  Eelativity  of  Human  Knowledge  has  guided 
many  to  it,  though  we  cannot  credit  Sir  "William 
Hamilton  himself  with  having  understood  the  prin- 
ciple, or  heen  willing  to  assent  to  it  if  he  had," 

Let  us  attend  to  the  last  sentence.  Mr.  Mill  ac- 
cepts Sir  William  Hamilton's  doctrine  that  human 
kaowledge  can  only  he  of  the  Kelative  or  Phsenome- 
nal  and  not  of  the  Absolute ;  but  he  holds  this  doc- 
trine with  a  difference.  With  what  difference  ?  Here 
again  the  habit  of  clearly  distinguishing  between  the 
cosmological  part  of  a  philosopher's  creed  and  the  on- 
tological  part  will  be  found  convenient.  Sir  William 
Hamilton,  as  I  have  already  explained,  holds  the  on- 
tological  or  anti-ontological  doctrine  of  the  Eelativity 
of  Human  Knowledge  as  it  may  be  held  by  one  who 
is,  cosmologically,  a  Natural  Kealist ;  Mr.  Mill,  if  I 
mistake  not,  holds  the  same  doctrine  as  it  maybe  held 
by  one  who  is,  cosmologically,  a  Constructive  Ideal- 
ist. This  seems  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  the  philos- 
ophers whom  Mr.  Mill  cites  as  having,  before  Comte, 
held  the  doctrine  of  Eelativity  in  what  he  thinks 
the  true  form — to  wit,  Kewton,  Kant,  Thomas  Brown, 
Bentham,  and  James  Mill — ^were  all,  like  himself, 
Constructive  Idealists.  For  Hume,  it  will  be  noted, 
is  represented  by  Mr.  Mill  as  standing  by  himself  in 


1 


EECENT  BErnSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


133 


a  peculiar  position,  far  out  beyond  this  group,  in  re- 
spect of  his  form  of  the  Eelativity  Doctrine;  and 
Hume  was,  cosmologically,  a  Nihilist  or  Non-Substan- 
tialist.  Evidently,  therefore,  the  clue  to  the  differ- 
ence of  Mr.  Mill's  form  of  the  Eelativity  Doctrine 
from  Sir  William  Hamilton's  is  to  be  found  in  the 
prior  difference  of  their  cosmological  conceptions. 

The  matter  may  be  easily  brought  out.  Sir  Will- 
iam Hamilton  and  Mr.  Mill  agree  in  the  statement 
that  all  our  knowledge  is  of  the  phsenomenal  only,  but 
with  a  prior  difference  of  opinion  as  to  what  is  to  be 
considered  the  true  sphere  or  central  fact  of  the  Phse- 
nomenal.  Sir  William  considers  that  the  central 
fact  of  the  Phsenomenal  is  a  dualism  or  antithesis  of 
two  series  of  phsenomena,  given  immediately  in  con- 
sciousness, the  one  constituting,  if  we  let  ourselves 
think  a  substance  or  substratum  for  it,  the  Ego  or 
Mind,  the  other,  if  we  give  ourselves  a  similar  liberty, 
the  External  World  or  Matter.  The  whole  concep- 
tion of  the  phaenomenal  Cosmos  is  the  development, 
by  memory,  imagination,  and  science,  of  this  radical 
belief  of  the  consciousness.  It  is  this  Phsenomenal 
Cosmos  that  is  to  be  figured  as  hung,  so  far  as  specu- 
lation is  concerned,  in  an  infinity  of  the  Unknowable ; 
it  is  round  the  perimeter  of  this  Phsenomenal  Cosmos 
that  the  ontological  beats  everlastingly,  and  we  seem 
to  hear  the  roar  of  its  obdurate  silence.    With  Mr. 


134 


EECENT  BEITISH    PHILOSOPHT. 


RECENT  BBinSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


135 


4< 


1^ 


I'  ' 


Mill,  on  the  other  hand,  the  radical  fact  of  the  phse- 
nomenal  is  not  a  dualism  at  all,  but  simply  a  stream, 
a  flow,  a  succession  of  feelings,  sensations,  or  states  of 
consciousness.  Unwind  the  wrappages  of  the  Cosmos 
so  as  to  get  at  the  one  physical  fact  of  which  they  are 
all  self-swathings,  and  to  this  and  this  alone  we  must 
come.  All  knowledge,  all  belief,  all  known  exist- 
ence, has  been  generated  out  of  this  succession  of 
sensations  or  states  of  consciousness,  registering 
its  own  interrelations  of  recurrence,  co-existence, 
and  similitude.  The  paramount  fact  in  the  re- 
sult certainly  is  the  universal  persuasion  of  men  of 
their  own  existence  as  beings  distinct  from  an  external 
world  around  them.  But  this  is  a  leap  beyond  the 
original  datum.  Of  a  substance  or  substratum  of 
Mind,  or  a  substance  or  substratum  of  Matter,  under- 
lying the  phsenomenal  series  of  feelings  or  sensations 
— ^nay  even  of  a  phaenomenon  Mind  per  se  or  a  phse- 
nomenon  Matter  j[>er  se — ^we  do,  and  can,  know  noth- 
ing. In  speaking  of  such  substrata^  or  such  phsenom- 
ena  per  se^  and  much  more  in  averring  their  ulti- 
mate real  or  even  phsenomenal  distinctness,  we  make 
a  postulate  or  assumption,  which,  so  far  as  we  know, 
may  be  quite  illusive.  The  radical  datum  of  specu- 
lative Philosophy  is  not  "  CogitOj^  nor  is  it  "  JEst  cogi- 
tahile^^  but  only  "  Sunt  cogitationes.^^  Here,  if  I  do  not 
misrepresent  Mr.  Mill,  he  accepts,  for  the  moment  at 


least,  Hume's  utmost  sceptical  analysis  of  existence. 
But  he  is  not  by  any  means  anxious,  as  we  have  seen, 
for  any  purpose  of  philosophy,  to  remain  in  Hume's 
Non-substantialism  or  Nihilism.  He  is  willing  to  be 
a  substantialist  so  far  as  to  allow  the  existence  of  a 
substance  called  Mind,  which  is  the  seat  or  subject  of 
the  phsenomenal  cogitationes^  provided  always  it  is 
granted  that  this  substance  is  unknown  and  imknow- 
able,  and  that,  though  a  substance  as  regards  the  cogir 
tationes  which  are  then  thought  of  as  its  modifications, 
it  is  itself  only  a  phsenomenon.  This  brings  him  up 
to  Pure  Idealism,  so  that  he  may  exchange  the  propo- 
sition "Sunt  cogitationes'^^  for  the  proposition  "Cogir 
to^^  or,  with  reference  to  the  multiplicity  of  phsenom- 
enal sentiencies,  "  Cogitamus^^  or  "  Sunt  cogitantesP 
But  he  is  willing,  as  we  have  farther  seen,  to  go  be- 
yond even  this,  and,  by  allowing  not  only  a  thinking 
or  feeling  subject,  but  also  an  independent  external 
cause  of  sensations  in  such  a  subject  (always  an  un- 
known cause,  however,  and  only  phsenomenal  even 
were  it  known),  to  rank  himself,  with  the  majority  of 
philosophers,  among  the  Constructive  Idealists.  On 
the  whole,  this  is  the  system  which  he  practically  pre- 
fers. Sunt  cogitationes  /  immo^  si  placet^  sunt  cogi- 
tantes ;  sunt  etiam  fortasse  cogitahilia  extra  cogi- 
tcmtes  ;  hceo  tamen  cogitabilia^  si  guomodo  extcmt^  nihil 
certe  cogitationibvs  ipsis  consimilia  sunt  existinumda 


\ 


136 


BECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


137 


-so  we  may  fommlize  the  creed  of  Constructive 


Idealism  as  entertained  by  Mr.  Mill.    Now,  at  which- 
ever point  of  the  creed  we  stop,  it  is  evident  that  the 
phsenomenal  totality  which  it  orbs  forth  as  hung  in  an 
nnknown  and  nnknowable  infinite  is  not  the  same  as 
the  phsenomenal  totality  in  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
system  of  Natural  Eealism.    If  we  stop  at  the  cogi- 
iationes^  we  plunge  at  once  from  them,  as  from  a 
curdling  consistency  of  phsenomenal  thought-phan- 
tasms into  Ontology,  or  (Ontology  being  impossible) 
into  Nescience.    K  we  go  as  far  as  the  cogitantes^  we 
have,  as  the  phsenomenal  Cosmos,  Minds  or  Thinking 
Beings,  and  all  the  evolution  of  their  thoughts,  and 
from  that  comparative  solidity  we    take  the  same 
plunge  into  Nescience.    If  we  add  to  the  phaenom- 
enal  world,  as  Mr.  MiU  is  willing  to  do,  the  cogitOr 
Ulia  extra  cogitantes^  we  so  far  complicate  the  vision 
to  which  we  belong,  and  have  an  option  of  another 
phsenomenal  point  from  which  to  plunge  into  Nesci- 
ence.   But,  even  on  this  last  supposition — accompa- 
nied as  it  is  by  the  injunction  not  to  think  that  the 
external  objects  or  causes  of  sensation  which  act  upon 
consciousness  are  at  all  such  as  consciousness  repre- 
sents them — ^there  is  still  a  difference  between  the 
radical  phsenomenal  totality  of  Constructive  Idealism 
and  that  of  Natural  Eealism.    The  Cosmos,  in  the 
Bcheme  of  the  Constructive  Idealists,  grapples  the  Ab- 


solute, if  we  may  so  say,  by  one  available  anchor 
(Mind  seeking  its  cause),  and  would  grapple  it  by  an- 
other if  it  knew  where  to  find  that  other  (the  unknown 
external  cause  of  sensation,  for  which  also,  were  it 
realized,  a  cause  would  have  to  be  sought) ;  the  Cos- 
mos, in  the  scheme  of  the  Natural  Eealist,  grapples 
the  Absolute  by  two  anchors,  considered  equally 
available — ^Mind,  and  that  Material  Nature  which 
Mind  knows  face  to  face  as  phaBuomenally  existing 
out  of  itself. 

Seeing  it  is  confessed  by  both  parties  that  the 
grappling  is  hopeless — that  this  is  a  case  in  which  all 
anchors  and  all  chains  melt  the  moment  they  touch 
the  element  into  which  they  would  insert  themselves 
— ^the  difference  may  seem  unimportant.  But  it  did 
not  seem  unimportant  to  Sir  William  Hamilton ;  nor 
does  it  to  Mr.  Mill.  The  essential  battle  between 
these  two  philosophers,  indeed,  reduces  itself  to  the 
battle  cosmological — ^to  the  controversy  as  to  what 
the  phsenomenal  totality  readily  is  and  consists  of. 
As  to  the  impossibility  of  transcending  the  phsenom- 
enal speculatively  they  both  agree.  And  yet  with 
this  speculative  agreement  there  is  a  sentimental  di- 
versity. 

Newton,  Kant,  Thomas  Brown,  Bentham,  James 
Mill,  and  Comte  are  collectively  cited  by  Mr.  John 
Stuart  Mill  as  philosophers  who  had  realized  the  doc- 


ii 


138 


EECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


u       < 


1 


trine  of  the  Eelativity  of  Knowledge  in  what  lie  con- 
siders its  correct  form — that  is,  as  I  interpret,  had  ap- 
pended the  doctrine  to  a  cosmological  system  of  Con- 
structive Idealism,  and  not  to  any  such  cosmological 
system  as  the  Hamiltonian  one  of  Natural  Eealism. 
ISTow  it  requires  but  the  vaguest  recollection  of  these 
philosophers  severally  to  see  that,  though  thus 
grouped  together  as  all  in  the  right  speculatively  on 
the  Eelativity  question,  they  differed  enormously  in 
respect  of  the  state  of  sentiment  with  which  they  con- 
fronted the  Unknowability  to  which  they  confessed  in 
common.  ITewton  was  a  Theist  and  Theologian; 
Kant  was  a  Theist ;  Thomas  Brown  was  a  Theist ; 
of  the  others  it  may  certainly  be  said  that,  though 
they  never  denied  real  or  !Noumenal  existence  or 
causes  beyond  the  Phaenomenal  world,  they  were  not 
theologically  inclined.  Here,  then,  is  a  difference, 
and  one  of  immense  moment  practically,  among  some 
who  have  been  cited  as  all  in  the  right  speculatively 
on  the  great  doctrine  of  the  Eelativity  of  Knowledge, 
or  the  impossibility  of  an  Ontology.  How  is  this  ? 
Is  it  that  they  were  not  all  equally  in  the  right  in  their 
apprehension  of  the  doctrine,  that  there  adhered  to 
some  of  them  inconsistencies  which  they  had  not 
got  rid  of,  chips  of  the  ancient  egg-shell?  This  is 
not  the  explanation  which  Mr.  Mill  suggests.  His 
explanation  is  that  Theism,  and  Theology,  under  cer- 


RECEKT  BRinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


139 


tain  conditions,  still  are,  and  ought  to  be  allowed  to 
remain,  "open  questions"  in  the  most  advanced 
school  of  Philosophy.  Eeferring  to  M.  Comte,  and  to 
his  avowed  opinion  that,  when  properly  converted  to 
the  positive  mode  of  thought,  "  mankind  would  cease 
to  refer  the  constitution  of  Nature  to  an  intelligent 
wiU,  or  to  believe  at  all  in  a  Creator  and  Supreme 
Governor  of  the  world,"  Mr.  MiU  takes  occasion  to 
protest  that  this  was  unnecessarily  encumbering  the 
true  doctrine  of  Positivism,  or  the  Eelativity  of 
Knowledge,  with  a  religious  prejudice.  "  It  is  one  of 
M.  Comte's  mistakes,"  he  says,  "  that  he  never  allows 
of  open  questions."  And  he  thus  states  his  own  views 
of  the  whole  matter : — "  The  positive  mode  of  thought 
is  not  necessarily  a  denial  of  the  supernatural ;  it 
merely  throws  back  that  question  to  the  origin  of 
things.  If  the  universe  had  a  beginning,  its  begin- 
ning, by  the  very  conditions  of  the  case,  was  super- 
natural ;  the  laws  of  nature  cannot  account  for  their 
origin.  The  Positive  philosopher  is  free  to  form  his 
opinion  on  this  subject  according  to  the  weight  he  at- 
taches to  the  analogies  which  are  called  marks  of  de- 
sign, and  to  the  general  traditions  of  the  human  race. 
The  value  of  these  evidences  is  indeed  a  question  for 
Positive  philosophy,  but  it  is  not  one  on  which  Posi- 
tive philosophers  must  necessarily  be  agreed.  .  .  . 
Positive  philosophy  maintains  that,  within  the  exist- 


140 


EECEirr  BEmsH  philosophy. 


BECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


Ul 


^f 


ing  order  of  the  Universe,  or  rather  of  the  part  of  it 
Imown  to  US,  the  direct  detennining  cause  of  every 
phgenomenon  is  not  supernatural  but  natural.  It  is 
compatible  with  this  to  believe  that  the  universe  was 
created  and  even  that  it  is  continuously  governed  by 
an  Intelligence,  provided  we  admit  that  the  intelligent 
Governor  adheres  to  fixed  laws,  which  are  only  modi- 
fied or  counteracted  by  other  laws  of  the  same  dispen- 
sation, and  are  never  either  capriciously  or  providen- 
tially departed  from.''  This  is  as  explicit  a  statement 
as  is  to  be  found  in  Mr.  Mill's  writings  of  his  notion 
of  the  amount  of  ontological  sentiment  that  may  prop- 
erly mingle  with  philosophy  ;  nor  do  I  find  any  onto- 
logical passion  in  his  own  procedure  as  a  philosopher 
that  is  at  all  in  excess  of  this.  Herein,  I  repeat, 
there  is  a  contrast  between  him  and  Sir  William  Ham- 
ilton, even  where,  at  first  sight,  they  seem  most  near- 
ly to  agree. 

We  may  now  end  this  chapter.  The  result,  his- 
torically, is  that,  during  the  greater  portion  of  the 
last  thirty  years,  the  most  prominent  rival  leaders  in 
formal  or  systematic  British  speculation  have  been  two 
philosophers,  one  of  whom  may  be  described  as  a 
Transcendental  Natural  Realist,  forswearing  specula- 
tive Ontology,  but  with  much  of  the  ontological  pas- 
sion in  his  temper,  and  the  other  as  an  Empirical 


Idealist,  also  repudiating  Ontology,  but  doing  so  with 
the  ease  of  one  in  whom  the  ontological  feeling  was 
at  any  rate  suppressed  or  languid.  Transcendental 
Natural  Realism  in  Hamilton,  announcing  itself  as 
anti-ontological,  but  with  strong  theological  sympa- 
thies, and  Empirical  Constructive  Idealism  in  Mill, 
also  announcing  itself  as  anti-ontological,  but  consent- 
ing to  leave  the  main  theological  questions  open  on  cer- 
tain pretty  strict  conditions — such,  it  seems  to  me, 
were  the  two  philosophical  Angels  that  began  to  con- 
tend formally  for  the  soul  of  Britain  about  thirty  years 
ago,  and  that  are  still  contending  for  as  much  of  it  as 
has  not  in  the  meantime  transported  itself  beyond  the 
reach  of  either.  Whether  any  has  done  so,  and  how 
much,  and  where  it  has  gone,  are  matters  that  remain 
to  be  seen. 


142 


BECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


EEOENT  BBiriSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


Ii3 


[I 


CHAPTEE  III. 

EFFECTS  OP   EECENT  SCIENTIFIC  CONCEPTIOKS  ON 

PHILOSOPHY. 

However  earnestly  we  may  contend  for  sucli  a 
notion  of  Philosophy  as  shall  keep  np  the  tradition  of 
it  as  something  more  than  Science,  yet  the  perpetual 
liability  of.  Philosophy  to  modifications  at  the  hands 
of  Science  is  a  fact  obvious  to  all.  IN'ot  a  new  scien- 
tific discovery  can  be  made,  not  a  new  scientific  con- 
ception can  get  abroad,  but  it  exercises  a  disturbing 
influence  on  the  previous  system  of  thought,  antiquat- 
ing  something,  disintegrating  something,  compelling 
some  re-adjustment  of  the  parts  to  each  other,  some 
trepidation  of  the  axis  of  the  whole.  Sometimes  the 
action  is  almost  revolutionary.  What  a  derangement 
in  men's  ideas  about  everything  whatsoever,  what  a 
compulsion  to  new  modes  of  thinking  and  to  new 
habits  of  speech,  must  have  been  caused  by  the  prop- 
agation of  the   Copemican  Astronomy!     What  a 


wrench  to  all  one's  habits  of  thought,  to  be  taught 
that  the  little  ball  which  carries  us  rotates  on  itself, 
and  is  one  of  a  small  company  of  celestial  bodies  that 
perform  their  periodical  wanderings  round  the  sun, 
in  lieu  of  the  older  astronomical  faith,  according  to 
which  the  earth  was  fixed  in  the  centre,  and  the  lim- 
itless azure  with  its  fires  was  one  vast  spectacular 
sphere,  composed  of  ten  successive  and  independent 
spherical  transparencies,  made  to  wheel  round  the 
earth  diumally  for  her  solitary  pleasure!  Man's 
thoughts,  even  about  himself  and  his  destinies,  could 
not  but  be  changed  in  some  respects  by  this  compul- 
sion of  his  imagination  to  a  totally  new  way  of  fancy- 
ing physical  immensity  and  our  earth's  share  in  its 
proceedings.  True,  the  great  spiritualities  and  mo- 
ralities that  the  human  race  held  within  it,  and  that 
constituted  a  million-fold  more  truly  the  real  sub- 
stance of  its  life  than  all  its  accompanying  theories 
and  imaginations  of  things  physical — ^these  survived 
intact  and  uninterrupted.  We  read  the  old  poets 
now,  the  old  historians,  the  old  moralists,  with  no  ac- 
quired sense  that  they,  or  their  themes,  or  their  teach- 
ings at  the  deepest,  are  appreciably  removed  from  us 
because  of  their  pre-Copernicanism.  It  hardly  occurs 
to  us  to  remember  that  they  were  pre-Copemicans. 
What  does  it  matter,  in  respect  of  the  power  over  our 
hearts  and  spirits  as  we  read,  what  astronomical  sys- 


144 


EECENT  BKinSH   PHILOSOPHY, 


RECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


145 


If 


tern  we  may  fancy  we  detect  in  the  Book  of  Job  ? 
And  yet  not  tlie  less  true  is  it  that  even  the  spiritnaK- 
ties  and  moralities  that  constitute  the  essence  of  phi- 
losophy are  tremulous  to  our  imaginations  of  physical 
nature,  and  are  ever  re-adjusting  the  expressions  of 
themselves  to  the  new  conceptions   which  Science 
makes  imperative.    It  would  be  possible  to  point  out 
in  our  greatest  old  poets,  including  Shakespeare,  not 
only  pervading  peculiarities  of  phraseology,  but  even 
fashions  of  speculative  thought,  which  might  be  deb- 
ited to  their  pre-Copemicanism.^    And  so  through- 
out the  whole  history,  and  especially  the  recent  histo- 
ry, of  Philosophy.    It  is  not  every  day,  indeed,  nor 
every  century,  that  there  occurs  such  a  vast  compul- 
sory shifting  of  the  very  axis  of  men's  conceptions  of 
the  physical  universe  as  that  which  our  ancestors  had 
so  reluctantly  to  submit  to  only  a  century  or  two  ago. 
But  every  generation,  every  year   brings  with  it  a 
quantum  of  new  scientific  conceptions,  new  scientific 
truths.    They  creep  in  upon  us  on  all  sides.    Is  Phi- 
losophy to  stand  in  the  midst  of  them  haughtily  and 
superciliously,  taking  no  notice  ?    She  cannot  do  so 

*  Although  Copernicus  died  in  1543,  it  was  not  till  the  end  of  the 
seventeenth  century  that  Copernicanism  was  the  established  belief  even 
of  educated  European  minds.  If  it  was  the  Roman  Inquisition  that 
condemned  Galileo,  there  were  probably  fewer  persons  at  the  tune  in 
Britain  than  in  Italy  who  thought  Galileo's  opinion  right.  We  are 
apt  now  to  forget  this. 


and  live.  Whether  she  knows  it  or  not,  these  are  her 
appointed  food.  She  must  eat  them  up  or  perish. 
They  do  not  constitute  her  vitality,  any  more  than  the 
food  that  men  eat  constitutes  the  life  that  is  in  them ; 
but,  just  as  men,  in  order  merely  to  continue  alive, 
must  refresh  themselves  continually  with  food,  so  Phi- 
losophy, that  she  may  not  fall  down  emaciated  and 
dead  by  the  wayside,  must  not  only  not  hold  aloof  from 
Science,  but  must  regard  what  Science  brings  as  her 
daily  and  delicious  nutriment.  Whatever  definition 
of  Philosophy  we  adopt — ^whether  we  call  it  simply 
and  beautifully  with  Plato  in  one  passage  "  a  medita- 
tion of  Death,"  or  adopt  some  of  the  more  laboured 
definitions  that  have  been  given  expressly  to  indicate 
its  relations  to  Science — ^it  is  equally  certain  that 
a  philosophy  that  should  be  out  of  accord  with  any 
ascertained  scientific  truth  or  tendency  to  truth,  or 
that  should  not  in  some  efficient  manner  harmonize 
for  the  reason  all  the  conceptions  and  informations  of 
contemporary  science,  would  be  of  no  use  for  educated 
intelligences,  and  would  exist  as  a  refuge  for  others 
only  by  sufterance.  Shall  Philosophy  pretend  to 
regulate  the  human  spirit,  and  not  know  what  is  pass- 
ing within  it — ^to  supervise  and  direct  man's  think- 
ings, and  not  know  what  they  are?  We  can  all 
admire,  indeed,   and    understand,    the    feeling    of 

Wordsworth  when  he  says : 

7 


I 


146  KEOENT  BEmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 

"Great  God!  Td  rather  be 
A  Pagan  suckled  in  a  creed  outworn, 
60  might  I,  standing  on  this  pleasant  lea, 
Have  glimpses  that  would  make  me  less  forlorn, 
Have  sight  of  Proteus  rising  from  the  sea, 
Or  hear  old  Triton  blow  his  wreathed  horn." 

We  can  feel  with  tlie  poet  in  this  passionate  outburst. 
But  need  we  be  suckled  in  an  "  outworn  creed "  to 
hope  for  these  glorious  glimpses  ?  Those  mysterious 
sights  and  sounds  that  took  the  lightsome  Greek 
with  such  quick  awe  and  ravishment  by  the  shore  of 
some  ancient  bit  of  blue  ^gean  bay,  rise  they  not 
yet,  are  they  not  to  be  heard  yet,  the  same  Proteus, 
the  same  horn  of  Triton,  by  the  shore  of  a  greyer 
and  grander  ocean  ?  And  what  though  the  glimpses 
should  not  aU  be  pleasant?  What  though  they 
should  make  some  of  us,  for  a  moment  or  so,  con- 
sciously more  forlorn !  Is  there  not  good  in  such  sor- 
row itself? 

In  no  age  so  conspicuously  as  in  our  own  has 
there  been  a  crowding  in  of  new  scientific  concep- 
tions of  aU  kinds  to  exercise  a  perturbing  influence 
on  Speculative  Philosophy.  They  have  come  in 
almost  too  fast  for  Philosophy's  powers  of  reception. 
She  has  visibly  reeled  amid  their  shocks,  and  has  not 
yet  recovered  her  equilibrium.  Within  those  years 
alone  which  we  are  engaged  in  surveying  there  have 


I. ' 


1 


RECENT  BRmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


147 


been  developments  of  native  British  science,  not  to 
speak  of  influxes  of  scientific  ideas,  hints,  and  proba- 
bilities from  without,  in  the  midst  of  which  British 
Philosophy  has  looked  about  her  scared  and  bewil- 
dered, and  has  felt  that  some  of  her  oldest  statements 
about  herself,  and  some  of  the  most  important  terms 
in  her  vocabulary,  require  re-explication.  I  think 
that  I  can  even  mark  the  precise  year  1848  as  a 
point  whence  the  appearance  of  an  unusual  amount 
of  unsteadying  thought  may  be  dated — as  if,  in  that 
year  of  simultaneous  European  irritability,  not  only 
were  the  nations  agitated  politically,  as  the  news- 
papers saw,  but  conceptions  of  an  intellectual  kind 
that  had  long  been  forming  themselves  underneath  in 
the  depths  were  shaken  up  to  the  surface  in  scientific 
journals  and  books.  There  are  several  vital  points 
on  which  no  one  can  now  think,  even  were  he  receiv- 
ing four  thousand  a  year  for  doing  so,  as  he  might 
very  creditably  have  thought  seventeen  years  ago. 
There  have  been  during  that  period,  in  consequence 
of  revelations  by  scientific  research  in  this  direction 
and  in  that,  some  most  notable  enlargements  of  our 
views  of  physical  nature  and  of  history — enlarge- 
ments even  to  the  breaking  down  of  what  had  for- 
merly been  a  wall  in  the  minds  of  most,  arid  the  sub- 
stitution on  that  side  of  a  sheer  vista  of  open  space. 
But  there  is  no  need  of  dating  from  1848,  or  from 


148 


EECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EEOENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


149 


■! 


any  other  year  in  particular.  In  all  that  we  have 
recently  seen  of  the  kind  there  has  been  but  the  pro- 
longation of  an  action  from  Science  npon  Philos- 
ophy that  had  been  going  on  for  a  considerable  time 
before  1848.  It  had  been  going  on  before  British 
Philosophy  had  assumed  what  I  wiU  now  venture  to 
call  it^  penultimate  shape,  or  opposition  of  shapes — ^to 
wit,  that  shape,  or  opposition  of  shapes,  which  it  be- 
gan to  assume  about  thirty  years  ago,  when  Hamil- 
ton and  Mill  presented  themselves  as  the  likeliest 
chiefs  of  formally  opposed  systems. 

It  is  nine  years  since  Sir  "William  Hamilton  died ; 
and,  with  hardly  an  exception,  all  his  philosophical 
remains,  as  they  are  now  before  the  world,  had  left 
his  pen  ten  years  before  that — or  more  than  nineteen 
years  ago.*^  Assume  that  there  was — as  his  open- 
mindedness  and  his  insatiable  appetite  for  all  kinds 
of  knowledge  make  it  likely  that  there  was — ^the 
most  perfect  adjustment  in  his  own  mind  of  his  phil- 
osophical system  at  that  time  to  the  surrounding  me- 
dium of  the  best  and  widest  scientific  conceptions. 
StiQ,  is  it  not  possible  that,  in  the  lapse  of  time,  his 
system,  or  some  portion  of  it,  may  have  lost  its  hite 
upon  the  British  mind?  May  it  not  be  different 
questions  that  the  intellect  of  the  age  is  now  refer- 

*  His  Lectures  on  Metaphysics  and  Logic,  though  posthumously 
published,  had  been  in  manuscript  substantially  as  they  are  before  1838. 


ring  to  Philosophy,  or,  if  the  same  questions,  may  not 
the  forms  of  them  be  changed  ?  As  regards  Mr.  Mill 
the  case  is,  happily,  different.  He  is  still  among  us 
to  hear  what  new  questions  are  asked,  or  what  new 
forms  old  questions  assume,  and  to  further  Philosophy 
by  his  answers.  His  Philosophy  is  not  yet  com- 
pleted. Indeed,  it  has  been  the  characteristic  of  his 
writings  hitherto  that  they  rather  avow  and  assume 
the  metaphysical  principles  of  his  system,  and  pro- 
ceed to  rich  and  interesting  applications  of  them, 
than  fundamentally  discuss  them.  Hence,  up  to  the 
present  moment,  and  waiting  what  to-morrow  may 
bring  forth,^  I  am  still  inclined  to  hold  that  the  state 
of  British  Philosophy,  as  represented  by  Mill  in  con- 
trast with  Hamilton,  in  respect  of  the  questions 
selected  in  last  chapter  as  most  important,  cannot  be 
considered  the  ultimate  state,  but  only  the  penulti- 
mate. Neither  Hamilton's  writings,  nor  Mill's,  nor 
both  together,  present  these  questions  in  the  exact 
form  in  which,  so  far  as  I  see,  it  would  be  now  neces- 
sary to  put  them. 

*  Written  in  anticipation  of  Mr.  Mill's  Examination  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton's  Fhilosopht/,  which  had  been  announced,  but  had  not  ap- 
peared, when  this  part  of  the  text  of  these  pages  was  in  type.  What 
reference  to  this  work  seems  necessary  for  the  purposes  of  these 
pages  will  be  made  farther  on.  My  references  to  Mr.  Mill  in  the  pres- 
ent and  previous  parts  of  the  text  are  to  be  considered  independent  of 
that  work,  or  such  as,  after  my  first  perusal  of  that  work,  I  have 
thought  fit  to  let  stand,  as  true  for  the  period  referred  to. 


150 


EECENT  BEmSH   PHTLOSOPHT. 


il 


) 


Let  us  take  the  state  of  the  controversy  between 
the  two  opposed  psychological  theories  of  Empiricism 
and  Transcendentalism,  as  it  is  exhibited  in  Mill's 
writings,  and  Hamilton's.  I  do  not  think  that  what 
is  exhibited  there  is  the  exact  present  state  of  the  con- 
troversy. Believing  that  Transcendentalism  and  Em- 
piricism are  still  locked  in  each  other's  grips  and 
struggling  with  each  other  as  of  old,  I  do  not  think 
that  they  are  now  gripping  each  other  and  struggling 
precisely  as  we  see  them  in  the  writings  of  Hamilton 
and  Mill.  Kay,  more,  it  seems  to  me  that,  of  the  two 
writers,  Mill  is,  in  this  respect,  the  farther  back. 

Whatever  Mr.  Mill  may  think  of  the  value  to  gen- 
eral philosophy  of  Berkeley's  prosecution  of  Locke's 
doctrine  into  Idealism,  and  of  Hume's  more  exhaust- 
ive thinking  out  of  the  same  into  imiversal  Scepticism, 
he  seems,  like  previous  English  thinkers,  to  have  re- 
garded these  early  metaphysical  demonstrations  in 
the  path  of  Lockism  only  as  air-clearing  explosions, 
after  which  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  pursue  the 
path  all  the  same.  Be  it,  as  Hume  has  shown,  that 
all  that  Man  is  presented  with  is  a  mere  vision  or 
phaenomenal  aggregate  of  mental  co-existences  and  se- 
quences floating  in  a  void,  still,  as  this  is  the  only  uni- 
verse of  Knowledge  that  man  has  got,  and  as  it  is 
mightily  real  for  A^m,  he  must  have  a  philosophy  for 
it !    Now,  all  the  more,  rather  than  aU  the  less,  for 


EEOElSrT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


151 


this  shutting  up   of  the  human  mind  conclusively 
in  a    phsenomenal   world  of   co-existences  and    se- 
quences with  which  to  have  commerce,  that  philos- 
ophy must  be  Lockism !    Experience  is  the  only  rule 
for  such  a  Universe  at  any  rate,  whatever  might  be 
the  rule  for  others !    In  this  spirit,  and  with  very  much 
this  appreciation  of  Hume's  speculative  services  to 
Philosophy,  Hartley  and  Priestley  proceeded  straight- 
forward from  Locke.    Now  Mr.  Mill  seems,  as  re- 
gards his  fundamental  psychological  theory,  to  pro- 
ceed straight  from  Locke  too.    He  speaks  with  es- 
teem of  Hartley  and  Priestley,  and  more  especially 
of  Hartley.     "  With  respect,"  he  says,  "  to  those  of 
Locke's  doctrines  which  are  properly  metaphysical, 
however  the  sceptical  part  of  them  may  have  been 
followed  up  by  others,  and  earned  beyond  the  point  at 
which  he  stopped,  the  only  one  of  his  successors  who 
attempted   and  achieved   any  considerable  improve- 
ment and  extension  of  the  analytical  part,  and  there- 
by added  anything  to  the  explanation  of  the  human 
mind  on  Locke's  principles,  was  Hartley."  ^    This 
certainly  implies  a  belief  on  Mr.   Mill's  part  that 
Locke's  principle  of  experience  was  susceptible  of  far- 
ther scientific  development,  and  that  Hartley  contrib- 
uted to  that  development  by  bringing  his  physiologi- 
cal method  to  the  aid  of  psychology— ^.  e.  by  his  study- 

•  Essay  on  Coleridge :  Dissertations^  vol.  L 


i 


152 


EECENT  BBmSH  PHILOOPHY. 


i 


ing  the  radical  mental  plisenomenon,  sensation,  in  and 
throngli  its  physical  equivalent    or  concomitant  of 
nerve-vibration.    But  Mr.  Mill,  for  himself,  seems  to 
have  abandoned  that   method,  with  only  his   good 
wishes,    fie  seems,  for  himself,  rather  to  avoid  that 
mode  of  speech  or  of  thought  respecting  the  mind 
which  would  refer  the  origin  of  our  ideas,  habits, 
knowledge,  and  beliefs  to  infinite  numbers  of  past 
nerve-vibrations  treasured  up  in  the  organism,  there 
associated  in  all  varieties  of  simple  and  compound 
combination,  and  recoverable  on  stimulus  or  demand. 
He  prefers,  in  the  main,  the  older  language  of  the 
pure  psychologists,  who  speak  of  Experience  simply  as 
Experience,  and  begin  their  cognizance  of  mental  ac- 
tions when  they  may  be  observed  as  phaenomena,  oc- 
curring, so  to  speak,  within  an  inner  chamber  called 
Mind  or   Consciousness,  through  whatever  nervous 
labyrinths  they  came  there,  or  by  whatever  nervous 
mechanism  they  were  generated.    I  am  not  sure  but 
there  is  involved  in  this,  among  other  things,  a  protest 
on  Mr.  Mill's  part  against  the  resolution  of  Empiri- 
cism into  Sensationalism.    If  he  would  let  the  word 
Empiricism  itself  stand,  as,  though  objectionable,  yet 
so  far  an  established  name  in  the  Schools  for  Philos- 
ophy on  Locke's  principle,  he  would  certainly  disown 
Sensationalism  as  an  odious  nickname  even  for  this 
Empiricism.    Thus  he  rejects,  almost  with  loathing, 


EECENT  BEniSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


153 


the  philosophy  of  Condillac  and  his  school.    He  con- 
siders that  philosophy  an  unwarrantable  degradation 
of  the  philosophy  of  Locke,  and  believes  that  it  did 
more  than  anything  else  to  bring  Locke's  name  into 
disrepute.    In  what  form,  he  asks,  did  Locke's  pHlos- 
ophy  present  itself  to  European  critics  towards  the 
end  of  the  last  century  and  the  beginning  of  the  pres- 
ent ?    "  In  that,"  he  says,  "  of  the  shallowest  set  of 
doctrines  which  perhaps  were  ever  passed  off  upon  a 
cultivated  age  as  a  complete  psychological  system— 
the  ideology  of  Condillac  and  his  school ;  a  system 
which  affected  to  revolve  all  the  phaenomena  of  the 
human  mind  into  sensation  by  a  process  which  event- 
ually consisted  in  merely  calling  all  states  of  mind, 
however  heterogeneous,  by  that  name ;  a  philosophy 
now  acknowledged  to  consist  solely  of  a  se*  of  verbal 
generalizations,    explaining    nothing,    distinguishing 
nothing,  leading  to  nothing."  *    From  this  passage  it 
appears  that,  with  whatever  kindliness  Mr.    Mill, 
when  it  was  written,  looked  upon  the  English  Hart- 
ley's psychological  inroad  upon  psychology,  he  viewed 
with  anything  but  liking  the  French  Condillac's  ex- 
tended reduction  of  Psychology  under  Physiology  by 
the  generalization  that  all  our  thoughts,  powers,  and 
feelings  are  but  transformed  sensation. 

The  upshot  then  is  that  Mr.  Mill's  statement  of 

♦  Essay  on  Coleridge,  1840,  reprinted  in  MiU's  Dmeriatiom. 

1* 


■•^ 


154r 


EECENT  BBmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


BEOEHT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


155 


r^ 


It 


his  ftmdamental  psychological  theory  does  not  diflFer 
much  from  Locke's.  "  We  see  no  ground  for  believ- 
ing," he  says,  "  that  anything  can  be  the  object  of  our 
knowledge  except  our  experience,  and  what  can  be  in- 
ferred from  our  experience  by  the  analogies  of  experi- 
ence itself;  nor  that  there  is  any  idea,  feeling,  or 
power  in  the  human  mind  which,  in  order  to  account 
for  it,  requires  that  its  origin  should  be  referred  to 
any  other  source."  "^  And  again,  "  Not  only  what 
man  knows,  but  what  he  can  conceive,  depends  upon 
what  he  has  experienced" — where  Mr.  Mill  must 
mean  "  wholly  depends."  f  Other  passages  might  be 
cited,  but,  so  far  as  I  remember,  with  no  essential 
change  in  the  wording  of  the  principle. 

Kow  it  seems  to  me  that  Mr.  Mill,  starting  with 
his  princij)le  in  a  form  so  little  differing  in  appear- 
ance from  Locke's,  has  to  run  the  gauntlet  over  again 
of  all  those  objections  which  were  levelled  at  Locke's, 
and  from  which  it  certainly  did  not  escape  unscathed. 
In  the  end  (he  will  be  told,  whether  justly  or  not) 
his  "  Experience  "  must  mean  "  Sensation  "  and  noth- 
ing more ;  for  any  allowance  for  the  mind's  conscious- 
ness of  its  proceedings  with  the  matter  given  it  in 
sensation,  whether  under  Locke's  name  of  Reflection, 
or  any  other,  is,  it  will  be  reiterated,  either  a  sur- 
render of  the  principle,  or  an  addition  which  turns  out 

*  Essay  on  Coleridge.  f  Logic,  H.  109,  110. 


H 


f  I 


►' 


5 


meaningless,  inasmuch  as  blank  conscious  retention  of 
a  deposit  adds  nothing  to  the  deposit.  Then,  farther, 
this  reduction  of  the  mind  aboriginally  to  a  pure  pas- 
sivity to  sensation,  a  mere  receiving-surface  for  mat- 
ter of  experience,  is  liable  to  all  the  old  objections 
afresh.  Leibnitz  again  starts  up  with  his  irrefragable 
"  nisi  intellectua  ijpseJ^  The  mind  must  be  more  than 
a  pure  passivity  or  receiving-surface ;  it  must  be  an 
organism  of  some  kind,  treating  what  is  put  upon  it  or 
into  it  in  some  manner  or  manners  dependent  on  its 
structure.  The  a  priori  nature  of  the  intellectus  ijpse 
must,  from  the  first,  be  a  co-efficient  with  matter  of 
experience  in  the  production  of  thought  or  knowledge. 
On  the  whole,  Condillac's  theory,  which  Mr.  Mill 
speaks  of  with  so  much  dislike,  would  seem  at  this 
point  to  be  the  most  natural  resting-ground  for  Mr. 
Mill  himself  as  we  can  conceive  him  so  pursued  by 
Transcendentalist  critics.  Condillac  does  furnish  a 
way  of  looking  at  the  thing  by  which  the  a  jpriori 
element,  the  co-efficiency  of  anything  in  the  shape  of 
an  endowed  intellectus  ipse^  might  be  reduced  to  a 
mvnimum.  All  the  so-called  feelings  and  powers  of  the 
mind  are,  according  to  him,  conceivable  as  so  much 
past  sensation  transformed,  indurated,  or  concreted, 
by  repetition  and  association,  into  faculty  or  organ. 
Give  him,  therefore,  the  smallest  speck  of  sentiency  to 
begin  with,  and  the  rest  would  require  but  suitable 


I 

/ 


I 


) 


'•3, 


i 


156 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


food  for  this  sentiency,  and  time  for  its  accnmnlated 
sensations  to  transform  themselves  into  the  various 
habits  or   faculties  of  organized    mind.      But  here 
arises  Kant  to  confront  even  Condillac,  and  to  main- 
tain that  his  theory  is  but  a  delusive  resting-ground. 
Sentiency  itself,  Kant  declares,  involves  an  d  priori 
element ;  there  can  be  no  sentiency,  any  more  than 
there  can  be  thinking  or  intellection,  except  accord- 
ing to  innate  forms,  or  laws,  of  the  sentient  subject. 
Nothing  is  gained  then  by  going  with  Condillac.    In 
for  a  pennyworth  of  the  d  priori  element,  you  inay  as 
well  go  in  for  a  pound's  worth !    And  so  Kant,  not 
because  he  desired  any  such  hap-hazard  plunge  into 
Transcendentalism  in  mere  despite,  but  really  because 
he  aimed  at  as  rigid  an  economy  as  possible  of  that  d 
priori  element,  some  considerable  amount  of  which 
seemed  requisite  to  account  for  the  facts  of  Experience, 
hung  up  his  famous  definition  or  schema  of  the  Mind 
of  Man,  as  a  something  feeling  in  Space  and  Time, 
thinking  according  to  Quantity,  Quality,  Kelation,  and 
Modality,  and  carrying  in  it  intuitions  of  such  supra- 
sensuous  objects  as  God,  the  Soul,  and  the  Universe. 
Kant  was  cognisant  of  all  that  the  Physiology  of  his 
time  had  done  or  proposed  to  do  for  the  relief  or  help 
of  Psychology ;  and,  though  his  own  method  was  the 
psychological,  he  would  doubtless  have  been  willing 
enough,  for  some  purposes,  to  think  of  Man  after  the 


1 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


157 


manner  of  the  physiologists.     "  Give  me  an  organ- 
ism,'' he  might  have  said,  "  having  the  potencies  and 
functions  enumerated  in  my  Schema,  and,  whatever 
is  the  look  of  it,  or  however  it  came  to  be,  I  will  call 
that  Man  or  Human  Reason."    But  it  was  a  Soul,  a 
Spirituality,  an  Invisibility,  an  unbounded  dynami- 
cal Something,  possessing  these  potencies  and  ftmc- 
tions,  and  not  a  Brain  and  Body,  that  he  recom- 
mended Philosophy  to  think  of  as  the  real  organism. 
The  question  at  the  end  of  last  century  thus  really 
was  whether  Kant's  notion  of  Mind  or  Condillac's 
should  prevail,  whether  Man  should  be  regarded  by 
Philosophy  psychologically  or  physiologically,  wheth- 
er the  Anima  should  be  studied  in  itself  as  hereto- 
fore or  only  through  the  Animal.    Rightly  or  wrong- 
ly, the  latter — ^the  study  of  mind  only  physiologically, 
of  Man  as  an  animal  organism — ^was  that  to  which 
Lockism,  partly  in  England  itself,  and  more  generally 
in  France,  had  led.     The  reduction  of  Locke's  "  ex- 
perience "  simply  to  "  sensations  "  had  fastened  atten- 
tion on  sensibility  as  the  radical  or  initial  property  of 
the  Animaj  out  of  the  action  of  which  all  else  might 
be  shown  to  result  as  product  or  accretion ;  and  sensi- 
bility was  precisely  that  in  the  Anima  the  study  of 
which,  if  undertaken  on  its  account,  would  have  com- 
pelled attention  to  the  bodily  and  especially  the  ner- 
vous organization  of  the  Animal.    But,  in  truth,  it 


i'^ 


i 


' 


!==r 


158 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


was  not  so  much  that  Psychology  had  called  in  Phys- 
iology ;  it  was  that  Physiology  came  in  upon  Psychol- 
ogy in  its  own  natural  course  as  a  conquering  power. 
Physiology  had  come  into  conscious  existence  as  a 
science.    All  things  that  had  life  were  her  objects. 
Looking  at  all  other  animals,  and  connecting  the  phse- 
nomena  of  Kfe  in  them  unmistakeably  with  definite  or- 
ganic arrangements  and  actions  of  these  arrangements, 
was  she  to  refrain  from  extending  her  researches  and 
comparisons  to  Man,  simply  because  he  was  called 
Man  ?    Really  converted  into  a  Psychology  in  respect 
of  some  portions  of  her  investigations  of  the  lower  ani- 
mals, she  merged,  in  her  study  of  Man,  at  that  ex- 
treme, into  what  had  always  been  considered  Psychol- 
ogy proper.    Nay,  it  was  only  over  modesty,  or  hypoc- 
risy, if  she  did  not  proclaim  what  was  the  fact,  that 
the  special  Psychology  then  particularly  in  demand 
among  French  psychologists  themselves — ^to  wit,  the 
science  of  the  phgenomena  of  sensibility — ^it  was  for 
her  to  furnish.      "For  the  sake  of  economy  of  la- 
bour," the  Physiologists  might  then  have  saidtto  the 
Psychologists,  "let  there  be  a  separation  of  our  ju- 
risdictions.   Leave  tc8  in  possession  of  this  circular 
fringe  or  frontier  of  sensibility,  which  you  have  been 
BO  particularly  cultivating,  but  which  belongs  now  to 
us,  and  which  we  promise  to  do  our  best  with.     You 
retire  into  the  interior,  whither  we  will  duly  send 


mi! 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


159 


I 


you  as  much  authentic  material  as  we  can  for  your 
especially  psychological  problem.  That  problem  is, 
as  you  yourselves  own,  the  transformation  of  sensation 
into  feeling,  habit,  faculty,  desire,  will,  conscience, 
and  the  like;  a  very  beautiful  problem  it  is,  and 
worthy  of  your  known  abilities ;  do  your  very  best 
with  it.  We  will  not  absolutely  swear  never  to 
follow  you  into  the  interior  and  undertake  that  prob- 
lem too ;  but,  in  the  meantime,  we  do  not  know  the 
extent  of  our  resources — so,  till  you  hear  from  us 
again,  let  the  circular  fringe  outside  be  Physiology, 
and  the  concentric  interior  Psychology." 

Matters,  I  say,  were  in  this  state  between  the 
lineal  heirs  of  Locke's  Psychology  in  Europe,  or 
those  who  assume  to  be  such,  and  the  pioneers  of  a 
noble  new  science  of  Animal  Physiology,  the  hour  of 
whose  appearance  in  the  world  had  arrived.  There 
wiere  in  Europe,  to  be  sure,  the  German  Philoso- 
phy of  Kant,  and,  in  a  much  smaller  and  more  local 
way  of  business,  the  Scottish  Philosophy  of  Eeid. 
But  both  of  these,  though  they  were  not  indifferent 
to  the  advances  of  Physiology  for  reasons  affecting 
themselves,  rather  stood  aloof  from  the  negotiations 
going  on,  with  such  an  excess  of  power  on  one  side, 
between  Physiology  and  what  they  considered  their 
fallen  and  bankrupt  relative.  She  had  brought  the 
crisis  upon  herself,  and  must  get  through  it  as  she 


»^ 


I 


160 


EECENT  BKmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


w 


could !    Hence,  for  a  time,  what  continued  Paycliol- 
ogy  we  see  in  France,  and  aU  that  portion  of  the 
continent  which  obeyed  French  influence,  is  not  so 
much  Psychology  in  the  old  sense  as  Physiology 
carrying  on  the  business  in  the  name  of  Psychology. 
In  the  hands  of  Cabanis  (1757—1808)  and  others, 
CondiUac's  Ideology  became  more  and  more  merged 
in  Physiology,  until  it  was  a  positive  relief  to  all  con- 
cerned to  see  the  pretension  of  a  distinction  between 
Physiology  and  Psychology  put  an  end  to,  and  the 
affairs  of  the  expiring  firm  &ially  wound  up.    This 
was  done  by  the  physiologist  Gail  (1757—1828), 
whose  system  of  Cranioscopy,  publishing  itself  under 
the  name  of  Phrenology,  took  such  rapid  possession 
of  every  country,  and  had,  and  still  has,  such  recom- 
mendations for  the  popular  intelUgence  everywhere 
as  a  science  of  Mind  made  easy.    GaU's  real  merits, 
it  is  now  acknowledged  by  those  physiologists  who 
retain  least  of  his  system,  were  very  great.    He  gave 
a  stimulus  to  researches  in  the  anatomy  and  physiol- 
ogy of  the  brain ;  and  some  of  his  leading  conclu- 
sions were  of  provisional,  if  not  of  permanent,  value. 
At  all  events.  Phrenology,  the  influence  of  which 
was  sufficiently  powerful  among  ourselves,  gave  the 
coup  de  grace  to  the  lingering  remnant  of  what  had 
once  been  Locke's  Philosophy  in  France. 

The  Philosophy  that  offered  itself  at  this  moment 


EEOENT  BEtnSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


161 


to  fill  the  vacancy,  and  to  satisfy  any  reawakened 
desires  of  the  French  mind  which  Phrenology  or 
Physiology  at  large  might  not  be  meeting,  was  one 
which  grounded  its  claims  expressly  on  its  repudia- 
tion of  the  essential  principle  of  Lockism  in  all  its 
forms  back  to  Locke  himself  and  beyond.  We  have 
aU  heard  of  that  Philosophy— the  Modem  "Spirit- 
ualism "  or  "  Eclecticism  "  of  France.  It  began  to  be 
heard  of  towards  the  end  of  the  First  Empire,  and  it 
was  at  its  most  brilliant  epoch  in  the  reign  of  Louis- 
Philippe.  M.  EoTEE-CoLLAKD,  the  father  of  the  new 
School  (1763 — 1845),  avowedly  drew  his  ideas  from  the 
Scottish  Philosophy  of  Eeid,  and  professed  to  import 
that  philosophy  into  France  in  a  form  adapted  to  the 
mind  of  the  nation  as  corrupted  and  debilitated  by  its 
course  of  CondiUac  and  Cabanis.  Fresh  elements 
were  added  by  M.  Maine-de-Biean  (1766 — 1824), 
Cousm  {not.  ,1792),  and  Jootfbot  (1796—1842),  until 
at  length  there  was  formed  the  system  of  views,  com- 
pounded of  Scottish  psychology,  fine  native  French 
speculations,  and  an  overwhelming  intermixture  of 
ideas  from  the  German  Philosophy  of  Kant  and  his 
successors,  of  which  Cousin  continued  to  be  the  ac- 
knowledged head. 

The  School  of  French  Scotto-Germanism  had  cer- 
tainly an  energetic  life,  and  its  place  in  French  His- 
tory, is  a  marked  one.    Apparently,  however,  it  rather 


1 


162 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


163 


floated  in  the  middle  of  the  nation,  as  a  splendid  fac- 
titious philosophy  of  a  few  associated  minds,  than  ex- 
pressed the  real  workings  going  on  at  large  in  French 
thought.  Around  it  and  underneath  it,  we  can  now 
see,  the  real  French  mind,  still  full  of  speculative 
life,  but  no  longer  detained  by  a  Psychology  as  be- 
fore, and  having  plenty  of  time  after  all  the  necessary 
attention  to  Phrenology  or  to  Physiology  generally, 
was  tumbling  about  in  all  sorts  of  speculations  as  to 
the  construction  of  Society  and  the  theory  of  Politics. 
"  Satan  finds  some  mischief  still  for  im-psychological 
hands  to  do,''  is  the  phrase  in  which  the  prejudice  of 
some  would  express  its  opinion  of  the  cause  and  drift 
of  these  speculations  of  an  unusual  order.  But  a  more 
sympathetic  criticism  will  recognise  in  such  phae- 
nomena  of  the  French  intellectual  world  as  Saint- 
Simonianism  and  Fourierism  not  only  facts  pregnant 
of  much  that  was  to  come,  but  also  the  instinctive  per- 
ception of  Philosophy  where  her  work  lay  if  pure 
Psychology  were  really  obsolete  or  were  to  be  over- 
passed. And  this  new  notion  of  Philosophy  respect- 
ing her  future  work  found,  in  a  man  utterly  out  of  the 
school  of  Cousin,  and  whose  training  had  been  in 
Saint-Simonianism  and  in  all  the  sciences  from  Mathe- 
matics to  Physiology,  a  most  competent  exponent. 

All  the  world  has  heard  of  Auguste  Comte  (1797 
— 1857).    And  what  was  Comte's  proclamation  ?    It 


r 


was  that  what  had  hitherto  been  known  as  Empiricism 
was  to  transmute  itself  for  ever  into  Positivism  or  the 
JPositi/ve  Philosophy^  the  principle  of  which  was  to  be 
the  utter  rejection  both  of  Theology  and  of  Metaphys- 
ics, not  only  as  fruitless,  but  as  absolutely  outgrown 
modes  of  thinking,  and  the  exclusive  study  of  positive 
physical  laws  in  all  departments  with  a  special  view 
to  generalisations  that  might  bear  on  the  social  well- 
being.    Arranging  the  sciences  in  this  order — Mathe- 
matics, Astronomy,  General  Physics,  Chemistry,  Bi- 
ology, and  Sociology — ^he  announced  Sociology  or  the 
Social  Science  as  that  ultimate  and  all-absorbing  sci- 
ence of  the  world  which  it  had  been  reserved  for  him 
to  describe,  name,  and  inaugurate.    Philosophy  in  fu- 
ture was  to  be  simply  Sociology ;  which,  however,  im- 
plied a  study  of  all  the  preceding  five  sciences  in  their 
social  bearings.     Such  was  his  own  Cours  de  Philos- 
aphie  Positive^  published  in  1830-42.     It  was  a  series 
of  treatises  on  the  methods  and  generalities  of  Mathe- 
matics, Astronomy,  Physics,  Chemistry,  and  Biology 
{i.  e.  Vegetable  and  Animal  Physiology),  ending  in  a 
bulkier  treatise  on  the  Science  of  History  and  Politics. 
He  gave  no  separate  place  whatever  to  Psychology  or 
the  Science  of  Mind.    He  nipped  it  into  nothing  be- 
tween the  two  great  sciences  of  Biology  and  Soci- 
ology.   He  did  this  deliberately,  and  made  his  doing 
so  a  characteristic  merit  of  his  system.    Whatever  of 


I 


ll 


1. 

I 


164 


BECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


study  or  speculation  respecting  Man  was  not  provided 
for,  and  did  not  really  find  its  only  possible  gratifica- 
tion, in  Sociology,  or  the  science  of  men's  actions  in 
society,  could  only  offer  itself  as  that  fi-agment  or 
highest  reach  of  Biology  which  took  account  of  the 
phsenomena  and  functions  of  nerve  and  brain  in  the 
human  subject.  Thought,  radically,  of  all  kinds,  was 
cerebration  /  and  only  as  cerebration  could  it  be  hope- 
fully studied,  except  as  it  translated  itself  into  the 
grander  tide  of  social  feeling  and  activity. 

Thus,  at  last,  Kantism  was  confronted  with  its  fiilly 
developed  European  antagonist  in  Comtism.  Previ- 
ous physiological  psychologists,  including  phrenolo- 
gists, had  generally  shrunk  from  the  extreme  to  which 
their  opponents  said  they  were  committed.  They 
had  kept  up  the  time-honoured  distinction  between 
Mind  and  Body ;  they  had  used  language  implying 
a  recognition  of  some  unknown  Anima^  or  vital  prin- 
ciple, concealed  behind  the  animal  organism;  some 
of  them  had  been  even  anxious  to  vindicate  their  be- 
lief in  the  immateriality  or  transcendental  nature  of 
this  principle.  But  Comte  ended  all  that  shilly-shal- 
lying. Mind,  he  said,  is  the  name  for  the  functions 
of  Brain  and  !Nerve ;  Mind  is  Brain  and  ISTerve. 
This  destroyed,  that  ceases.  You  may  fancy  Mind  or 
Consciousnesss,  if  you  like,  as  an  inner  chamber,  in 
which  thoughts  come  and  go  like  phantoms,  or  as  a 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


165 


vast  transparent  space,  without  roof,  without  walls, 
without  bounds,  in  which  the  very  stars  and  celestial 
systems  seem  to  wheel  and  make  Pythagorean  music ; 
but  that  very  fancy,  I  tell  you,  is  the  whimsical  result 
of  the  arrangements  and  actions  of  an  intricate  flesh- 
and-blood  organism  of  definite  size  and  form.  You 
may  call  mind  a  Spirituality,  an  Invisibility,  a  Dy- 
namical Something,  if  you  like.  A  Dynamical  Some- 
thing it  certainly  is ;  an  Invisibility,  in  a  sense,  it  is, 
but  much  as  the  power  of  a  galvanic  pile  is  an  invisi- 
bility ;  but  a  Spirituality,  as  I  know  you  to  have  un- 
derstood that  word,  it  is  noty  and  never  was. — Thus,  I 
say,  was  Kantism  at  last  confronted  with  its  direct 
European  antagonist.  ^ 

ITow  the  Transcendentalism  of  Sir  "William  Ham- 
ilton is  a  Transcendentalism  which  had  adjusted  it- 
self, to  its  author's  own  satisfiiction  at  least,  with  all 
that  had  turned  up  in  this  long  course  of  conflicting 
speculation,  as  far,  at  any  rate,  as  to  Kant,  his  im- 
mediate German  successors,  and  the  allied  school  of 
Cousin.  He  had  not,  I  think,  attended  so  much  to 
Comte  as  he  would  have  done  had  he  foreseen  the  ex- 
tent to  which  Comtism  was  to  diffuse  itself  out  of 
France.  But  he  had  attended  closely  to  the  move- 
ments of  the  physiological  psychologists  prior  to  their 
change  of  name  into  Phrenologists,  and  he  had  ven- 
tured his  neck  into  the  camp  of  the  Phrenologists 


I 


i\ 


J 


/ 


166 


EECEKT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


lip 


themselves  that  he  might  spy  out  their  strength  or 
their  weakness.      His  Transcendentalism,  therefore, 
was  in  a  state  of  formation  fit,  as  he  conceived,  to 
meet  the  enemy's  latest  line  of  battle.     It  is  in  this 
respect  that  Mr.  Mill's  Empiricism,  as  it  is  to  be  gath- 
ered from  those  of  his  writings  mentioned  in  our  con- 
spectus, does  not  seem  to  me  to  be  equally  adjusted 
to  the  most  recent  exigencies  of  the  question.    That 
Mr.  Mill  was  likely  to  have  been  as  intimately  ac- 
quainted as  any  of  his  countrymen  with  the  history 
and  varieties  of  philosophical  opinion  in  the  different 
nations  of  Europe,  from  Locke's  time  downwards,  may 
be  at  once  assumed.     In  extent  and  minuteness  of  ac- 
quaintance with   French  thought,  at  least,  he  can 
have  had  few  competitors.    Was  it  not  he  that  intro- 
duced Comte,  now  some  three-and-twenty  years  ago, 
to  this  country,  and  so  opened  up,  in  the  English- 
speaking  part  of  the  world,  a  wider  realm  for  that  ex- 
traordinary French  thinker  than  was  prophesied  by 
any  recognition  he  was  receiving  in  France  ?    But, 
while  it  would  be  preposterous  to  imagine  that  Mr. 
Mill  had  not,  in  his  own  mind,  disposed  his  Empiri- 
cism in  accordance  with  the  exact  state  of  the  ground 
and  the  likelihoods  of  the  battle— that  he  had  not 
seen  even  to  its  outposts  and  pickets — ^it  must  be  con- 
fessed, I  think,  that  he  kept  his  dispositions  secret. 
British  Empiricism,  as  commanded  by  him,  did  not 


RECENT  BEiriSH   PHILOSOPHT. 


167 


r' 


seem  to  have  itself  so  weU  in  hand,  or  to  know  the 
ground  so  well,  as  did  British  Transcendentalism, 
commanded  by  Hamilton. 

Thus,  was  it  not  always,  or  generally,  the  pre- 
Kantian  forms  of  Transcendentalism  that  Mr.  Mill  at- 
tacked— ^those  forms  which,  asserting  the  doctrine  of 
innate  or  djpriori  elements  of  knowledge,  usually  pro- 
duced a  number  of  uncouth-looking  propositions,  ex- 
pressing the  private  convictions,  or  hereditary  and 
professional  tenets,  of  some  individual  or  class,  and 
called  them  the  necessary  beliefs  of  mankind  ?  But, 
in  doing  so,  was  he  not  attacking  fortresses  evacuated 
by  the  enemy  long  ago,  and  left,  if  with  anything  in 
them,  only  with  victuals  and  a  guard  of  pensioners  ? 
It  was  the  Kantian  doctrine  of  d  priori  "  forms  " — 
of  the  very  structure  of  the  mind  as  a  co-efficient  d 
priori  in  the  production  of  Knowledge — ^that  had  be- 
come the  real  position  of  Transcendentalism.  How 
did  Mr.  Mill  propose  to  attack  this  position  ?  One 
observed  in  him  not  so  much  an  indisposition  to  at- 
tack it  as  a  seeming  non-apprehension  of  its  existence 
or  whereabouts.  If  there  was  one  thing  that  was 
missed  more  than  any  other  throughout  Mill's  writ- 
ings by  those  who  would  impartially  see  it  out  be- 
tween him  and  the  Transcendentalists,  it  was  an  ade- 
quate recognition  and  appreciation  of  their  all-im- 
portant distinction  between  "  Form  "  and  "  Matter.'' 


A 


168 


EECENT  BSmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


! 


All  the  more  because  Mr.  Mill  was  bound  by  his  prin- 
ciples not  to  accept  the  distinction,  but  to  war  it 
down,  one  would  have  liked  to  see  him  stating  it  to 
himself,  and  keeping  it  before  him,  in  the  exact  mean- 
ing given  to  it  by  his  opponents. 

But  it  was  not  only  in  the  mode  and  direction  of 
his  outgoings  against  Transcendentalism  that  one 
missed  satisfactory  assurance  that  Mr.  Mill  had  the  ex- 
act state  of  the  controversy  in  his  view.  When  one 
looked  again  at  his  own  position,  so  little  changed  in 
appearance  since  Locke's  time,  one  could  not  see  its 
superior  tenability  in  the  new  conditions  of  the  cam- 
paign. 

In  protesting  against  Comte's  abolition  of  Psy- 
chology, as  an  intermediate  science  between  Biology 
and  Sociology,  Mr.  Mill  did  what  it  was  perfectly 
competent  for  him  to  do,  even  while  generously  intro- 
ducing Comte,  and  certifying  to  Englishmen  the 
great  importance  and  value  of  Comte's  main  system 
of  speculation.  By  doing  so  Mr.  Mill  consulted  the 
best  interests  of  whatever  might  be  conmion  between 
his  own  philosophy  and  Comte's.  He  even  supplied 
a  deficiency  in  Comtism  which  must  have  been  felt 
by  Comtists  themselves,  though  the  master  was  res- 
olute that  it  was  no  deficiency.  It  was  quite  com- 
petent  for  Mr.  Mill  to  maintain,  as  he  did  so  interest- 
ingly in  his  Logic^  that  there  might  still  be,  and 


EECENT  BEIIISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


169 


ought  to  be,  a  science  which,  assuming  the  genesis  of 
all  the  phsenomena  of  Consciousness  in  an  organism, 
should  watch  these  phsenomena  on  their  own  account 
'  as  flitting  through  an  imagined  hall  or  chamber  of 
Consciousness,  should  register  their  co-existences  and 
sequences,  and  should  arrive  in  the  inductive  way  at 
•  generalizations  of  the  laws  of  mind.  And  not  only 
was  it  competent  for  him  to  do  this ;  it  was  consistent 
also  with  a  certain  fine  anxiety,  which  he  had  already 
shown,  that  what  he  believed  to  be  Truth  should 
never  waive  her  rights  to  any  power  she  might  fairly 
possess  over  men's  feelings  of  the  becoming,  the  ven- 
erable, the  grand,  or  the  beautiful.  "We  have  seen 
his  repugnance  to  the  incessant  driving-up,  by  Con- 
dillac  and  his  school,  of  all  the  feelings  and  powers 
of  mind  into  transformed  sensation.  This  was,  he 
said,  essentially  only  to  ignore  all  the  multiplicity 
and  variety  of  the  mind's  states  and  faculties,  and  to 
call  all  of  them  by  the  name  of  lowest  and  least 
agreeable  associations.  Was  that  so  mighty  a  service 
to  Philosophy  ?  If  there  were  candour  in  it,  was  it 
not  only  such  candour  as  we  meet  with  in  men  whose 
notions  of  being  truthful  is  that  it  is  to  be  as  brutally 
offensive  as  possible  ?  Because  a  rose  or  a  lily  may 
truly  enough  be  spoken  of  as  earth  transfoi'med,  is 
that  any  reason  for  never  saying  rose,  or  lily,  or  stalk, 

or  calyx  ?    Is  not  the  rosiness  of  the  rose  as  lovely, 

8 


! 


>^ 


170 


RECENT  BRITISH    PHILOSOPHY. 


hangs  not  the  lily  as  whitely  graceful,  for  him  who 
knows  them  to  be  resolvable  as  for  him  who  does 
not  ?    And  so,  we  doubt  not,  Mr.  Mill  felt  when  he 
refused  to  let  Psychology  be  nipped  out  of  existence, 
as  Comte  proposed,  between  a  Biology  and  a  Soci- 
ology.   No  good  could  be  got  by  it,  but  much  the  re- 
verse!   Why  give  up  such  words  ag  Soul,  Spirit, 
Heart,  Conscience,  Love,  with  all  their  noble  associa- 
tions?    Transcendentalists  were  too  apt  already  to 
assume  that  they  alone  had  a  theoretical  right  to 
these  words,  and  to  the  esteem  and  veneration  engen- 
dered by  them.    As  if,  forsooth,  the  full  rosiness  even 
of  this  rose  of  roses,  the  impassioned  Soul  of  Man, 
could  not  be  known  to  the  Empiricist !    ITow,  as  M. 
Comte   agreed  with  all  this — ^none  more  so;   none 
with  a  richer  retention,  in  his  own  case,  of  phrases 
from  the  vocabulary  of  populai*  and  chivabous  emo- 
tion— why,  by  the  obstinate  omission   of  a  special 
Science  of  Mind,  give  the  Transcendentalists  a  cause 
of  triumph  ?    Was  it  such  a  stroke  into  the  citadel  of 
Truth  to  insist  on  translating  thought  into  cerebra- 
tion?   Why  not  speak  of  thought,  too,  like  other 
people,  and  show  that  Empiricism  has  as  high  and 
various  a  cognisance  of  all  that  is  called  thought  as 
Transcendentalism  can  have  ? 

Still  the  real  question  recurs — ^What  is  Mind  to 
be  called  on  the  last  analysis  of  it  ?    What  does  the 


RECENT  BBmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


in 


science  of  the  rose  arrive  at  ultimately  as  the  begin- 
ning, principle,  or  root  of  its  utmost  rosiness  ?  Had 
not  the  rose  itself  a  start  given  it  d  priori  in  a  certain 
germ,  a  potentiality  of  being  a  rose  and  nothing  else  ? 
Could  the  rose  be  fabricated  out  of  the  mere  experi- 
ence of  a  preceding  nothing  in  any  set  of  conditions  ? 
Why,  in  such  a  case,  the  emergence,  should  a  flower 
emerge  at  all,  of  a  rose  rather  than  a  lily  or  any  other 
flower  ?  The  immediate  answer  to  these  questions  we 
can  all  divine.  Well,  is  it  the  same  answer  that  will 
be  given  by  the  Empiricist  if  we  push  him  to  a  pre- 
cise explication  of  what  he  means  when  he  declares 
that  there  is  not  a  particle  of  d  priori  composition  in 
the  mind  of  Man?  When  Mr.  Mill  says  that  "  there 
is  not  any  idea,  feeling,  or  power,  in  the  human  mind 
which,  in  order  to  account  for  it,  requires  that  its 
origin  should  be  referred  to  any  other  source  than  Ex- 
perience," what  does  he  mean  ?  He,  of  course,  allows 
that,  if  we  consider  a  full-grown  individual  man  act- 
ing or  deliberating  at  any  particular  moment,  we  do 
find  in  him  an  immense  deal  that,  with  reference  to 
that  moment,  is  decidedly  of  d  priori  origin.  The 
man  carries  in  him  all  his  prior  experience  concreted 
and  organized  into  knowledge,  habit,  tendency,  fac- 
ulty, character ;  and  it  is  with  the  strength  and  ac- 
cording to  the  forms  and  ideas  of  this  peculiar  d  priori 
mass  of  endowment  that  he  apprehends  and  deals  with 


it" 


A 


1T2 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


173 


i  i 

r      W 


f 


the  conditions  of  the  new  moment.  Of  course,  there- 
fore, in  the  statement  that  there  is  no  djpriori  idea,  or 
feeling  or  power  in  the  human  mind,  it  is  intended 
that  there  shall  be  a  regress  to  some  point  which  shall 
be  taken  as  the  commencement  of  the  human  mind. 
But  what  shall  be  taken  as  that  point  ?  Shall  a  point 
be  taken  for  each  man  individually,  and  shall  it  be 
when  he  began  to  exist  ?  Shall  it  be  maintained  that 
every  man,  intellectually  and  morally,  is  wholly  built 
up  of  his  own  experience  from  that  point  onward,  and 
that,  with  reference  to  his  individual  life  as  a  whole, 
there  is  nothing  in  his  mind  of  a  priori  derivation  ? 
This  would  be  to  render  it  impossible  to  conceive  why 
he  should  have  existed  as  a  man  at  all.  That  which 
did  not  start  as  some  a  priori  potentiality  of  being  a 
man  and  nothing  else  might  as  easily  have  been  any- 
thing else,  or  have  remained  nothing.  Or,  if  we  were 
to  try  to  suppose  an  a  priori  potentiality  of  being  a 
man  without  any  farther  a  priori  outfit  to  be  one 
kind  of  man  rather  than  another  (which,  however, 
would  yield  the  point),  would  not  this  be  to  deny  he- 
redity, the  connexion  of  each  individual  physiologi- 
cally with  the  past,  the  transmission  of  qualities? 
But,  differ  as  people  may  as  to  the  relative  importance 
of  these  two  things  to  a  man's  character— his  inherited 
capability,  and  the  education  given  him  by  circum- 
stances— ^few,  worth  taking  account  of,  now  deny  that 


\ 


there  is  in  every  man  an  inherited  element.  Comte 
certainly  did  not  deny  it.  The  Phrenologists  reso- 
lutely asserted  it,  and  offered  their  system  as  the 
means  of  taking  account  of  transmitted  qualities  in 
the  business  of  education.  Our  regress,  therefore,  in 
order  to  reach  the  point  where  Empiricism  begins  its 
reckoning,  must  be  farther  back  yet.  Let  it  be  said 
that  there  is  something  oi  a  priori  or  ante-natal  deri- 
vation in  each  mind,  but  that,  as  this  may  be  referred 
to  past  experience  in  the  persons  of  parents  and  other 
ancestors,  the  principle  of  the  all-sufficiency  of  expe- 
rience is  not  abandoned.  Shall  the  human  race  then 
be  taken  as  a  whole,  and  shall  the  allegation  be  that 
as  regards  Man  or  Humanity  in  the  generalized  sense, 
no  idea,  or  feeling,  or  power  is  a  priori^  but  all  con- 
sists merely  of  organized  and  diversely-distributed 
Experience  ?  But  for  a  certain  haziness  in  the  lan- 
guage used  in  the  controversy — ^the  signification  of  the 
word  "  Man  "  alternating  without  warning  between 
some  single  individual  thought  of  and  Humanity  at 
large — ^we  should  probably  have  known  that  this  Was 
meant,  and  recent  Empiricists  would  have  escaped 
being  charged  with  a  form  of  their  thesis  which  the 
farthest-sighted  of  them  never  would  have  undertaken 
to  maintain. 

If,  however,  up  to  this  point,  recent  British  Tran- 
scendentalism seems  to  have  been  more  carefiil  than 


•  Hi. 


!' 


it'' 


|! 


f^^^ 


9BSB 


174 


EECENT  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


recent  Britisli  Empiricism  to  conform  its  enunciations 
of  itself  to  the  new  conceptions  which  Science  was 
bringing  in,  and  to  assert  its  entire  durability  in  the 
midst  of  these  conceptions,  we  now  reach  a  point  be- 
yond which  both  Transcendentalism  and  Empiricism 
are  seen  as  if  carried  out  to  sea,  and  equally  swim- 
ming for  their  lives  in  strange  waters. 

The  influx  upon  Philosophy  of  new  and  disorgan- 
izing scientific  conceptions  has  never  been  greater 
thaA  during  the  seventeen  years  since  1848.  Scien- 
tific conceptions  unknown  to  the  physiologists  of  the 
earlier  part  of  this  century,  unknown  to  the  phrenolo- 
gists, and  not  to  be  found  even  in  the  Oours  de  Phi- 
losqphiei  Postive  of  M.  Comte, — scientific  conceptions, 
I  say,  till  recently  unheard  of,  or  existing  only  in  the 
form  of  certain  vague  drifts  and  conjectures  of  the 
scientific  mind — ^have  of  late  years  poured  in  upon  us 
in  full  fiood.  Dykes  have  been  burst ;  boundaries  re- 
moved ;  we  hardly  know  the  old  landmarks.  I^ow, 
upon  none  of  our  previous  modes  of  thought,  whether 
among  philosophers  or  among  people  at  large,  has  the 
aggregate  influence  of  these  new  conceptions  been 
greater  than  precisely  upon  that  notion  of  Man  or 
Humanity  as  a  whole  over  which,  as  we  have  said, 
there  might  have  been  a  general  opinion  among  the 
bystanders  that  the  battle  of  Empiricism  and  Tran- 
scendentalism might  at  last  be  fought  out.    Lo  I  ere 


RECENT  BRmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


175 


the  battle  could  be  begun,  the  very  notion  over  which  . 
it  was  to  be  fought  is  dissolved,  agitated  out  of  defi- 
nite shape,  or  rolled  away,  on  one  side  of  it,  into  an 
edgeless  mist !    No  flag-staff,  we  are  now  told,  can  we 
plant  at  any  one  spot,  however  fax  back,  in  earthly 
time,  and  say  that  at  that  point  Humanity  is  to  be 
considered  as  beginning— that  all  before  was  a  world 
prehuman,  but  all  after  is  a  history  with  Man  in  it. 
In  the  first  place,  what  of  all  those  recent  specula- 
tions as  to  the  Antiquity  of  the  Human  Species? 
It  is  not  for  me  here  to  discuss  these  speculations,  or 
even  to  enumerate  them  in  their  mutual  relations ; 
but  to  be  speaking  of  Eecent  British  Philosophy,  and 
not  to  recognise  the  vast  question  of  Science  so  raised 
as  bearing  upon  British  Philosophy,  and  as  compel- 
ling her  in  some  way  or  other  to  new  explications 
of  herself,  would  be  a  piece  of  hypocritical  coward- 
liness.   How  our  popular  system  of  Chronology  is 
faring,  or  may  ultimately  fare,  at  the  hands  of  the 
new  Archaeologists,  let  Time  (which  is  the  party 
principally  concerned)  itself  determine.    It  will  fare 
as  Truth  would  have  it,  and  no  otherwise.    But  it  is 
more  than  the  question  of  human  chronology  that  is 
now  in  agitation.    Behind  that  question  as  to  the 
Antiquity  of  the  Human  Species  lies  the  question  as 
to  the  Origin  of  all  Species,  as  to  the  place  and  con- 
nexions of  Man  in  the  entire  scheme  of  Animated 


/f' 


I ; 


176 


EECENT  BEinsn  PHILOSOPHT. 


3i' 


K'ature  in  our  planet.  Kaised  long  ago  in  all  varie- 
ties of  ways  by  naturalists  whose  particular  theories 
are  exploded,  this  question  has  been  raised  again,  and 
notably  among  ourselves,  in  forms  that  have  brought 
our  scientific  chiefs  into  earnest  debate,  and  gathered 
almost  the  whole  population  round  them  as  specta- 
tors. The  issue  here  too  it  is  not  for  me  to  forecast. 
But  observe  how,  if  the  views  so  recently  announced 
should  become  general  in  any  modification  of  them, 
Condillac's  resolution  of  all  human  thought,  feeling, 
belief,  or  faculty,  into  transformed  sensation  reap- 
pears in  the  world  with  its  scope  enlarged.  Human- 
ity itself  then  shades  off  by  indefinite  gradations  into 
preceding  forms  of  life.  It  is  not  at  any  particular 
point,  however  far  back,  assumed  as  the  beginning  of 
hxmian  history,  that  Empiricism  need  then  abandon  the 
battle,  from  the  impossibility  of  accounting  empiri- 
cally for  the  then  incipient  organism,  however  poor 
and  wretched  it  was.  That  organism  itself,  with  all 
its  stock  of  powers,  was  still.  Empiricism  might  say, 
only  transformed  or  concreted  experience.  Seas, 
ao-es,  aeons  of  experience  had  preceded  it,  whose 
essence  was  conserved  and  elaborated  in  its  struc- 
ture; and  specimens  of  the  intermediate  organisms 
through  which  this  one  had  been  reached,  and  also 
the  wrecks  and  shapes  of  myriads  of  others,  lay 
strewn  about,  showing   the  measureless  energy  of 


RECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


177 


Nature,  and  the  enormous  struggle  of  sentient  inven- 
tiveness which  she  had  carried  in  her  bosom,  during 
periods  anterior  to  the  farthest  ken  of  Man.  And  so, 
on  and  on,  bursting  the  Yertebrate  in  the  way,  burst- 
ing type  after  type.  Imagination,  growing  dizzier  and 
dizzier  in  her  ascent  through  an  animated  vagueness 
of  she  knows  not  what,  pursues  and  stiU  pursues  that 
ideal  of  a  by-past  Eternity,  at  which  Keason,  follow- 
ing in  her  train,  can  take  his  stand  and  say,  "  Here 
we  may  stop ;  here  experience  begins ;  nothing  here 
is  d  priorV^  Utterly  in  vain!  Whither  goes  the 
last  phantasy  of  Science,  still  holding  by  the  principle 
of  continuity,  transformation  out  of  prior  elements, 
the  resolution  of  what  is  into  what  was  ?  Whither 
but  beyond  conceivable  sentiency  itself  on  our  Earth, 
nay  beyond  aught  of  a  slush  of  vegetation  conceivable 
as  preceding  sentiency,  on  through  theories  of  a 
sheerly  mineral  geology,  to  alight  at  last  on  the  steam- 
ing crust  of  a  desolate  planet  of  molten  rotundity, 
itself  the  convolved  shred  of  what  was  once  a  space- 
filling nebula  ?  Here,  fi-om  sheer  fatigue,  the  imagi- 
nation does  rest  for  the  present ;  here,  if  anywhere, 
it  seems  possible  to  whisper  to  oneself  a  faint  persua- 
sion as  if  one  need  not  think  of  anything  a  priori  to 
such  a  milk  of  thinness.  Suppose  the  last  word  of 
Science  then  to  be  that  all  that  exists  is  transformed 

nebula.    "With  a  thousand-fold  more  energy  at  such  a 

8* 


1 


r 


178 


KECEOT^  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


last  word  in  general  knowledge  than  at  Condillac's 
last  word  in  psychological  knowledge  may  Mr.  MiU 
Titter  his  protest.    Is  it  such  a  mighty  thing,  such  a 
stroke  of  unirersal  explanation,  simply  to  gather  up 
the  world  and  all  its  glories  and  to  call  them  "  trans- 
formed nebula  ? "    No ;  but  the  particular  question  is 
as  to  the  ultimate  resting-place  of  that  theory  of  Ex- 
perience which  Mr.  Mill  himself  holds.     If  water  is 
oxygen  and  hydrogen,  why  should    we  fear  to  say 
so  ?    We  want  to  trace  Experience  to  its  fountain-head. 
It  seems  to  me,  I  repeat,  that  by  the  recent  crowd- 
ing in  of  such  new  scientific  conceptions  there  has 
been  a  disturbance  of  the  relations  of  recent  British 
Empiricism  as  represented  hitherto  in  MiU  and  recent 
British  Transcendentalism  as  thrown  into  form  by 
Hamilton.    Neither  system  seems  to  present  its  lead- 
ing principle  bent  as  one  would  like  to  see  it  into  the 
curves  and  junctures  of  the  most  anxious  thought  of 
our  time.    Possibly  Mr.  Mill's  system,  from  its  com- 
parative abstinence  hitherto  from  the  attempt  to  do  so 
— ^from  its  being  so  much  more  the  rich  forthgoing  of 
a  philosophy  the  principles  of  which  are  avowed  than 
a  metaphysical  wrestle  for  these  principles— will  have 
less  difficulty  in  shaping  itself  to  what  it  may  recog- 
nize a§  the  new  requirements.    It  is  by  metaphysical 
deficiency  that  it  falls  short  of  such  a  system  of  more 
developed  empiricism  as  one  can  conceive  offering  it- 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


179 


self  in  the  midst  of  these  requirements.  On  the  other 
hand,  from  the  very  elaborateness  and  exactness  of  the 
metaphysical  part  of  Hamilton's  Philosophy,  from  its 
consisting  so  peculiarly  of  a  system  of  Metaphysics, 
it  is  possible  that  the  complaint  against  it  may  be 
that  of  jpositive  incompatihility  at  many  points  with 
present  requirements.  One  can  conceive  a  system  of 
Transcendentalism  that  should  be  provided  with  an- 
swers to  some  questions,  different  from  those  which 
sufficed  for  Hamilton  ere  yet  the  questions  had  taken 
their  present  shape.  Might  not  that  Kantian  scheme 
of  the  Mind  of  Man,  for  example,  which  represents  it 
as  a  complex  organism  of  so  many  d  priori  forms, 
neither  more  nor  fewer,  encounter  now-a-days  a  kind 
of  opposition  that  could  not  have  been  ready  for  it 
when  it  was  first  promulgated  ?  Might  not  Science, 
in  one  of  her  new  moods,  object  that  it  isolates  Man 
as  the  last  term  of  a  series  from  all  the  preceding — 
nay,  that  it  gives  an  account  of  Man  fixed  down,  as  it 
were,  for  inspection  and  analysis,  at  one  moment  (two 
or  three  thousand  years  long  perhaps,  but  still  a  mo- 
ment) of  his  own  nominal  existence  ?  Is  the  organism 
itself  stable  ?  May  not  the  very  constituting  forms 
of  human  thought  have  increased  themselves,  or 
changed  perceptibly  by  a  touch  here  and  there,  even 
within  historic  time,  and  may  not  the  best  present 
list  that  could  be  given  of  these  forms  be  inapplicable 


'  ii 


4 


180 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


to  Man  in  the  future  ?  So  I  can  conceive  Science  in- 
terrogating Transcendentalism,  and  perhaps  explain- 
ing her  meaning  by  means  of  a  series  of  human  crania 
chronologically  arranged;  and  I  do  not  think  that 
such  replies  as  Transcendentalism  could  give  would 
suggest  themselves  easily  out  of  Hamilton. 

Always  it  is  necessary,  as  I  explained  in  the  last 
chapter,  to  supplement   any    notion  we  may  have 
formed  of  a  system  of  Philosophy  from  a  considera- 
tion of  the  Psychological  Theory  which  it  avows, 
by   an   independent  look    at  the   system  in  refer- 
ence to  its  ruling  Cosmological  Conception.      Kot 
only  have  philosophers,  as  I  there  explained,  been  di- 
vided, psychologically,  into  the  two  great  schools  of 
Empiricists  and  Tkanscendentalists  ;  they  have  been 
distributed,  in  farther  recognition  of  the  varying  Cos- 
mological Conceptions  in  which  either  Empiricism  or 
Transcendentalism  may  be  found  housed  (and  not  the 
less   really  housed  because  sometimes  perhaps  in- 
consistently), into  such  cliisses  as  Nihilists,  Material- 
ists^ Natural  Realists,  Constructive  Idealists,  Pure 
Idealists,  and  believers  in  Absolute  Identity.    In  the 
view  of  this  classification,  I  said.  Sir  "William  Hamil- 
ton was  to  be  ranked,  by  his  own  profession,  in  that 
class  of  I^atural  Eealists  whose  representatives  among 
philosophers  have  yet  been  few,  while  Mr.  Mill,  aB  I 


recent  BRmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


181 


thought,  might  be  ranked,  with  the  great  majority  of 
philosophers  hitherto,  in  the  class  of  Constructive 
Idealists.  ITow,  here  also,  I  go  on  to  say,  it  appears 
to  me  that  the  influx  of  recent  scientific  conceptions 
has  disturbed  the  equilibrium  between  the  systems  of 
the  two  philosophers,  or,  if  the  fulcrum  or  middle 
point  has  remained  the  same,  has  occasioned  a  shed- 
ding off  of  much  of  British  thought  from  that  point  in 
both  directions  towards  the  extremes. 

Is  it  not  precisely  in  the  form  of  an  alteration,  or 
of  alterations,  of  the  cosmological  conceptions  that 
had  served  for  us  before,  that  the  recent  abundance 
of  new  scientific  teachings  and  revelations  has  most 
visibly  taken  eflfect  ?  What  is  that  battle  of  Faith 
now  going  on  among  us,  and  painfully  exercising  so 
many  minds,  but  a  struggle  between  the  expanded 
Bort  of  cosmological  conception  which  Science  has 
seemed  to  be  making  imperative  on  the  imaginations 
of  us  all  and  the  little  heap  of  propositions  we  have 
heretofore  guarded  so  fondly  at  the  centre  as  the  true 
epitome  to  the  reason  of  the  whole  physical  vast  of 
things  ?  And  what  expanded  sort  of  cosmological  con- 
ception does  Science  seem  to  have  been  making  im- 
perative ?  We  have  just  been  speaking  of  it.  In  run- 
ning back  the  difference  of  the  two  psychological 
theories  to  the  extreme  point  to  which  Science 
seemed  to  be  driving  it  up,  we  ended  in  a  tumult  of 


n 


I 


4 


1 1 


182 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


I 


Cosmology.  Whither  had  we  run  ourselves  back  ? 
■Whj—2Lnd  this  only  because  there  seemed  a  defiance 
of  any  conceivable  going  farther— to  a  universal 
Nebula!  Let  rhythm  re-suggest  what  prose  is  too 
shame-faced  to  repeat : — 

"  Our  hour  is  now :  Erst,  space  was  nebulous ; 
It  whirled,  and  in  the  whirl  the  luminous  milk 
Broke  out  in  rifts  and  curdled  into  orbs- 
Whirled  and  still  curdled,  till  the  azure  rifts 
Severed  and  shored  vast  systems,  all  of  orbs. 
Each  orb  has  had  its  history.    For  ours, 
It  blazed  and  steamed,  cooled  and  contracted,  till, 
Tired  of  mere  vapouring  within  the  grasp 
Of  ruthless  condensation,  it  assumed 
Its  present  form,  proportions,  magnitude— 
Our  tidy  ball,  axled  eight  thousand  miles." 

And  SO,  on  and  on,  Geology  taking  up  the  wondrous 
tale,  and  navigating  our  ball  and  furbishing  it,  as  she 
only  knows  how,  through  the  boundless  series  of  ages 
of  her  possession  of  it,  till  at  length,  not  so  very  long 
ago,  History  meets  her  emerging  into  a  glimmering 
light,  and,  the  ball  somehow  having  bred  or  been  cov- 
ered with  populations  of  human  beings,  some  of  whom 
had  made  great  advances,  and  formed  civilizations, 
and  taught  themselves  to  read  and  write  and  think  of 
high  matters,  we  see  at  last  a  Greek  Herodotus  walking 
musingly  round  the  margin  of  the  Mediterranean,  and 


EECENT  BRmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


183 


collecting  those  legends  of  the  past  and  those  scraps 
of  information  respecting  manners,  customs,  and 
monuments,  for  which  we  bless  him  and  think  of  him 
with  love  !  Thenceforward  till  now  the  voyage  has 
been  in  a  more  familiar  sea,  and  all  has  been  simpler 
sailing. 

Instead  of  trying,  by  farther  description,  and  by 
involving  each  of  the  more  important  recent  specu- 
lations of  science  in  its  proper  place  and  measure,  to 
body  forth  the  cosmological  Image  which  is  becoming 
prevalent  in  educated  minds,  let  me  despatch  the  mat- 
ter more  swiftly  by  saying  that  any  change  or  expan- 
sion of  the  cosmological  Image  that  has  recently 
taken  place  seems  to  be  the  result  of  a  synthesis  of 
three  notions,  each  having  its  origin  in  scientific  re- 
search : — 

(1)  There  is  the  notion  of  Evolution^  as  a  fact  or 
law  holding  universally  throughout  existence.  It  is 
the  notion  that  every  existing  state  has  grown  entirely 
out  of  an  immediately  preceding  state,  has  been 
evolved  out  of  that  state  by  using  up  all  its  elements 
or  constituents.  I  need  not  stay  to  illustrate  the  no- 
tion. It  is  now  tolerably  familiar  to  most.  A  crude 
form  of  the  notion  existed  long  ago,  and  still  figures, 
with  a  quantity  of  haze  around  it,  in  the  word  Prog- 
ress. But,  though  Progress  is  a  verj^  good  word,  and 
may  still  most  usefully  be  kept  in  service  as  express- 


i 


f 


184 


RECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


ing  that  advance  from  a  worse  state  of  tUngs  to  a 
better  whicli  is  the  sort  of  CYolution  to  be  preferred  and 
striven  for,  yet,  for  the  general  meaning  now  in  view, 
Progress^  both  from  its  excess  and  its  deficiency,  is  not 
nearly  so  good  a  word  as  its  later  substitute.  Evolu- 
tioUy  accordingly,  has  become  the  common  word ;  it  is 
more  and  more  showing  itself  in  our  literature,  and 
carrying  the  exact  notion  it  expresses  along  with  it. 
And  the  result  of  the  diflfusion  of  this  notion,  and  of 
the  exercise  of  it  in  the  minds  that  have  received  it, 
has  been  that  more  men  have  been  accustomed  to 
ihinlc  hachy  as  it  were,  all  the  heterogeneous  universe 
which  we  now  behold,  including  our  himian  society 
in  the  heart  of  it,  through  its  preceding  series  of  states 
making  a  complete  rendition  of  all  the  contents  of 
each  state  into  the  body  of  its  predecessor,  still  in  the 
direction  of  that  simplest  and  homogeneous  unity  out 
of  which  all  may  be  conceived  as  evolved.  Observe, 
in  this  very  statement  of  the  notion  of  Evolution,  the 
implied  sub-notion  that  the  course  or  method  of  Evo- 
lution is  the  gradual  presentation  of  what  was  once 
simple  and  homogeneous  in  states  more  and  more  com- 
plex and  heterogeneous.  A  name  has  been  given  to 
this  sub-notion  too.  It  has  been  called  Differentiation. 
(2)  There  is  a  notion  which  has  not  come  into 
such  distinct  recognition  as  to  have  received  a  special 
name,  but  the   existence  and  working  of  which  in 


RECENT  BRmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


185 


many  minds  may  certainly  be  detected,  and  which  is 
hinted  at  in  many  current  forms  of  speculation.     I 
will  call  it  the  notion  of  Interplanetary ^  or  even  In- 
terstellar ^  Hecijprocity.    Imperceptibly,  by  the  action 
of  many  suggestions  from  different  quarters,  men  have 
of  late  contracted  or  recovered  a  habit  of  interplanet- 
ary recoUectiveness  in  their  thoughts  about  tEngs — 
a  habit  of  consciously  extending  their  regards  to  the 
other  bodies  of  our  solar  system,  and  even  to  other  si- 
dereal systems,  and  feeling  as  if  somehow  they  were 
not  to   go   for    nothing    in  the   calculation  of  our 
Earth's  interests  and  fortunes.     Not  of  course  the  sort 
of  interplanetary  recoUectiveness  involved  in  the  old 
dream  of  Astrology,  during  the  prevalence  of  which 
dream  nien  did,  with  an  intensity  which  we  seldom 
realize,  though  History  would  be  a  fool  to  forget  it, 
bring  down  the  high  heavens  into  their  being  and 
carry  the  very  stars  as  golden  bees  in  their  bonnets. 
It  is  not  that  we  are  becoming  Guy  Mannerings  in 
ruined  towers  and  again  casting  horoscopes.    Kor  is 
the  habit  of  thought  dependent  on  any  continuance 
or  revival. of  the  old  controversy  as  to  the  Plurality  of 
Worlds.    We  are  compelled  to  interplanetary  recol- 
lectiveness  in  quite  new  ways.     Seeing  how  we  have 
conquered  our  little  Earth  physically,  and  brought  it 
thoroughly  into  grasp  with  telegraphs  and  railroads, 
it  has  even  been  a  whimsy  of  some  minds  that  we 


\ 


186 


EECENT   BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


might  begin  to  foresee  a  time  when  terrestrial  work 
alone  would  not  suffice  for  the  activity  of  the  devel- 
oped race  of  Earth's  sons,  and,  in  answer  to  their  pas- 
sionate longings,  Kature  might  be  bound  to  furnish 
them  an  outlet  of  enterprise  in  interplanetary  connex- 
ions. But,  such  mere  whimsies  apart,  very  stringent 
teachings  of  real  science  are  compelling  to  what  may 
be  called  an  interplanetary  habit  of  consciousness. 
Those  extraordinary  recent  revelations,  by  spectrum- 
analysis,  as  to  the  constitution  of  the  Sun  and  of  other 
celestial  bodies,  are  they  the  curiosities  merely  of 
chemical  speculation?  No;  the  general  thought  of 
man  drinks  them  in,  and  is  different,  with  them, 
through  a  thousand  correspondences,  from  what  it 
would  have  been  without  them.  Or,  again,  has  no 
action  of  a  vital  kind  been  exerted  upon  general 
thought  by  those  marvellous  calculations,  founded  on 
the  doctrine  of  the  Coirelation  of  Forces,  as  to  prob- 
able endurance  of  that  heat  of  the  sun  on  which  Sci- 
ence finds  that  all  the  movements,  all  the  actions,  all 
the  life  of  our  Earth  and  the  rest  of  the  solar  system 
depend,  and  of  which  it  views  them  as  but  conver- 
sions ?  I  remember,  indeed,  that,  when  one  of  our 
most  distinguished  scientific  men  put  forth  a  popular 
paper  on  the  age  of  the  Sun's  Heat,  stating  the  proba- 
bility that  in  so  many  hundred  millions  of  years  the 
whole  stock  of  heat  would  be  exhausted,  and  we 


--i'^ 


EECENT  BETIISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


187 


or  our  posterity  should  have  to  take  the  conse- 
quences, an  English  newspaper  seriously  objected  to 
the  publishing  of  such  things,  on  the  ground  that,  as 
the  catastrophe  was  so  far  off,  it  could  concern  neither 
man  nor  beast  to  think  about  it.  Here  was  an  in- 
stance of  a  kind  of  pig-headedness,  or  indifference  to 
ideas,  which  possess  to  a  disastrous  extent  the  cun^ent 
literature  of  Britain,  and  would  move  to  indignation 
if  it  were  not  so  comical.  As  if  any  man  into  whose 
mind  this  idea  of  the  exhaustibility  of  the  Sun's 
Heat,  and  consequently  of  the  force  energizing  our 
system,  had  once  entered,  could  ever  think  a  thought 
about  anything  whatsoever  that  should  not,  in  shape 
and  colour,  be  influenced  by  that  idea?  In  short,  just 
as  Science  has  made  general,  or  is  beginning  to  make 
general,  by  her  teachings,  the  notion  of  the  evolution 
of  all  the  present  cosmical  variety  and  complexity  of 
things  from  some  vast  indistinct  beginning,  so,  by  some 
of  her  late  teachings,  she  has  been  persuading  men  to 
embrace  in  their  regards  all  parts  of  the  present  com- 
plexity as  still  vibrating  together,  and  to  think  of 
planets  and  stars  and  all  starry  systems,  despite  their 
enormous  interspaces,  as  glittering  dispersed  in  one 
entanglement. 

(3)  Distinct  from  either  the  notion  of  the  past 
evolution  of  all  things  physical  from  some  one  homo- 
geneous beginning,  or  from  the  notion  of  their  present 


188 


RECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


189 


inter-entanglement  in  all  their  places  thronghont  the 
purlieus  of  Immensity,  as  still  holding  from  that 
beginning  by  the  threads  of  its  mazy  outrush — dis- 
tinct from  both  these  notions,  but  completing  them 
and  rounding  them  off  towards  the  future,  is  the 
notion  of  the  tendency  of  all  things  to  vlt/imate  a/nd 
universal  collapse.  M.  Comte,  if  I  remember  rightly, 
has  an  inkling  of  this  speculation  in  one  of  its  par- 
ticular forms.  Anticipating  for  the  human  race  an 
almost  indefinite  career  of  farther  development  on 
this  Earth,  thinking  humanity  yet  not  near  midway 
of  the  course  of  its  mighty  collective  life,  he  never- 
theless considers  himself  bound  to  announce  it  as  an 
inevitable  conclusion  of  strict  science,  that  even  this 
collective  life  of  Humanity  cannot  go  on  forever — 
that  there  must  come  a  period,  however  far  distant, 
when  all  the  elements  of  the  collective  organism  of 
Humanity  shall  have  been  used  up  or  brought  into 
equilibrium,  and  when  consequently  the  organism, 
like  any  other,  must  begin  to  decay.  Some  day, 
unless  for  a  reserve  of  interferences  of  which  we  can 
foresee  nothing,  our  Earth  will  be  carrying  not  its 
present  freight  of  nations,  with  their  civilizations, 
governments,  agricultures,  literatures,  and  libraries, 
but  only  the  unrecognisable  wrecks  of  what  had  once 
been  such,  crawling  over  its  surface,  and  degenerat- 
ing, through  stages  of  meaner  and  meaner  vitality, 


back  into  shapelessness  and  extinction.  But  this 
prognostication  of  M.  Comte's  is  as  nothing  compared 
with  the  prognostications  to  which  Science  has  been 
led  by  the  same  principle.  One  might  suppose,  in 
considering  M.  Comte's  anticipation,  the  coming-in, 
ere  the  period  arrived  for  its  fulfilment,  of  such  a 
reserve  of  interferences,  now  unimaginable,  as  should 
hand  on  Man  and  his  belongings,  together  with  the 
tradition  of  our  forsaken  planet,  into  some  wider 
mode  of  existence.  But  it  is  the  collapse  or  winding- 
down  of  the  whole  solar  system  that  recent  Science, 
conjecturing  onwards  through  time,  has  been  prog- 
nosticating as  inevitable  in  the  distance.  By  a  pro- 
cess which  has  been  named  the  Equilibration  of 
Forces,  and  which  is  slowly  going  on,  it  seems  to  be 
foreseen  that  a  period  will  come  when  all  the  energy 
locked  up  in  the  solar  system,  and  sustaining  what- 
ever of  motion  or  life  there  is  in  it,  will  be  exhausted, 
when  the  vivid  play  of  its  actions  and  interactions 
shall  cease,  and  all  its  parts  through  all  their  present 
variousness  will  be  stiffened  or  resolved,  as  regards 
each  other,  in  a  defunct  and  featureless  community 
of  rest  and  death.  ISTor  is  this  all.  Speculation  dares 
to  go  with  her  mathematics  beyond  the  bounds  of  the 
solar  system  itself,  and,  though  professing  to  grope 
here  in  a  region  the  possibilities  of  which  transcend 
her  accustomed  grasp  and  make  it  falter  and  tremble. 


Nl 
\\\\ 


!r' 


I 


i 


11 


I 


II 


190 


EECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


yet  sees  no  other  end  but  that  aU  the  immeasurable 
entanglement  of  aU  the  starry  systems  shall  also  run 
itself  together  at  last  in  an  indistinguishable  eqwlih- 
rium  of  ruin,  as  beads  or  fleeces  of  oily  substance 
hung  in  some  gauze-work  would  trickle  together  in 
burning  tears  at  the  touch  of  fire,  and  be  consumed 
in  a  steam.    Thus,  to  something  Kke  that  Universal 
Nebula  out  of  which  aU  things  are  fancied  as  evolved 
does  Science,  at  her  utmost  daring,  conceive  of  them 
as  tending  to  be  resolved  again.    Universal  dissolu- 
tion,  universal  rest,  universal  death,  is  her  last  dream 
of  the  drift  of  things  in  the  infinite  future.    Or,  if 
she  wiU  not  let  it  be  finaUy  a  dream  of  Universal 
Death,  but  will  arouse  herself  even  as  she  dreams,  is 
it  not  by  an  act  which  she  confesses  to  be  incompe- 
tent to  herself  as  yet-by  a  kind  of  convulsive 
shudder  of  her  being  at  the  touch  of  a  ghostly  hand, 
and  an  unconscious  turning  in  her  sleep  1    To  this, 
however,  there  are  some  who  think  she  ought  to  con- 
sent.   Hence,  with  some,  the  notion  of  the  tendency 
of  all  things  back  to  a  universal  homogeneousness  and 
collapse  is  reUeved  by  the  farther  speculation  that, 
when  that  state  is  reached,  the  process  of  evolution 
wiU  somehow  begin  again.    Again  the  Nebula  will 
whirl ;  again  there  will  be  spun  forth  some  wondrous 
entanglement  of  starry  systems  through  a  blue  Im- 
mensity; again  there  will  be  dances  of  orbs  round 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


191 


their  central  suns ;  again  the  orbs  will  have  their 
strange  particular  histories;  and  again,  when  the 
maximum  of  diversity  and  speciality  is  reached,  there 
will  be  a  beginning  of  the  revoke  of  all  things  into 
involution  and  integration  again.  Thus  is  introduced 
into  the  Cosmological  Conception,  as  far  as  Science 
can  carry  it  or  consent  that  it  can  be  carried,  the  ulti- 
mate notion  or  imagination  of  a  vast  periodicity. 
The  Universe  is  a  recurring  beat  or  pulsation.  It  is 
a  rhythm  of  alternate  evolution  and  involution,  ex- 
pansion and  contraction.  It  is  the  opening  and  shut- 
ting of  a  hand.  It  is  a  !N'othing  ever  manifesting 
itself  as  a  Something,  and  a  Something  ever  returning 
into  a  Nothing. 

By  the  action  of  these  various  scientific  notions  or 
speculations,  there  has  been,  I  repeat,  a  disturbance 
of  the  prior  distribution  of  British  thought  among  the 
six  traditional  systems  of  which,  so  far  as  it  discussed 
the  cosmological  problem  at  all,  it  seemed  to  have 
the  option.  Suppose  these  systems  to  be  arranged  in 
a  line  thus : — 


Nihilism, 
or  Non- 
Substan- 
tialism 


2 


Materialism 


8 

Natural 
Realism 


Constructive 
Idealism 


Pure 
Idealism 


Absolute 
Identity 


Then,  I  said,  it  was  chiefly  among  the  four  middle 
systems,  from  Materialism  to  Pure  Idealism^  that 


I 


I 


( 


192 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


recent  British  pWlosophical  thought  seemed  to  have 
distributed  itself;  and,  if  Sir  William  Hamilton  and 
Mr.  Mill  were  taken  as  the  chief  representatives  of 
recent  British  philosophical  thought,  then,  I  added, 
the  division  seemed  to  be  most  marked  at  the  very 
midmost  point,  between  the  two  systems  of  Natural 
Mealism  and  Constructive  Idealism.  ITow,  however, 
in  consequence  of  the  action  of  such  recent  scientific 
conceptions  as  I  have  been  expounding,  it  seems  to  me 
that  there  have  been  drifts  left  and  right,  away  from 
the  middle  point,  towards  the  two  extremes  of  the 
series.  A  large  quantity  of  speculative  thought  has 
taken,  I  think,  the  Materialistic  direction — a  good  deal 
remaining  within  the  bounds  of  Materialism,  but  some 
passing  on  to  a  kind  of  Nihilism,  which  is  David 
Hume's  Nihilism  over  again,  though  reached  by  a 
different  method.  On  the  other  hand,  unless  I  am 
mistaken,  there  has  been,  or  is  now,  a  drift  of  a  large 
quantity  of  speculative  thought  on  through  Pure 
Idealism,  towards  something  like  Schelling's  and 
Hegel's  doctrine  of  the  Absolute  Identity  of  subject 
and  object.  Lastly,  though  this  is  a  more  obscure 
matter,  I  am  not  sure  but  there  might  be  recognised 
among  us  some  yet  inconsiderable  quantity  of  thought 
which  might  be  described  as  a  blind  struggling 
towards  a  logic  that  should  profess  to  unite  the  two 
extremes,  and  intervolve  the  thought  of  Nothing  in- 


EEOENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


193 


extricably,  by  a  law  of  the  intellect,  with  the  thought 
of  Absolute  Being. 

To  this  most  excruciating  pass,  as  it  must  appear 
to  British  souls,  Science  at  the  utmost  seems  to  have 
conducted  Metaphysics.  How  well  the  Laureate  has 
expressed  the  real  pain  of  the  crisis !  Always  one  of 
Us  peculiar  merits  is  that  he  receives  and  ponders  to 
the  utmost  the  last  scientific  informations  of  the  time, 
letting  them  sway  his  thoughts  and  occultly  shape 
even  the  phrasing  of  his  song ;  and  no  reader  of  the  In 
Memoriam  but  must  have  noted  this  noble  elegy,  and 
its  full  philosophical  significance : — 

'  So  careful  of  tlie  type  ? '    But  no. 

From  scarped  cliff  and  quarried  stone 
She  cries,  '  A  thousand  types  are  gone : 
I  care  for  nothing,  all  shall  go. 

'  Thou  makest  thine  appeal  to  me : 
I  bring  to  life,  I  bring  to  death : 
The  spirit  does  but  mean  the  breath : 
I  know  no  more.'    And  he,  shall  he, 

Man,  her  last  work,  who  seemed  so  fair, 
Such  splendid  purpose  in  his  eyes. 
Who  rolled  the  psalm  to  wintry  skies, 

Who  built  him  fanes  of  fruitless  prayer, 

Who  trusted  God  was  love  indeed 
And  love  Creation's  final  law — 
9 


.'■  >\ 


.1 


•     ! 


194 


EECENT  BBmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 

Though  Nature,  red  in  tooth  and  claw 
With  ravine,  shrieked  against  his  creed — 

Who  lived,  who  suffered  countless  ills, 
Who  battled  for  the  True,  the  Just, 
Be  blown  about  the  desert  dust. 

Or  sealed  within  the  iron  hills? 

No  more  ?    A  monster  then,  a  dream, 
A  discord.    Dragons  in  the  prime, 
That  tare  each  other  in  their  slime, 

Were  mellow  music  matched  with  him. 

O  life  as  futile,  then,  as  frail  I 
O  for  thy  voice  to  soothe  and  bless  1 
What  hope  of  answer,  or  redress? 

Behind  the  veil,  behind  the  veil. 


BBOENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


195 


/ 


i  LIBRARY 

I.      NAOiUt.   ) 


mmmmmmtmmtmm 


CHAPTEE   IV. 

LATEST  BEIFTS  AND  GEOTJPINGS. 

In  order  to  describe  more  exactly  the  present  state 
of  British  Philosophy,  I  can  take  no  better  plan  than 
that  of  attempting  an  enumeration  of  the  chief  cur- 
rents and  eddies  of  philosophical  opinion  that  are  now 
meeting  and  traversing  each  other  at  all  angles  within 
Great  Britain. 

I. 

There  may  be  grouped  together  a  few  eminent  men 
speaking  to  the  British  public  from  the  platforms  of 
modes  of  thought  announced  as  theirs  long  ago,  and 
which  they  do  not  seek  to  adjust  now,  in  any  system- 
atic manner,  to  the  surrounding  medium. 

In  this  class  may  be  again  named  Mr.  Carlyle. 
"We  have  seen  how  great,  both  extensively  and  inten- 
sively, has  been  his  influence  on  the  British  mind  of 
the  last  generation — ^how  to  omit  thie  recognition  of 


;  ) 
.   I 


!  r 


( 

,1 


a. 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


197 


196 


EECENT  BEITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


him  from  any  history  of  recent  Britisli  Philosophy 
would  be  to  omit  the  part  of  Hamlet's  father  from  the 
play  of  Hamlet.  We  all  know,  too,  how  his  influence 
continues.  No  man  is  wider-awake  than  he  to  this 
day ;  no  man  catches  more  willingly  and  inquisitive- 
ly, out  of  the  roar  of  speculations  and  events  around 
him,  the  tones  that  are  significant.  And,  by  his  fre- 
quent voice  in  reply  out  of  his  characteristic  solitude, 
or  visibly  in  our  presence,  we  know  that  he  is  listen- 
ing, and  not  only  listening,  but  always  revolving  the 
last  news  within  his  mind,  and  forming  his  judg- 
ments, and  still  caring  for  the  state  of  Denmark.  And, 
as  for  a  generation  past,  whatever  communication 
comes  from  that  source  flashes  among  us,  in  zig-zag, 
from  coast  to  coast  of  our  Denmark,  and  ends  not 
even  there.  IsTor,  though  the  message  may  ofi'end, 
and  irritate,  or  even  enrage,  is  it  ever  felt  to  be — 
what  is  the  sole  damnation  of  thought — irrelevant. 
But  of  the  system  or  mode  of  mind  out  of  which  there 
still  come  these  fresh  communications,  we  have  long 
had  the  theory  before  us  as  fully  as  it  is  ever  likely 
to  be.  What  a  permanence  of  greatness  in  this  per- 
sonality !  At  whatever  time  of  his  life,  and  by  what- 
ever aid  from  without,  Mr.  Carlyle  contrived  to  extri- 
cate himself  so  absolutely  as  it  is  clear  he  must  have 
done  from  the  coils  of  previous  British  systems,  and  to 
start  with  his  own  set  of  ideas  and  principles,  certain  it 


is  that,  since  he  began  his  career  as  a  public  teacher, 
we  have  seen  him,  more  than  most  men,  one  and  the 
same.  Let  him  be  supposed,  then,  remaining  still  gi- 
gantically apart  on  his  particular  well-known  part 
of  the  stage,  while   we   proceed  with   our  general 

survey. 

Occupying  also  their  various  particular  positions, 

more  or  less  known,  from  time  past,  and  requiring 
here  but  to  be  mentioned,  are  such  thinkers  and  writ- 
ers as  Me.  Isaac  Tayloe,  De.  Whewell,  De.  New- 
man, Me.  Maueice,  and  Me.  F.  W.  Newman.     There 
might  be  an  interesting  study  of  the  mode  of  philo- 
sophical thought  exhibited  in  the  writings  of  each  of 
these,  and  of  its  connexions  with  preceding  powers 
and  movements  in  British  Philosophy.    Partly  be- 
cause most  of  them  are  theologians,  and  have  inwound 
their  speculations  with  theological  questions  and  con- 
troversies, I  refrain  from  such  a  glance  at  each,  as, 
even  from  our  present  point  of  view,  each  might  merit. 
^But  I  cannot  but  ask  you  to  note  how,  in  Dr.  New- 
man's case,  we  have  a  splendid  instance  over  again 
of  the  power  of  a  purely  metaphysical  notion  once 
formed  and  dwelt  in,  to  dominate  a  man's  whole  life, 
and  determine  the  nature  of  his  practical  activity. 
Dr.  Newman  had  apparently  at  no  time  of  his  life 
concerned  himself  with    philosophy,  except   in  and 
through  Theology ;  but  he  tells  us,  in  his  Apologia 


\ 


_x 


198 


EECENT  BETTISH  PHIIOSOPHT. 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


199 


pro  Yita  Sua,  how  he  recollects  that  from  his  veiy 
boyhood  he  carried  with  him  a  certain  constitutional 
frame  or  condition  of  mind,  resembling,  if  I  do  not 
misinterpret  his   description  of   it,  the  Berkeleyan 
IdeaKsm.    All  the  external  Universe  seemed  to  him  a 
deception,  an  angeUc  extravaganza,  a  spangled  phan- 
tasmagory  of  zodiacal  signs  and  Meroglyphics,  a  vivid 
environment  of  sacramental  symbolisms  and  picture- 
writings,  speaking  to  him  of  a  great  Being,  besides 
whom  and  his  own  soul  there  was  no  other  *    Dwell- 
ing long  within  the  blazing  cabalistic  ether  of  this 
cosmological  conception,  tiU  his  soul  had  learnt  its 
language  and  could  think  in  no  other,  but  tenacious 
of  a  principle  which  had  also  strongly  possessed  him 
from  an  early  age,  that  of  the  necessity  of  dogma, 
Dr.  ISTewman  passed  on,  gradually  but  logically,  into 
his  peculiar  eeclesiasticism,  and  became  what  he  has 
become.    It  would  be  more  difficult,  in  the  case  of 
Mr.  Maurice,  to  refer   the  origin  of  a  theological 
activity  so  different  from  Dr.  Newman's  to  any  recov- 
ering in  its  author's  mind,  by  reading  or  native  medi- 
tation, of  any  of  the  leading  speculative  systems  in 
particular  of  which  there  is  record  in  the  history  of 
philosophy.    Mauricianism,  as  it  is  called,  would  re- 
quire an  explanation  by  itself,  which  could  perhaps 
be  given  only  by  one  imbued  with  it.    It  is  to  be  ob^ 

•  See  Apologia,  p.  66,  p.  69,  and  pp.  88—91. 


served,  however,  that  Mr.  Maurice,  having  written  the 
history  of  Philosophy,  must  carry  in  his  mind,  even 
more  than  appears,  a  connected  recollection  of  the  al- 
ternations and  vicissitudes  of  metaphysical  systems 
that  have  characterized  its  course,  and  the  means 
of  thinking  of  his  own  Theology  accurately  in  its  his- 
torical as  well  as  in  its  contemporary  relations.    That 
there  is  more  than  a  relation  of  mere  sequence  be- 
tween him  and  Coleridge  (in  whom  again,  as  I  have 
said,   there  was  a   resumption   and   re-issue  of  the 
elements  of  a  rich  and  free  native  Anglicanism,  the 
tradition  of  which  had  been  long  overborne  or  frit- 
tered away)  seems' to  me  a  fair  assertion,  and,  indeed, 
in  Mr.  Maurice's  Theology,  if  nowhere  else,  I  should 
find  evidence  that  the  influence  of  Coleridge's  Philos- 
ophy, notwithstanding  all  that  has  intervened,  is  not 
exhausted  in  England, 

In  this  place,  as  naturally  as  anywhere  else,  may 
be  mentioned  Mb.  J.  D.  Mokell.  Of  his  various 
writings  I  do  not  know  that  any  has  contributed  so 
much  to  the  diffusion  of  philosophical  notions,  and  of 
an  interest  in  Philosophy,  as  his  lucid  and  compre- 
hensive "History  of  Speculative  Philosophy  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century,"  published  nearly  twenty  years 
ago.  It  was  a  most  welcome  book  at  the  time ;  and 
to  it,  along  with  Mr.  Lewes's  "  Biographical  History 
of  Philosophy,"  our  literary  men,  as  well  as  readers 


',\. 


■"^■-4 

? 

\ 
_  \ 


200 


EECEKT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


201 


at  large,  are  indebted  to  this  day  for  more  of  their 
best  information  on  philosophical  subjects  than  is  al- 
ways acknowledged. 

n. 

A  very  marked  group  of  thinkers  and  writers 
among  ns  may  be  distinguished,  fairly  enough,  as  the 
British  Comtists. 

Here  let  me  take  prejudice  by  the  horns.    N"o  dif- 
ference from  Comte  over  the  fundamental  principle  of 
his  philosophy,  no  recoil  or  aversion  of  the  spirit  (let 
it  be  even  as  vehement  as  my  own)  from  his  final 
theory  of  things,  ought  to  prevent  or  will  prevent — 
save  where  fear  of  the  Blatant  Beast  is  allowed  to 
measure  men's  words — a  recognition  of  Comte's  great 
services  in  the  world  of  recent  speculation.    A  fio-ure 
full  of  interest  to  me — an  interest  compounded  of  ad- 
miration, moumfulness,  and  yet  a  sense  of  the  comic 
— ^is  that  of  the  lonely  Parisian,  of  little  regard  among 
the  authorities  of  his  country,  and  whom  they  had  de- 
prived almost  of  bread,  persevering  till  his  death  in 
the  work  of  building  up,  and  finishing  to  its  last  de- 
tail and  pinnacle,  a  system  of  thought  in  which,  as  he 
conceived,  all  Humanity,  after  its  ages  of  weary  wan- 
dering, might  at  last  find  rest.     "  Ho !  all  ye  nations, 
and  especially  ye  five,  the  elite  of  Humanity — French- 
men,  Britons,   Germans,  Italians,    and  Spaniards! 


Te  have  now  nearly  passed  through  the  two  stages,  or 
modes  of  thought,  through  which,  as  I  can  prove  to 
you,  the  mind  of  man  must  pass  on  all  subjects  what- 
soever, before  it  teaches  the  third  and  last.  It  is  time 
that  this  third  stage  should  be  prepared  for  you,  and 
extended  before  your  eyes  in  its  reaches  through  a  glo- 
rious future.  This  is  my  work ;  I  am  the  herald,  the 
apostle  of  Positivism.  All  the  materials  that  have 
been  accumulating  for  the  new  construction,  all  the 
hints  for  its  design,  have  come  together  in  me,  and 
found  the  proper  architect ;— nay,  not  only  have  I 
been  the  architect,  but  I  have  been  the  builder  from 
the  foundation  upwards,  the  carver,  the  gilder,  the 
decorator.  The  vast  construction  is  ready.  Leaving 
all  other  systems,  come,  ye  choicest  spirits,  my  specu- 
lative kinsmen,  from  all  ends  of  the  earth ;  here  we 
shall  dwell  together  in  unity,  understanding  and  even 
reverencing  the  past,  but  regulating  the  present,  and 
looking  forward  tranquilly  to  that  future  to  which  we 
shall  have  prescribed  the  true  problem  of  Philosophy, 
Art,  and  Government,  all  in  one— ^  the  reorganization 
of  human  society,  without  God  or  King,  through  the 
systematic  worship  of  Humanity.' "  If  there  is  some- 
thing ludicrous  to  many  in  this  over-estimate,  in  a 
man's  own  case,  of  what  it  can  possibly  be  given  to 
any  one  man  to  accomplish  and  leave  permanent  in 

the  world,  there  is  not  the  less  something  majestic  in 
9* 


^^  ( 


202 


EECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EEOENT  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


203 


the  intensity  of  conviction,  the  indomitable  faith  in 
ideas,  which  conld  lead  to  it.  To  onr  loss,  we  in 
Britain  have  too  little  of  this  spirit  of  self-assertion 
rather  than  too  much.  Given  an  intense  idiosyncra- 
sy, and  a  really  powerful  and  inventive  mind,  and  so- 
ciety aronnd  harms  itself,  rather  than  secures  itself, 
by  an  intolerance  of  the  speculative  extravagances, 
the  audacities  of  egotism,  which  might  result,  and  by 
the  habit  of  beating  them  back  with  coldness,  witti- 
cisms, and  derision.  It  is  hard,  indeed,  for  Teutonic 
flesh  and  blood  to  look  on  and  see  a  Frenchman  gen- 
eralizing, to  the  utmost  of  his  national  manner  when 
it  breaks  loose,  without  a  longing  to  knock  him  down, 
and  put  him  in  a  strait-waistcoat.  There  is  such  a 
confidence  about  him,  such  a  systematizing  rapidity, 
such  an  unhesitating  sureness  about  things,  where  we 
Goths  are  clogged  and  restrained  by  traditional  con- 
siderations and  a  sense  of  diflSculty  atid  complexity ! 
But  there  is  something  superb,  nevertheless,  in  the 
speculative  movements  of  a  first-rate  French  intellect. 
In  the  works  of  M.  Comte,  at  all  events,  there  is  a 
well  of  thought  and  suggestion  on  all  sorts  of  subjects, 
the  value  of  which  it  does  not  need  even  an  approach 
to  acquiescence  in  his  philosophical  basis  to  appreci- 
ate. There  are  propositions  and  generalizations  of  his, 
more  especially  in  the  department  of  politics,  the  ab- 
sorption of  which  into  the  general  mind,  or  in  the 


i 


working-creeds  df  professional  statesmen,  would  con- 
siderably transform  and  exalt  what  now  passes  for 
politics.  Throughout  Britain,  indeed,  this  has  been 
long  perceived  in  many  quarters ;  and,  while  Mr.  MiU 
and  others  have  expressed  to  the  full  their  obligations 
to  Comte,  even  when  defining  their  increasing  differ- 
ences from  him,  others  have  been  secretly  helping 
themselves  to  Comte,  and  living  on  the  results. 

All  in  all,  there  is,  I  should  say,  a  considerable 
tinge  of  Comtism  through  our  present  speculative  lit- 
erature. It  is  not,  however,  of  those  among  us  who 
have  only  in  a  general  way  received  this  tinge,  as 
they  would  have  received  a  tinge  from  any  other  pow- 
erful intellectual  infiuence  of  their  time,  that  I  speak 
under  the  name  of  the  British  Comtists.  Under  this 
name  I  have  in  view  a  few  writers  and  thinkers  who 
in  a  more  express  manner  adhere  to  Comte,  or  to  an 
acknowledged  adaptation  of  him.  Even  here,  how- 
ever, there  are  degrees.  One  may  distinguish,  even 
within  Comte's  own  life-time,  two  Comtisms,  of  which 
those  who  were  inclined  to  be  Comtists  had  the  op- 
tion. There  was  the  "  Earlier  Comtism,"  if  I  may  so 
call  it,  represented  in  his  completed  Cours  de  Philos- 
ophie  Positive ;  in  which,  though  there  was  extrava- 
gance enough  of  opinion  and  expression  to  shock  the 
British  mind,  there  was  still  areining-in  of  the  intellect 
on  this  side  of  delirium.    But  this  was  ere  long  devel- 


204 


BECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


oped  into  the  "  Later  Comtism ; "  in  which,  impelled 
by  a  sudden  revelation  that  his  system  was  deficient 
as  yet  on  the  sentimental  side,  the  author  suddenly 
broke  down  one  of  its  gables,  and  did  pass  on,  with- 
out his  hat,  into  what  irreverent  lookers-on  must 
really  call  delirium  and  moonlight.  Out  from  that 
gable  he  built,  as  it  were,  a  spacious  verandah  for  a 
new  Eeligion,  attached  to  his  Positive  Philosophy  un- 
der the  name  of  the  GvUe  Systematique  de  VSuman- 
ite.  Here  there  might  be  busts  of  three  hundred  and 
sixty-five  selected  eminent  men  of  the  past  (a  large 
proportion  being,  of  course.  Frenchmen),  ranged  in 
niches,  as  gods  for  ordinary  daily  worship  throughout 
the  year ;  besides  more  colossal  busts  of  greater  gods 
for  the  weeks  and  months,  and  a  striking  peculiarity 
of  four  black  busts  of  History's  most  retrograde  scoun- 
drels, at  quarterly  intervals,  to  serve  as  devils,  or  de- 
sirable objects  of  execration ;  while  within  all,  in  a 
secret  alcove,  one  might  practise  the  sweetest  and 
keenest  of  all  forms  of  the  worship  of  Humanity — ^the 
worship  of  Woman — ^by  praying  habitually  to  one's 
own  mother,  or  wife ! 

Some  form  even  of  the  later  or  sacerdotal  Comtism, 
I  believe,  does  exist  among  us  in  perfect  earnest,  and 
without  seeking  to  conceal  itself;  but,  as  might  be 
expected,  it  is  chiefly  the  earlier  or  purely  speculative 
Comtism,  and  that  with  modifications,  that  has  any 


RECENT  BEITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


205 


following  in  Britain.  If  I  reckon  Me.  Lewes  and  Miss 
Martineau  among  British  Comtists  in  this  sense,  it 
must  be  only  in  as  far  as  they  themselves,  in  trans- 
lating or  expounding  Comte,  have  signified  their  ad- 
hesion to  his  principles.  Miss  Martineau  has  had  a 
career  of  thought  and  activity  of  her  own  too  marked 
to  make  it  conceivable  that  it  can  have  merged  abso- 
lutely in  Comtism ;  and  Mr.  Lewes  is  too  able  and 
spirited  a  man,  too  cultured,  of  too  frank  and  quick 
sympathies  in  all  fine  directions,  that  we  should  tie 
him  down  very  stringently  to  his  own  enthusiastic 
expression,  that  "  in  the  Cours  de  JPhilosqphie  JPosi- 
twe  we  have  the  grandest,  because  on  the  whole,  the 
truest  system  which  Philosophy  has  yet  produced."  ^ 
Still,  there  is  a  considerable  amount  of  effective  Brit- 
ish Comtism  among  us — of  that  philosophy  which  ab- 
jures and  protests  against  Metaphysics,  or  the  thou{;ht 
of  the  supernatural  in  any  form  whatsoever,  as  by  this 
time  proved  rubbish,  and  would  direct  the  plough- 
share of  the  human  mind,  in  respect  of  the  study  of 
Man,  exclusively  to  Physiology  and  Sociology. 

Into  this  British  Comtism  have  been  absorbed,  I 
think,  all  the  relics,  worth  reckoning,  of  what  was 
once  native  British  Secularism.  Absorption  into  Comt- 
ism  has  been  an  elevation  for  it. 


*  Lewes's  Biographical  History  of  Philosophy^  Library  Edition,  p. 


662. 


■M 


206 


EECEKT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


To  be  named  in  close  connexion  with  the  British 
Comtists,  though  not  decisively  as  one  of  them,  is  the 
late  Mr.  Buckle.    His  great  idea,  that  for  which  he 
lived  and  died,  was  the  possibility  of  a  Science  of 
History.    There  was  a  paramount  obh'gation  of  the 
human  mind  in  the  present  age  to  the  study  of  His- 
tory in  a  scientific  manner,  with  all  possible  aids  from 
Physiology  and  the  other  sciences,  in  order  to  the  dis- 
covery and  establishment  of  a  new  body  of  truths  bear- 
ing on  the  social  well-being.     In  prosecuting  this  idea 
Mr.  Buckle  himself  put  forth  a  number  of  more  or 
less    suggestive   conjectures    and  criticisms,  and  re- 
vealed also  certain  strong  idiosyncrasies — ^in  particu- 
lar, his  passion  for  liberty  of  thought,  and  his  abomi- 
nation of  the  theological  spirit  in  all  times  and  coun- 
tries.    There  was  a  breaking  away  in  him,  too — as  is 
often  interestingly  the  case  with  enthusiastic  Empiri- 
cists of  his  type — into  a  consolatory  private  transcen- 
dentalism of  his  own,  accessible  from  his  general  sys- 
tem by  a  wicket  to  which  he  only  had  the  key.    But, 
on  the  whole,  it  must  have  been  chiefly  owing  to  the 
small  amount  of  public  familiarity  there  was  in  this 
country  with  exercises  of  speculation  in  the  same  gen- 
eral direction,  and  particularly  with  Comte's,  that  Mr. 
Buckle's  doctrines  ran  about  with  such  a  clamour  of 
rejection  and  acceptance.    As  far  as  I  know,  all  that 
was  essential  in  them  might  have  been  cut  out  of  a 


J 


I 


\ 


EECENT  BRinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


207 


comer  of  Comte,  or  out  of  that  with  a  portion  of  Mill 
in  addition — though  I  do  not  mean  to  say  the  author 
got  at  them  by  any  such  immediate  method;  and 
there  was  a  crudity  about  his  statements  of  them,  an 
incoherence,  and  a  sort  of  slap-dash  contemptuousness 
towards  whole  centmies  and  civilizations  of  the  past, 
on  account  of  their  using  battle-axes,  burning  witches, 
wearing  shoe-ties,  or  some  trifle  of  that  sort,  from 
which  the  more  comprehensive  genius  of  Comte  kept 
him  free.  It  was  Mr.  Buckle's  intellectual  courage, 
his  pugnacity  for  ideas  that  had  roused  and  invigo- 
rated himself,  that  was  his  main  merit.  In  our  coun- 
try it  is  a  great  merit,  because  still  a  rare  one. 
Thinking,  therefore,  how  largely  he  possessed  it,  and 
how  prematurely  and  sadly  he  was  cut  oflF  while  oth- 
ers who  have  no  such  virtue  are  left,  the  words  may 
occur  to  us : 

« 

"How  well  could  we  have  spared  for  thee,  young  swain, 
Enow  of  such  as  for  their  bellies'  sake 
Creep,  and  intrude,  and  climb  into  the  fold  1" 

III. 

I  will  now  name  together  two  writers,  not  because 
they  can  be  constituted  into  a  class,  but  because  each 
of  them  is  so  important  individually  that  there  is  a 
propriety,  on  that  account,  in  connecting  them. 

Associated  with  Mr.  Mill  by  a  mutual  respect, 


( 


208 


EECENT  BEITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


E:eCENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


209 


wHcli  has  taken  opportunities  of  expressing  itself, 
and  also  by  substantial  adhesion  in  principle,  is  Me. 
Alkxandee  Bain.  His  contribution  to  Philosophy 
is  mainly  his  large  system  of  Psychology  in  two  vol- 
umes, entitled  The  Senses  and  the  Intellect  and  The 
Emotions  cmd  the  Will.  It  is  perhaps  the  richest 
Katural  History  of  the  Human  Mind  in  the  language 
— ^the  most  fully  mapped  out,  and  the  most  abundant 
in  happy  detail  and  illustration.  The  author  deci- 
dedly belongs  to  the  school  of  Empiricism,  and  he 
roots  his  Psychology,  more  strenuously  and  exten- 
sively, I  think,  than  any  British  psychologist  since 
Hartley,  in  Physiology.  But,  from  the  fact  that  his 
Physiology  is  that  of  the  present  day,  he  does  this 
with  greater  intelligibility  and  effect.  He  does  not 
indeed  reject  from  Psychology  the  method  of  the  ob- 
servation and  registration  of  the  phsenomena  of  Mind, 
as  flitting,  however  generated,  in  a  supposed  inner 
chamber  of  Consciousness ;  but  he  takes  care  to  assert 
at  the  outset  that  this  inner  chamber  is  a  mere  phan- 
tasy or  trick  of  the  mind.  Sweeping  away  even  the 
imaginary  sensorium,  or  central  receptacle  for  im- 
pressions, of  the  older  physiologists,  he  views  Mind 
as  presenting  itself  in  nerve-currents^  the  recoverahil- 
ity  of  nerve-currents,  and  the  associability  of  nerve- 
currents,  on  and  on,  in  ever-increasing  complexity 
and  in  ever-varying  combinations.    Beginning,  there- 


fe 


fore,  with  Brain  and  Nerve  as  the  seats  of  the  nerve- 
currents,  and  educing  thence  those  simplest  and  most 
rudimentary  states  of  mind  which  consist  of  instinc- 
tive muscular  movements  and  sensations  of  the  five 
senses,  he  proceeds  to  show  how,  out  of  these,  by  the 
processes  of  recoverability  and  association,  all  the 
facts  of  the  mind,  all  the  habits  and  faculties  of  men, 
all  their  cognitions  and  beliefs,  aU  the  varieties  of 
aptitude,  intelligence,  character,  and  genius,  may  be 
conceivably  built  up.    As  he  does  this  in  a  quiet, 
gradually  synthetic  way — leaving  the  suflSciency  of 
his  system  to  be  judged  of  by  his  exhibition  of  its 
ability  to  work  through,  and  account  for,  all  the 
abundance  of  men's  notions  as  to  themselves  and  each 
other,  rather  than  debating  it  formally — ^it  is  only 
incidentally,  and  here  and  there,  that  he  touches  on 
the  great  questions  of  Metaphysics.    And  yet  his 
book,  I  should  say,  strews  excellent  new  material  over 
these  questions,  and,  if  attended  to,  will  not  leave  their 
British  forms  precisely  as  they  were.     Thus,  with 
respect  to  the  battle  of  the  two  opposed  psychological 
theories — ^that  of  Empiricism  and  that  of  Transcen- 
dentalism—Mr. Bain,  I  think,  introduces  a  novelty  in 
his  Psychology.     Eightly  or  wrongly,  he  places  it  to 
the  credit  of  Empiricism ;  and,  if  rightly  so  placed,  it 
would  improve  the  position  of  Empiricists,  including 
Mr.  Mill,  against  their  opponents.    He  finds,  phys- 


l^ 


i 


210 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHTLOSOPHT. 


211 


iologically,  that  among  the  rudimentary  facts  of  the 
hmnan  organism  is  that  of  a  force  of  spontaneous 
movement,  as  well  as  an  equipment  for  passive  sensi- 
bility— a  power  of  generating  active  nerve-currents 
from  within  outwards,  as  well  as  a  liability  to  sensi- 
tive nerve-currents  from  without  inwards ;  and  through 
all  the  complications  of  his  farther  expositions  he 
takes  care  to  run  this  fund  of  automatic  force,  inter- 
mingled continually  with  mere  sensation,  as  a  some- 
thing that  may  prove  tantamount,  when  investigated, 
to  a  good  deal  of  that  d  priori  element,  apart  from 
sensation,  for  which  Transcendentalists  contend.  Mo- 
mentarily, as  regards  the  individual  human  being, 
Mr.  Bain,  by  this  provision  of  a  physiological  substi- 
tute for  at  least  somewhat  of  the  a  priori  element  of 
the  Transcendentalists,  does  put  a  different  complex- 
ion on  the  question  between  Empiricism  and  Tran- 
scendentalism, and  alters  the  setting  of  it.  As  re- 
gards each  individual,  he  provides,  on  physiological 
evidence,  an  ever-flowing  fountain  of  necessary  or 
innate  impulse,  independent  of  sensation  from  with- 
out, and  intermingling  with  it.  And,  as  thus,  in  the 
very  beginning  of  his  Psychology,  he  offers  what  may 
pass  provisionally,  in  respect  of  the  individual  mind, 
as  a  physiological  substitute,  as  far  as  it  will  go,  for 
the  important  distinction  of  the  Kantians  between 
Form  and  Matter,  so  at  the  end  of  his  work,  where 


he  comes  round  to  his  last  word  on  the  ultimate  meta- 
physical question— the  question  of  the  trustworthiness 
of  Consciousness  in  that  conception  of  a  double  Uni- 
verse, of  Self  and  ]S"ot-Self,  of  Subject  and  Object, 
which  seems  to  be  compelled  in  every  act  of  external 
perception— he  makes  the  same  notion  reappear  on 
an  extended  scale,  so  as  to  take  effect  upon  the  state 
of  the  controversy  between  the  various  systems  of 
Eealism  on  the  one  side  and  those  of  Idealism  on  the 
other.    Movement  and  sensation,  nerve-currents  from 
within  outwards  and  nerve-currents  from  without  in- 
wards, being  rudimentarily  and  from  the  first  moment 
the  one  radical  contrast  or  antithesis  in  our  feelings 
— ^this  contrast,  always  accompanying  us,  and,  though 
strengthened,  enlarged,  and  educated  by  million-fold 
repetitions  and  associations,  yet  always  remaining 
constant,  swells  out  at  last  into  that  contrast  between 
the  extended  visible  immensity  of  an  external  world 
up  to  the  stars,  and  a  felt  but  invisible  and  unlike 
immensity  of  spirit  within,  which  all  men  carry  with 
them,  and  which  has  been  the  fascinating  fact  for 
Metaphysics.    The  notion  of  Self  or  Subject  is  a  gen- 
eralization of  the  feelings  of  Active  Movement :  the 
notion  of  Not-Self  or  Object  is  a  generalization  of  the 
feelings  of  Passive  Sensation.    What,  then,  must  be 
the  answer  of  a  philosopher  to  that  question,  as  to  the 
last  certainty  accruing  from  the  total  evidence  of 


IPV 


%^ 


212 


RECENT  BBmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


Consciousness,  to  which  philosophers  may  be  expected 
to  possess  an  answer,  although  common  men,  not  for 
that  matter  philosophers  themselves,  except  when  they 
philosophize,  need  not  entertain  it  ?  Where  shall  one 
rank  oneself?  Among  Nihilists,  among  Materialists, 
among  Natural  EeaHsts,  among  Constructive  IdeaHsts, 
among  Pure  Idealists,  or  among  those  who  hold  the 
doctrine  of  Absolute  Identity  ?  Curiously  enough,  Mr. 
Bain's  premiss  leads,  on  the  one  hand,  out  of  any  form 
of  Idealism,  towards  a  peculiar,  and  what  may  be 
called  physiological,  form  of  the  doctrine  of  radical 
Identity.  Though  the  two  generalizations  of  Self  and 
Not-Self,  of  the  perceiving  mind  and  of  the  world  exter- 
nal to  it,  are  carried  apart  practically  by  all  men,  and 
life  consists  in  a  perpetual  hypothesis  of  their  opposi- 
tion, yet  the  psychologist,  knowing  that  they  have 
their  roots  inextricably  united  in  the  same  organism, 
and  knowing  no  more  than  this,  is  bound  to  proclaim, 
as  the  deepest  fact  of  the  phaenomenal  universe  arrived 
at  by  his  science,  the  identity,  the  inseparability,  of 
Subject  and  Object.  Of  course,  as  it  is  within  the 
bounds  of  his  psychological  theory  of  Empiricism  that 
Mr.  Bain  takes  up  this  position,  his  Identity-system  is 
a  very  different  thing,  in  its  metaphysical  bearings, 
fipom  the  Identity-system  of  some  of  the  Transcenden- 
talists.  They,  or  any  of  their  brother-Transcenden- 
talists,  would  be  entitled  to  run  Mr.  Bain  back,  with 


RECENT   BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


213 


this  physiological  form  of  the  Identity-system  in  his 
hands,  along  that  eternal  track  which  the  controversy 
between  Empiricism  and    Transcendentalism    must 
pursue  in  the  quest  of  the  real  beginning.     Such 
farther  interrogation,  however,  Mr.  Bain  implicitly 
declines.     Except  through  Psychology,   and  conse- 
quently except  through  Physiology,  he  refuses  Meta- 
physics.    He  does  so,  I  believe,  on  definite  principle. 
And,  considering  the  great  services  he  has  done  to 
Psychology  by   preserving    adherence   to  his    own 
method — the  important  novelties,  I  think  I  may  say, 
which  he  has  introduced  into  British  Psychology  in 
particular — ^we  ought,  most  certainly,  not  to  object  to 
his  system  that  it  does  not  give  us  what  it  never 
undertook  to  give.    Still,  as  Philosophy  in  its  widest 
sense  asks,  and  always  has  asked,  for  instruction  as 
to  the  best  mode  of  thought  on  those  metaphysical 
questions,  at  their  highest  and  most  extreme  range, 
which  Mr.  Bain  declines  to  entertain,  and  as,  at  the 
present  moment  in  particular,  it  is  obvious  to  all  that 
it  is  with  these  questions,  as  reset  for  it  by  an  all-com- 
prehensive and  soul-exciting  Cosmology,  that  British 
Philosophy  is    passionately  grappling,    Mr.    Bain's 
treatise  does  not  encircle  all  the  requirements. 

No  such  defeat  can  be  charged  against  the  other 
writer  whom  I  am  now  to  name — ^Me.  Herbert 
Spencer.     Of  all  our  thinkers  he  is  the  one  who,  as 


V 


'T    ^- 


214 


EECENT  BBiriSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


Nil 


it  appears  to  me,  lias  formed  to  timself  the  largest 
new  scheme  of  a  systematic  philosophy,  and,  in  rela- 
tion to  some  of  the  greatest  questions  of  philosophy  in 
their  most  recent  forms,  as  set  or  reset  by  the  last 
specnlations  and  revelations  of  science,  has  already 
shot  his  thoughts  the  farthest.    He  both  works  out 
his  Philosophy  physiologically  and  psychologically 
from  the  centre,  and — what  seems  to  me  an  eminent 
merit  in  relation  to  the  intellectual  needs  of  the  time 
— surveys  it  and  contemplates  it  from  the  circum- 
ference cosmologically.    Indeed,  I  should  say  that  he 
is  the  British  thinker  who  has  most  distinctly  realized 
the  absolute  necessity  that  Philosophy  lies  under,  of 
dealing  with  the  total  cosmological  conception  as  well 
as  with  the  mere  psychical  or  physiological  organism 
(and  this  from  the  demonstrable  inter-relatedness  of 
both),  if  it  would  grasp  all  the  present  throbbings  of 
the    speculative    intellect.      His  writings    take   for 
granted  this  necessity,  and  make  it  plainer  than  it 
would  otherwise  be.    ITowhere  else  are  the  various 
sciences  so  fished  for  generalizations  that  may  come 
together  as  a  whole  to  help  in  forming  a  Philosophy. 
N'owhere  else,  at  all  events,  is  there  a  more  beautiful 
and  fearless  exposition  of  some  of  those  recent  scientific 
notions  which  I  spoke  of  in  the  last  chapter  as  afiect- 
ing  our  views  of  metaphysical  problems.     There 
are  parts  of  Mr.  Spencer's  writings,  occupied  with 


^'r 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


215 


i 


such  expositions,  which,  from  sheer  scientific  clear- 
ness, and  adequacy  of  language  to  the  matter,  have 
all  the  effect  of  a  poem.  If  even  only  for  such  ren- 
derings of  high  scientific  conceptions,  on  the  chance 
of  their  somehow  taking  possession  of  the  popular 
soul,  and  imiting  there  to  rectify  previous  forms  of 
thought,  he  would  deserve  honourable  recognition. 

But  Mr.  Spencer  does  not  stop  short  in  the  charac- 
ter of  an  interpreter  between  Science  and  Philosophy, 
handing  on  the  conceptions  of  Science  to  that  congress 
of  all  the  Powers  where  they  are  to  be  adjusted  and 
take  effect.  He  assumes  the  work  of  the  philosopher 
proper.  He  seeks  to  enmesh  the  physical  round  of 
things,  as  Science  now  orbs  it  to  the  instructed  imagi- 
nation, within  a  competent  Metaphysic ;  he  desires  to 
fix  in  the  centre  a  competent  Psychology,  consistent 
with  this  Metaphysic,  and  yet  empirically  and  physi- 
ologically educed ;  and  he  would  fill  up  the  interior, 
or  what  of  it  the  physical  sciences  leave  void,  with  a 
competent  Ethics,  a  competent  Jurisprudence,  a  com- 
petent ^Esthetics,  a  competent  Science  of  Education, 
and  a  competent  Science  of  Government  and  Politics. 

In  this  great  work  he  is  still  engaged ;  and  it  will 
not  perhaps  be  till  the  whole  is  accomplished  that 
there  will  be  the  means  of  determining  either  the  suf- 
ficiency of  Mr.  Spencer's  philosophy  for  the  higher 
practical  purposes  of  philosophy,  or  its  exact  intellect- 


II 1 


ti 


;:i. 


J 


216 


RECENT  BBmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


217 


III 


ual  relations  to  previous  systems.    Already,  in  con- 
sequence both  of  the  decisiveness  of  his  views  and  the 
variety  of  interesting  subjects  over  which  they  extend, 
Mr.  Spencer,  more  than  any  other  systematic  British 
thinker  save  Mill,  has  an  avowed  following  both  here 
and  in  America ;  and,  if  any  individual  influence  is 
visibly  encroaching  on  Mill's  in  this  country,  it  is  his. 
For  my  own  part,  believing  that  no  type  of  man 
ought  to  be  more  precious  to  a  nation  than  a  resolute 
systematic  thinker,  and  believing  Mr.  Spencer  to  be 
a  very  high  specimen  of  this  type,  I  anticipate  noth- 
ing but  good,  nothing  at  least  but  a  clearing  away  of 
the  bad,  from  what  he  has  already  done  or  may  yet 
do.    And  this  I  say,  though  differing  as  deeply  and 
at  as  many  points  from  Mr.  Spencer  as  from  any  man 
whom  I  respect.    His  Metaphysic  seems  to  me  too 
merely  negative  ;  and  this  negativeness  of  character  I 
trace  through  his  views,  so  far  as  I  know  them,  in 
Politics,  in  Esthetics,  and  in  all  matters  whatsoever. 
Also  I  think — or  it  may  be  the  same  thing  in  a  par- 
ticular form— he  undervalues  history,  erudition,  and 
the  power  of  the  historical  element. 

lY. 

Although  Hamilton  is  no  more  in  the  midst  of  us, 
Hamiltonianism  is  not  defunct.  But  why  should  I 
say  Hamiltonianism?     All  our   British  speculative 


thought,  in  every  comer  where  intellect  is  still  recep- 
tive and  fresh,  has  been  affected,  at  least  posthumous- 
ly, by  the  influence  of  that  massive  man,  of  the  bold 
look  and  the  clear  hazel  eyes,  whose  library  lamp 
might  have  been  seen  nightly,  a  few  years  ago,  by 
late  stragglers  in  one  of  the  streets  of  Edinburgh, 
burning  far  into  the  night  when  the  rest  of  the  city 
was  asleep.  Oh!  our  miserable  judgments!  Here 
was  a  man  probably  unique  in  Britain ;  but  Britain 
was  not  running  after  him,  nor  thinking  of  him,  but 
was  occupied  as  she  always  is  and  always  will  be, 
with  her  temporary  concerns  and  her  riff-raff  of  tem- 
porary notabilities.  And  now  one  has  to  dig  one's 
way  to  the  best  of  him  through  the  small-type  col- 
umns of  perhaps  the  most  amorphous  book  ever  issued 
from  the  British  press.  But  some  have  done  this, 
who  had  no  inducement  to  do  so  except  their  love  of 
Ideas,  wherever  thev  were  to  be  found.  Mill  and 
Bain,  who  are  fundamentally  opposed  to  Hamilton's 
Transcendentalism,  and  Spencer,  who  is  certainly  not 
a  Hamiltonian,  all  acknowledge  their  respect  for 
Hamilton,  and  the  obligations  of  British  thought  to  his 
labour.  And  it  was  the  gymnastic  of  Philosophy,  its 
power  to  energize  and  elevate  the  mind  in  the  pursuit 
of  truth,  more  than  agreement  with  any  one  supposed 
system  of  truth,  whether  his  own  or  another,  that  he 

himself  cared  for.    Hence,  if  I  say  that  there  are  still 
10 


■ 


!i* 


I  f 


1  '■ 


•f 


•t  i 


218 


EECENT   BRITISH    PUILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


219 


Hamiltonians  among  us,  I  do  not  mean  that  even 
those  whom  I  call  such  adhere  to  Hamilton's  doc- 
trines, but  only  that  to  Hamilton  they  confess,  more 
than  others  do,  a  sense  of  continued  allegiance. 

In  England  there  is  first  to  be  mentioned  Mr. 
Mansel,  whose  own  works  in  Philosophy  have  earned 
him  justly  so  high  a  reputation,  and  who  has  given  a 
turn  to  one  of  Hamilton's  doctrines,  in  connexion  with 
a  form  of  English  Theology,  for  which,  some  think, 
the  form  of  theology  is  more  obliged  to  him  than  the 
Hamiltonian  doctrine.      Acknowledging  specific  ob- 
ligations to  Hamilton,  but  differing  from  him  most  of 
all  precisely  where  Mr.  Mansel's  agreement  is  greatest, 
is  Dr.  McCosh  of  Belfast,  in  the  last  edition  of  whose 
Intuitions  of  tJie  Mind  Inductively  Investigated  will 
be  found  some  express  criticisms  of  the  ontological  ap- 
plications of  Hamilton's  Philosophy  by  Mr.  Mansel 
and  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.     Along  with  Dr.  McCosh, 
as  also  admiring  Hamilton  in  the  main,  but  dreading 
the  consequences  of  his  Relativity  doctrine,  may  be 
named  Mr.  Lowndes,  the  author  of  a  very  shrewd  and 
clear  little  volume  recently  published  under  the  title 
of  An  Introduction  to  the  Philosophy  of  Primary 
Beliefs  /  and  there  are  still  other  writers  that  might 
be  named  in  the  same  connexion. ^Naturally,  how- 
ever, it  is  in  Scotland,  and  among  Hamilton's  own 
pupils  there,  that  Hamiltonianism  lasts  the  strongest. 


I  can  name  one  former  student  of  Hamilton's  now  a 
minister  in  what  would  be  accounted  in  England  one 
of  the  straitest  sects  of  Scottish  Puritanism,  and  who 
has  consecrated  to  the  duties  of  that  calling  the  pow- 
ers of  a  mind  among  the  noblest  I  have  known,  and 
the  most  learned  in  pure  Philosophy.  Any  man  who, 
on  any  subject  of  metaphysical  speculation,  should 
contend  with  Dr.  Cairns,  of  Berwick-upon-Tweed, 
would  have  reason  to  know,  ere  he  had  done  with 
him,  what  strength  for  offence  or  defence  there  may 
yet  be  in  a  Puritan  minister's  hand-grip.  And,  if  I 
mention  him  so,  it  is  to  bring  out  a  fact  which  we  are 
too  apt  to  forget  in  these  days  of  increasing  disrespect 
for  the  clergy— to  wit,  that  it  is  impossible  for  any 
one  to  know,  otherwise  than  by  actual  observation  of 
society,  and  a  habit  of  estimating  men  not  merely  by 
the  apparent  direction  in  which  they  are  scudding, 
whether  with  the  prevalent  breeze  or  not  (which  the 
smallest  ships  may  be  doing),  but  by  their  weight  and 
build  all  in  all,  what  combinations  of  native  power 
and  of  high  speculative  culture  and  insight  may  be 
found  with  what  inherited  positions  and  systems  of 
belief,  and  honestly  verifying  them  to  their  homeliest 
letter.  Dr.  Cairns  is,  in  the  main,  though  with  con- 
siderable modifications,  an  adherent  to  Hamilton's 
speculative  philosophy  ;  and  he  has  published  inter- 
pretations and  defenceis  of  portions  of  that  philosophy 


■11 


•  I 


220 


BECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


RECENT  BEmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


221 


as  well  as  occasional  expositions  and  criticisms  of 
Kant  and  the  later  Germans.     Freer  and  more  at  lei- 
sure by  their  positions  to  maintain  Hamiltonianism, 
or  to  go  on  modifying  it  or  leading  it  out  of  itself,  are 
Peofessoe  Feasee,  Hamilton's  successor  in  the  Uni- 
versity of  Edinburgh,  Peofessoe  Yeitch  of  Glasgow, 
the  joint-editor,  with  Mr.  Mansel,  of  Hamilton's  Lec- 
tures, and  Peofessoe  T.  Spencer  Batnes,  of  St.  An- 
drews— the  last  of  whom,  though  a  pupil  of  Hamilton 
and  for  some  time  his  assistant,  is  of  English  birth. 
Thus,  of  the  four  Scottish  Universities,  three,  so  far  as 
the  express  chairs  of  Speculative  Philosophy  are  con- 
cerned, are  in  the  possession  of  former  pupils  of  Ham- 
ilton— the  fourth,  that  of  Aberdeen,  having  Mr.  Bain 
for  its  philosophical  chief.     The  influence  of  the  three 
is  exerting  itself  as  yet  chiefly,  as  Hamilton's  own  did 
so  long,  in  the  private  conduct  of  their  classes ;  nor  is 
there  sufficient  public  means  of  measuring  and  char- 
acterizing it.    All  three,  however,  have  given  proofs 
in  occasional  published  writings  of  their  ability  and 
of  their  fitness  to  lead  philosophic  thought;  and  Mr. 
I'raser,  in  particular,  besides  teaching  with  admirable 
success,  classes  larger  than  Hamilton's  ever  were,  has 
signalized  his  departure  from    some  of  Hamilton's 
views  both  in  essays  openly  to  that  effect,  and  in  some 
striking  disquisitions,  from  a  new  point  of  view,  on 
older  philosophers,  particularly  Berkeley.     On  the 


whole,  in  his  case,  if  not  among  the  Scottish  Hamilto- 
nians  generally,  I  think  I  see,  along  with  a  resolute 
adhesion  to  Transcendentalism  in  principle,  a  tenden- 
cy to  deviation  from  Hamilton's  system  of  Natural 
Kealism  in  the  direction  of  Idealism.  At  all  events, 
both  Berkeley  and  Locke  have  received  more  exten- 
sive and  profound  attention  from  Mr.  Fraser  than  has 
been  common  recently  among  thinkers  of  the  Scottish 
school  in  Philosophy.*^ 

Y. 

A  frequent  sign  of  a  forward  movement  in  Philos- 
ophy is  an  extravagant  show  of  disrespect  among 
those  who  represent  it  towards  their  immediate  prede- 
cessors or  their  memory.     The  very  sense  of  nearness 

m 

causes  antagonism.  It  is  easier  to  do  justice  to  philos- 
ophers between  whose  views  and  one's  own  the  dis- 
tance is  great,  than  to  those  from  whom  one  has  just 
parted  in  order  to  shoot  ahead. 

Something  of  this  kind,  but  rather  implied  than 
expressed,  I  find  in  that  very  remarkable  book,  Insttr 
tutes  of  Metaphysic :   the  Theory  of  Knowing  and 

*  See  an  article  by  Professor  Eraser,  entitled  "  The  Real  World  of 
Berkeley,"  in  MdcmiUan's  Magaziiie  for  July,  1862,  and  another,  un- 
derstood to  be  by  him,  entitled  "  Berkeley's  Theory  of  Vision,"  in  the 
North  British  Review  for  August,  1864.  A  collected  edition  of  Berke- 
ley's works,  of  which  Professor  Fraser  is  to  be  the  editor,  has  been  an- 
nounced as  forthcoming  from  the  Oxford  University  Press. 


Z'l 


M 


M 


222 


KECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


Being^    by    the    late    Pkofessor    Fereier,    of    St. 
Andrews.      It  was    published  in    1854,   while   Sir 
William  Hamilton  was  still  alive.     It  is  throusrhout  a 
protest  against  Hamiltonianism,  and  an  effort  to  lead 
on  into  a  new  system,  having  affinity  with  the  post- 
Kantian  metaphysics  of  Germany,  and  especially  with 
ScheUing  and  Hegel,  but  constructed  by  the  author 
himself  in  a  belief  that,  though  there  had  been  a 
struggle  towards  the  true  philosophy,  and  incessant 
and  splendid  glimpses  of  it  in  Plato,  Spinoza,  Leib- 
nitz, and  Berkeley,  and  then  in  Kant  and  his  Ger- 
man followers,  yet  the  all-important  cardinal  proposi- 
tion had  never  been  seized  and  once  for  all  articula- 
ted.     "  It  may  be  affirmed  with  certainty,''  he  said, 
"  that  no  man  for  at  least  two  thousand  years  [since 
Plato,  he  meant]  has  seen  the  true  flesh-and-blood 
countenance  of  a  single  philosophical  problem."    And 
what  was  the  all-important  cardinal  proposition  the 
missing  of  which  had  made  the  history  of  philosophy 
one  such  wide  welter  of  occasionally  illuminated  con- 
fusion ?    It  was  thio  : — "  Along  with  whatever  any 
intelligence  knows,  it  must,  as  the  ground  or  condi- 
tion of  its  knowledge,  have  some  cognisance  of  itself  P 
Starting    jfrom    this    proposition,  —  and    proceeding 
through  three  sections  of  his  treatise,  entitled  respec- 
tively "  Epistemology,  or  the  Theory  of  Knowing," 
"Agnoiology,  or  the  Theory  of  Ignorance,"    and 


RECENT  BRIIISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


223 


1 , 


"Ontology,  or  the  Theory  of  Being  "—Professor 
Ferrier  deduced  from  it,  or  attached  to  it,  a  series  of 
farther  propositions,  following  each  other  numerically 
like  the  propositions  in  Euclid,  and  professing  to  be 
as  strictly  reasoned  out,  and  offered  in  their  totality 
as  constituting  an  irrefragable  system  of  Metaphysic 
or  Necessary  Truth.  The  last  proposition  in  the 
"  Ontology  "  may  be  here  quoted,  as  exhibiting  Mr. 
Ferrier's  final  landing-place  in  the  question  of  the 
Absolute.  "All  absolute  existences  are  contingent 
exce;pt  one;  in  other  words,  there  is  One,  but  only 
one.  Absolute  Existence  which  is  strictly  necessary; 
and  that  existence  is  a  supreme  and  infinite  and  ever- 
lasting  Mind  in  synthesis  with  all  things."  Eepul- 
sive  to  the  general  taste  as  is  a  system  of  Metaphysics 
taking  the  form  of  a  chain  of  such  abstract  proposi- 
tions, like  grinning  death's  heads,  Mr.  Ferrier's  book 
is  unusually  rich  in  popular  expositions  of  philosophi- 
cal questions.  The  intervals  between  the  propositions 
are  filled  with  dissertations  and  elucidations  of  great 
literary  power  and  picturesqueness,  and  containing 
passages  eloquent  with  high  feeling,  and  sparkling 
with  wit.  There  are  blasts,  in  particular,  of  measure- 
less contempt  against  the  Scottish  psychologists  as  a 
body,  and  Dr.  Eeid  as  their  type ;  there  is  a  brave 
yearning  of  the  spirit  back  into  sympathy  with  the 
grander  and  more  dynamic  metaphysics  of  the  past, 


i« 


:    '    ! 


\ 


t    . 


224: 


RECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


unappreciated  or  misappreciated  because  of  their 
higher  nature — ^the  metaphysics  of  Plato,  Spinoza, 
and  Berkeley ;  there  is  an  inquisitive,  and  also  sym- 
pathetic, looking  across  the  seas  towards  the  German 
Hegelianism,  as  if  with  the  thought  that  noble  ele- 
ments might  be  brewing  within  that  dark  monstrosity 
to  British  eyes,  if  only  it  could  be  penetrated ;  and 
there  are  interesting  historical  sketches  of  the  connex- 
ions of  previous  systems,  and  the  mode  of  their  grad- 
ual evolution.  A  fine  speculative  mind  disappeared 
from  Britain  when  Professsor  Terrier  died. 

What  is  of  interest  to  us  here  is  the  attempt  of 
British  Transcendentalism,  in  Ferrier,  to  move  out 
of  the  Hamiltonian  system  altogether,  by  leaving 
Natural  Eealism  in  disgust,  and  then  not  stopping 
even  in  any  ordinary  form  of  Idealism,  but  passing 
sheer  on  to  the  doctrine  of  Absolute  Identity.     The 
inseparability  of  subject  and  object,  the  identity  of 
Knowing  and  Being — this  was  the  doctrine  to  be 
hung  up  in  the  centre  for  ever  as  the  aU-irradiating, 
all-glorifying,   all-cheering  lamp   of  light.     How  it 
would  strike  to  quick  transparence  all  the  gloom! 
How,  seen  at  its  highest,  as  the  assertion  of  a  one 
Absolute  Mind  in  synthesis  with  all  things,  it  need 
not  fear,  because  it  could  overmatch  and  spiritualize, 
through  and  through,  and  round  and  round,  any  ex- 
pansion of  the  cosmological  conception  that  Science 


RECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


225 


might  empirically  compel,  if  even  into  a  vast  perio- 
dicity  from  Kebula  to  ITebula  again— clearing,  as  it 
would,  the    whole   periodicity  of  its    materialistic 
horror,  or  of  its  dread  of  being  shored  by  a  Nothing- 
ness ;  uniting  Time  past,  present,  and  future  in  one 
Consciousness,  making  the  stars,  once  more,  but  orbs 
or  twinklings  of  Deity ;  and  filling  all  within  them, 
to  the  earth  and  the  heart  of  man,  with  His  presence 
and  His  love  !-So,  as  I  fancy,  did  the  author  repre- 
sent  to  himself  the  consequences  of  his  doctrine. 
Still,  observe  how  closely  the  doctrine  itself,  in  its 
simple  verbal  form,  as  respects  the  individual  mind, 
corresponds,  though  belonging  to  a  system  of  high  d 
^rioH  Metaphysic,  with  the  doctrine  of  Mr.  Bain, 
worked  out  physiologically,  and  stationed  at  the  cen- 
tre  of  his  so  different  system.    The  systems  are  poles 
apart,— the  one  that  of  utmost  Transcendentalism, 
the  other  that  of  the  most  exact  Empiricism ;  but 
they  revolve,  as  nearly  as  possible,  on  exchangeable 

pivots. 

Since  I  began  the  preparation  of  these  pages,  there 

has  come  into  my  hands  a  book  which  enables  me,  I 
think,  to  point  to  a  British  representative  of  a  meta- 
physical system  beyond  even  Mr.  Ferrier's,  and  a 
representative  of  which  was  wanting  to  fill  the  only 
place  left  vacant  in  our  scheme. 

Let  me  repeat  our  arrangement,  for  the  eye,  of  the 
10* 


1- 


n-r. 


226 


EECEKT  BErriSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


227 


six  cosmological  systems  propounded  and  maintained 
by  metaphysicians.    It  was  as  follows : — 


Nihilism, 
or  Non- 
Bubstan- 
tialism 


Materialism 


a 

Natural 
Healism 


Conslmctive 
Idealism 


Pure 
Idealism 


Absolnte 
Identity 


Assuming  that  the  opposition  of  prevailing  British 
philosophies,  as  recently  represented  in  Hamilton  and 
Mill,  was  most  marked  at  about  the  mid-point  of  this 
series,  or  between  IS'atural  Eealism  and  Constructive 
Idealism,  there  has  been  observable  of  late,  I  ventured 
to  say,  a  drifting  away  of  British  thought  from  that 
middle  point  in  both  directions  towards  the  extremes. 
There  has  been  a  drift  leftwards,  through  Materialism 
or  Materialistic  Eealism,  towards  Nihilism,  or  the 
conception  of  an  ultimate  nothingness,  or,  if  the  ex- 
pression is  preferred,  the  resolute  non-conception  of 
an  ultimate  anything.     There  has  similarly  been  a 
drift  rightwards,  through  more  and    more  refined 
varieties  of  Idealism,  towards  the  notion  of  Absolute 
Identity,  or  an  eternal  real  Oneness  of  Subject  and 
Object,  of  which  all  the  vast  cosmical  periodicities 
from  N'ebula  to  Nebula,  or  whatever  may  be  the 
terms,  are  to  be  conceived  as  living  pulsations.    Mr. 
Ferrier,  as  I  have  just  said,  seems,  more  distinctly 
than  any  other  recent  British  metaphysician,  to  have 
carried  Transcendentalism  to  this  last  point,  and  to 


have  estabHshed,  by  so  doing,  a  cousinsliip  iu  this 
country  with  Schelling  and  Hegel.    Well,  was  any- 
thing more  to  be  done?     It  seems  difficult  to  con- 
ceive that  anything  remained  to  be  done.    One  might 
run  backwards  and  forwards  among  the  six  schemes, 
returning  from  Nihilism  or  from  Absolute  Identity 
centrewards ;  but  either  to  leap  off  Nihilism  on  the 
one  hand,  or  to  leap  off  Absolute  Identity  on  the 
other,  was  a  feat  apparently  beyond  all  rational  gym- 
nastic.   "Well,  but  what  if  the  two  extremes  could  be 
united  ?    What  if  a  logical  bridge  could  be  thrown  at 
once  from  NihiHsm  to  Absolute  Identity,  over-span- 
ning all  the  intermediate  systems  ?   What  if  the  mind 
could  be  hung  as  a  pendulum,  necessarily  taking  the 
exact  arc  from  Nihilism  to  Absolute  Being  in  its 
every  swing,  so  that  one  swing  of  it,  one  single  act 
of  thought,  should  actually  realize,  apprehend,  nay, 
repeat  and  represent,  that  vast   cosmical   beat  of 
periodicity,  from  Nothing  to  completed  Being,  and 
from  completed  Being  back  to  Nothing  again  ? 

At  such  a  suggestion  we  Britons  naturally  feel 
uneasy.  We  would  rather  not  have  our  mind  swung 
BO !  "  For  any  sake,  don't,"  we  cry ;  "  we  haven't  been 
accustomed  to  it.  Absolute  Oneness,  if  you  please,  or 
Nihilism,  if  you  please ;  we  should  not  so  much  mind 
which;  but  who  can  live  on  a  shuttle  between 
them  1 "    And  yet  this  is  precisely  what  he  whom  his 


III 


i 


w 


228 


EEOENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


!M 


admirers  regard  as  the  last  of  the  world's  great  meta- 
physicians tells  us  we  must  do,  and  indeed  are  doing 
every  moment,  whether  we  know  it  or  not.    And  who 
is  he?    Hegel,  the  terrible  Hegel,  the  brain-benumb- 
ing Hegel— on  scraps  of  whose  doctrines  modem  Ger- 
many is  said  to  have  been  living  for  forty  years,  but 
whose  entire  system  no  German  soul  even  is  beUeved 
to  have  yet  fathomed  or  got  round ;  who  himself  said, 
after  his  system  had  been  before  the  world  for  a  suf- 
ficient time,  and  hundreds  had  been  doing  their  best 
with  it,  «  There  is  only  one  man  living  that  under- 
stands  me,  and  he  doesn't."    What  Hegel  gave  to  the 
world,  as  principally  wanted  and  as  the  foundation  for 
all  else,  was  a  new  Logic,  or  science  of  the  necessary 
laws  of  Thought ;  and  in  this  Zo^^•c  the  foundation-prin- 
ciple was  the  identity,  the  inseparability  in  thought,  of 
the  idea  of  Being  and  the  idea  of  l^othing.    The  most 
abstract  thought  of  man,  that  in  which  he  ends  by  the 
most  intense  effort  of  reason,  is  the  idea  of  pure  Be- 
ing ;  and  absolutely  and  in  every  way,  this  idea  is  the 
same  as  the  idea  of  pure  Nothing ;  and  each  merges 
into  the  other  necessarily ;  and  both  are  forms  of  one 
combining  idea,  the  idea  of  Becoming.   And  this  alter- 
nation between  the  idea  of  Nothing  and  the  idea  of  Be- 
ing, through  the  idea  of  Becoming,  is  the  law  of  every 
thought  that  man  thinks  or  can  think.    Eveiy  thought 
is  a  poise,  a  beat,  a  pulsation  between  the  two  con- 


EECENT  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


229 


tradictories,  comprising  them  both  in  one  organic  act, 
as  inseparable,  though  distinguishable.  And  this  law 
of  Thought  is  also  the  law  of  Being;  and  Logic, 
which  is  the  science  of  Thought,  is  also  the  science  of 
Being.  Logic  and  Metaphysic  are  identical.  What 
takes  place  in  every  thought  also  takes  place  in  every 
fact.  "  Nowhere  in  heaven  or  in  earth  is  there  any- 
thing, that  contains  not  both  these— Being  and  Noth- 
ing." And,  on  the  largest  scale,  with  respect  even  to 
the  vast  cosmical  periodicity  itself,  the  entire  rounded 
object  of  the  cosmological  conception,  the  same,  accord- 
ing to  Hegel,  if  I  understand  him,  is  the  desired  ex- 
planation. The  Universe  is  a  thought,  a  beat,  a 
pulse,  of  the  Absolute  Mind.  The  apprehension  of 
the  logical  law  of  this  thought  constitutes  our  Meta- 
physic ;  and  again  this  Metaphysic  reappears  as  the 
Loffic  of  our  own  minds,  and  of  each  of  their  minutest 
acts.  In  the  minutest  act  of  onr  minds  is  the  same 
secret — ^logical,  physical,  metaphysical — as  in  the  en- 
tire Universe ! 

Of  course,  we  by  no  means  see  the  complete 
Hegel  in  this  speculation,  even  if  it  has  been  rightly 
stated.  It  is  only  the  most  abstract  form  of  that  one 
special  principle  the  leaven  of  which  threw  German 
Philosophy,  as  received  by  Hegel  from  Kant,  through 
Fichte  and  Schelling,  into  a  new  universal  ferment. 
Hegel  had  his  Philosophy  of  Nature,  his  Philosophy 


li 


230 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EECEKT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


231 


of   History,    his  Philosophy   of  Art,    his   Politics, 
&c.,  in   addition  to  his  Logic,  but  declared  to   be 
in  consistency  with  it.     He  had  also  his  Theology, 
which  he  discriminated  from  the  Pantheism  of  the 
mere  Identity-system  as  it  had  remained  in  Schel- 
ling's  hands.     By  the  new  Hegelian  law  of  the  pen- 
dulum-movement of  the  mind  between  ITothing  and 
Being,  it  was  not  Pantheism,  but  a  theology  much 
more  at  one  with  the  common  theology,  that  was  ne- 
cessitated.    And,  in  point  of  fact,  most  of  the  recent 
religious  developments    of   Germany,  orthodox  and 
heterodox.  Catholic  and   Protestant,  Straussian  and 
anti-Straussian,  refer  themselves  to  Hegelianism.     A 
tincture  of  Hegel  has  also  appeared,  with  various  ef- 
fects, in  the  most  recent  speculative  literature    of 
France.     It  is,  I  think,  a  later  influence  in  the  French 
mind  than  that  of  Cousin  or  that  of  Comte.    I  trace  it 
in  the  writings  of  Proudhon,  if  not  in  those  of  Eenan. 
This  influence,  for  better  or  worse,  has  broken  in 
among  ourselves.    Mr.  James  Hutchison  Stirling — 
of  whom  I  know  nothing  more  than  I  am  now  stat- 
ing, but  who  is  certainly  no  common  person — ^has  just 
published,  in  two  handsome  volumes,  an  exposition  of 
Hegel,  entitled,  The  Secret  of  Hegel :  leing  the  He- 
gelian System  in  Origin^  Principle^  Form  and  Mat- 
ter.   It  consists  partly  of  translations  from  Hegel's 
Logic,  partly  of  introductions,  comments,  &c.,  by  Mr. 


Stirling  himself,  relating  to  Hegel,  and  to  all  things 
in  heaven  or  earth,  from  a  Hegelian  point  of  view.  A 
passage  from  the  book,  which  I  quoted  in  my  first 
chapter,  will  have  given  an  idea  of  the  author's  views 
and  style.  He  thinks  that  there  have  been  three,  and 
only  three,  all-comprehensive  philosophical  minds  in 
recent  Europe — ^Hume,  Kant,  and  Hegel — and  that 
any  search  for  the  real  stuff  of  philosophy  out  of 
these  three,  except  in  the  way  of  historical  and  bio- 
graphical episode  and  fiUing-up,  is  labour  lost.  But, 
as  Kant  ate  up  all  Hume,  and  redigested  him,  and 
Hegel  ate  up  all  Kant  and  redigested  him^  Hegel  is 
the  appointed  food  for  these  generations.  Knowing 
Hume  from  long  ago,  it  has  been  the  labour  of  Mr. 
Stirling's  own  life  to  master  Kant  and  Hegel.  He 
was  almost  beaten  by  Hegel ;  it  has  taken  him  years 
to  work  himself  into  a  knowledge  of  Hegel's  system ; 
it  was  like  going  round  and  round  a  monstrous  block 
of  flint,  but  he  thinks  he  has  succeeded.  He  has  pre- 
pared an  exposition  of  Kant  and  an  exposition  of 
Hegel  for  the  British  public;  but,  for  various  rea- 
sons, he  has  published  his  exposition  of  Hegel  first. 
What  the  British  public  wiU  say  to  the  gift  I  can  an- 
ticipate. They  will  say  nothing  at  all ;  or  they  will 
say  that,  if  this  is  Hegel  in  English,  he  might  as  well 
have  remained  in  German.  Mr.  Stirling's  translation 
of  Hegel,  and  even  some  parts  of  his  exposition  of  He- 


i 


) . 


232 


EEOENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


gel  in  his  own  words,  are  more  Hegelian  than  Hegel 
himself.    Yet  the  book  deserves  a  cordial  welcome, 
not  only  as  introducing  Hegel  among  ns  more  authen- 
tically and  laboriously  than  hitherto,  but  also  as  in- 
troducing, in  Mr.   Stirling  himself,  a   new  British 
philosophical  writer  of  great,  if  somewhat  uncouth, 
strength.     There  is  every  probability,  I  should  say, 
that  he  will  be  yet  better  known ;  and,  indeed,  in  ad- 
dition to  the  exposition  of  Kant  which  he  has*  ready 
for  publication  as  a  companion  to  the  present  work, 
he  has  announced,  since  the  present  work  was  pub- 
lished, a  farther  contribution  to  Philosophy  in  the 
shape  of  a  special  criticism  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
Logical  opinions.     This  is  one  out  of  many  signs  that 
our  British  literature  of  Speculation  is  most  healthily 
on  the  increase  at  present.     In  Mr.  Stirling's  present 
volume  he  speaks  of  Sir  William  Hamilton  through- 
out with  what  I  cannot  but  consider  unpardonable 
disrespect  and  irreverence ;  but,  as  it  is  from  the  con- 
ceived vantage-ground  of  a  knowledge  of  Kant  and 
Hegel  possessed  by  no  one  else  in  Britain  that  Mr. 
Stirling  thus  steps  forth  as  an  iconoclast,  and  as  he  is 
impartially  iconoclastic  all  round  among  our  recent 
British  philosophical  writers  from  this  same  conceived 
vantage-groimd  (Mr.  Buckle,  for  example,  is  termed 
"  a  conceited  schoolboy,"  and  Coleridge  and  Mr.  Mill 
are  mentioned  only  sneeringly),  one  feels  at  least  a 


BECENT  BBinSH  PHILOSOPHY- 


233 


roused  anxiety  about  the  message  which  Mr.  Stirling 
himself  may  be  bringing,  and  a  roused  interest  in  the 
way  he  may  be  able  to  comport  himself  in  bringing  it. 
We  have  only  as  yet  his  first  publication  to  judge 
from.  My  impression  of  it  is  that  it  is  certainly  an 
uncouth  and  turbid  book,  but  yet  with  more  in  it  both 
of  heoi  and  of  light  of  certain  kinds  than  I  have  met 
with  for  a  long  time.  As  presented  by  this  book, 
Hegel's  Philosophy,  I  should  say,  will  appear  among 
us  with  such  welcome  as  might  be  given  to  an 
elephant,  if,  from  the  peculiar  shape  of  the  animal, 
one  were  uncertain  which  end  of  him  was  his  head. 

YI. 

If  only  on  the  principle  that  bulk  entitles  to  rec- 
ognition, it  would  be  wrong  to  omit,  in  an  enumera- 
tion of  the  elements  composing  the  present  state  of 
British  philosophical  opinion,  a  distinct  reference  to 
British   Swedenborgianism  and  the  widely-diffused 
forms  of  analogous  belief  represented  in  the  so-caUed 
literature   of  Spiritualism  or    Spirit-manifestations. 
Without  entering  on  a  criticism    of  these  peculiar 
creeds,  or  trying  to  distinguish  their  forms  and  de- 
grees—from the  mere  Animal-Magnetism  of  Baron 
Reichenbach  and  others,  which  professed  to  be  noth- 
ing more  than  an  enlargement  of  the  science  of  nerve 
in  certain  curious  directions,  up  to  the  wildest  recent 


'i  ' 


II 


234 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


imaginations  of  an  interfusion  of  the  ghostly  with  the 
normally-physical-it  wiU  be  enough  to  note  what 
seems  to  be  the  one  common  mode  of  thought  which 
these  breeds  in  aU  their  forms  seek  to  contribute  to 
Philosophy,  and  the   fact  that   they  do   contribute 
which,  in  spite  of  whatever  exaggeration  and  what- 
ever admixture  of  delusion  and  folly,  is  perhaps  a  suf- 
ficient reason  why  they  should  exist.     The  chief  in- 
fluence, then,  of  aU   these  forms  of  speculative  re- 
search or  bewnderment,  worth  noting  here,  seems  to 
be  one  of  a  cosmological  kind.    What  they  all  incul- 
cate, from  the  most  moderate  Animal  Magnetism  up 
to  the  most  involved  dreams  of  the  Swedenborgians 
and  Spirit-rappers,  is  simply  the  idea  that  our  famil- 
iar phaenomenal  world,  or  cosmos,  may  not  be  the  to- 
tal sphere  of  the  phaenomenal,  or  even  of  the  phaenom- 
enal as  it  may  possibly  be  brought  within  our  ap- 
prehension by  appropriate  experimentation  and  arti- 
fice.    The  idea  is  old  enough.    Shakespeare  has  fur- 
nished us  with  an  expression  of  it  which  we  are  never 
tired  of  quoting,  and  which  has  been  a  godsend  to  the 
Spiritualists  in  particular.    It  is  where  Horatio  and 
Hamlet   compare  their  impressions  after  the  disap- 
pearance of  the  Ghost  :— 

H»r.   O  day  and  night,  but  this  is  wondrons  strange  1 
Bam.  And  therefore  as  a  stranger  give  it  welcome. 

There  are  more  things  in  heaven  and  earth,  HoraHo, 

Than  are  dreamt  of  in  your  phDosophy, 


«•■■ 


KECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


235 


"With  or  without  a  ghost  at  hand  to  enforce  the  les- 
son, all  philosophers  of  mark  have  taken  care  to  pro- 
vide a  similar  protest  against  that  "  Horatio "  spirit 
(if  it  be  not  maligning  Hamlet's  Mend  to  call  it  such) 
which  would  identify  the    sphere  of  the  hitherto 
known  with  the  sphere  of  all  phaenomenal  existence, 
or  even  of  the  knowable.    It  is  an  obvious  corollary 
of  the  doctrine  of  the  Kelativity  of  Knowledge  ;  and 
we  have  seen  how  both  Mr.  MiU  and  Sir  William 
Hamilton  recognize  it  as  such.    "  The  existing  order 
of  the  Universe,  or  rather  of  thepaH  of  it  known  to 
us;'  isa  phrase  of  Mr.  Mill's,  which  we  have  already 
quoted ;  and  Mr.  MiU  is  most  careful  always  to  speak 
in  this  manner,  so  as  to  foster,  rather  than  discourage, 
in  his  readers,  the  habit  of  conceiving  that  our  cos- 
mos may  be  but  that  snatch  of  a  measurelessly  greater 
and  more  complex  phaenomenal  totality  which  is  pos- 
sible to   the  present   conditions  (these   perhaps  not 
fixed,  nor  the  same  at  all)  of  our  sentiency.    So  also 
Sir  William  Hamilton.    We  have  quoted  his  striHng 
iUustration  of  his  doctrine  of  Eelativity  by  the  suppo- 
sition of  the  total  universe  of  the  phaenomenal  as  "  a 
polygon  of  a  thousand,  or  a  hundred  thousand,  sides 
or  facets,"  to  only  three  or  four  of  which  we  may  be 
organically  related  by  our  senses  or  faculties.    But, 
indeed,  he  went  farther.    He  contended  for  "  the  rec- 
6jmition  of  occult  causes"  as  a  duty  of  Philosophy— 


i 


236 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EEOENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


237 


that  is,  for  the  admission  that  there  are  credible  and 
attested  phaenomena  in  our  present  experience  which 
we  are  unable  as  yet  "  to  refer  to  any  known  cause  or 
class."  He  specially  cited  the  "  phaenomena  of  Ani- 
mal  Magnetism  "  as  an  instance,  expressing  his  sur- 
prise at  the  "  difficult  credence  "  accorded  to  these  phae- 
nomena in  Britain  (he  was  writing  in  1852)  in  con- 
trast with  the  "  facile  credence ''  accorded  to  what  he 
considered  the  baseless  pretensions  of  Craniology."^ 

IN'ow,  so  far  as  Swedenborgianism  and  its  cognate 
"  Spiritualism "  have  had  any  appreciable  influence 
on  recent  British  Speculative  Philosophy,  that  influ- 
ence has  consisted,  I  believe,  in  their  having  diffused 
through  the  philosophical  mind  (whether  from  any 
background  of  real  facts  or  no  is  a  different  question) 
a  stronger  disposition  than  existed  a  little  while  ago 
to  acknowledge  the   existence  of  occult  causes — a 
stronger  form  of  the  always  philosophical  notion  that 
the  phaenomenal  cosmos  of  our  sentiency  is  not  neces- 
sarily the  phaenomenal  cosmos  of  all  contemporary 
sentiency.    I  am  confirmed  in  this  by  observing  that 
this  is  the  sort  of  representation  of  the  alleged  phae- 
nomena of  spirit-rapping,  clairvoyance,  apparitions, 
&c.,  given  by  that  British  believer  in  these  phae- 
nomena who  has  the  greatest  independent  philosophi- 
cal reputation,  and  whose  name  is  always  cited  by 

•  Appendix  to  Discussions^  pp.  611,  612. 


the  spiritualists  as  that  of  their  weightiest  supporter. 
"  When  it  comes  to  what  is  the  caus6  of  these  phaenom- 
ena," says  this  writer,  in  a  remarkable  preface  to  a 
recent  book  on  spirit-manifestations,  "  I  find  I  cannot 
adopt  any  explanation  which  has  yet  been  suggested. 
If  I  were  bound  to  choose  among  things  which  I  can 
conceive,  I  should  say  that  there  is  some  sort  of  action 
of  some  combination  of  will,  intellect,  and  physical 
power,  which  is  not  that  of  any  of  the  human  beings 
present.  But,  thinking  it  very  likely  that  the  uni- 
verse may  contain  a  few  agencies — ^say  half  a  million 
— about  which  no  man  knows  anything,  I  cannot  but 
suspect  that  a  small  proportion  of  these  agencies — say 
five  thousand— may  be  severally  competent  to  the 
production  of  all  the  phaenomena,  or  may  be  quite  up 
to  the  task  among  them."  ^  This  is  precisely  Ham- 
let's rebuke  to  Horatio  over  again,  though  in  different 
language.  It  suggests  simply  that  we  may  be  under 
a  mistake  in  our  habit  of  conceiving  of  the  cosmos 
orbed  forth  to  us  by  our  present  science  and  experi- 
ence as  if  it  were  the  total  cosmos  of  actual  existence. 

♦  "  From  Matter  to  Spirit :  the  Result  of  Ten  Years'  Experience  in 
Spirit-manifestation  by  C.  D. ;  with  a  Preface  by  A.  B.  1863."  The 
extract  is  from  the  Preface,  the  writer  of  which,  though  signing  him- 
self only  "  A.  B.,"  was  announced  so  generally  at  the  time  of  the  pub- 
lication of  the  book  to  be  Professor  De  Morgan  that  it  would  be  an 
affectation  of  etiquette  not  to  name  him  here.  For  ingenuity  and 
sceptical  suggestiveness,  as  well  as  wit,  I  know  nothmg  in  the  "  Litera- 
ture of  Spiritualism"  comparable  to  this  brief  Essay. 


238 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


239 


I 


It  grounds  this  suggestion,  however,  on  certain  alleged 
facts,  believed  in  by  the  author,  which  seem  to  him 
to  prove  that,  even  within  the  orb  of  our  present 
cosmos,  and  intermingling  with  its  affairs,  there  are 
hosts  of  occult  agencies,  of  which,  by  momentary 
accidents,  or  by  known  artificial  arrangements,  we 
may  be  so  far  made  cognisant  as  to  hear,  as  it  were, 
the  rustle,  and  feel  the  touch,  of  their  passing  wings. 
Kow  observe  that,  in  all  this,  there  is  no  implication 
respecting  the  alleged  phaenomena,  that,  were  they 
true  even  to  the  utmost  extent  of  the  most  open- 
mouth  credulity,  they  would  bring  us  a  single  inch 
nearer  an   Ontology,  or  knowledge  of  the  central 
Absolute.     This  is,  indeed,  what  the  mob  of  ladies 
and  gentlemen  who  amuse,  excite,  and  stupefy  them- 
selves with  "mediums''  and  "seances"  do  always 
assume ;  but  the  drift  of  the  present  critic's  remarks 
is  very  different.     The  result  at  the  very  utmost, 
according  to  him,  would  only  be  an  enlargement  of 
our  notions  of  the  phaenomenal,  and  by  no  means  an 
acquaintance  with  noumena — a  perception  that  there 
were  more  things  in  our  "  heaven  and  earth "  than 
had  usually  been  dreamt  of  in  our  philosophy ;  but 
by  no  means  a  vision  of  any  Empyrean  or  Heaven  of 
Heavens  beyond  the  heaven  and  earth  of  the  phse- 
nomenal.     Our  present  conception  of  the  Cosmos 
might  be  burst  and  honeycombed-— which  might  be 


attended  with  useful  soul-shaking  and  an  overpower- 
ing flood  of  mystery ;  but,  after  all,  it  would  be  only 
a  new  Cosmology  that  we  should  have,  and  not  in 
the  least  an  Ontology.  In  short,  if  we  inweave  the 
whole  substance  of  the  speculation  with  that  pre- 
ceding philosophical  doctrine  of  Eelativity  into  which 
it  seeks  to  fit  itself,  the  matter  shapes  itself  as  foUows : 
— ^It  has  been  the  general  admission  of  Philosophy 
that  knowledge  is  in  proportion  to  the  grasp,  or 
mode,  or  faculty,  of  the  particular  sentiency  knowing. 
Now,  there  are,  within  our  view,  countless  gradations 
of  sentiency,  all  busily  existing — from  those  infinites- 
imally  minute  creatures  which  the  microscope  re- 
veals to  us  swarming  in  and  in  among  the  mere  inter- 
stices of  things  till  invisibility  is  reached,  up  to  our- 
selves, the  chief  possessors  of  the  Earth,  and  the  last 
and  highest  of  the  visible  scale.  Make  out  a  chain 
of  these  sentiencies,  and  of  each  it  must  be  supposed 
that  it  has  its  cosmos,  its  proportionate  apprehension 
or  cognisance  of  the  phaenomenal.  The  minutest 
microscopic  animalcule  has  its  little  nip  of  a  cosmos, 
its  little  pin-point  apprehension  of  existence,  be  it 
even  existence  in  a  water-drop,  or  in  the  fibre  of 
another  animal's  muscle.  As  we  rise  higher  in  the 
scale,  the  same  thing  is  borne  in  upon  us  by  more 
distinct  evidence.  Imagine  a  mole  disturbed  in  a 
field  during  its  brief  ramble  above-ground  for  food  on 


M 


Vl 


I 


240 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BErnSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


241 


a  summer  niglit.     Has  not  tlie  sleek,  black,  and 
almost  eyeless  little  sentiency  its  momentary  notion 
of  a  cosmos,  though  that  notion  may  go  but  a  very 
little  way,  may  be    compounded  chiefly  of  petty 
subterranean  experiences,  and  may  include  nothing 
of  that  wonder  of  the  shimmering  lawns  around,  and 
none  of  those  glimpses  of  the  moon,  which  make  the 
walk  poetic  to  the  man  whose  approach  has  disturbed 
it  ?    And  so  through  the  nobler  animals— the  watch- 
dog in  his  lair,  the  lion  roaming  the  forest— till  "  the 
paragon"  is  reached.     Must  our  supposition  of  a 
series  of  phsenomenal  worlds,  each  the  construction 
of  its  particular  native  sentiency,  and  outsphering 
and  transcending  each  other  according  as  the  sen- 
tiency increases  in  grasp— must  this  supposition  be 
closed  abruptly  when  we  come  to  Man?    One  reason 
may  be  alleged  why  it  should.    Man,  as  the  last  term 
of  the  series,  is  able  to  look  inward  on  the  whole 
range  of  the  preceding  terms  till  the  microscope  fails 
him.      WeU,  does    he  not    everywhere   mark  this 
peculiarity— that  each  sentiency  is  aware  of  at  least 
some  of  the  sentiencies  higher  than  itself,  and  includes 
these  sentiencies  in  its  cosmos?     Animalcules  are 
alert  to  escape  the  bigger  neighbours  that  would 
make  them  their  prey ;  the  mole,  little  fellow,  has 
experimental  evidence  of  the  existence  of  owls  as 
diarp  and  indubitable  aa  if  he  could  take  their  por- 


traits ;  the  dog  sees  and  knows  of  men,  and  will  fly  at 
them,  or  look  them  in  the  face  and  understand  what 
they  say.  But  in  the  cosmos  of  man  what  sentiencies 
or  intelligences  are  there  of  which  man  is  sensibly 
aware  as  preterhuman  ?  According  to  orthodox  mod- 
em science,  none.  He  is  himself  the  extreme  of 
known  sentiency ;  and,  when  he  looks  out  from  him- 
self, so  far  as  physical  experience  can  teach  him, 
it  is  into  a  void.  He  may,  if  he  chooses,  exercise  his 
imagination  so  as  to  fill  that  void  with  ideal  forms  of 
sentiency  and  intelligence  transcending  his  own,  and 
for  such  an  exercise  of  imagination  he  may  be  made 
more  apt  by  constitutional  peculiarities  or  by  the 
form  of  his  religious  belief.  Science,  though  dis- 
inclined on  its  own  account  to  such  idealizing  or  per- 
sonification of  the  metaphysical,  need  not  prohibit  it, 
if  certain  conditions  are  observed.  One  may  even 
figure  to  oneself  that  the  entire  human  cosmos  is  to 
the  totality  of  phaenomenal  existence  but  as  one  of 
those  glass  globes  in  which,  in  a  lighted  drawing- 
room,  in  these  days  of  aquaria,  some  of  the  guests 
may  be  seen  studying  the  little  forms  of  filmy  and 
filamentous  life  attached  to  stones  or  weeds,  or  the 
movements  of  the  small  fishes  as  they  go  round  and 
round,  speculating  confusedly  with  their  eyes  what  is 
all  that  glamour  beyond  the  globe  and  away  in  the 

distances  of  the  room.    Science  will  not  prohibit  ev«n 

11 


242 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


'(  i; 


!f 


I 


this  image  to  any  who  may  find  it  satisfactory — only 
taking  care  to  point  out  that  it  fails  in  exactness. 
Some  of  the  creatures  in  the  glass  globe  do  testify 
that  their  sentiency  extends  beyond  the  glass.  Though 
it  may  not  take  in  much  of  the  spectacle  of  the  room, 
or  be  aware  of  the  flirtation  going  on  in  one  comer 
of  it,  or  the  discussion  on  the  politics  of  Brazil  going 
on  in  another,  yet  it  distinctly  recognises  the  finger 
touching  the  outside  of  the  glass,  and  shuns  or  follows 
the  tracing.  In  that  cosmos  of  man  which  the  image 
compares  to  the  glass  globe,  what  is  there  analogous 
to  this  ?  Here  it  is  that  the  heterodox  science  of  the 
Swedenborgians  and  the  spirit-manifestationists  steps 
in  to  differ  from  orthodox  science.  It  is  maintained 
by  them  that  the  tradition  of  the  vulgar  in  all  times 
as  to  the  occasional  apprehension  by  man's  sentiency 
of  the  real  activity  of  other  sentiencies  that  are  dis- 
tinctly preterhuman  has  had  a  foundation  in  fact.  It 
is  maintained  that  the  percentage  of  such  sentient 
contact  among  men  with  this  preterhuman  world 
may  have  exhibited  historical  increases  and  diminu- 
tions in  the  past,  and  that  it  may  depend  on  such 
conditions  as  either  suddenly  to  expand  itself  without 
solicitation  from  man,  or  to  be  capable  of  artificial 
solicitation  and  extension.  And  so — on  the  faith  of 
.masses  of  alleged  experience  and  experimentation,  in 
which  not  even  the  respect  that  ought  to  be  felt  for 


>i 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


243 


men  of  great  intellectual  power  entertaining  the 
faith,  nor  yet  the  most  studious  disposition  of  Philoso- 
phy to  act  on  Hamlet's  rule  of  "  ^ving  welcome  to 
the  stranger,"  ought  to  restrain  one  from  declaring 
that  there  has  been  more  of  the  silly,  the  disgusting, 
and  the  hideous  in  every  way,  than  in  almost  any 
other  social  extravagance  of  our  time — out  of  these 
alleged  experimentations  what  are  the  items  of  belief 
which  the  out-and-out  manifestationists  would  seek  to 
add  to  our  philosophy  ?  Eeligion,  independently  of 
Science,  had  already  offered  two  beliefs  that  might 
fill  for  the  imagination  of  the  pious  the  realms  beyond 
Appearance — the  belief  in  the  indestructibility,  and 
perpetual  discriminated  duration  somewhere  and 
somehow,  of  all  human  sentiencies  of  the  human 
degree  that  had  ever  once  existed ;  and  the  belief  in 
Angels,  or  superior  Spirits,  good  and  bad,  also  lead- 
ing lives  of  inscrutable  and  preterhuman  modes.  To 
these  beliefs  the  manifestationists,  or  the  extreme  of 
them,  have  sought  to  add  a  doctrine  which,  if  devel- 
oped, would  assert  nothing  less  than  the  phsenomenal 
recoverability  within  the  Cosmos  of  all  sentiency  that 
had  ever  belonged  to  it,  and  the  phaenomenal  pre- 
sentability  within  it,  on  occasion  or  summons,  of  other 
and  non-native  sentiencies,  angelic  or  demonic.  But, 
go  as  far  as  they  may,  it  is  still  only  a  cosmos  that 
they  figure,  stiU  only  a  world  of  the  phsenomenaL 


jli(L(L 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


BECEirr  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHY* 


245 


In  this  little  exposition,  it  will  be  perceived,  there 
has  been  a  bearing  on  the  question  between  Realism 
and  Idealism  as  alternative  systems  of  cosmological 
conception.  In  that  supposition  of  a  chain  of  sentien- 
cies  up  to  man,  each  grasping  or  construing  its  par- 
ticular cosmos  according  to  its  amount  of  relatedness 
to  a  potential  sum-total  conceived  as  existing,  it  is 
the  realistic  hypothesis  that  seems  most  natural.  It 
seems  most  natural  to  assume  an  external  totality  re- 
maining the  same  in  its  own  nature,  whether  there 
were  any  sentiency  to  grasp  it  or  no,  and  apprehen- 
sible in  different  degrees  of  extent  and  intricacy  by 
different  sentiencies,  though  by  none  wholly.  In  con- 
firmation of  this  the  fact  may  be  dealt  on  that,  where 
the  means  of  comparison  among  animals  exist,  notions 
of  the  phsenomenal  world  possessed  by  one  do  not 
seem  to  contradict  those  possessed  by  another.  The 
dog's  world  seems  to  corroborate  man's,  and  man's 
world  the  dog's,  and  on  this  feeling  generalized  not 
only  our  sport  but  all  our  action  proceeds.  Is  not 
this  as  if  there  were  a  basis  of  independent  reality  to 
which  every  sentiency  helped  itself  according  to  its 
appetite,  but  in  such  a  manner  that  all  can  co-operate  ? 
Not  even  so,  however,  need  the  Idealist  be  nonplussed. 
Viewing  the  cosmos  of  each  sentiency  as  a  pure  con- 
struction of  that  sentiency  out  of  its  subjective  affec- 
tions, he  may  find  the  reason  of  the  manifest  co- 


/ 


I 


operation  of  the  sentiencies  in  a  law  of  relation  among 
themselves,  producing  a  unanimity  of  illusion. 

YII. 

MR.  MILL  ON  SIR  W.  HAMILTON. 

Let  US  return  to  surer  ground.  As,  in  the  be- 
ginning of  our  review  of  recent  British  Philosophy, 
Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill  was  the  thinker  of  whom  it 
seemed  necessary  to  make  mention  almost  first  of  all, 
and  as  there  is  no  thinker  whom  it  has  been  necessary 
to  mention  more  frequently  in  the  course  of  the  re- 
view, so  it  chances  that  here,  at  the  end  of  the  review, 
Mr.  Mill  is  the  last  in  the  field.  Since  the  greater 
portion  of  the  preceding  pages  was  written,  two  pub- 
lications of  Mr.  Mill's  have  been  given  to  the  world, 
expounding  his  philosophy  in  that  shape  in  which  its 
chances  of  remaining  the  dominant  British  philosophy 
of  this  generation  may  be  best  discussed.  To  one  of 
these  publications— the  Westminster  Beview  article 
on  the  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte— we  have  been 
able  already  to  make  such  reference  as  seemed  requi- 
site. The  other,  and  by  far  the  more  important,  has  ^ 
been  reserved  till  now.  It  is  Mr.  Mill's  Examination 
of  Sir  William  Samilton's  Philosophy,  and  of  the 
Principal  Philosophical  Questions  discussed  in  his 
Writings. 


^ 


''k 


246 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


BECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


247 


Certainly,  if  the  Britisli  public,  or  that  portion  of 
it  which  is  interested  in  philosophy,  had  been  allowed 
to  hint  to  Mr.  Mill  the  sort  of  volume  that  would  be 
most  acceptable  from  him  after  so  much  else  that 
they  would  not  willingly  let  die,  this  is  the  volume 
for  which  they  would  have  petitioned.     With  the 
right  instinct  of  high  combat  Mr.  Mill  has  singled 
\  out  that  recent  British  thinker  who  is  imiversally  re- 
i  garded  as  the  most  formidable  representative  of  the 
I  antagonistic  philosophy,  and  has  undertaken  the  bat- 
I  tie  with  that  philosophy  over  again  in  the  form  of  a 
/   duel  with  him.     That  it  is,  in  seeming,  a  duel  of  the 
living  with  the  dead,  none  regrets  morfe  than  Mr.  Mill. 
"  In  thus  attempting,"  he  says,  "  to  anticipate,  as  far 
as  is  yet  possible,  the  judgment  of  posterity  on  Sir 
William  Hamilton's  labours,  I  sincerely  lament  that, 
on  the  many  points  on  which  I  am  at  issue  with  him, 
I  have  the  unfair  advantage  possessed  by  one  whose 
opponent  is  no  longer  in  a  condition  to  reply.    Per- 
sonally, I  might  have  had  small  cause  to  congratulate 
myself  on  the  reply  which  I  might  have  received,  for, 
though  a  strictly  honourable,  he  was  a  most  unspar- 
ing controversialist,  and  whoever  assailed  even  the 
most  unimportant  of  his  opinions  might  look  for  hard 
blows  in  return.    But  it  would  have  been  worth  far 
more,  even  to  myself,  than  any  polemical  success,  to 
have  known  with  certainty  in  what  maimer  he  would 


have  met  the  objections  raised  in  this  volume.  I  feel 
keenly,  with  Plato,  how  much  more  is  to  be  learnt  by 
discussing  with  a  man  who  can  question  and  answer, 
than  with  a  book,  which  cannot."  *  Thus  it  is,  in 
the  warfare  of  thought,  no  less  than  in  cruder  and 
older  warfare,  that  a  true  knight  speaks  and  thinks  of 
his  dead  opponent. 

"  The  Percy  leaned  on  his  hand, 
And  saw  the  Douglas  dee ; 
He  took  fhe  dead  man  by  the  hand, 
And  said,  *  Wo  is  me  for  thee  1 ' " 

But,  though  there  is  this  'chivalry  of  feeling  tow- 
ards the  memory  of  his  antagonist  throughout  Mr. 
Mill's  volume,  and  there  is  not  a  word  in  it  that  does 
not  show  the  most  anxious  desire  to  do  that  antagonist 
justice,  I  must  confess  that,  on  the  whole,  Mr.  Mill's   ^ 
estimate  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  intellect,  and  of   / 
the  worth  of  his  services  to  British  thought,  seems  to  | 
me  lower  than  was  to  be  expected  from  so  fit  a  judge. 
The  praises  that  a  man  bestows  must  be  valued  ac- 
cording to  his  habit  in  the  matter  of  praising ;  and 
adjectives  which  from  one  man  would  mean  much 
will  disappoint  from  another.    Again  and  again  Mr. 
Mill  uses  expressions  about  Sir  William  Hamilton 
which,  if  they  stood  alone,  would  seem  sufficiently 

*  Page  8. 


P'i 


248 


RECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


high-pitched.  He  frequently  praises  Sir  William 
Hamilton's  ability,  his  candour,  his  industry,  and  es- 
pecially his  great  erudition.  Yet,  when  all  these 
expressions  of  admiration,  taken  together,  are  viewed 
in  the  light  of  the  summary  appreciation  of  Sir  Wil- 
liam Hamilton  with  which  the  volume  is  wound  up, 
and  when  the  total  estimate  thus  resulting  is  com- 
pared with  the  corresponding  estimates  which  Mr. 
Mill  has  given  of  other  philosophers,  not  to  speak  of 
his  more  casual  eulogies  of  various  writers  miscel- 
laneously on  account  of  this  or  that  pleasing  to  him 
in  their  stray  performances,  the  impression,  I  repeat, 
falls  short  of  the  just  expectation.  It  is  not  only  be- 
cause, contemporaneously  with  Mr.  Mill's  judgment 
of  Hamilton,  there  has  appeared  his  so  much  more 
enthusiastic  appreciation  of  M.  Comte — ^though  this 
does  make  the  contrast  more  striking.  M.  Comte  was 
a  great  European  thinker ;  and  they  are  but  few  that 
would  compare  Hamilton's  intellectual  efficiency,  or 
probable  influence,  all  in  all,  with  M.  Comte's.  But, 
when  I  find  Mr.  Mill  saying,  for  example,  of  such 
a  distinctly  inferior  British  thinker  as  Archbishop 
Whately,  that  he  "has  done  far  greater  service  to 
the  world,  in  the  origination  and  diffusion  of  import- 
ant thought,  than  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  with  all  his 
learning,"  ^  my  sense  of  proportion  is  jarred.     Such 


*  Page  653. 


RECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


249 


an  opinion  comes  upon  me  as  a  phenomenon  requiring 
to  be  accounted  for. 

Partly  it  may  be  because  Mr.  Mill's  acquaintance 
with  Sir  William  Hamilton's  writings  is  not  of  old 
date.     One's  recollections  of  early  friends  are  more 
affectionate  than  of  later.    Or,  again,  the  cause  may 
be  looked  for  in  a  certain  high  form  of  party-spirit, 
which  is  no  more  unnatural  in  a  philosopher  than  in 
a  poHtician.    It  is  not  unbecoming  that  one  should 
have  a  superior  affection  for  those  of  whose  opinions 
one  approves,  and  who  are  one's  colleagues  and  aux- 
iliaries in  urging  things  in  the  direction  in  which  it 
is  one's  deepest  conviction  that  they  should  go.    Phi- 
losophy, as  well  as  politics,  will  be  in  a  strange  pass 
when  there  is  no  discount  against  a  man  for  being  on 
the  opposite  benches.    Mr.  Mill's  language  seems  to 
imply  that,  on  the  whole,  he  thinks  Sir  WiUiam  Ham- 
ilton the  greatest  representative  of  the  Transcendental 
Philosophy  of  late  times  in  Britain ;  but  then,  as  he 
thinks  this  philosophy  a  wrong  philosophy,  it  may  be 
his  private  opinion  that  no  mind  holding  by  it  can  be 
first-rate.    Yet,  a  generous  controversialist  may,  after 
all,  have  a  greater  respect  for  the  powers  and  charac- 
ter of  some  antagonist  than  for  those  of  any  of  his 
own  coUeaguBS,  and  may  even  recognize  that  antag- 
onist's state  of  mind  as  less  removed  from  his  own- 
removed,  say,  only  by  a  single  oscillation  of  the  pen- 
11* 


If 


250 


RECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


duluin,  whereas  the  interval  in  the  case  of  the  best 
of  his  colleagues  may  be  measured  by  two,  or  four, 
or  ten  oscillations.  Kow,  as  Mr.  Mill  has  given  proof, 
in  other  instances,  of  more  than  usual  capacity  of  this 
kind  of  feeling,  it  is  to  be  inferred  that  there  is  some- 
thing in  the  total  style  or  form  of  Sir  William  Ham- 
ilton's intellect  that  has  prevented  Mm  from  becoming 
the  object  of  the  feeling. 

If  I  am  not  mistaken,  something  of  this  result  is  to 
be  attributed  to  a  habit  of  preference,  on  Mr.  Mill's 
part,  for  a  quality  of  intellect  which  he  seems  fre- 
quently to  have  in  vieV  under  the  names  fertile  and 
fertility.  "  A  fertile  thinker  "  is  one  of  his  most  char- 
acteristic phrases  of  praise;  and  what  he  seems  to 
mean  by  such  a  thinker  is  one  who  yields  his  readers 
a  large  number  of  socially  available  propositions.  I 
was  going  to  say  "  marketable  propositions ;  "  and,  if 
the  expression  were  imderstood  as  implying  nothing 
derogatory,  but  simply  as  describing  truths  or  ideas 
adapted  to  the  state  of  the  intellectual  demand,  fit- 
ting felt  needs,  and  useful  at  once  for  helping  things 
on,  it  might  not  be  amiss.  One  descries,  at  least,  a 
certain  ruling  of  Mr.  Mill's  critical  judgments  by  his 
1  own  principle  of  Utilitarianism — a  high  and  widely 
sympathetic  principle,  certainly,  in  his  interpretation 
and  exemplification  of  it ;  but  still  such  as  must  ex- 
clude from  his  liking  modes  and  displays  of  intellect 


1 


EEOENT  BKITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


261 


that  are  greatly  impressive  to  others,  who  admire  on 
no  such  definite  principle,  hut,  as  it  were,  instinctive- 
ly and  at  large.    Barharic  pearls  and  gold,  we  should 
say,  would  have  small  chance  with  Mr.  Mill.    Hence, 
doubtless,  in  part,  his  great  admiration  of  M.  Comte. 
He  was  pre-eminently  a  fertile  thinker ;  his  writiags 
are  fields  of  valuable  generalizations ;  whoever  visits 
them,  if  he  should  read  but  a  few  pages,  may  carry 
away  in  his  pocket  one  or  two  propositions  that  will 
serve  for  the  purposes  of  a  leading-article,  a  speech  in 
Parliament  or  even  (though  then  the  authority  need 
not  be  quoted)  a  discom-se  from  the  pulpit.    With 
Sir  William  Hamilton  it  is,  at  first  sight,  very  differ- 
ent.   One  may  say  of  hhn,  indeed,  that  his  greatest 
and  most  characteristic  merit  among  his  contempora- 
ries consisted  in  his  having  been,  while  he  lived,  the 
most  ardent  and  impassioned  devotee  to  the  useless 
within  Great  Britain. 

«  Plague  on't!  "  quotli  Time  to  Thomas  Heame, 
"  Whatever  /  forget  you  learn." 

What  all  the  world  besides  had  forgotten  and  given 
up,  Sir  William  Hamilton,  for  that  very  reason,  would 
overhaul  and  bring  back  into  notice.  Hqucc  the  un- 
paralleled extent  and  range  of  his  CTudition.  Hence 
also  the  profound  bent  of  his  own  speculative  endeav- 
ours.   Problems  which  immediately  preceding  Brit- 


'1 


M 

•  1; 


252 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


253 


ifih  speculation  had  ruled  to  be  obsolete,  in  its  own 
mere  hurry  to  get  on,  were  his  daily  and  nightly 
meditation.  He  even  avowed  (and  this  is  one  of 
the  points  on  which  Mr.  Mill  professes  inability  to 
agree  with  him)  his  preference  for  philosophy  con- 
\  Bidered  as  a  gymnastic  for  the  soul  over  philos- 
ophy considered  as  a  purveyor  of  available  truths. 
The  toil,  the  labour,  the  pain  of  philosophizing 
seemed  to  him  valuable  to  the  individual  spirit, 
apart  from  any  teachable  results.  Of  course,  just 
as  Mr.  Mill  would  justify  the  toil  and  the  pain  of 
philosophizing  by  bringing  them  within  the  scope 
of  his  principle  of  utility,  or  of  the  utmost  of  pleasure 
for  all  sentient  existence,  so  Sir  William  Hamilton,  in 
passionately  consenting  to  such  toil  and  pain  for  him- 
self, both  confessed  his  own  overpaying  delight  there- 
in, and  foresaw,  in  a  cloud,  plenty  of  future  utilities. 
But  try  him  by  any  standard.  What  a  writer  he 
was  !  What  strength  and  nerve  in  his  style,  what  fe- 
licity in  new  philosophical  expressions !  Throw  that 
aside,  and  try  him  even  in  respect  of  the  importance 
of  his  effects  on  the  national  thought.  Whether  from 
his  learning,  or  by  reason  of  his  independent  think- 
ings, was  it  not  he  that  hurled  into  the  midst  of  us 
the  very  questions  of  metaphysics,  and  the  very  forms 
of  those  questions,  that  have  become  the  academic 
theses  everywhere  in  this  British  age  for  real  meta- 


physical discussion  ?  Throw  this  aside  too,  and  let  it 
be  said  of  Sir  William  Hamilton  that,  simply  and  by 
whatever  means,  he  did  more  than  any  other  man  to 
reinstate  the  worship  of  Difficulty  in  the  higher  mind 
of  Great  Britain.  On  this  ground  alone  I  should  have 
expected,  still  on  the  principle  of  utility,  a  consider- 
ably higher  recognition  of  his  ser\T[ces  from  Mr.  Mill 
than  he  has  been  able  to  accord.  Mr.  Herbert  Spen- 
cer, it  seems  to  me,  speaks  of  Sir  WiUiam  Hamilton 
with  a  juster  sense  of  proportion.  He  even  goes  so 
far  as  to  confess,  for  himself,  a  greater  indebtedness, 
for  special  doctrines   and   suggestions,  to  Hamilton 

than  to  Comte. 

One  tribute  Mr.  Mill  has  certainly  paid  to  Sir 
William  Hamilton,  which  amply  compensates  aU 
omissions.  He  has  written,  in  reply  to  Hamilton,  a 
book  which  will  probably  take  rank  as  the  ablest  and 
profoundest  of  even  Mr.  Mill's  works.  Were  I  to  say 
that,  in  the  process  of  studying  and  answering  Ham- 
ilton, Mr.  Mill  has  become  twice  the  metaphysician 
he  was,  the  expression  might  be  over  the  mark ;  but 
that  Mr.  Mfll  has  been  moved  by  this  antagonism  to 
bring  out  twice  the  amount  of  his  metaphysics  ever 
brought  out  before,  will,  I  think,  be  questioned  by  no 
competent  critic.  It  is,  indeed,  a  splendid  treatise. 
Ahnost  at  the  outset  of  this  volume  we  quoted 
from  an  early  essay  of  Mr.  Mill's  a  passage  of  lam- 


1 


/ 


254 


RECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


entation  over  the  low  state  into  wliicli  Specula- 
tive Philosophy  had  fallen  in  Britain  at  the  time 
when  it  was  written.  What  does  Mr.  Mill  say  in  the 
present  work?  "The  justification  of  the  work," 
he  says,  "  lies  in  the  importance  of  the  questions 
to  the  discussion  of  which  it  is  a  contribution. 
England  is  often  reproached  by  Continental  think- 
ers with  indifference  to  the  higher  philosophy. 
But  England  did  not  always  deserve  this  reproach, 
and  is  already  showing,  by  no  doubtful  symptoms, 
that  she  will  not  deserve  it  much  longer.  Her  think- 
ers are  again  beginning  to  see,  what  they  had  only 
temporarily  forgotten,  that  a  true  Psychology  is  the 
indispensable  scientific  basis  of  Morals,  of  Politics,  of 
tlie  Science  and  Art  of  Education;  that  the  difficul- 
ties of  Metaphysics  lie  at  the  root  of  all  science ;  that 
these  difficulties  can  only  be  quieted  by  being  re- 
solved, and  that  until  they  are  resolved,  positively  if 
possible,  but  at  any  rate  negatively,  we  are  never  as- 
t  sured  that  any  human  knowledge,  even  physical, 
Vstands  on  solid  foundations."  *  Now,  if  Mr.  MiU  was 
one  of  those  who  began  that  revival  of  Philosophy  in 
Britain  of  which  he  here  speaks,  and  if  for  thirty 
years  he  has  been  one  of  the  chief  powers  in  the  revi- 
val, he  appears  before  us  in  this  very  volume  as  likely 
to  expedite,  in  a  manner  more  vigorous  than  ever,  that 

*  Page  2. 


EEOENT  BEHISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


255 


farther  desirable  stage  of  the  revival  which  shall  lead 
us  out  of  our  insular  discredit,  and  enable  us  to  hold 
up  our  heads  with  the  best  that  is  going  in  Europe. 
Tons  of  popular  literature  might  be  spared  for  a  vol- 
ume such  as  this  1  It  will  make  men  think.  It  is 
Britain  that  will  proximately  be  benefited,  but  the 
volume  will  probably  have  a  wider  influence. 

Considering  how  invigorating  to  the  mind  of  the 
nation  at  the  present  moment  would  be  such  a  battle 
of  purely  philosophical  opinion  as  might  be  raised 
over  Mr.  MUl's  volume,  one  must  hope  that  the  vol- 
ume will  rouse  opposition.  It  is  certain  to  do  so. 
EepUes  may  be  expected,  first  of  all,  from  the  Ham- 
iltonians— whether  those  who  adhere  in  the  main  to 
Hamilton's  system,  or  those  who  do  so  only  partially.  \ 
Mr.  Mansel  will,  no  doubt,  come  forward,  if  only  in 
defence  of  his  own  peculiar  theological  application  of 
one  of  Hamilton's  doctrines.  Something  may  surely 
be  looked  for  from  Professor  Veitch  and  Professor 
Spencer  Baynes;  and  these  are  points  on  which 
Professor  Eraser,  notwithstanding  those  deviations 
from  some  of  Hamilton's  most  important  views  of 
which  his  writings  have  given  evidence,  will  probably 
think  that  Mr.  Mill  has  missed  his  way,  or  failed  in 
his  attack  on  Hamilton.  If  Dr.  Cairns  of  Berwick- 
upon-Tweed  could  be  induced  to  lay  aside  other  work 


256 


RECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


257 


till  he  should  have  written  a  defence  or  re-explication 
of  the  Hamiltonian  Philosophy  in  reply  to  Mr.  Mill, 
I  should  expect  that  Mr.  Mill's  regrets  at  not  being 
able  to  look  for  such  an  answer  as  the  gladiator  him- 
Belf  would  have  given,  and  to  receive  his  "  hard  blows 
in  return,"  would  be  in  some  degree  assuaged.  But, 
indeed,  it  is  not  only  the  Hamiltonian  philosophy 
that  is  assailed  in  Mr.  Mill's  volume,  nor  is  it  the  ad- 
herents of  any  one  school  of  speculative  thought  that 
it  may  be  expected  to  rouse.  At  one  point  or  another 
every  fonn  of  philosophy,  not  reducible  to  Mr.  Mill's 
own  ultimate  interpretation  of  Locke's  Empiricism,  is 
thrust  at  in  the  volume  through  the  ribs  of  Hamil- 
ton ;  and  our  pre-Hamiltonian  British  Transcenden- 
talists,  as  well  as  our  Ferrierists,  our  Kantians,  and  our 
Hegelians  (so  far  as  there  are  such  among  us),  may  all 
feel  themselves  challenged.  There  are  several  points 
on  which  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  in  consequence  of  his 
modified  agreement  with  notions  of  Hamilton,  is  in- 
volved by  name  in  Mr.  Mill's  criticisms. 

My  own  impression  is  that  Mr.  Mill  has  made 
good  at  least  one  general  criticism  respecting  the 
character  of  Hamilton's  Philosophy  as  it  is  presented 
to  us  in  his  remaining  writings  collectively — ^to  wit, 
that  it  is  a  philosophy  of  imperfect  junctions.  There 
are  blocks  and  obstacles,  as  if  of  unremoved  embank- 
ments, between  its  several  parts.     One  doctrine,  pur- 


sued at  one  time,  does  not  always  meet  or  lead  into 
another,  pursued  at  another  time,  or  seem  as  if  it 
could  meet  or  lead  into  it ;  much  less  is  there  ary 
spacious  central  terminus  whither  the  various  doc- 
trines are  seen  to  converge,  and  from  which  access  to 
any  of  them  might  be  direct  and  easy.    Mr.  Mill, 
applying  a  simfle  suggested  by  Sir  WilUam  Hamilton 
himself,  has  expressed  this  very  happily.    "  I  formerly 
quoted  from  him,"  he  says,  "  a  felicitous  illustration 
drawn  from  the  mechanical  operation  of  tunnelling ; 
that  process  affords  another,  justly  applicable  to  him- 
self.    The  reader  must  have  heard  of  that  gigantic 
enterprise  of  the  Italian  Government,  the  tunnel 
through  Mount  Cenis.    This  great  work  is  carried  on 
simultaneously  from  both  ends,  in  well-grounded  con- 
fidence  (such  is  now  the  minute  accuracy  of  engineer- 
ing  operations)  that  the  two  parties  of  workmen  will 
correctly  meet  in  the  middle.    Were  they  to  dis- 
appoint  this  expectation,  and  work  past  one  another 
in  the  dark,  they  would  afford  a  likeness  of  Sir  W. 
Hamilton's  mode  of  tunnelling  the  human  mind."  * 
Every  reader  of  Sir  WiUiam  Hamilton  that  has  tried 
to  rethink  his  main  doctrines  so  as  to  connect  them 
must  have  experienced  something  of  this  feeling  ;^  but 
Mr.  MiU's  specific  enumeration  of  the  imperfect  junc- 
tions,  or  actual  inconsistencies  and  incompatibilities, 

•  Page  661. 


c/ 


t 


268 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHT. 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


259 


1 


between  the  several  parts  of  Hamilton's  philosophy, 
will  greatly  increase  the  feeling.  Mr.  MiU  suggests 
that  one  cause  of  this  incompleteness  or  imperfect 
centralization  of  Hamilton's  speculative  labours  may 
have  been  "  the  enormous  amount  of  time  and  mental 
vigour  which  he  expended  in  mere  philosophical 
erudition,  leaving,  it  may  be  said,  only  the  remains 
of  his  mind  for  the  real  business  of  thinking."  So 
far  as  this  suggestion  is  true,  however,  does  it  not 
furnish  an  excuse  admitting  also  of  admiration? 
Was  it  not  the  character  of  Hamilton's  erudition  that 
it  recovered  not  mere  irrelevant  facts  and  dry  bones 
of  defunct  ingenuities,  but  thoughts  and  forms  of 
thought  on  all  philosophical  questions  which  leaped 
again  into  vitality  and  the  full  interest  of  relevancy 
the  moment  they  were  re-stated  by  his  powerful  pen, 
and  some  of  which  modem  philosophy  had  voted  to 
be  impedimenta  only  in  its  too  great  hurry  to  get  on  ? 
Was  it  not  a  service  to  Philosophy  to  compel  it  to  re- 
assiune  these  so-called  impedimenta,  if  they  were  not 
such,  but  data  and  diflSculties  necessary  to  all  philoso- 
phizing that  would  find  itself  solid  and  efficient  in 
the  long  run  ?  At  all  events,  was  not  Hamilton's  own 
conception  of  a  complete  fabric  of  Philosophy  ren- 
dered hereby  so  much  more  laborious  that  to  have 
failed  to  finish  the  fabric,  or  even  to  leave  an  adequate 


conjecture  how  it  might  be  consistently  finished,  was 
hardly  a  discredit  to  one  man's  life  ? 

Of  those  of  Mr.  Mill's  criticisms  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton  which  fall  within  our  scope  in  these  pages, 
the  greater  portion  resolve  themselves  into  a  criticism, 
repeated  from  all  points  of  view,  of  Hamilton's  doc- 
tiine  of  the  Kelativity  of  Knowledge  in  connexion 
with  his  system  of  Katural  Eealism.    Accepting  the 
doctrine  of  the  Kelativity  of  Knowledge,  and  thinking 
it  a  most  important  doctrine,  and  indeed  the  founda- 
tion-doctrine of  all  sound  philosophy,  Mr.  Mill  argues 
again  and  again  through  the  earlier  chapters  of  his 
volume,  that  there  is  a  radical  incompatibility  be- 
tween this  doctrine,  in  any  sense  in  which  it  would  be 
worth  keeping,  and  that  Natural  Eealism  with  which 
in  Hamilton's    Philosophy  it    stands    incorporated. 
"  If  what  we  perceive  in  the  thing,"  says  Mr.  Mill, 
"is  something  of  which  we  are  only  aware  as  exist- 
ing, and  as  causing  impressions  on  us,  our  knowledge 
of  the  thing  is  only  relative.    But,  if  what  we  per- 
ceive and  cognise  is  not  merely  a  cause  of  our  sub- 
jective impressions,  but  a  thing  possessing,  in  its  own 
nature  and  essence,  a  long  list  of  properties.  Exten- 
sion, Impenetrability,  Number,  Magnitude,  Figure, 
Mobility,  Position,  all  perceived  as  ^essential  attri- 
butes '  of  the  thing  as.  '  objectively  existing  '—all  as 
^  Modes  of  a  Not-Self,'  and  by  no  means  as  an  occult 


■H 


A 


1 


I 


260 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY, 


cause  or  causes  of  any  modes  of  Self— (and  that  sucli 
is  the  case  Sir  W.  Hamilton  asserts  in  every  form 
of  language,  leaving  no  stone  unturned  to  make  us 
apprehend  the  breadth  of  the  distinction)  then  I  am 
willing  to  believe  that,  in  aflBLrming  this  knowledge  to 
be  entirely  relative  to  Self,  such  a  thinker  as  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  had  a  meaning,  but  I  have  no  small  diffi- 
culty in  discovering  what   it  is.''*     Again,  after 
farther  discussion,  Mr.  Mill  thus  sums  up  : — "  It  has 
been   shown,  by  accumulated    proof,  that  Sir  W. 
Hamilton  did  not  hold  any  opinion  in  virtue  of  which 
it  could  rationally  be  asserted  that  all  human  knowl- 
edge is  relative,  but  did  hold,  as  one  of  the  main 
elements  of  his  philosophical  creed,  the  opposite  doc- 
trine of  the  cognoscibility  of  external  things  in  cer- 
tain of  their  aspects,  as  they  are  in  themselves."  f 
"Now,  with  all  deference  to  Mr.  Mill,  we  cannot  see 
that  he  has  here  fairly  apprehended  Sir  "William 
Hamilton.    Whether  Sir  William's  doctrine  of  l^atu- 
ral  Eealism  is  true  or  false  is  one  question ;  and  it  is 
a  question  on  which  Mr.  Mill,  in  other  parts  of  his 
volume,  where  he  defends  the  Idealistic  theory  of 
external  perception,  and  developes  it  with  reference 
to  the  so-called  "  primary  qualities "  of  matter,  has 
pressed  Sir  William  very  hard.     He  has  also,  I  think, 
convicted  Sir  William  of  a  somewhat  fast-and-loose 


•  Page  21. 


+  Page  31. 


EECEl^  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


261 


.    / 

of  sufficient  care  to  distinguish  that  sense  m  which 
he  alleged  that  we  possess  an  intuitive,  or  face-to-face 
knowledge  of  certain  properties  of  matter  "  as  it  is 
in  itself,"  and  that  sense  in  which  he  denied  the  pos- 
sibility of  any  knowledge  of  "  things  in  themselves." 
But,  as  we  have  already  tried  to  show,  while  antici- 
pating this  very  objection  (see  ante,  pp.  119 — 122), 
there  seems  no  necessary  incompatibility  between  Sir 
William  Hamilton's  Natural  Eealism,  or  doctrine  of 
the  cognoscibility  of  certain  attributes  as  belonging 
to  matter  itself,  independently  of  the  mind  knowing, 
and  a  very  distinct  and  substantial  sense  of  the  doc- 
trine of  Eelativity.  Keferring  to  our  previous  obser- 
vations  on  this  subject,  we  need  only  repeat  that  the 
difference  between  Sir  William  Hamilton  and  Mr. 
Mill  seems  to  be  wholly  cosmological,  and  not  at  all 
ontdogical.  They  both  agree  that  only  the  phaenom- 
enal  can  be  known,  but  they  differ  as  to  what  is  to  be 
taken  as  the  sum  or  composition  of  the  phsenomenal. 
Sir  William  Hamilton,  as  a  natural  Eealist,  holds  that 
in  the  phsenomenal  cosmos  there  are  two  directly 
known  constituents — a  phaenomenal  world  of  Matter,  f 
that  has  to  be  thought  of  as  persisting  the  same  in 
itself  apart  from  any  percipiency  that  may  be  brought 
to  bear  upon  it ;  and  a  phsenomenal  agency  of  mind,  *^ 
BO  related  to  this  world  of  matter  as  to  apprehend 


EEOENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BETTISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


263 


Mi' 


It 


'if 


II 


some  of  its  real  or  independent  qualities.     There  is  a 
cognising  phaenomenon,  and  a  phsenomenon  cognised 
in  certain  items  of  its  own  independent  phsenomenal 
nature.     This  doctrine  may  be  wrong;  and,  as  we 
have  abeady  said,  it  gives  a  kind  of  wrench  to  the 
cultivated  or  etymological  notion  of  the  meaning  of 
the  word  "  phaenomenal,"  to  be  called  upon  to  im- 
agine a  phsenomenon,  or  world  of  phaenomena,  sub- 
sisting with  no  percipiency  to  which  it  could  be  phse- 
nomenal.    But,  instead  of  the  word  "  phsenomenon  " 
use  the  word  "  nature "  or  "  creation,"  and  it  is  diffi- 
cult to  see  why  Sir  William  Hamilton  could  not  have 
held  his  particular  cosmological  system  of  I^^atural 
Eealism,  its  tenability  once  allowed,  in  perfect  con- 
sistency with  a  very  sturdy  doctrine  of  the  incognos- 
cibility  of  the  Absolute.     The  two  creations.  Mind 
and  Matter,  might  roll  on  together  in  a  joint  cosmos, 
so  related  that  the  one  might  have  a  conviction  that 
it  toothed  at  some  points  into  the  independent  consti- 
•  tution  of  the  other ;  and  yet  both  creations  might  be 
thought  of  as  equally  melting  away,  in  the  last  study 
of  them,  into  an  Absolute  unknown.    Mr.  Mill's  error 
seems  to  be  in  supposing  that,  when  Sir  William  Ham- 
ilton spoke  of  our  direct  cognisance  of  certain  qual- 
ities of  matter  as  it  is  in  itself,  this  was  equivalent 
to  saying  that  we  know  something  of  Matter  as  a 
Noumenon,  of  Matter  in  the  absolute.     He  never 


meant  this,  and  he  guarded  himself  in  several  inci- 
dental sentences  against  such  a  construction  of  his 
meaning.  But,  as  we  hinted,  it  might  have  been 
better  if  he  had  done  so  at  greater  length,  and  with 
a  stronger  partition  between  his  cosmological  and  his 
ontological  statements. 

Leaying  Mr.  Mill's  criticisms  of  Sir  William  Ham- 
ilton after  this  mere  reference  to  one  of  the  chief  of 
them,  let  us  note  such  re-explications  of  Mr.  Mill's 
own  philosophical  opinions,  intermingled  with  the 
criticisms  or  arising  out  of  them,  as  may  bring  our 
views  of  the  principal  articles  of  his  metaphysical 
system  down  to  the  latest  date. 

The  most  likely  charge  against  Mr.  Mill's  previous 
writings,  we  said,  might  have  been  that  they  left  a 
sense  of  metaphysical  deficiency.  While  the  charge 
against  Sir  William  Hamilton  is  that  of  imperfect 
junctions  of  the  constituent  portions  of  his  system  at 
the  critical  points,  the  charge  against  Mr.  Mill,  with 
reference  to  his  previous  writings,  I  can  conceive  to 
have  been  that  of  a  limpid  evasion  of  the  chief  meta- 
physical difficulties  as  felt  by  others.  As  an  instance 
take  the  fact  that  in  his  beautiful  essay  on  Utilitarian- 
ism he  devoted  but  a  few  sentences  to  what  seemed 
to  be  the  very  knot  of  the  whole  question — ^the  psy- 
chological genesis  of  the  idea  of  right ;  the  conversion 


/ 


264 


EECENT  BErnSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


i 


-^ 


of  the  Prodest  into  the  Ojportet  /  the  evolution  of  the 
participle  in  dus  out  of  never  so  much  of  the  past  par- 
ticiple passive ;  the  demonstration  how  or  why,  if  it 
were  granted  that  moral  actions  are  those  done  with 
a  view  to  the  greatest  possible  diminution  of  pain  and 
promotion  of  pleasure  throughout  the  sentient  uni- 
verse, there  should  have  arisen  in  connexion  with  this 
class  of  actions  the  notion  of  moral  obligation  to  do 
them,  unless  on  the  principle  of  some  djpriori  or  con- 
nate notion  of  rightness  that  fitted  itself  on  to  that 
class  of  actions.  The  apparent  deficiency  in  Mr. 
Mill's  writings  of  which  this  has  been  felt  to  be  an 
instance,  may  be  attributed  in  part  to  the  ease  with 
which  Mr.  MiU  had  grasped  for  himself  the  connex- 
ions of  his  system,  and  could  evolve  everything  in  it, 
to  his  own  satisfaction,  inductively  out  of  experience. 
In  part,  however,  it  may  have  been  owing  to  the  pe- 
culiarity of  Mr.  Mill's  literary  style  and  method.  Sir 
William  Hamilton's  style  and  method  are  such  as  to 
force  his  ideas  upon  his  readers  in  their  individual 
distinctness.  He  heaps  them  up,  as  it  were,  in  mounds, 
each  crowned  by  a  signal-flag,  so  that  there  can  be  no 
mistake  about  it.  His  plan  is  generally  something 
like  this :  "  On  this  subject  there  are  three  opinions. 
Primo^  there  is  such  and  such  an  opinion ;  and  that 
is  the  opinion  of  such  and  such  philosophers  (naming 
them).    Secundo^  there  is  such  another  opinion ;  and 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


266 


this  is  what  is  held  by  so-and-so  and  so-and-so  (naming 
them).  Tertio^  there  is  this  third  opinion  (describing 
it),  and  this  is  the  opinion  that  I  hold."  Hence  it  re- 
sults that  there  is  hardly  ever  any  difficulty  in  pinning 
Sir  "William  Hamilton  to  his  opinions,  and,  if  they  are 
inconsistent  with  each  other,  the  inconsistencies  al- 
most solicit  observation.  Mr.  Mill,  on  the  other  hand, 
though  admirably  exact  in  his  criticisms  of  the  opin- 
ions of  others,  generally  presented  his  own  views  on 
philosophical  subjects  in  what  may  be  called  clear 
liquid  lapses  of  exposition,  over  which  one  floated 
with  an  agreeable  sense  of  facility,  feeling  all  the 
while  a  fine  and  full  element  of  meaning  underneath 
one— which  meaning,  however,  it  was  more  difficult, 
afterwards,  than  in  Sir  William  Hamilton's  case,  to 
concentrate  into  definite  propositions  for  the  purposes 
of  recollection  and  controversy.  Sometimes,  even, 
there  was  a  feeling  as  if  there  must  have  been  points 
of  rocks  concealed  under  the  clear  flow  of  the  stream. 
Whatever  truth  there  may  be  in  these  remarks  as 
applied  to  Mr.  Mill's  previous  writings,  all  critics  will 
admit  that,  to  a  great  degree,  they  cease  to  be  ap- 
plicable to  the  present  volume.  I  am  not  sure  but 
there  are  traces  in  it  of  effects  of  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton's bold  and  strenuous  rhetoric  on  the  manner  and 
language  of  his  opponent.    At  all  events,  in  studying 

Sir  WiUiam  Hamilton  and  replying  to  him,  Mr.  Mill 

12 


V 


I 


/ 


.1 


266 


KECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EEOENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


267 


■'} 


I 


has  felt  the  necessity  of  taking  a  harder  grasp  of  some 
of  his  chief  philosophical  opinions  than  before,  and 
re-issning  them  in  a  more  distinct  manifesto. 

I. 

There  is  a  most  interesting  restatement  in  this 
volume  of  Mr.  Mill's  peculiar  cosmological  Idealism. 
The  chapters  containing  this  restatement  (Chapters 
XT-,  XII.,  XIII.)  are,  I  should  say,  in  some  respects, 
the  best  in  the  whole  volume.  They  form,  I  believe, 
a  valuable  contribution  of  new  reasonings  and  happy 
forms  of  phraseology  to  one  branch  of  metaphysics. 
Let  me  give  as  much  of  their  substance  as  seems  ne- 
cessary by  way  of  extension  of  our  previous  account 
of  Mr.  MiU's  Idealistic  doctrine. 

Sunt  cogitationes,  There  are  Thoughts  or  Feel- 
incrs — such  is  still,  Mr.  Mill  seems  to  hold,  the  one 
radical  fact,  or  phsenomenon  of  the  Universe,  from 
which  all  Philosophy  must  be  developed.  Beyond 
this  fact,  that  there  are  thoughts^  feelings,"  sensations, 
cogitations,  we  cannot,  by  any  analysis,  go.  Perhaps 
cogitations^  though  not  the  word  used  by  Mr.  Mill,  is 
the  word  that  would  best  convey  his  conception  of 
those  ultimate  phsenomena  out  of  which  aU  else  must 
Btart.  For  what  he  insists  on,  in  the  same  breath  in 
which  he  fastens  attention  on  these  ultimate  phaenom- 


ena,  is  the  fact  of  what  may  be  called  a  curdling  ten- 
dency among  them — a  tendency  among  them  to  form 
associations  with  each  other,  according  to  relations  of 
coexistence,  succession,  and  likeness.  Given  sensa- 
tions or  feelings  and  their  physical  sociability  (I  say 
physical^  for  as  yet  no  notion  of  Mind  as  a  distinct 
entity,  nor  indeed  of  Matter  either,  must  enter  into 
the  conception,  though  I  think  Mr.  Mill  inadvertently 
permits  it  to  enter  in  some  parts  of  his  language  even 
thus  early  in  his  account  of  things) — ^given  these,  and 
all  the  rest  is  an  evolution  thencefrom.  The  most 
notable  agency  in  the  evolution  is  that  of  the  repe- 
tition of  certain  associations  between  sensations  or 
the  phsenomena  of  feeling  till  they  seem  indissoluble 
or  inseparable.  It  is  this  Inseparability^ofA^ciation 
(why  Mr.  Mill  should  say  "  Inseparability "  I  do  not 
see :  he  seems  entitled  only  to  "  Unseparatedness ") 
that  has  been  the  agency  in  generating  what  are  now 
our  most  constant  cognitions  and  beliefs.  It  is  through 
the  action  of  the  principle  of  association  among  the 
ultimate  phsenomena  called  feelings  that  we  see  tak- 
ing place,  first  of  all,  that  enormous  self-separation  of 
the  phsenomena  into  two  orders  or  aggregates — that 
now  called  Mind  or  Self,  and  that  now  called  Matter 
or  Not-Self.  The  correct  theory  "maintains,''  says 
Mr.  Mill,  "  that  there  are  associations,  naturally  and 
even  necessarily  generated  by  the  order  of  our  sen- 


I 


268 


BECEKT  BBinSH  FHILOSOFHY. 


EEOEHT  BBTTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


269 


I 
1 


sations  and  of  our  reminiscences  of  sensation,  which, 
supposing  no  intuition  of  an  external  world  to  have 
existed  in  consciousness,  would  inevitably  have  gen- 
erated the  belief,  and  would  cause  it  to  be  regarded 
as  an  intuition."  *  And  the  notion  of  Mind  or  Self 
admits,  he  contends,  of  "  a  similar  analysis."  f  I^ 
other  words,  that  duality  of  Self  and  Kot-Self  which 
is  now  the  paramount  fact  or  rule  of  all  consciousness 
known  to  us  has  been  generated  out  of  the  curdling 
or  inter-association,  according  to  laws  of  co-existence, 
succession,  and  likeness,  of  phsenomena  in  which,  in 
their  prime  or  crude  state,  no  such  notion  can  have 
subsisted.  But,  now  that  the  notion  does  subsist,  now 
that  the  entire  Cosmos  seems  to  revolve  on  the  poles 
of  this  antithesis,  what  is  Philosophy  to  make  of  it  ? 
Is  Philosophy— cognisant  as  it  now  is  of  the  fact  that 
aU  has  been  the  product  of  a  process  of  cogitation,  or 
association  on  and  on,  among  feelings  in  ever-growing 
complexity — ^to  uncoil  the  complexity  to  the  utter- 
most, and,  reaching  a  succession  of  associable  feelings 
or  sensations,  describable  as  phsenomena,  but  undis- 
tinguished as  either  of  Matter  or  Mind,  to  proclaim 
that  as  the  basis  or  ultimatum  of  the  Cosmos  ?  This 
would  be  nearly  the  conception  of  the  NonrSubstan- 
tialists  or  Nihilists^  as  represented  by  Hume.  But 
Mr.  Mill,  as  before,  shows  no  anxiety  for  going  so  far 

*  Page  192.  f  ^^^  204. 


back,  unless  where  he  thinks  there  may  be  benefit  in 
a  bath  of  such  final  scegtigism  as  may  wash  away 
from  the  mind  all  notion  of  knowledge  where  we  da 
not  absolutely  know  but  only  assume  that  we  know. 
Nor  is  he  content  with  such  a  rise  out  of  Non-Sub- 
stantialism  as,  economizing  assumption  the  most  pos- 
sible, and  assuming  only  one  kind  of  substance,  or 
cause  of  phsenomena,  behind  the  phsenomena  them- 
selves, should  offer  Materialimi  or  Pure  Idealism  as 
the  alternative.  Whatever  may  be  his  reserve  of  sci- 
entific opinion  as  to  the  probable  origin  of  sentiency, 
the  cosmological  conception  which  he  states  and  de- 
fends as  the  best  working  conception  for  Philosophy, 
is,  as  before,  that  of  Constructive  Idealism.  But  here 
is  perhaps  the  chief  novelty  of  his  volume.  It  is  a 
new  and  refined  form  of  Constructive  Idealism  that 
he  now  propounds — a  form  so  expressed  that,  while  it 
will  serve,  he  thinks,  as  a  working  conception  fitted 
for  all  the  essential  purposes  of  philosophy  or  science, 
philosophy  and  science  may  sink  back  through  its 
meshes  at  will  into  all  desirable  vagueness  and  quest 
of  the  homogeneous. 

"  As  Body  is  the  mysterious  something  which  ex- 
cites the  mind  to  feel,  so  Mind  is  the  mysterious  some- 
thing which  feels  and  thinks  " — ^thus,  after  aU  sorts  of 
caveats  and  explanations,  we  found  Mr.  Mill  willing 
formerly  to  sum  up  his  doctrine  of  Constructive  Ideal- 


y 


270 


EECEin:   BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


271 


ism.  He  does  not  now  reject  this  mode  of  speech, 
but  he  substitutes  another  which  is  much  more  ab- 
stract. If  we  examine  our  assertion  that  we  are  cog- 
nisant of  a  world  external  to  ourselves,  and  of  our- 
selves as  having  a  being  distinct  from  that  world, 
what  is  it,  he  asks,  that  we  really  imply  ?  N^othing 
more  or  less  than  this — ^that  there  seem  to  be  two  du- 
rations, distinct  from  each  other,  though  in  contact 
from  moment  to  moment,  in  each  of  which  we  are 
aware,  in  every  momentary  contact,  of  a  great  deal 
more  than  is  ever  then  momentarily  present.  Take 
first  our  notion  of  an  external  world.  "  What  is  it 
we  mean  when  we  say  that  the  object  we  perceive  is 
external  to  us,  and  not  a  part  of  our  own  thoughts  ? 
We  mean  that  there  is  in  our  perceptions  somethiag 
which  exists  when  we  are  not  thinking  of  it ;  which 
existed  before  we  had  ever  thought  about  it,  and 
would  exist  if  we  were  annihilated ;  and,  further,  that 
there  exist  things  which  we  never  saw,  touched,  or 
otherwise  perceived,  and  things  which  never  have 
been  perceived  by  man.  This  idea  of  something 
which  is  distinguished  from  our  fleeting  impressions 
by  what,  in  Kantian  language,  is  called  perdurability 
— something  which  is  fixed  and  the  same  while  our 
impressions  vary — constitutes  altogether  our  idea  of 
external  substance.  Whoever  can  assign  an  origin  to 
this  complex  conception  has  accounted  for  what  we 


mean  by  the  behef  in  matter."  *     Developing  this 
idea  farther— calling  attention  to  the  fact  that  each 
petty  patch  or  flash  of  present  sensation  that  we  ex- 
perience seems  to  us  to  certify  a  vast  background  of 
permanent  possibilities  of  sensation  out  of  whicK  it  is 
but  the  momentary  emergence,  and  which  we  know 
to  be  common  to  other  sentient  beings  besides  our- 
selves, while  the  present  emerging  patch  or  flash  is 
ours  in  particular— Mr.  Mill  finds  in  the  phrase  "per- 
manent or  guaranteed  possibilities  of  sensation "  all 
that  he  thinks  included,  or  requiring  to  be  included, 
in  the  notion  of  an  external  world.     "  Matter,  then," 
he  says,  "  may  be  defined  a  Permanent  Possibility  of 
Sensation.    If  I  am  asked  whether  I  believe  in  mat- 
ter I  ask  whether  the  questioner  accepts  this  defini- 
tion of  it.     If  he  does,  I  believe  in  matter ;  and  so  do 
all  Berkeleians.    In  any  other  sense  than  this  I  do 
not."  t     Similarly,  in  the  same  notion  of  a  present 
shifting  experience  reposing  on  and  certifying  an  infi- 
nitely wider  non-present  of  possibilities,  Mr.  Mill 
finds  all  that  seems  necessary  for  a  definition  S^^Mind 
or  Self.    "  Our  notion  of  Mind,  as  well  as  of  Matter, 
is  the  notion  of  a  permanent  something,  contrasted 
with  the  perpetual  fiux  of  the  sensations,  and  other 
feelings  or   mental  states    which  we  refer  to  it— a 
something  which  we  figure  as  remaining  the  same 


/ 


^ 


*  Page  192. 


t  Page  198. 


\ 


* 

I 


\ 


272 


EECENT  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


vrhile  the  particular  feelings  tlirough  which  it  reveals 
/  its  existence  change.     This  attribute  of  permanence, 
/  supposing  that  there  were  nothing  else  to  be  consid- 
^  ered,  would  admit  of  the   same   explanation  when 
predicated  of  Mind  as  of  Matter.     The  beHef  I  enter- 
tain that  my  mind  exists  when  it  is  not  feeling,  nor 
thinking,  nor  conscious  of  its  own  existence,  resolves 
itself  into  the  belief  of  a  Permanent  Possibility  of 
those  States."  *    Mr.  MiU  goes  on  to  point  out  that 
this  «  permanent  possibility  of  feeling,"  constituting 
our  notion  of  Self,  is  distinguished  by  certain  impor- 
tant  differences  from  the  "  permanent  possibilities  of 
sensation"   constituting   our  notion  of  an  external 
world.     Still  Mind,  as  well  as  Matter,  resolves  itself, 
Mr.  Mill  concludes,  into  a  patch  of  present  upon  the 
ground  of  an  unlimited  non-present— into  a  series  of 
feelings  varying  and  fugitive  from  moment  to  mo- 
ment, in  a  sea  of  possibilities  of  feeling.     «  Thus  far  " 
he  says,  "  there  seems  no  hindrance  to  our  regarding 
Mind  as  nothing  but  the  series  of  our  sensations  (to 
which  must  now  be  added  our  internal  feelings),  as 
they  actually  occur,  with  the  addition  of  infinite  pos- 
sibiUties  of  feeling,  requiring  for  their  actual  realiza- 
tion conditions  which  may  or  may  not  take  place,  but 
which,  as  possibilities,  are  always  in  existence,  and 
many  of  them  present."  f    And  again,  more  briefly, 

•  Page  206.  |  p^g^  206. 


EEOENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


273 


«  My  Mind  is  but  a  series  of  feelings,  or,  as  it  has 
been  called,  a  thread  of  consciousness,  however  sup- 
plemented by  believed  possibilities  of  conscious- 
ness, which  are  not,  though  they  might  be,  real- 
ized." * 

Such  is  Mr.  Mill's  new  version  of  his  system  of 

Constructive  Idealism.  It  is  likely,  I  think,  to  be  a 
good  deal  canvassed  in  future  metaphysical  discus- 
sions. The  oblections.that  most  naturally  arise  to  it 
are  the  following : — 

It  does  not,  as  it  stands,  seem  to  answer  the  actual 
and  total  conception  which  we  all  have  of  even  the 
present  constitution  of  the  cosmos.  It  seems  to  break 
down  at  least  on  the  side  of  Mind  or  Self.  It  does 
not  seem,  on  that  side,  to  answer  the  felt  requisites  so 
well  as  either  the  old  Constructive  Idealism  of  Berke- 
ley and  others,  which  supposed  a  permanent  substance 
or  entity  of  Mind,  determined  by  some  external  cause 
or  causes  to  imagine  a  world  of  material  objects,  or  the 
system  of  Pure  Idealism,  which  supposes  a  substance 
or  entity  of  mind  self-determined  to  the  same  exer- 
cise. A  patch  of  present  on  an  unlimited  ground  of 
a  non-present,  a  series  of  feelings  varying  and  fugi- 
tive from  moment  to  moment  in  a  sea  of  possibilities 
of  feeling— this  does  not  seem  to  be  all  that  our  no- 
tion of  Mind  or  Self  includes.    It  includes  an  organic 


12» 


•  Page  208. 


i: 


I' 


1^ 

f'li 

4 


V 


111 


274 


EECENT  BBinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


I 


% 


union  someliow  of  tlie  present  witli  the  non-present, 
the  identity  somehow,  in  one  conscious  organism,  of 
the  was^  the  is^  and  the  is  to  he.    In  a  passage  of  sin- 
gular candour,  Mr.  Mill  has  himself  anticipated  and 
stated  this  objection  to  his  theory  of  Mind.    After 
disposing  of   certain  "extrinsic"    objections  to  the 
theory  he  announces  an  "  intrinsic  "  diflSculty  which 
it  seems  to  him  "  beyond  the  power  of  metaphysical 
analysis  to  remove."     This  diflSculty  presents  itself  in 
the  mental  phaenomena  of  memory  and  expectation. 
"Besides  present  feelings  and  possibilities  of  pres- 
ent feeling,"  he  says,  "  there  is  another  class  of  phse- 
nomena  to  be   included  in  an   enumeration  of  the 
elements  making  up  our  conception  of  Mind.     The 
thread  of  consciousness  which  composes  the  mind's 
phgenomenal  life  consists  not  only  of  present  sensa- 
tions, but  likewise,  in  part,  of  memories  and  expecta- 
tions.   !N'ow  what  are  these?    In  themselves,  they 
are  present  feelings,  states  of  present  consciousness, 
and  in  that  respect  are  not  distinguished  from  sensa- 
tions.   They  aU,  moreover,  resemble  some  given  sen- 
sations or  feelings  of  which  we  have  previously  had 
experience. — ^But  they  are  attended  with  the  peculi- 
arity that  each  of  them  involves  a  belief  in  more  than 
its  own  present  existence.     A  sensation  involves  only 
this :  but  a  remembrance  of  a  sensation,  even  if  not 
referred  to  any  particular  date,  involves  the  sugges- 


BECENT  BEmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


275 


tion  and  belief  that  a  sensation  of  which  it  is  a  copy 
or  representation  actually  existed  in  the  past ;  and  an 
expectation  involves  the  belief,  more  or  less  positive, 
that  a  sensation  or  other  feeling  to  which  it  directly 
refers  will  exist  in  the  future.  ISTor  can  the  phsenom- 
ena  involved  in  these  two  states  of  consciousness  be 
adequately  expressed  without  saying  that  the  belief 
they  include  is  that  I  myself  formerly  had,  or  that  I 
myself,  and  no  other,  shall  hereafter  have,  the  sensa- 
tions remembered  or  expected.  The  fact  believed  is, 
that  the  sensations  did  actually  form,  or  will  hereafter 
form,  part  of  the  self-same  series  of  states,  or  thread  of 
consciousness,  of  which  the  remembrance  or  expecta- 
tion of  those  sensations  is  the  part  now  present.  K, 
therefore,  we  speak  of  the  Mind  as  a  series  of  feelings, 
we  are  obliged  to  complete  the  statement  by  calling  it 
a  series  of  feelings  which  is  aware  of  itself  as  past  and 
future ;  and  we  are  reduced  to  the  alternative  of  be- 
lieving that  the  mind,  or  Ego,  is  something  different 
from  any  series  of  feelings  or  possibilities  of  them,  or 
of  accepting  the  paradox  that  something  which,  ex 
hypothesis  is  but  a  series  of  feelings  can  be  aware  of 
itself  as  a  series."  *  ITothing  could  be  fairer  or  braver 
than  this  statement  by  Mr.  Mill  of  the  intrinsic  objec- 
tion to  his  proposed  theory  of  Mind ;  for  he  goes  on 
to  confess  his  conviction  of  its  insuperability.    "  The 

*  Pp.  212,  213. 


..I  ) 


i! 


Hi 


,f 


iiJ 


Xi 


276 


BECENT  BBinSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


i 


truth  is,"  he  continues,  "that  we  are  here  fat6-to-face 
with  that  final  inexpKcability  at  which,  as  Sir  Will- 
iam  Hamilton  observes,  we  inevitably  arrive  when  we 
reach  ultimate  facts ;  and,  in  general,  one  mode  of 
stating  it  only  appears  more  incomprehensible  than 
another,  because  the  whole  of  human  language  is  ac- 
commodated to  the  one,  and  is  so  incongruous  with  the 
other  that  it  cannot  be  expressed  in  any  terms  which 
do  not  deny  its  truth.     The  real  stumbHng-block  is 
perhaps  not  in  any  theory  of  the  fact,  but  in  the  fact 
itself.     The  true  incomprehensibility  perhaps  is,  that 
something  which  has  ceased,  or  is  not  yet  in  exist- 
ence,  can  still  be,  in  a  manner,  present— that  a  series 
of  feelings  the  infinitely  greater  part  of  which  is  past 
or  future,  can  be  gathered  up,  as  it  were,  into  a  sin- 
gle present  conception,  accompanied  by  a  belief  of 
reality.     I  think  by  far  the  wisest  thing  we  can  do  is 
to  accept  the  inexplicable  fact,  without  any  theory  of 
how  it  takes  place,  and,  when  we  are  obliged  to  speak 
of  it  in  terms  which  assume  a  theory,  to  use  them 
with  a  reservation  as  to  their  meaning."  *     This,  I 
venture  to  say,  is  the  most  memorable  passage,  in  its 
philosophical  consequence,  in  the  whole  of  Mr.  Mill's 
volume.     Were  I  to  say  that  it  reveals  a  trap-door 
opened  by  Mr.  Mill  himself  in  the  fioor  of  his  own 
philosophy,  I  should  say  what  others  wiU  feel  as  weU 

*  Page  213. 


EECENT  BElnSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


277 


as  myself.  What  concerns  us  here  is  that  Mr.  Mill 
avows  that  the  difficulty  he  has  stated  leaves  his  defi- 
nition of  Mind'insufficient  unless  with  the  accompa- 
niment of  a  paradox.  What  is  the  advantage,  then, 
of  propounding  such  a  definition  ?  Why  not  adhere 
to  the  notion  of  Mind  in  the  older  Constructive  Ideal- 
ism, which  regarded  it  as  the  unknown  substance,  or 
entity,  or  organism,  which  feels  and  thinks  ?  What- 
ever objections  there  may  be  to  the  words  "sub- 
stance "  and  "  entity,"  let  them  die  a  natural  death. 
If  the  notion  of  Mind  as  "  a  series  of  feelings  with  a 
background  of  possibihties  of  feeling  "  is  not  complete 
without  the  rider  that  "  the  series  of  feelings  can  be 
aware  of  itself  as  a  series,"  or  that  "  something  which 
has  ceased,  or  is  not  yet  in  existence,  can  still,  in  a 
manner,  be  present,"  then  the  word  "  substance,"  with 
all  its  faults,  seems  a  very  exact  etymological  equiva- 
lent for  both  notion  and  rider. 

A  second  objection  to  Mr.  Mill's  new  version  of 
Constructive  Idealism,  in  competition  with  other  cos- 
mological  systems,  is  that  it  is  confessedly  only  a  use- 
ful working  conception  of  the  present  constitution  of 
the  Cosmos,  which  we  may  rest  in  by  voluntarily 
stopping  short  of  an  ulterior  scientific  conception. 
When  Natural  Realism  speaks  of  a  substance  Mind, 
and  an  independent  substance  Matter  directly  known 
to  some  extent  by  Mind,  and  calls  these  the  two  con- 


y. 


I 


't 


!| 


1 


m 


278 


KECENT   BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


/ 


stituents  or  factors  of  the  phsenomenal  cosmos,  it  pro- 
fesses to  give  the  results  of  its  utmost  analysis  of  the 
cosmos.  When  Materialism  resolves  present  Mind 
into  quondam  Matter,  it  also  professes  to  go  the 
whole  length  of  the  analysis  to  which  it  is  competent. 
When  Pure  Idealism  asserts  the  contrary,  and  main- 
tains that  so-called  Matter  is  but  a  figment  of  Mind, 
this  also  is  its  final  account  of  the  sum-total  of  the 
phaenomenal.  I^ay,  when  the  older  Constructive 
Idealism  set  up  a  substance  or  principle  called  Mind, 
and  supposed  it  actuated  by  some  force  out  of  itself  in 
its  ideas  of  external  objects,  not  the  less  was  this  prof- 
fered as  an  analysis  to  the  utmost  of  the  total  world  of 
phaenomena.  But  Mr.  Mill's  new  Constructive  Ideal- 
ism does  no  such  thing.  When  it  speaks  of  the  Cos- 
mos as  consisting  of  a  series  of  feelings  carrying  in  it- 
self a  sense  of  permanent  internal  possibilities  of  feel- 
ing, and  aware  of  itself  as  in  the  midst  of  permanent 
external  possibilities  of  sensation,  it  professes  nothing 
more  than  an  analysis  arrested  at  a  convenient  point 
for  practical  purposes.  Scientifically,  it  avows  its 
own  ability  to  carry  the  analysis  farther.  These  pres- 
ent notions  or  facts  of  Mind  and  Matter,  it  avows,  are 
ultimately  to  be  conceived  as  generated  out  of  a 
prime  original  of  phsenomena,  definable  in  their  origi- 
nal state  neither  as  mind  nor  matter,  but  only  as  feel- 
ings or  sensations    and  their  associabilities.      Sunt 


\ 


JBECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


279 


Hi 


cogitationes  I  fuerunt  cogttaf zones — this  is  the  ulti- 
mate statement  to  which  we  are  led  back.  A  cur- 
dling together  of  phaenomena,  such  as  we  now  call  feel- 
ings or  sensations — this  is  the  fact  of  the  Cosmos  at  its 
uttermost.  It  is  but  a  secondary  or  subsequent  fact, 
that  out  of  this  cm^dling  there  has  resulted  that  vast 
self-differentiation  of  the  curdled  material  whereby  it 
has  happened  that  now,  in  every  act  of  thought  or 
perception,  there  is,  as  by  a  necessary  law  of  our  be- 
ing, a  discrimination  bursting  asunder,  or  mutual  re- 
lease and  disengagement,  of  two  notions— the  notion  of 
an  external  world  of  permanent  possibilities  of  sensa- 
tion, whirled  away  from  us  in  extension  up  to  the 
clouds  and  the  stars  ;  and  the  notion  of  a  distinct  in- 
ternal persistency  of  feeling,  living  on  amid  this  ex- 
tension, and  uniting  in  its  consciousness  the  past,  the 
present,  and  the  future.  ISTow,  is  not  Mr.  Mill's  Con- 
structive Idealism  only  an  account  of  the  secondary 
fact — an  account  of  our  notions  of  Ego  and  Non-Ego 
as  they  have  been  generated  for  us  out  of  a  prior  and 
simpler  consistency  referred  to  by  himself,  and  de- 
scribable  neither  as  Ego  nor  Non-Ego,  but  only  as 
cogitations  or  associable  phaenomena  of  feeling  ?  If 
Mr.  Mill  is  forced  back  to  the  very  end  of  the  avenue 
which  his  own  system  opens  to  the  view,  does  he  not 
cease  to  be,  cosmologicaUy,  a  Constructive  Idealist,  in 
any  preservable  sense  of  the  term,  and  lapse  into 


I  m 


280 


EECENT  BBmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


I 


I 


something  else  ?    It  is  difficult  to  see  wliat  name  al- 
ready in  nse  would  then  describe  his  cosmological  con- 
ception in  its  ultimate  form.     Owing  to  his  describing 
the  ultimate  cosmical  phsenomena  as  "  feelings,"  and 
thus  inducing  us  to  think  of  them,  however  vaguely, 
as  phaenomena  of  what  we  now  call  the  mental  or 
ideal  order,  there  would  still  be  a  character  of  general 
Idealism  in  his  system.     His  ultimate  resolution  of 
things  would  involve  a  preference  for  the  language 
of  the  idealistic  over  that  of  the  materialistic  hypoth- 
esis.    What  he  would  invite  us  to  think  of  as  the 
prime  "  matter  "  of  the  Universe  would  be  describable, 
at  aU  events,  as  "  matter  of  feeling."    Yet  it  would 
by  no  means  be  Idealism,  as  hitherto  understood,  to 
which  we  should  thus  be  brought ;  for,  in  Idealism, 
as  hitherto  understood,  the  prime  or  genetic  phaenom- 
ena have  always  been  feelings  imagined  as  functions 
of  some  personality  or  personalities,  whereas  in  Mr. 
Mill's  system  personality  is    itself  a  mere    notion 
evolved  out  of  the  phaenomena,  and  therefore  not  to 
be  imported  (though  I  think  he  does  himself  inadver- 
tently import  it)  into  the  primary  contemplation  of 
them.    In  some  respects  it  is  the  Nihilism  or  Non- 
Substantialism  of  Hume  to  which  Mr.  MiU  would 
seem  to  be  brought  back,  for  in  that  system  there  is 
no  denial  of  anything  of  phaenomenal  fact  that  Mr. 
MiU  seems  to  think  it  necessary  to  keep.    But,  as  Mr. 


RECENT  BRmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


281 


MiU  does  perhaps  make  more  of  the  natural  associa- 
bilities  of  the  prime  phaenomena  than  Hume,  a  more 
positive  name  than  NihiUsm  or  Non-SubstantiaUsm  is 
desirable  for  his  system.  On  the  whole,  if  I  were  al- 
lowed to  invent  a  term,  I  should  say  that  Mr.  MiU, 
cosmologically,  is  now  a  Cogitationist.  The  ultimate 
fact  of  the  phaenomenal  world,  as  recognized  by  him, 
is  neither  Matter  nor  Mind  in  any  present  sense  of 
these  terms,  but  a  cogitation  or  coagulation  of  phae- 
nomena which  may  be  called  feelings ;  out  of  which 
cogitation  or  coagulation  it  has  happened,  in  virtue  of 
the  laws  regulating  it,  that  there  is  now  that  stupen- 
dous fact  of  all  present,  or  at  least  of  aU  human,  sen- 
tiency — ^the  instinctive  fm'liiag  off,  in  every  conscious 
or  perceptive  act,  of  a  conceived  external  world  of 
possibilities  from  a  conscious  and  persisting  person- 
ality. If  we  stop  at  this  fact — ^whieh  we  may  do  for 
most  practical  purposes — our  cosmological  system 
may  be  that  of  the  new  Constructive  Idealism ;  but, 
if  we  persevere  in  the  analysis,  we  end  in  CogitOr 
tionism. 

But  can  we  end  even  here  ?  Is  even  this  Cogita- 
tionism,  as  it  is  propounded,  ultimate  ?  For,  as  we 
have  said,  it  is  still  a  kind  of  Idealism.  Those  prime 
phaenomena,  out  of  the  coagulation  of  which,  accord- 
ing to  their  laws  of  associability,  he  represents  our 
cosmos  of  Matter  and  Mind  to  have  been  whoUy 


4. 


Vi>\ 


\\ 


:( 


H'  ,1 


L,. 


]•■ 


282 


RECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


evolved,  are,  lie  is  always  studious  to  remind  us, 
pliaenomena  definable  as  feelings.    "What  we  have  to 
start  with,  in  his  scheme,  as  the  prime  cosmical  mat- 
ter, is  still  a  matter  of  feeling— the  facts  or  phaenom- 
ena  of  a  crude  original  sort  of  sentiency,  which  has 
not  yet  worked  out  the  distinction  of  Ego  and  iNTon- 
Ego,  but  is  only  engaged  in  working  it  out.    He  will 
not  even  part  with  the  word  "  consciousness ; "  but, 
holding  by  the  expressions  "  thread  of  consciousness," 
and  "  series  of  states  of  consciousness,"  as,  in  his  opin- 
ion, equivalent  to  Mind,  he  follows  up  the  "  thread  " 
or  "  series,"  in  the  case  of  each  individual  being,  stiU 
calling  it  consciousness,  back  into  that  infant  con- 
fusion of  first  sensations  with  first  muscular  move- 
ments wherein  the  notions  of  Self  and  Not-Self  are 
to  be  conceived  as  lying  yet  unseparated  and  indis- 
tinct.    Beyond  this  he  does  not  go.     But  will  the 
theory  serve  us  to  the  last  extreme  ?    Mr.  Mill  has 
spoken  of  the  difficulty  of  conceiving  how  that  which, 
ex  hypothesi  in  his  theory  of  Personality  or  Mind,  is 
but  a  series  of  feelings,  can  be  aware  of  itself  as  a 
series,  or  can  grasp  the  non-present  in  the  present. 
He  has  represented  this  as  the  one  stumbling-block  in 
the  way  of  his  total  theory  of  Mind  and  Matter — the 
final  mystery  or  inexplicability  which  he  can  only  ac- 
cept, without  attempting  a  solution.    But  are  there 
not  mysteries  on  the  back  of  this  one  ? 


rV: 


RECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


283 


How,  for  example,  about  our  belief  in  the  exist- 
ence of  other  sentiencies,  or  "  threads  of  conscious- 
ness, "or  successions  of  feelings,"  contemporaneous 
with  our  own — ^whether  our  human  fellow-creatures, 
or  the  inferior  sentiencies  of  all  grades,  from  the  largest 
quadrupeds  down  to  microscopic  animalcules  ?  Mr. 
Mill  sees  no  difficulty  here.  He  thinks  his  theory 
may  be  easUy  relieved  from  that  "  extrinsic "  objec- 
tion which  Keid  threw  in  the  way  of  Idealism,  when 
he  maintained  that  it  would  leave  us  without  evidence 
of  the  existence  of  our  fellow-creatures.  Eeid,  Mr. 
Mill  argues,  was  here  under  a  complete  mistake. 
What  is  there,  he  asks,  in  the  admission  that  Self  or 
Personality  is  nothing  but  a  "  succession  of  feelings  " 
or  "  thread  of  consciousness,"  that  should  prevent  our 
believing  that  there  are  other  selves  besides  our  own 
—human,  or  inferior  to  human,  or  even  hyperphysical 
and  divine— provided  only  these  selves  are  regarded 
also  but  as  "  successions  of  feelings  "  or  "  threads  of 
consciousness  ? "  Among  my  permanent  possibilities 
of  sensation  there  are  recurring  appearances— say  of 
bodies  like  my  own,  shaped  and  moving  and  behaving 
like  my  own,  and  yet  felt  not  to  be  my  own— whence 
I  infer  that  there  are  around  me  other  human  minds 
or  possibilities  of  feeling  besides  myself;  and  from 
similar  marks  or  signs  I  conclude,  with  equal  cer- 
tainty, that  there  are  hosts  of  sentiencies  not  human. 


'   CM 


vi 


■ 


4 


284 


EECENT  BBinSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


I 


l^ow,  it  is  not  the  mere  dizzying  intricacy  of  the  con- 
ception that  would  so  arise  that  should  prevent  us 
from  allowing  that  Mr.  Mill  may  be  in  the  right  here 
against  Keid.     But  the  intricacy  is  worth  noting. 
According  to  Idealism,  when  I  meet  a  man  walking 
in  the  street,  he,  as  part  of  my  INon-Ego,  or  possibili- 
ties of  sensation,  is  really  a  production  of  my  Self  or 
series  of  feelings,  and  yet  I  may  know  that  the  com- 
pliment is  returned,  and  that  I,  as  part  of  his  Kon- 
Ego,  am  a  production  of  his  series  of  feelings.    Again, 
what  is  the  butterfly  I  see  fluttering  in  the  garden  but 
a  little  object  accounted  for  by  the  self-evolution  of 
my  consciousness  or  series  of  feelings,  respecting  which 
object  nevertheless  I  am  bound  to  conclude  that  it 
also  is  a  little  series  of  feelings,  working  out  its  life  as 
self  and  not-self  within  the  sphere  of  my  ITot-Self  ? 
Or,  again,  do  not  the  French  Emperor  and  the  whole 
of  the  French  nation  exist  for  me  but  as  a  portion  of 
the  aggregate  possibilities  of  sensation  that  have  been 
generated  out  of  the  experience  of  that  series  of  feel- 
ings which  constitutes  Me,  and  yet,  on  the  other  hand, 
as  neither  the  French  Emperor  nor  the  French  nation 
ever  heard  of  my  existence,  must  I  not  think  of  my 
series  of  feelings  as  a  something  lodging  not  yet  re- 
alized amid  the  possibilities  of  sensation  appertaining 
to  those  transmarine  threads  of  consciousness  ?     In 
abort,  what,  according  to  the  Idealistic  theory,  are  the 


EEOENT  BETIISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


285 


millions  of  human  beings  of  whose  existence  on  the 
earth  contemporaneously  with  myself  I  am  so  well 
aware,  and  the  countless  hosts  of  inferior  contem- 
porary sentiencies  with  which  Zoology  amazes  me, 
but  multitudinous  "threads  of  consciousness"  whir- 
ring and  spinning  their  lives  within  the  bounds  of 
that  which  is  but  a  poem  of  my  consciousness,  and 
making  their  poems  there,  aU  of  which  are  difierent 
from  mine,  and  some  of  which  outsphere  mine  ?  Illus- 
trations of  this  kind  might  be  multiplied,  not  in  the 
least  for  the  purpose  of  ridiculing  Idealism,  but  only 
for  the  purpose  of  exhibiting  the  involutions  of  ideal- 
ism within  idealism  to  which  the  thinking  out  of  the 
theory  leads.  Of  the  Idealists  metaphysically,  as  of 
the  Ptolemaists  physically,  it  may  be  said  that  there 
is  an  interest  in  knowing 

"  how  they  will  wield 
The  mighty  frame ;  how  build,  unbuild,  contrive 
To  save  appearances ;  how  gird  the  sphere 
With  centric  and  eccentric  scribbled  o'er, 
Cycle  and  epicycle,  orb  in  orb." 

Whether  Mr.  Mill  has  adequately  met  the  alleged 
difficulty  of  reconciling  such  an  idealistic  theory  as 
his  with  the  belief  in  the  independent  existence  of 
contemporary  sentiencies  I  cannot  undertake  to  say, 
not  having  been  able  to  think  his  explanation  out  to 
my  own  satisfaction.    It  seems  to  me,  however,  that 


' ' 


^■i 


^^ 


286 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHT. 


If- 


the  explanation  is  too  summary,  as  it  stands.    It  is 
not  in  the  least  doubted  that  Idealism  may  work  out 
the  notion  of  the  existence  of  other  beings  besides 
self.    It  seems  only  to  be  questioned  whether,  on  the 
idealistic  hypothesis,  this  notion  must  not  be  regarded 
as  an  illusion.     For  what  is  the  idealistic  hypothesis, 
as  entertained  by  Mr.  MiU  ?    Is  it  not  that  the  sum- 
total  of  existence  for  each  sentiency  is  its  own  series 
of  feelings  worked  out  ?    "What  I  am  aware  of  as 
really  existing  in  my  thread  of  consciousness,  my  se- 
ries of  feelings.    If,  in  the  course  of  my  series  of  feel- 
ings, there  occurs  to  me  the  notion  of  another  series 
of  feelings  out  of  me,  I  may  certainly  call  that  an  ex- 
istence, inasmuch  as  it  belongs  to  my  series  of  feel- 
ings.   But  do  I  not  leap  beyond  the  fact  when  I  set 
up  this  second  or  notionary  series  of  feelings  in  inde- 
pendent existence,  as  emancipated  from  me,  nay,  as 
approaching  me  for  the  first  time  out  of  circumjacent 
vacancy  where  I  had  nothing  to  do  with  it,  and  even 
as  capable  of  making  my  series  of  feelings,  of  which 
it  is  the  creature,  its  creature  in  return  ?    Yet  is  it 
not  in  this  sense  that  we  believe  in  the  existence  of 
our  feUow-mortals  ?     How  can  one  thread  of  con- 
sciousness be  aware  of  another  conceived  thread  of 
consciousness  as  anything  more  than  its  own  concep- 
tion ?    WiU  it  be  repHed  by  Mr.  MiU  that  this  kind 
or  amount  of  existence  is  the  same  that  the  first  thread 


t  / 


^l 


EECENT   BRTIISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


28T 


\\\ 


of  consciousness  claims  for  itself?  It  does  not  seem 
to  be  so.  The  Ego  and  Non-Ego  of  any  thread  of 
consciousness  are^  according  to  Mr.  Mill,  conceptions 
of  that  thread  of  consciousness  experimentally  arrived 
at ;  but  he  has  never  said  that  the  thread  of  conscious- 
ness itself  is  only  a  conception  of  the  thread  of  con- 
sciousness. The  thread  of  consciousness  constituting 
each  man  is  followed  up  at  last  to  a  specific  original 
of  feelings  and  their  associabilities  which  formed  that 
man's  peculiar  infant  existence,  and  was  as  yet  the 
neutrum  of  his  Ego  and  ISTon-Ego.  The  existence 
which  each  man  predicates  of  himself  is,  according 
to  Mr.  Mill,  derivability  from  that  neutrum ;  but  is 
the  existence  which  each  man  predicates  of  his  feUow- 
creatures  also  derivability  from  that  neutrum?  If, 
then,  I  admit  the  notion  of  the  existence  of  my  fel- 
low-creatures to  be  a  product  of  the  experience  of  my 
thread  of  consciousness,  must  I  not  admit  also  that 
this  notion  corresponds  to  a  fact  of  which  my  expe- 
rience can  give  no  account  ?  But  is  this  Empirical 
Idealism?  Is  it  Empirical  Idealism  first  to  resolve 
the  whole  of  my  Non-Ego  into  my  acquired  notion 
of  permanent  possibilities  of  sensation,  and  then  to 
have  to  admit,  respecting  those  moving  bits  of  my 
Non-Ego  in  which  I  recognise  alien  threads  of  con- 
sciousness or  possibilities  of  feeling,  that  their  exist- 
ence is  not  I'ooted  within  my  being  ? 


/ 


i 


i 


288 


RECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


Let  me  not  be  misunderstood.    An  IdeaKsm  or 
Cogitationism  that  should  start  with  the  assumption 
that  there  is  in  the  universe  a  plurality  of  minds,  sen- 
tiencies,  threads  of  consciousness,  already  discrimi- 
nated from  each  other  in  the  nature  of  things,  might 
very  well  explain  the  supposed  existence  of  Matter  on 
the  idealistic  principle,  and  might  adopt  Mr.  MiU's 
definition  of  Matter  as  the  happiest  and  most  exact 
that  has  yet  been  given.    Each  of  these  minds,  sen- 
tiencies,  or  threads  of  consciousness  comes  to  be  aware 
of  "permanent  possibilities  of  sensation,"  which  it 
figures,  according  to  its  ability,  as  a  substantial  world 
of  matter,  external  to  itself,  but  the  cause  of  which 
may  be  in  others  minds  or  sentiencies.     The  cause  of 
all  those  sensations  which  each  of  us  feels,  and  which 
we  body  forth  in  so  mighty  a  framework  of  imagery, 
may  be  not,  as  the  If  atural  Eealists  hold,  the  actual 
existence  out  of  us  of  any  material  objects  at  all  such 
as  we  suppose,  but  only  the  perpetual  uniform  deter- 
minations of  our  minds  so  to  think  in  consequence  of 
influences  or  suggestions  from  other  minds — say  hy- 
perphysical  intelligences  or  one  Supreme  Mind.    By 
this  kind  of  Idealism,  which  was  very  much  Berke- 
ley's, the  Universe  might  be  simplified  into  Thought 
or  Ifotion.    But  it  postulates  plurality  of  minds  or 
threads  of  consciousness  in  the  present  universe ;  and 
here  it  is  that  Mr.  Mill's  Cogitationism  seems  to  differ 


i 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


289 


from  it.  For,  in  Mr.  Mill's  system,  not  only  is  Matter 
resolved  into  a  conception  of  each  particular  thread 
of  consciousness,  worked  out  by  the  laws  of  associa- 
tion from  its  experienced  feelings,  but  the  existence 
of  other  sentiencies  or  threads  of  consciousness  is  re- 
solved into  a  conception  of  each  particular  thread  of 
consciousness,  arrived  at  in  the  same  way.  Now,  if  it 
is  a  conception  merely,  how  can  I  predicate  the  exist- 
ence of  other  minds  in  the  same  sense  in  which  I 
predicate  my  own  ?  In  the  case  of  my  own,  I  have 
the  guarantee  of  the  fact  of  the  thread  of  conscious- 
ness which  has  come  at  the  conception ;  and,  if  I  run 
back  that  fact  to  the  utmost,  I  come  still,  Mr.  Mill 
admits,  to  the  indestructible  fact  of  a  specific  initial 
cogitation  of  phsenomena  called  feelings,  a  specific 
neutrum  of  Ego  and  ITon-Ego,  emerging  out  of  a 
previous  complexity  of  things,  or  let  it  be  out  of 
nothingness.  But,  in  the  other  case,  I  have  no  such 
guarantee ;  and,  unless  I  can  assume  the  contempo- 
raneity of  other  minds  as  vouched  somehow  in  the 
initial  neutrum  of  my  own  consciousness,  or  can 
break  through  that  neutrum,  so  as  to  see  it  but  as 
one  in  a  crowd  of  other  neutra,  prior  or  contempo- 
raneous (both  of  which  suppositions  Mr.  Mill's  Em- 
piricism would  disallow),  then  I  can  predicate  the 
existence  of  other  threads  of  consciousness  only  in  the 
sense  that  they  are  notions  of  my  thread  of  conscious- 

13 


':ii 


1m 


! 


i?i 


;  a 


(I 


290 


RECENT   BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


ii 


ness.  When  I  say  tliat  I  exist,  I  do  not  mean,  nor 
does  Mr.  Mill's  Cogitationism  oblige  me  to  mean,  tliat 
my  thread  of  consciousness  is  a  notion  of  my  thread 
of  consciousness ;  but,  when  I  say  that  my  feUow- 
creatnres  exist,  in  what  other  sense  Mr.  Mill's  Cogi- 
tationism allows  me  to  say  it  than  that  these  fellow- 
creatures  are  notions  of  my  thread  of  consciousness, 
I  confess  I  cannot  see. 

But  farther.  Let  all  difficulty  be  supposed  over- 
come about  the  reconciliation  of  Mr.  Mill's  theory 
with  the  belief  in  the  existence  of  a  countless  plural- 
ity of  minds  and  sentiencies  contemporaneous  with 
our  own.  Let  it  be  supposed  also  that  the  theory  is 
perfectly  reconcileable  with  our  belief  in  those  ages 
of  mind  and  sentiency,  anterior  to  the  present,  and 
sustaining  or  constituting  the  history  of  things  down 
to  the  present,  of  which  we  have  assurance  in  record 
and  in  science.  Has  not  recent  science  been  making 
another  conception  incumbent  upon  us — the  concep- 
tion of  a  point  in  backward  time  at  which  not  only 
human  sentiency,  but  all  sentiency  whatever,  disap- 
pears from  the  scene,  and  yet  the  Cosmos  is  not  anni- 
hilated, but  there  remains  a  more  or  less  substantial 
priority  of  non-sentiency,  which  had  a  history  of  its 
own?  Is  it  not  worth  while  to  look  at  Mr.  Mill's 
Cogitationism,  or  at  Idealism  generally,  in  connexion 
with  this  conception  ?    A  while  ago  the  necessity  of 


RECENT  BRmSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


291 


such  a  test  of  cosmological  Idealism  was  not  likely  to 
be  thought  of.  The  emergence  of  the  completed  Cos- 
mos from  an  Absolute  Unknown  was  imagined  as  in- 
stant or  sudden,  and  all  known  sentiency,  including 
that  of  Man,  was  imagined  as  introduced  into  the 
Cosmos  within,  at  latest,  the  first  week  of  it.  Ideal- 
ism, whose  principle  it  is  that  esse  is  synonymous  with 
jpercipi^  had  only,  as  it  were,  to  find  the  means  of 
supporting  metaphysically  a  shell  of  esse^  consisting 
of  the  heavens  and  earth  with  all  their  material  gar- 
nishment, for  a  brief  day  or  two ;  after  which  the  ar- 
rival within  this  shell  of  a  competent  native  provision 
of  sentiency,  or  plurality  of  perceiving  powers  and 
forms,  relieved  the  chief  amount  of  the  strain.  But 
it  is  different  now  that  the  advent  of  sentiency  into 
the  universe  is  conceived  as  gradual.  There  are  long 
tracts  of  an  esse  which  could  not  be  ^^jpercipi  at  all  to 
any  native  sentiencies,  save  of  kinds  decreasingly  in- 
ferior to  man ;  and  again,  beyond  these,  there  are  far- 
ther aeons  of  an  esse^  claiming  to  be  thought  of  as  by 
no  means  nothing,  but  a  real  and  true  ongoing  of 
phsenomena,  though  bereft  of  all  native  percipiency 
whatever.  How  does  cosmological  Idealism,  or  Mr. 
Mill's  Cogitationism,  reconcile  itself  with  this  scientific 
conception  ? 

There  is  one  plan,  which  I  suppose  was  the  plan 
of  the  old  Idealists  in  regard  to  that  brief  interval 


f*   I 


lllf 


292 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


over  which  they  had  to  tide  of  a  material  esse  in  the 
Cosmos  before  the  advent  of  a  native  percipiency.  It 
is  the  plan  of  deputation  to  prior  mind  or  percipiency. 
For  the  interval  which  the  older  Idealists  had  to  tide 
over,  they  could  suppose  the  shell  of  the  material  uni- 
verse sustained  or  suspended,  as  it  were,  as  an  idea  or 
conception  in  the  thoughts  of  non-native  or  hyper- 
physical  intelligences,  or  in  the  creative  mood  of 
Deity  himself — ^this  conception  waiting  for  the  native 
sentiencies  that  were  to  leap  on  to  it,  or  arise  within 
it,  and  were  to  inherit  it  as  a  prompting-ground  for 
their  continued  constitutional  thinkings.  By  a  little 
adaptation  the  same  plan  of  deputation  might  be 
available  for  present  Idealism.  A  world  of  some 
kind  might  be  sustained  in  existence  backward,  far 
beyond  the  era  of  man,  by  fancying  it  as  the  conjoint 
function  of  such  inferior  native  sentiencies  or  percip- 
iencies  as  were  anterior  to  man.  Or,  if  such  a  world 
seemed  too  mean,  resort  might  be  had  immediately  to 
that  transcendent  "  metaphysical  aid "  which  would 
liave  finally  to  be  resorted  to,  in  any  case,  when  all 
native  percipiency  had  been  exhausted  to  the  dregs, 
and  there  still  remained  a  vast  priority  of  esse  refus- 
ing to  be  abolished.  Hyperphysical  intelligences,  to 
whom  our  human  measure  of  time  is  naught,  might 
be  reading  the  marvellous  poem  of  creation  and  cele- 
brating its  completion  in  chorus  ere  yet  there  was  ap- 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY, 


293 


pearance  of  any  native  sentiency  in  that  creation  to 
take  up  the  song.  Or  He  to  whom  a  thousand  years 
are  as  one  day,  and  one  day  as  a  thousand  years, 
and  of  whom  we  are  told  that,  surveying  the  ema- 
nation of  His  mind.  He  pronounced  it  good— might 
not  He  have  continued  the  necessary  contemplation  ? 
Of  this  mode  of  thought  Idealism  may  avail  itself,  as 
I  believe  all  religious  human  feeling  must  avail  itself 
of  some  analogous  mode  of  thought  in  the  long  run, 
whether  it  calls  itself  Idealism  or  not.  But  it  is  to  be 
observed  that  it  imports  a  transcendent  reality  into 
Idealism.  It  does  not  require  the  particular  reality 
characteristic  of  Natural  Kealism— ^.  e.  a  real  block 
and  history  of  a  material  world,  distinct  from  all  the 
minds  or  sentiencies  appertaining  to  it,  and  to  which 
they  help  themselves  according  to  their  capacities; 
but  it  requires,  as  a  substitute,  a  reality  of  previous 
idea  or  thought,  transmitted  as  a  housing  and  pas- 
turage for  the  sentiencies,  minds,  or  threads  of  con- 
sciousness arriving  within  it,  and  furnishing  them 
with  the  suggestions  that  determine  their  perceptions 
and  thinkings. 

"What  is  the  relation  of  Mr.  Mill's  Cogitationism 
to  Absolute  Idealism  we  shall  presently  see.  Mean- 
while, it  does  not  appear  that  it  is  of  any  such  plan  of 
deputation  as  that  just  described  that  he  would  avail 
himself  in  respect  of  the  problem  in  question.    He 


I ' 


•\ 


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RECENT  BBmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT   BBTTISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


295 


holds,  apparently,  that  his  phrase  "  permanent  possi- 
bilities of  sensation,"  taken  as  expressing  that  I^on- 
Ego  or  material  world  which  each  individual  mind 
works  out  for  itself,  is  amply  sufficient  to  cover,  for 
that  mind,  all  requisites  of  conceivability  back  to  the 
Nebula.  He  does  not  depute  the  burden  of  sustain- 
ing the  conception  of  a  world  not  yet  tenanted  by 
man,  or  by  any  sentient  forms,  upon  supposed  non 
native  or  hyperjphysical  intelligences;  but,  leaving 
the  question  of  the  existence  of  such  intelligences 
open,  he  thinks  that  each  human  intelligence  is  capa- 
ble of  sustaining  the  burden  for  itself  without  going 
beyond  the  process  of  its  own  thoughts. 

Now  we  cannot  see  how  Mr.  Mill  makes  this  out. 
There  is  not  the  least  objection  to  his  phrase  "  perma- 
nent possibilities  of  sensation  "  as  an  equivalent  for 
the  material  world.  It  is  a  phrase  admirably  chosen 
in  many  respects,  and  one  which  Natural  Realists,  as 
well  as  Constructive  Idealists,  might  accept  as  express- 
ing what  they  agree  in  before  they  begin  to  differ.  AU 
schools,  indeed,  agree  that  there  are  "  permanent  pos- 
sibilities of  sensation ; "  and  the  sole  question  among 
them  is  as  to  the  nature  of  the  cause  of  these  perma- 
nent possibilities.  Natural  Eealists  find  the  cause  in 
an  actual  external  material  world  with  which  the 
mind  is  so  constituted  as  to  hold  intuitive  commerce ; 
Constructive  Idealists  find  it  in  some  agency,  physical 


or  hyperphysical,  determining  the  mind  to  uniform 
sensations  or  images,  but  not  necessarily  in  the  least 
like  them  in  its  own  nature ;  Absolute  Idealists  find 
it  immediately  in  the  thoughts  of  the  Divine  mind.  In 
each  case  there  is  a  substratum  for  the  possibilities — 
a  something  out  of  which  they  are  imagined  as  spring- 
ing, and  which  is  independent  of  the  mind  of  the  in- 
dividual percipient.  But  in  Mr.  Mill's  Cogitationism 
there'  is  no  such  substratum  allowed  or  taken  for 
granted.  Each  mind,  or  thread  of  consciousness,  is 
supposed  to  work  out  its  notion  of  an  external  world 
by  a  process  confined  to  itself;  and  it  is  the  notion  of 
"permanent  possibilities  of  sensation"  so  worked  out 
by  each  mind  for  itself  that  Mr.  MAI  must  hold  to  be 
a  sufficient  notion  of  a  material  world  wherewith  to 
cover  all  that  that  mind  may  be  called  upon,  by  history 
or  science,  to  believe  in  as  existing  or  having  happened 
before  its  own  birth,  or  before  the  era  of  humanity 
on  the  earth,  or  before  the  era  of  any  forms  of  senti- 
ency  on  the  earth,  or  back,  if  need  be,  to  the  imagined 
convolutions  of  a  universal  Nebula.  But  is  any  such 
notion  of  "  permanent  possibilities  "  as  may  be  worked 
out  by  the  process  of  the  individual  consciousness  suf- 
ficient for  this  immense  burden  ?  As  far  as  I  can  see, 
it  is  not.  For  either  the  "  permanent  possibilities  " 
are  only  a  notion  of  the  individual  mind,  evolved  in 
the  course  of  that  mind's  development  out  of  its  origi- 


s 


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296 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


297 


nal  condition  as  a  mere  neutrum  of  Ego  and  !N'on- 
Ego,  a  mere  bundle  of  feelings ;   or  they  are  more 
than  a  notion,  and  answer  to  a  fact  in  the  nature 
of  things  beyond  the  individual  mind  taken  in  its 
whole  evolution  from  the  first  moment.    K  they  are 
a  mere  notion,  what  happens  ?    One  mind  may  then 
fill  antecedent  time  with  any  cloud  of  possibilities  it 
chooses,  and  it  may  elect  to  fill  it  with  those  precise 
possibilities  which  history  arid  science  represent  as 
real  occurrences.     But  in  all  this  it  is  only  filling  an- 
tecedent time  with  a  notion ;    and  a  notion  w;on't  do. 
For  it  is  out  of  antecedent  time,  and  in  consequence 
of  the  conditions  of  antecedent  time,  whatever  thev 
were,  that  the  mind  must  think  of  itself  as  h^iving 
come  to  exist ;  and,  if  the  sole  contents  of  antecedent 
time  are  a  notion  of  the  present  mind,  then  the  mind 
that  has  formed  the  notion  must  think  of  itself  as 
springing  out  of  the  notion  which  itself  has  formed. 
Physics  and  metaphysics  are  then  at  war.     The  world 
of  antecedent  existence  is,  metaphysically,  the  child 
of  the  conceiving  mind,  and  this  child  is,  physicaUy, 
the  ancestor  of  its  own  mother.    Mr.  Mill  then  cannot 
mean  that  the  "  permanent  possibilities  of  sensation," 
which  he  offers  as  equivalent  to  all  we  know  of  an  ex- 
ternal world,  are  a  mere  notion  of  the  individual 
mind  conceiving  them,   and  nothing  more.      Well, 
then,  let  us  take  the  other  alternative— that  these 


"  permanent  possibilities  "  are  indeed  a  notion  of  the 
individual  mind,  but  a  notion  which  it  knows  or  be- 
lieves to  answer  to  a  fact  in  the  independent  nature 
of  things.  Here  we  should  be  all  right ;  only  this  is 
precisely  the  position  with  respect  to  our  belief  in  an 
external  world  from  which  Mr.  Mill's  Empirical  Cogi- 
tationism  seems  to  seek  to  drive  us.  That  the  mind, 
without  going  beyond  its  own  experience,  may  form 
a  notion  of  "  permanent  possibilities  of  sensation  " — 
let  it  be  granted  that  his  theory  is  competent  so  far ; 
but,  if  what  is  wanted  is  that  the  mind  may  form  such 
a  notion,  and  also  know  or  believe  that  the  notion 
corresponds  to  a  fact  in  the  nature  of  things,  then  how 
his  theory  will  suffice,  unless  by  knocking  a  hole  in 
itself,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive.  For  to  form  such  a 
notion,  and  to  know  or  believe  that  the  notion  does  not 
end  in  itself,  but  shakes  hands  with  a  fact  in  nature — 
what  is  this  but  to  have  an  intuition,  to  acknowl- 
edge a  structural  compulsion  to  an  act  of  faith,  to  re- 
fer out  of  the  mind  to  a  basis  or  security  for  its  con- 
ceptions in  things  beyond  ? 

In  order  to  account,  therefore,  for  our  belief  in  an 
antecedent  history  of  things,  whether  back  to  the 
Nebula,  or  to  any  other  point  that  may  be  taken  as 
the  proper  cosmical  beginning,  must  not  Mr.  Mill 
considerably  enlarge  that  ultimate  inexplicability  to 
which  (at  the  peril,  as  it  seemed,  of  the  principle  of 

13* 


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298 


EECENT  BEITISH  PHTLOSOPnY. 


EECENT  BEITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


299 


his  own  philosophy)  we  found  him  willing  to  confess  ? 
It*  the  mind  is  to  be  spoken  of  as  a  "  series  of  feel- 
ings "  (which  is  the  definition  of  Mind  he  contends 
for),  then,  he  admitted,  an  inexplicable  mystery  must 
be  acknowledged  in  the  mind's  constitution.  It  must 
be  thought  of  as  "  a  series  of  feelings  which  is  aware 
of  itself  as  past  and  future."  The  alternative  was 
that  either  the  definition  of  mind  as  "  a  series  of  feel- 
ings''  must  be  abandoned,  and  the  mind  must  be 
thought  of  as  "  something  different  from  any  series  of 
feelings  or  possibilities  of  them,"  or  the  paradox  must 
be  maintained  that  "  that  which,  ex  hypothesis  is  but 
a  series  of  feelings  can  be  aware  of  itself  as  a  series." 
Keeping  his  definition,  Mr.  Mill  must  be  supposed  to 
have  accepted  the  accompanying  paradox.  "  The 
true  incomprehensibility,"  he  said,  "  perhaps  is,  that 
something  which  has  ceased  or  is  not  yet  in  existence 
can  still  be  in  a  maimer  present — ^that  a  series  of  feel- 
ings the  infinitely  greater  part  of  which  is  past  or  fu- 
ture can  be  gathered  up  into  a  single  present  concep- 
tion accompanied  hy  a  helief  of  reality. '^^  Observe 
the  last  phrase.  It  exactly  expresses  what  we  have 
arrived  at  in  examining  the  reconcileability  of  Mr. 
Mill's  Cogitationism  with  the  mind's  knowledge  of  a 
world  pre-existing  itself.  Only  "  as  a  present  concep- 
tion accompanied  by  a  belief  in  reality"  will  Mr. 
Mill's  iN'on-Ego  or  "  permanent  possibilities  of  sensa- 


tion "  cover  our  knowledge  of  an  antecedent  history 
of  things.    It  is  not  the  "  present  conception,"  but 
the  accompanying  "  belief  in  reality  "  that  is  the  re- 
quired factotum.    But  it  is  a  "  belief  in  reality  "  of  a 
wider  range  than  Mr.  Mill  then  particularly  bar- 
gained for,  though  he  must  surely  have  been  aware  of 
its  elasticity  even  to  the  present  requirement.     For 
then  he  was  thinking  only  of  the  life  of  an  individual 
mind,  and  only  of  as  much  of  that  life  as  consisted  in 
the  mind's  self-consciousness.    Even  so,  in  order  to 
account  for  the  indubitable  experience  of  every  mind 
within  its  own  life,  it  was  necessary  to  suppose  an  or- 
ganic union  of  the  successive  moments  of  that  life  in  a 
sense  of  identity  or  personality.     It  was  necessary  to 
suppose  that  a  series  of  feelings  could  be  aware  of  it- 
self as  a  series— that  perhaps  something  which  had 
ceased,  or  was  not  yet  in  existence,  could  still  be,  in 
a  manner,  present.    But  for  the  requisites  of  our 
present  problem  must  not  this  mystery  be  enlarged  ? 
In  order  to  account  for  a  certainty  in  a  world  preced- 
ing ourselves,  must  not  each  series  of  feelings,  consti- 
tuting a  self,  be  aware  of  itself  not  only  as  a  series, 
but  as  a  series  that  is  not  foreclosed  at  its  own  nomi- 
nal beginning,  but  depends  on  a  vaster  series  ?    In 
the  total  self,  as  weU  as  in  each  moment  of  that  self^ 
must  there  not  be  a  sense  of  a  something  past  which 
is  still  in  a  manner  present— ^.  e.  of  a  bequest  into  self 


\i 


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% 


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300 


EECEISTT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


301 


of  a  something  that  was  not  self?  'No  mere  gathering 
up  of  the  past  or  futm*e  moments  of  the  single  thi-ead 
of  consciousness  into  a  single  conception  will  suflSce. 
There  must  be  a  conception  of  the  thread  of  con- 
sciousness transcending  the  whole  thread  of  conscious- 
ness— which  conception  would  be  worthless  unless  ac- 
companied by  a  belief  in  a  reality  corresponding. 
What  the  reality  is  may  be  phrased  in  various  ways, 
by  Materialists,  N"atural  Eealists,  Constructive  Ideal- 
ists, and  Absolute  Idealists.  The  belief  in  some 
reality  or  other,  supporting  or  yielding  "  the  perma- 
nent possibilities  of  sensation  "  of  which  one  figures 
the  past  as  composed,  is  what  all  systems  alike  re- 
quire ;  and,  if  a  single  series  of  feelings,  evolving  it- 
self from  an  initial  neutrum,  could  generate  the  con- 
ception of  the  "permanent  possibilities,"  how  else 
could  it  add  the  required  belief  in  a  corresponding  re- 
ality than  through  some  necessity  so  to  believe,  in- 
wrought in  the  very  nature  of  the  neutrum  ? 

Whatever  farther  objections  may  arise  to  Mr. 
Mill's  new  cosmological  doctrine  will  mostly  resolve 
themselves,  I  fancy,  into  the  question,  on  which  we 
have  just  been  trenching,  of  the  reconcileability  of  the 
doctrine  with  his  principle  of  Empiricism.  We  pro- 
ceed, therefore,  to  a  remark  or  two  on  Mr.  Mill's  vol- 
ume in  as  far  as  it  illustrates  his  present  state  of  feel- 
ing with  respect  to  the  fundamental  principle  of  all 


his  philosophy  hitherto.  Had  we  adhered  to  our  for- 
mer order  of  topics,  we  should  have  taken  this  point 
first.  But  there  have  been  reasons  for  the  slight  dif- 
ference of  arrangement. 

n. 

Mr.  Mill's  volume,  we  now  therefore  say  in  the   j 
second  place,  is  wholly,  and  from  first  to  last,  a  reas- 
sertion  of  his  psychological  theory  of   Empiricism 
against  the  opposite  theory  of  Transcendentalism.  As 
it  is  the  latest,  so  it  is  the  most  uncompromising  and 
most  thoroughgoing,  British  manifesto  in  favour  of 
Empiricism.     Its  very  purpose  is  to  reassert  Locke's 
principle  in  a  form  adapted  to  the  latest  developments 
of  opinion,  and  to  exhibit  afresh  its  unversal  compe- 
tency.   Not  only  is  this  the  implied  drift  of  every 
chapter  and  page,  but  there  are  portions  of  the  vol- 
ume specially  devoted  to  a  re-explication  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  Experience  and  a  demonstration  of  its  suffi- 
ciency for  every  possible  requirement  of  philosophy. 
More  particularly,  there  is  brought  forward,  under 
the  name  of  "  the  law  of  inseparable  association,"  a 
reserve  of  strength   in  the   experimental  principle, 
which  Mr.  MiU  believes  that  the  Transcendentalists, 
and  especiaUy  Hamilton  and  Mansel,  have  uniformly 
ignored. 


\\ 


302 


RECENT   BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


N"ow,  with  all  our  admiration  of  Mr.  Mill's  argu- 
ments, and  witli  every  willingness  to  admit  that,  in 
consequence  of  some  of  them,  Transcendentalism  may 
have  to  change  some  of  its  dispositions  and  re-intrench 
itself  (which  is  always  the  effect  of  a  good  attack,  as 
Empiricism  has  itself  confessed  again  and  again  by 
its  own  behaviour  in  like  circumstances),  we  must 
avow  our  general  conviction  that  Mr.  Mill  has  left  the 
battle  perfectly  renewable  on  the  side  of  Transcen- 
dentaUsm.     We  see  not  the  least  reason  why,  not- 
withstanding the  immediate  hurrahing  that  there  will 
be  on  the  other  side,  and  among  mere  bystanders, 
over  so  vigorous  and  well-conducted  an  onslaught, 
Transcendentalism  may  not  be  as  lively  among  us  as 
ever,  and  quite  confident  of  its  power,  if  equally  well 
led,  to  inflict  as  valiant  a  retaliation.     Indeed  we 
must  say  that  there  is  hardly  any  one  of  the  old  stock 
arguments  of  the  Transcendentalists  against  Locke's 
principle  that  Mr.  MiU's  volume  seems  to  have  robbed 
of  its  real  force.      Leibnitz's  "  intellectus  ipse,''  the 
well-known  illustration  of  the  impossibility  of  conceiv- 
ing that  two  straight  Imes  should  enclose  a  space,  and 
many  more  of  the  like,  seem  to  me  to  survive  all  Mr. 
Mill's  reasonings  in  the  present  volume,  and  to  start 
up  again  as  popularly  available  as  ever.     There  is  no 
use,  however,  in  going  back  on  these  old  forms  of  ob- 
jection to  the  theory  of  Empiricism.    Let  us  look  at 


EECENT  BEniSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


303 


the  theory  in  respect  of  its  compatibility  with  that 
cosmological  system  of  Constructive  Idealism,  or,  as 
we  have  called  it  ultimately,  Cogitationism,  which  Mr. 
Mill  has  advanced  in  its  interest.     For  it  is  expressly 
in  the  interest  of  the  principle  of  Empiricism  that  Mr. 
Mill  has  advanced  his  new  cosmological  conception. 
Of  all  our  natural,  or,  as  the  Transcendentalists  say, 
intuitive  beliefs,  there  is  none  surely  more  natural, 
more  intuitive,  than  our  belief  in  the  distinction  or  in- 
dependent reality  of  these  two  things— an  external 
world  or  ISTon-Ego,  and  an  internal  personality   or 
Ego.     If,  then,  the  origin  of  this  belief  can  be  em- 
pirically accounted  for.  Empiricism  may  be  said  to 
have  been  crucially  tested.    ISTow  Mr.  Mill's  new  cos- 
mological Idealism  is  propounded  expressly  to  show 
that   Empiricism  can   stand    even    this  test.    It  is 
offered  as  a  proof  that  the  most  immense  and  conse- 
quential of  all  our  so-called  natural  beliefs  can  be  ac- 
counted for  on  the  principle  of  Experience  without 
any  a  'priori  supposition.    Let  us  view  it  afresh  in 

this  particular  light. 

First,  as  to  the  possibility  of  accounting  empiri- 
cally for  our  belief  in  an  external  world.  "  I  pro- 
ceed," says  Mr.  Mill,  breaking  ground  fii-st  on  this 
part  of  his  subject,  "  to  state  the  case  of  those  who 
hold  that  belief  in  an  external  world  is  not  intuitive, 
but  an  acquired  product."     And  how  does  he  pro- 


H 

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11 


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EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


305 


ceed  ?  "  This  theory,"  he  proceeds,  "  postulates  the 
following  psychological  truths,  all  of  which  are  proved 
by  experience.  ...  It  postulates,  first,  that  the  hu- 
man mind  is  capable  of  expectation — in  other  words, 
that,  after  having  had  actual  sensations,  we  are 
capable  of  forming  the  conception  of  possible  sensa- 
tions. ...  It  postulates,  secondly,  the  laws  of  the  As- 
sociation of  Ideas.  So  far  as  we  are  here  concerned, 
these  laws  are  the  following :  1st.  Similar  phsenom- 
ena  tend  to  be  thought  of  together.  2nd.  Phaenom- 
ena  which  have  either  been  experienced  or  conceived 
in  close  contiguity  to  one  another  tend  to  be  thought 
of  together.  The  contiguity  is  of  two  kinds — simul- 
taneity and  immediate  succession.  .  .  .  3rd.  Associ- 
ations produced  by  contiguity  become  more  certain 
and  rapid  by  repetition.  Where  two  phsenomena 
have  been  very  often  experienced  in  conjunction,  and 
have  not  in  a  single  instance  occmTcd  separately, 
either  in  experience  or  in  thought,  there  has  been  pro- 
duced between  them  what  has  been  called  Insepara- 
ble, or,  less  correctly.  Indissoluble  Association;  by 
which  is  not  meant  that  the  association  must  in- 
evitably last  to  the  end  of  life,  that  no  subsequent  ex- 
perience or  process  of  thought  can  possibly  avail  to 
dissolve  it,  but  only  that,  as  long  as  no  such  experi- 
ence or  process  of  thought  has  taken  place,  the  as- 
sociation is  inevitable.  .  .  .  4th.  When  an  association 


has  acquired  this  character  of  inseparability— when 
the  bond  between  the  two  ideas  has  been  thus  firmly 
riveted— not  only  does  the  idea  called  up  by  associa- 
tion become,  in  our  consciousness,  inseparable  from 
the  idea  which  suggested  it,  but  the  facts  or  phsenom- 
ena  answering  to  these  ideas  come  at  last  to  seem  in- 
separable in  existence."  *      If  these  postulates  are 
granted,  there  is    no  difficulty  whatever,  Mr.  Mill 
holds,  in  showing  how  a  notion  of  an  external  world 
or  Non-Ego,  including  all  that  either  people  in  gener- 
al or  the  majority  of  philosophers  require  to  be  bound 
up  in  that  notion,  may  have  grown  up  factitiously,  as 
a  mere  product  of  experience.    For  out  of  these  con- 
ditions there  would  inevitably  be  formed  a  habit,  or 
call  it  instinct,  of  the  mature  mind,  in  every  act  of 
sensation  or  conception,  to  regard  what  occurred  in 
that  act  as  only  the  immediately  present  flash  out  of 
an  infinitely  wider  area  of  permanent  external  possi- 
bilities of  sensation,  more  or  less  accessible.    And 
what  more  than  this  need  any  theory  of  the  external 
world  include  ?    Why  assume  the  notion  of  a  Non- 
Ego  as  an  original  or  intuitive  datum  of  conscious- 
ness, when  we  can  see  so  clear  a  way  in  which,  though 
it  was  not  in  consciousness  from  the  beginning,  it  not 
only  might,  but  must  have  grown  up  there,  so  as  now 
to  be  perpetually  and  irresistibly  present? 

*  Pp.  190,  191. 


If 


306 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


» 


-( 


Of  course,  even  were  this  analysis  of  our  notion 
of  the  ]Sron-Ego  to  be  accepted  with  acclamation  as 
absolutely  and  in  every  particular  satisfactory,  Mr. 
Mill  cannot  mean  that  it  would  establish  the  prin- 
ciple of  Empiricism.     It  would  only  establish  the 
Berkeleian  Idealism.  It  would  show  that  one  most  im- 
portant notion  or  belief— that  of  the  existence  of  an 
external  world— need  not  be  held  primitive,  but  may 
be  resolved  into  j^ior  notions  or  beliefs ;  but,  so  far 
from  shutting  us  up  therefore  to  the  theory  of  a  facti- 
tious origin  for  our  notions  and  beliefs  in  general,  it 
would  seem  even  to  work  the  other  way.     By  retiring 
the  a  j^iori  element  from  one  wing,  in  which  its 
presence  seemed  unnecessary,  it  would  only  mass  that 
element  in  closer  strength  on  the  other  wing.     For 
what  does  the  speculation  amount  to?    To  what  else 
than  this — ^that,  given  a  mind,  or  thinking  principle, 
endowed  with  a  capability  of  expectation,  and  with  a 
priori  notions  of  likeness,  coexistence,  and  succession 
(and  in  this  capability  and  tliese  notions  there  seem  to 
be  included  the  notions,  or  mental  forms,  of  Time  and 
I!?'umber,  or  Plurality,  if  not  also  some  others),  then 
the  notion  of  an  external  world  might  well  be  a  mere 
result  or  factitious  product  of  the  experience  of  such  a 
mind  ?    But  surely,  in  what  is  here  begged  or  postu- 
lated, in  the  shape  of  structural  pre-equipment  for  the 
mind  ere  the  notion  of  an  external  world  could  be 


EECENT  BErnSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


307 


generated  out  of  its  experience,  the  Transcendentalist 
has  a  pretty  large  allowance  of  the  sort  of  thing  he 
wants.  ISTot  at  this  stage,  therefore,  can  Mr.  Mill 
think  for  a  moment  that  the  argument  is  closed. 

But  what  if  he  can  account  empirically  for  the 
notion  of  Mind  too  ?  Then  the  whole  field  will  be 
swept,  and  not  a  wrack  of  the  mirage  of  Transcen- 
dentalism need  disturb  the  universal  clearness  of  the 
view.  To  this  feat,  accordingly,  Mr.  Mill  next  ad- 
dresses himself.  Having  demonstrated,  in  one  chap- 
ter, that,  according  to  the  correct  psychological  theory, 
the  belief  in  matter  "  is  but  the  form  impressed  by  the 
known  laws  of  association  upon  the  conception  or  no- 
tion, obtained  by  experience  of  contingent  {i.  e.  non- 
present,  but  possible)  sensations,"  he  proceeds,  in  an- 
other chapter,  "  to  carry  the  inquiry  a  step  farther,  and 
to  examine  whether  the  Ego,  as  a  deliverance  of  con- 
sciousness, stands  on  any  firmer  ground  than  the  Non- 
Ego — ^whether,  at  the  first  moment  of  our  experience, 
we  abeady  have  in  our  consciousness  the  conception 
of  Self  as  a  permanent  existence,  or  whether  it  is 
formed  subsequently,  and  admits  of  a  similar  analysis 
to  that  which  we  have  found  that  the  notion  of  Not- 
Self  is  susceptible  of."  What  the  issue  of  the  inquiry 
is  we  have  abeady  seen.  It  is  that  the  sole  efiective 
notion  we  all  have,  or  can  want,  of  Mind,  is  that  of  a 
series  of  feelings  reposing  on,  or,  as  we  may  say,  navi- 


\* 


\ 


308 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY, 


EECENT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


309 


gating,  infinite  permanent  possibilities  of  feeling.  It 
is  a  flashing-on  of  consciousness  from  moment  to  mo- 
ment, eacli  flash  giving  a  horizon  of  a  limited  present, 
but  conveying  also  the  irresistible  conviction  of  end- 
less other  horizons  of  a  non-present  or  possible.  Now 
the  question  is  not  about  the  acceptability  of  this  defi- 
nition of  Mind — a  definition  which  I  can  conceive 
heated,  and  coloured,  and  glorified,  till  it  should  have 
charms  for  the  poet  no  less  than  for  the  metaphy- 
sician. The  question  is  as  to  the  possibility  of  an 
empirical  origin  for  the  notion  of  Mind  or  Person- 
ality, taken  as  so  defined.  When  Mr.  Mill  says  that 
such  a  conception  of  Mind  or  Self  admits  of  a  "  sim- 
ilar analysis "  back  into  experience  to  that  of  which 
the  notion  of  Not-Self  has  been  shown  by  him  to  be 
susceptible,  what  does  he  mean  ?  Does  he  require  for 
the  evolution  of  the  notion  of  the  Ego  the  same  pos- 
tulates as  in  the  case  of  the  Non-Ego  ?  Hardly  the 
same,  surely,  though  he  says  nothing  on  the  subject. 
For  what  were  these  postulates  ?  "  That  the  human 
mind  is  capable  of  expectation — ^that,  after  having 
had  actual  sensations,  we  are  capable  of  forming  con- 
ceptions of  possible  sensations : "  also  the  four  laws 
of  the  Association  of  Ideas — to  wit,  (1)  that "  similar 
phsenomena  tend  to  be  thought  of  together ; "  (2)  that 
phsenomena  experienced  or  conceived  as  either  simul- 
taneous or  immediately  sequent,  "  tend  to  be  thought 


of  together ; "  (3)  that  associations  of  this  recond  class 
"  become  more  certain  and  rapid  by  repetition,"  till, 
by  very  frequent  and  uninterrupted  coincidence,  they 
may  acquire  a -character  of  inseparability  ;  (4)  that, 
when  an  association  of  ideas  has  acquired  this  char- 
acter of  inseparability,  the  notion  of  inseparability  is 
transferred  from  the  ideas  to  the  phsenomena  thought 
of.  Mr.  Mill  cannot  surely  want  this  cumbrous  allow- 
ance of  postulation  for  the  evolution  of  our  conception 
of  an  Ego  out  of  conditions  in  which  it  was  not  orig- 
inally present ;  or,  if  he  does  want  it,  we  may  be  a 
little  astonished.  For  what  would  be  virtually  his 
offer  in  such  a  case  ?  What  but  that,  if  there  were 
given  him  a  mind  endowed  with  the  capability  of  ex- 
pectation, and  structurally  equipped  with  the  notions 
of  likeness,  coexistence,  and  succession  (involving 
Time  and  Plurality),  then  he  would  undertake  to 
show  that  out  of  such  a  mind's  experience  of  phse- 
nomena  there  might  be  generated  the  notion  of 
"  present  feelings  with  a  background  of  permanent 
possibilities  of  feeling."  Would  not  this  be  very 
much  as  if  out  of  a  four-horse  stage-coach  one  were 
to  offer  empirically  to  produce  a  tandem  or  gig? 
Empirically !— yes,  save  for  the  slight  a  priori  con- 
cession of  the  four-horse  coach !  Of  course,  I  repeat, 
Mr.  Mill  cannot  possibly  have  meant  any  such  ab- 
surdity.   But  he  does  not  sufficiently  guard  against 


Hi 


310 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


the  chance  that  it  might  be  attributed  to  him.  The 
very  title  of  his  chapter,  "  The  Psychological  Theory 
of  Matter,  how  far  applicable  to  Mind,"  suggests  that 
the  process  of  the  evolution  of  belief  explained  in 
the  preceding  chapter  as  accounting  for  the  origin  of 
the  notion  of  Matter,  is  to  be  carried  on  into  this 
chapter  as  accounting  also  for  the  origin  of  the  notion 
of  Mind ;  and  I  am  much  mistaken  if  the  unwary 
reader  of  the  second  chapter  does  not  fancy  that  he 
has  the  full  benefit  still  of  the  postulates  of  the  first. 
There  is  no  formal  abrogation  in  the  second  chapter 
of  these  postulates,  nor  any  re-expression  of  them  to 
suit  a  new  problem,  to  which,  as  they  stand,  their 
very  phraseology  is  repugnant ;  nor  is  there  any  suf- 
ficient suggestion  of  a  new  process  whereby  that 
which  was  spoken  of  in  the  foregoing  chapter  (pro- 
visionally, it  must  be  supposed)  imder  such  terms  as 
"  the  human  mind,"  "  we,"  "  our,"  &c.,  and  figured 
as  a  structure  of  very  definite  forms  and  capabilities 
holding  converse  with  phsenomena,  might  be  now 
seen  to  melt  itself  into  the  required  "  series  of  feelings 
with  permanent  possibilities  of  feeling."  In  other 
words,  Mr.  Mill,  in  order  to  account  empirically  for 
the  notion  of  the  K'on-Ego,  postulates  in  one  chapter 
an  Ego  which  is  wonderfully  like  the  ordinary  Ego 
of  the  Transcendentalists ;  this  Ego  he  resolves  in  the 
next  chapter  into  a  form  so  different  from  the  Ego 


i 


RECENT  BRIIISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


311 


postulated  that  it  would  be  interesting  to  know  how, 
if  he  were  compelled  to  go  back  and  work  with  it  as 
a  substitute  for  the  postulated  Ego,  he  would  be  able 
to  repeat  his  preliminary  exposition  of  the  derivative- 
ness  of  the  notion  of  Matter :  but  as  to  how  this  sec- 
ond notion  of  the  Ego  is  arrived  at,  there  is,  within 
the  limits  of  the  chapter,  no  detailed  explanation. 

We  are  not  left  in  the  dark,  however.  We  can 
fall  back  on  the  theory  of  Cogitationism  as,  from  va- 
rious hints  here  and  elsewhere,  we  can  see  that  Mr. 
Mill  would  work  it  in  that  earlier  stage  of  the  process 
when  as  yet  neither  the  Ego  nor  the  Kon-Ego  has 
been  developed  in  the  crude  consciousness,  but  there 
is  only  the  initial  neutrum  of  both.  Here,  of  course, 
we  cannot  speak  of  a  mind  observing  phsenomena, 
and  forming  conceptions  and  expectations  according 
to  the  laws  of  the  association  of  ideas  by  likeness,  co- 
existence, and  succession.  That  is  a  form  of  language 
not  applicable  till  the  mind  is  supposed  suflSciently 
extricated  from  the  phsenomena  of  sensation  and 
movement  to  be  able  consciously  to  watch  them  as 
something  distinct  from  itself.  We  have  not  yet  got 
at  Mind  in  this  sense.  What  we  are  at  work  with  is 
the  material  out  of  which  the  notions  both  of  mind 
and  matter  are  evolved.  What  is  that?  Feelings 
and  their  associabilities ;  a  certain  curdhng  or  cogi- 
tation of  phsenomena  definable  simply  as  feelings ; 


u 


312 


EECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHT. 


'I 


i 


that  first  kind  of  consciousness  in  whicli  tlie  Ego  and 
the  Non-Ego  lie  confused  or  intertwined.  It  is  out 
of  this  state  of  things  that  Mr.  Mill  maintains  that 
our  notions  of  Matter,  as  "  a  permanent  possibility  of 
sensation,"  and  Mind,  as  "  a  permanent  possibility  of 
feeling,"  might  be  generated  empirically  and  without 
any  a  priori  assumption. 

It  seems  to  me  that  a  very  large  amount  of  a 
jniori  assumption  is  implied  in  the  very  terms  of  the 
statement.  It  is  assumed,  in  the  first  place,  that  there 
are  certain  predetermined  associabilities  among  the 
phsenomena  of  feeling  from  the  first— that  they  tend 
to  come  together,  or  to  grow  together,  according  to 
certain  laws  or  rules  of  associability  pre-imparted  to 
them.  It  is  assumed,  in  the  second  place,  that  the 
phsenomena  themselves  are,  atomically,  if  I  may  so 
express  it,  or  in  their  own  individual  nature,  apart 
from  their  associabilities,  of  a  certain  kind,  and  no 
other,  by  a  priori  derivation : — (1.)  The  Associabil- 
ities. These  must  be  represented  now  not  as  asso- 
ciabilities by  conscious  likeness,  coexistence,  or  suc- 
cession (for  these,  with  the  involved  notions  of  Time 
and  Plurality,  are  surely  mental  notions,  the  origin 
of  which  requires  to  be  accounted  for  as  much  as  the 
origin  of  the  notions  of  Matter  and  Mind,  and  can 
hardly  have  been  earlier),  but  rather  as  physical  or 
physiological  associabilities,  which  we  can  character- 


EEOENT  BEIIISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


313 


ize  in  the  retrospect,  as  likenesses,  coexistences,  or 
successions,  but  which,  as  acting  among  the  phsenom- 
ena themselves,  may  have  involved  much  not  so  de- 
scribable.  If  we  take  Mr.  Bain's  phrase  "  nervous 
currents  "  as  furnishing  the  physical  equivalent  to  the 
phsenomena  of  feeling,  then  we  may  say  that  coexist- 
ent or  immediately  consequent  nervous  currents  tend 
by  repetition  to  form  permanent  associations,  and  also 
perhaps  (though  this  is  farther-fetched)  that  like  ner- 
vous currents  tend  to  occur  together ;  or  there  may  be 
other  definitions  of  the  associabilities  of  nerve-currents 
that  Physiology  has  yet  to  find  out.  Mr.  Mill  abstains 
from  the  phrase  "  nerve-cmTcnts — ^preferring  to  talk 
consistently  with  his  metaphysical  Idealism,  accord- 
ing to  which,  if  the  nerve-currents  are  the  causes  of 
the  feelings,  yet  as  these  nerve-currents,  like  all  other 
things  and  existences,  are  only  conceptions  or  notions 
of  their  own  effects,  the  effects  must  have  the  pre- 
cedence in  metaphysical  discourse.  This  is  very  char- 
acteristic. That  there  are  feelings  is  certain;  that 
there  are  nerves  or  human  bodies  at  all  is  but  an  item 
in  that  conception  of  a  material  world  which  the  Ideal- 
ist maintains  to  be  merely  a  conception ;  and,  though 
it  may  be  an  irresistible  part  of  the  conception  that 
the  nerves  originate  or  occasion  the  feelings,  it  would 
be  doing  wrong  to  Idealism,  in  metaphysical  argu- 
ment, to  start  with  the  nerves.     But  among  these 

14 


^ 


314 


EEOENT  BEITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


1 


i 


"pTisenomena  of  feeling"  wlicli  Mr.  Mill,  as  an  Ideal- 
ist, consistently  does  start  with,  lie  recognises  asso- 
ciabilities  not  the  less  describable  in  the  retrospect  as 
associabilities  by  likeness,  coexistence,  and  succession. 
Without  these  precise  associabilities  among  the  crude 
phsenomena  of  feeling  there  would  not  be  the  result 
he  seeks — ^.  e.  the  generation  of  those  notions  of  Mind 
and  Matter,  of  an  Ego  and  a  ITon-Ego,  which  each 
mature  mind  has.    But,  as  these  associabilities  are 
laws  pre-imparted  to  the  phsenomena,  and  regulating 
most  stringently  the  process  of  their  cogitation,  how 
can  the  process  be  said  to  be  empirical  ?    Precisely 
what  Transcendentalism  asserts  in  opposition  to  Em- 
piricism is  that  in  every  process  there  must  be  con- 
ceived a  derived  or  a  jpriori  element  on  which  the  re- 
sult depends.     It  matters  not  how  far  the  inquiry  is 
moved  back.     If  the  mature  human  mind  is  taken, 
then  Transcendentalism  asserts  that  there  is  an  a 
Jpriori  element  in  it — forms  or  necessities  of  its  struc- 
ture, according  to  which  it  must  and  does- think.    If 
a  certain  coagulation  of  phsenomena,  called  feelings, 
is  taken  as  that  out  of  which  the  human  mind  was 
convolved  into  completed  being,  equally  there  Tran- 
scendentalism undertakes  to  place  its  finger  on  some- 
thing and  say,  "  That  is  a  priori.^^    The  associabilities 
of  the  feelings  are  a  jpriori  /  their  reason  and  origin 
transcend  the  process  itself.    (2).  The  Feelings  them- 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


315 


selves.  There  is  an  a  priori  element  here  too.  What 
the  result  shall  be  depends  on  the  a  priori  kind  or 
nature  of  the  atoms,  as  well  as  on  the  pre-imparted 
associabilities  by  which  they  are  drawn  into  combi- 
nations. Else  why  should  there  be  differences  of  sen- 
tiency  ?  "Feelings"  or  "phsenomena  of  feeling"  is 
an  indiscriminate  Atlantic  of  a  phrase.  In  fact,  there 
must  be  millions  of  kinds  of  "  feelings  "  or  "  phsenom- 
ena of  feeling,"  all  in  busy,  already  discriminated  ex- 
istence, out  of  a  priori  depths  of  the  Unfathomable  ; 
BO  that,  even  if  the  same  associabilities  prevailed 
among  them  in  common,  the  results  could  never  ap- 
proximate. There  are  feelings  and  feelings.  Why, 
in  one  case,  should  the  result  of  the  cogitation  of  feel- 
ing be  a  dog,  or  an  earwig,  rather  than  a  man  ?  Why 
but  because  there  was  an  inherent  dogginess  or  ear- 
wigginess  in  the  given  kind  of  associable  feelings, 
which,  whatever  the  associations  formed  among  the 
feelings,  would  not  let  the  result  be  anything  else 
than  a  dog  or  an  earwig  ?  Is  there  nothing  a  priori 
in  this  ? 

Deliberately  I  have  brought  the  question  between 
Empiricism  and  Transcendentalism  to  this  pass,  know- 
ing what  will  be  said.  "  What  is  the  mighty  differ- 
erence,"  it  will  be  said,  "between  Empiricism  and 
Transcendentalism,  if  this  is  Transcendentalism  ? 
Would  Empiricism  deny  aught  of  what  you  have 


k 


316 


EECENT  BEITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


^ 


4 


here  called  it  Transcendentalism  to  maintain  ?  If  it 
is  the  sole  difference  between  Transcendentalism  and 
Empiricism  that  the  one  maintains  that  in  every- 
thing, or  process,  there  is  an  d  priori  or  inherited 
element,  necessarily  assisting  to  determine  what  shall 
be  the  history  of  the  thing  or  the  result  of  the  pro- 
cess, while  the  other  maintains  that  this  also,  on  our 
mounting  higher  in  the  evolution,  may  be  resolved 
into  experience — ^if  this  is  all,  is  it  not  only  the  old 
story  of  looking  at  the  gold-and-silver  shield  from  op- 
posite sides,  and  pronouncing  it  golden  or  silver  ac- 
cording to  the  side  looked  at  ? "  Kot  so ;  I  cannot 
think  that  it  is  so.  Send  Transcendentalism  and  Em- 
piricism back,  tugging  with  each  other  on  the  very 
terms  described,  through  all  stages  of  the  evolution 
from  the  present  moment,  and  at  every  stage  Tran- 
scendentalism is  the  mode  of  thought  that  keeps  the 
field,  while  Empiricism  must  still  be  the  fugitive. 
That  is  something.  And  at  the  utmost,  when  the 
Nebula,  or  whatever  else  may  be  deemed  primordial 
and  homogeneous  in  the  phsenomenal  evolution,  is 
reached  and  rushed  through  by  the  two  combatants, 
the  pursued  and  the  pursuing,  is  there  not  a  mighty 
consequence  in  the  ultimate  victory  ?  If  Empiricism, 
fugitive  till  then,  can  then  turn  at  bay  and  conquer, 
it  can  only  be  because  its  back  is  against  Zero,  against 
Nihilism,  against  a  wall  of  absolute  blackness.    If 


EECENT  BRniSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


317 


Transcendentalism  is  still  courageous  and  sure  of  the 
victory,  it  can  only  be  because  it  sees  in  the  middle 
of  the  wall  of  blackness  a  blazing  gate,  and  knows  it 
to  be  the  gate  whence  the  chariots  issued  and  issue  of 
an  external  d  jpriori.  And  here  perspective  is  as 
nothing.  Wherever  we  stand,  it  is  either  the  wall  of 
absolute  blackness  that  terminates  our  view,  or  the 
blazing  gate  shoots  its  radiance  to  where  we  are  and 
move. 


n 


I 


III. 

Mr.  Mill  having,  throughout  his  volume,  re- 
asserted the  principle  of  Experimentalism  or  Em- 
piricism against  that  of  Transcendentalism  in  philos- 
ophy, and  having,  in  one  portion  of  his  volume,  put 
forth,  as  the  proper  consequence  of  this  principle 
when  applied  to  our  notions  of  Matter  and  Mind, 
that  developed  system  of  cosmological  Idealism  which 
I  have  ventured  to  call  Cogitationism,  it  becomes  in- 
teresting to  inquire,  finally,  in  what  attitude,  on  the 
platform  of  such  a  total  metaphysical  system  of  Em- 
pirical Idealism,  he  leaves  his  readers  standing  in 
view  of  the  permanent  ontological  questions,  or  ques- 
tions of  the  Supernatural. 

Partly,  we  have  already  had  hints  and  informa- 
tions on  this  subject.  Accepting  the  doctrine  of  the 
Relativity  of  all  knowledge,  but  declaring  the  doc- 


t' 


H' 


316 


RECENT   BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


here  called  it  Transcendentalism  to  maintain  ?  If  it 
is  the  sole  difference  between  Transcendentalism  and 
Empiricism  that  the  one  maintains  that  in  every 
thing,  or  process,  there  is  an  t?  priori  or  inherited 
element,  necessarily  assisting  to  determine  what  shall 
be  the  history  of  the  thing  or  the  result  of  the  pro- 
cess, while  the  other  maintains  that  this  also,  on  our 
mounting  higher  in  the  evolution,  may  be  resolved 
into  experience — ^if  this  is  all,  is  it  not  only  the  old 
story  of  looking  at  the  gold-and-silver  shield  from  op- 
posite sides,  and  pronouncing  it  golden  or  silver  ac- 
cording to  the  side  looked  at  ? "  Not  so  ;  I  cannot 
think  that  it  is  so.  Send  Transcendentalism  and  Em- 
piricism back,  tugging  with  each  other  on  the  very 
terms  described,  through  all  stages  of  the  evolution 
from  the  present  moment,  and  at  every  stage  Tran- 
scendentalism is  the  mode  of  thought  that  keeps  the 
field,  while  Empiricism  must  still  be  the  fugitive. 
That  is  something.  And  at  the  utmost,  when  the 
Nebula,  or  whatever  else  may  be  deemed  primordial 
and  homogeneous  in  the  phsenomenal  evolution,  is 
reached  and  rushed  through  by  the  two  combatants, 
the  pursued  and  the  pursuing,  is  there  not  a  mighty 
consequence  in  the  ultimate  victory  ?  If  Empiricism, 
fugitive  till  then,  can  then  turn  at  bay  and  conquer, 
it  can  only  be  because  its  back  is  against  Zero,  against 
Nihilism,  against  a  wall  of  absolute  blackness.    If 


f 


RECENT  BRIIISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


317 


Transcendentalism  is  still  courageous  and  sure  of  the 
victory,  it  can  only  be  because  it  sees  in  the  middle 
of  the  wall  of  blackness  a  blazing  gate,  and  knows  it 
to  be  the  gate  whence  the  chariots  issued  and  issue  of 
an  external  a  jpriori.  And  here  perspective  is  as 
nothing.  Wherever  we  stand,  it  is  either  the  wall  of 
absolute  blackness  that  terminates  our  view,  or  the 
blazing  gate  shoots  its  radiance  to  where  we  are  and 
move. 


III. 

Mr.  Mill  having,  throughout  his  volume,  re- 
asserted the  principle  of  Experimentalism  or  Em- 
piricism against  that  of  Transcendentalism  in  philos- 
ophy, and  having,  in  one  portion  of  his  volume,  put 
forth,  as  the  proper  consequence  of  this  principle 
when  applied  to  our  notions  of  Matter  and  Mind, 
that  developed  system  of  cosmological  Idealism  which 
I  have  ventured  to  call  Cogitationism,  it  becomes  in- 
teresting to  inquire,  finally,  in  what  attitude,  on  the 
platform  of  such  a  total  metaphysical  system  of  Em- 
pirical Idealism,  he  leaves  his  readers  standing  in 
view  of  the  permanent  ontological  questions,  or  ques- 
tions of  the  Supernatural. 

Partly,  we  have  already  had  hints  and  informa- 
tions on  this  subject.  Accepting  the  doctrine  of  the 
Eelativity  of  all  knowledge,  but  declaring  the  doc- 


tl 


318 


KECENT  BEITTSn  PHILOSOPHT. 


I 


\ 


I 

I 


trine  to  be  incompatible,  in  any  sense  in  whicli  it 
would  be  worth  keeping,  witb  tbat  cosmological  sys- 
tem of  JSTatural  Realism  with  which  Sir  William 
Hamilton  tried  to  associate  it — ^nay,  ultimately  iden- 
tifying the  doctrine  with  the  principle  of  Experimen- 
talism  itself,  and  denying  by  implication  its  compati- 
bility with  Transcendentalism — Mr.  MiU,  as  we  have 
seen,  agrees  with  Sir  William  Hamilton,  or  even  out- 
goes him,  in  his  formal  repudiation  of  Ontology.  All 
our  knowledge,  he  declares,  can  only  be  of  the  relative 
or  phsenomenal;  of  Noumena,  Absolute  Causes,  or 
Things  in  themselves,  we  know,  and  can  know,  no- 
thing. Again  and  again  this  declaration  is  made.  It 
pervades  the  entire  volume.  We  have  now  to  note, 
however,  two  respects  in  which,  notwithstanding  this 
formal  agreement  with  Sir  William  Hamilton  in  the 
repudiation  of  all  Ontology,  Mr.  Mill  is  by  no  means 
at  one  with  Sir  William  on  that  last  frontier  of  spec- 
ulative philosophy  where  the  shore  of  the  ontological 
is  supposed  to  be  reached. 

(1.)  Under  the  name  of  Faith,  Sir  WiUiam  Ham- 
ilton affirmed,  as  Mr.  Mill  has  himself  explained,  much 
which  he  declared  to  be  utterly  unpredicable  in  the 
name  of  Eeason.  There  is,  he  thought,  a  structural 
necessity  of  the  human  mind  whereby  it  is  compelled 
to  believe  much  that  it  cannot  know — ^to  accept  inex- 
plicabUities,  nay,  inconceivabilities,  as  nevertheless 


BECENT  BErnSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


319 


facts.    It  was  on  this  principle  (avowed,  but  not  suf- 
ficiently explained)  that  Sir  William  Hamilton,  not- 
withstanding his    speculative  doctrine  of  ultimate 
Nescience,  or  the  incognisability  of  the  Absolute,  as- 
sumed, with  a  fervour  equal  to  that  of  any  Ontologist, 
the  veritable  Absolute  of  the  Theists.   Now,  although 
Mr.  Mill  has  had  at  one  point  to  resort  practically  for 
himself  to  an  ultimate  salvo  which  looks  very  hke 
Faith— although  to  stop  a  hole  in  his  theory  of  Mind, 
he  has  had  to  assume  an  inexplicabUity,  an  inconceiv- 
ability, a  paradox,  as  nevertheless  a  fact— yet  in  his 
general  philosophy,  he  provides  no  room  or  function 
whatever  for  Belief  as  distinct  from  Knowledge.    If 
we  assert  a  Deity,  it  must  be  as  a  legitimate  inference 
from  the  phsenomena  of  our  experience ;  if  we  predi- 
cate certain  attributes  or  actions  of  this  Deity,  there 
also  must  be  rational  inferences  from  the  facts  that 
come  within  our  observation,  investigated  according 
to  the  ordinary  principles  of  reasoning.     In  other 
words,  if  Theism  and  Theology  are  to  sustain  them- 
selves at  all,  it  can  only  be  by  the  a  posteriori  argu- 
ment, and  not  by  any  form  or  forms  of  the  d  ^^or^ 
one.    This  is  certainly  an  interesting  intimation  of 
Mr.  MiU's  opinion  to  professional  theologians.    That 
Bridgewater  Argument  from  Design  which  has  been 
60  much  derided  of  late  is,  after  all,  he  asserts,  the 
only  argmnent  on  which  Theism  can  make  any  stand ; 


K. 


820 


BECENT  BETTISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


321 


and  the  miicli-abiised  metliod  of  Paley,  botli  in  Nat- 
ural Theology  and  in  the  matter  of  the  Christian 
Evidences,  was,  after  all,  the  only  right  method.  If 
Paley  fails,  or  rather  if  Paley's  style  of  argument 
fails,  all  is  over.  Herein,  I  say,  there  is  certainly  a 
difference  between  Mr.  Mill  and  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton— a  difference  which  will  be  construed  by  many  as 
giving  the  advantage  to  the  Hamiltonian  system  in 
connexion  with  Theism  and  Theology.  For,  without 
foregoing  whatever  may  be  of  worth  in  the  a  posteriori 
argument.  Sir  William  would  reach  Theism  and  The- 
ology also,  or  primarily,  through  faith,  or  an  a  priori 
necessity  of  our  mental  constitution ;  and,  since  our 
surfeit  of  Paley  and  the  Bridgewater  Treatises  some 
time  ago,  this  is  the  kind  of  warrant  for  Religion  that 
has  seemed  deepest  and  strongest  to  most  Theists. 

(2.)  JF^er  contra^  however,  Mr.  Mill  makes  some 
corrections  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  doctrine  of 
Relativity,  or  our  nescience  of  the  Absolute,  which 
may  be  taken  as  relieving  that  doctrine  itself  from  cer- 
tain supposed  impediments  to  rational  religious  belief. 
For  example.  Sir  William  Hamilton's  assertion  was 
that  in  our  notion  of  the  Absolute  there  is  nothing 
positive  whatever — that  our  sole  conception  of  the  Ab- 
solute is  that  of  "a  negation  of  conceivability." 
And  Mr.  Mansel,  expanding  the  statement,  declares 
the  Absolute  and  the  Infinite  to  be    but  "names 


indicating,  not  an  object  of  thought  or  conscious- 
ness at  all,  but  the  mere  absence  of  the  condi- 
tions under  which  consciousness  is  possible."  Many 
critics  of  Hamilton,  while  agreeing  with  his  doctrine 
of  the  Relativity  of  Knowledge,  or  the  TJnknowable- 
ness  of  the  Absolute,  have  dissented  from  this  extreme 
form  of  it,  which  would  allow  in  our  notion  of  the  Ab- 
solute nothing  else  than  a  negation  or  paralysis  of  all 
conception.  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  for  one,  has  argued 
at  some  length  against  this  as  "  a  grave  error,"  even 
while  expounding  approvingly  Sir  William's  main 
doctrine  of  Relativity."^  He  contends  for  the  neces- 
sarily positive  character,  however  vague,  of  our  con- 
sciousness of  the  Unconditioned.  In  our  notion  of  the 
Unlimited,  he  argues,  our  consciousness  of  limits  is 
abolished  but  not  the  consciousness  of  some  kind  of 
leififf  stretching  out  and  away  into  an  illimitable. 
Here— and  with  considerable  similarity  in  the  mode 
of  argument— Mr.  Mill  follows  and  corroborates  Mr. 
Spencer  in  his  criticism  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned.  (Chapter  YI.)  So 
long  as  we  use  the  abstractions,  "  the  Absolute,"  "  the 
Infinite,"  he  says,  it  may  be  possible  to  assert  that  our 
corresponding  conceptions  are  utterly  void  of  any 
positive  element— are  in  fact  simple  failures  to  con- 
ceive any  meaning  at  aU.    But  couple  the  predicate 

♦  Mr.  Spencer's  Mrst  Frinciplesj  pp.  87—97. 

14* 


5 


^ir 


322 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHT. 


"Absolute"  or  "Infinite"  with  a  subject— say  "In- 
finite  Space,"  or   "Absolute  Goodness  "—and  then 
the  mind  is  conscious  of  a  tolerably  positive  element 
in  the  compound  effort  of  thought.    "When  we  think 
of  space  as  infinite,  we  think  away  the  limits,  but  we 
do  not  cease  to  think  of  it  as  continuing  to  be  space ; 
when  we  try  to  imagine  absolute  Goodness,  we  fail  in 
realizing  the  predicate  "  absolute,"  but  the  Goodness 
remains  in  our  thoughts  substantive  enough.     Or,  if 
what  we  mean  by  the  abstractions  "  the  Absolute," 
"  the  Infinite,"  be  (as  Mr.  Spencer  understands,  and 
as  Sir  WiUiam  Hamilton  himself  doubtless  under- 
stood, when  he  used  these    phrases  independently), 
"  Absolute  Existence  "  or  "  Infinite  Being,"  then  still, 
Mr.  Mill  would  say  (as  Mr.  Spencer  has  said),  there  is 
a  positive  element,  however  vague  and  general,  pres- 
ent in  our  conception — inasmuch  as  we  still  think  of 
Existence  or  Being  as  that  something  whose  absolute- 
ness or  infinitude  is  inconceivable.    Kor  is  all  this 
without  consequence.    Not  unimportant  as  regards 
Sir  William  Hamilton's  own  philosophy,  the  error  (as 
Mr.  Mill  and  Spencer  agree  in  considering  it)  in  his 
statement  of  the  doctrine  of  Eelativity,  as  bearing  on 
the  question  of  rational  Theism,  swells  into  immense 
proportions  in  Mr.  Mansel's  express  application  of  the 
Hamiltonian  doctrine  to  Christian  Theology.    Ac- 
cordingly, Mr.  Mansel's  whole  elaboration  of  Hamil- 


\n 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


323 


ton's  Philosophy  of  the  Conditioned  in  its  bearings  on 
Beligion  is  assailed  by  Mr.  Mill  in  a  separate  on- 
slaught .(Chapter  VII.).    -"  He  maintains,"  says  Mr. 
Mill,  speaking  of  Mr.  Mansel,  "  the  necessary  rela- 
tivity of  all  our  knowledge.    He  holds  that  the  Ab- 
solute and  the  Infinite,  or,  to  use  a  more  significant 
expression,  an  Absolute  or  an  Infinite  being,  are  in- 
conceivable by  us,  and  that,  when  we  strive  to  con- 
ceive what  is  thus  inaccessible  to  our  faculties,  we  fall 
into  self-contradiction.    That  we  are  nevertheless  war- 
ranted in  believing,  and  bound  to  believe,  the  real  ex- 
istence of  an  absolute  and  infinite  being,  and  that  this 
being  is  God.     God,  therefore,  is  inconceivable  and 
unknowable  by  us,  and  cannot  even  be  thought  of 
without  self-contradiction ;  that  is  (for  Mr.  Mansel  is 
careful  thus  to  qualify  the  assertion),  thought  of  as 
Absolute,  and  as  Infinite.     Through  this  inherent  im- 
possibility of  our  conceiving  or  knowing  God's  essen- 
tial attributes,  we  are  disqualified  from  judging  what 
is  or  is  not  consistent  with  them.    If,  then,  a  religion 
is  presented  to  us,  containing  any  particular  doctrine 
respecting  the  Deity,  our  belief  or  rejection  of  the 
doctrine  ought  to  depend  exclusively  upon  the  evi- 
dences which  can  be  produced  for  the  divine  origin 
of  the  religion ;  and  no  argument  grounded  on  the  in- 
credibility of  the  doctrine,  as  involving  an  intellectual 
absurdity,  or  on  its  moral  badness  as  unworthy  of  a 


I 


324 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHTLOSOPHT. 


good  or  wise  being,  ought  to  have  any  weight,  since 
of  these  things  we  are  incompetent  to  judge."  *  Mr. 
Mill's  opinion  of  this  doctrine  being  that  it  is  "  sim- 
ply the  most  morally  pernicious  doctrine  now  cur- 
rent," he  spares  no  pains  in  denouncing  and  exposing 
it.  There  is  probably  no  portion  of  his  volume  which 
will  be  read  with  keener  popular  relish,  or  more  fre- 
quently quoted  from,  than  precisely  that  which  con- 
tains his  attack  on  Mr.  Mansel. 

It  is  an  attack,  as  we  have  hinted,  which  the  pre- 
vailing theology  will  pretty  unanimously  adopt,  with 
thanks  to  Mr.  Mill.  For,  however  common  it  has 
been  with  theologians  to  avail  themselves  of  a  mild 
form  of  Mr.  Mansel'S  doctrine,  and  by  the  single  aver- 
ment that  God's  ways  are  not  as  our  ways,  to  bar  or 
silence  rational  objections  to  particular  dogmas  of 
Theology,  yet  Mr.  Mansel's  doctrine  in  full,  as  he 
propounds  it,  is  one  from  which  all  theologians,  save 
a  few,  would  undoubtedly  shrink.  Whatever  myste- 
ries, or  inexplicabilities,  or  inconceivabilities  there 
may  be  in  Keligion,  few  theologians  would  contend  for 
that  kind  of  mystery  which  should  maintain  that,  pre- 
cisely hecaicse  our  sole  notion  of  the  Absolute  or  Deity 
is  that  of  a  Being  respecting  whom  we  can  make  no 
predicate  whatever,  or  respecting  whom  we  can  only 
say  that  he  unites  all  possible  predicates,  including 

*  Pp.  88,  89. 


t«i 


RECENT  BETHSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


825 


even  those  that  are  contradictory  of  each  other,  while 
at  the  same  time  none  of  these  predicates  have  the 
same  meaning  that  they  would  have  if  applied  to  a 
human  being,  therefore  no  objection  is  to  be  made  to 
a  Eeligion,  miraculously  attested,  on  account  of  the 
intrinsic  natm-e  of  any  of  its  teachings.     What  is 
called  Eational  Theology,  at  all  events,  has  never 
committed  itself  to  this.    Now  here  Mr.  Mill,  comes 
to  the  help  of  Eational  Theology.    He  does  not  en- 
ter on  the  question  of  the  possibility  that  any  evi- 
dence whatever  could  attest  to  us  that  a  Eevelation 
had  come  from  Deity,  if  we  had  no  preliminary  no- 
tion of  Deity  whereby  to  be  sure  that  the  Eevelation 
had  come  from  Him— no  other  notion  of  the  source 
of  the  revelation  than  that  it  was  the  inconceivable 
home  of  no  attribute,  or  of  no  attribute  in  a  human 
sense,  or  of  all  opposite  attributes  simultaneously,  and 
all  in  non-human  senses.    He  confines  himself  to  an 
indignant  protest,  in  the  name  of  reason,  against  the 
notion  that  such  a  Deity  could  be,  on  any  terms,  the 
object  of  the  religious  sentiment.    Only  in  so  far  as 
Deity  can  be  conceived  a^  a  Being  endowed  with 
those  attributes  (goodness,  wisdom,  justice,  power, 
&c.)  which  we  love  and  reverence  in  men,  and  with 
those  attributes  in  the  very  sense  in  which  they  are 
predicated  of  men,  albeit  in  Deity  they  are  regarded  as 
raised  to  the  degree  of  infinity  and  in  that  respect  are 


826 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


I    i: 


^ 


rolled  beyond  all  grasp  of  our  comprehension — only 
in  as  far  as  Keligion  can  offer  sncli  a  Deity,  onglit  rea- 
son, or  morality,  or  common  sense,  or  the  heart  of 
man,  Mr.  Mill  argnes,  to  have  satisfaction  in  Eeligion 
or  to  tolerate  it  in  the  world.  But  he  sees  nothing  in 
the  doctrine  of  the  Eelativity  of  Knowledge,  or  In- 
cognisability  of  the  Absolute,  rightly  interpreted,  to 
deprive  men  of  such  a  conception  of  Deity,  if  it  can 
be  otherwise  fairly  arrived  at  by  induction  from  the 
phasnomena  of  experience.  Speaking  in  behalf  of 
those  "  Eationalists,"  or  believers  in  a  "Eational 
Theology,"  against  whom  Mr.  Mansel's  arguments  are 
principally  directed,  he  says  that  they  may  "hold 
with  Mr.  Mansel  himself,  the  doctrine  of  the  relativity 
of  human  knowledge,"  and  yet  not  be  "  touched  by 
his  reasoning."  For  they  may  reply  to  Mr.  Mansel 
thus :  "  We  cannot  know  God  as  he  is  in  himself; 
granted :  and  what  then  ?  Can  we  know  man  as  he 
is  in  himself,  or  matter  as  it  is  in  itself  ?  We  do  not 
claim  any  other  knowledge  of  God  than  such  as  we 
have  of  man  or  of  matter.  Because  I  do  not  know 
my  fellow-men,  nor  any  of  the  powers  of  nature,  as 
they  are  in  themselves,  am  I  therefore  not  at  liberty 
to  disbelieve  anything  I  hear  respecting  them  as  be- 
ing inconsistent  with  their  character  ?  I  know  some- 
thing of  Man  and  ITature,  not  as  they  are  in  them- 
selves, but  as  they  are  relatively  to  us ;  and  it  is  as 


t- 


EECENT  BEinSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


327 


relative  to  us,  and  not  as  he  is  in  himself,  that  I  sup- 
pose myself  to  know  anything  of  God.     The  attri- 
butes which  I  ascribe  to  him,  as  goodness,  knowledge, 
power,   are  all  relative.     They  are  attributes  (says 
the  rationalist)  which  my  experience  enables  me  to 
conceive,  and  which  I  consider  as  proved,  not  abso- 
lutely, by  an  intuition  of  God,  but  phsenomenally,  by 
his  action  on  the   creation,   as  known  through  my 
senses  and  my  rational  faculty.     These  relative  attri- 
butes, each  of  them  in  an  infinite  degree,  are  all  I 
pretend  to  predicate  of  God.     When  I  reject  a  doc- 
trine as  inconsistent  with  God's  nature,  it  is  not  as 
being  inconsistent  with  what  God  is  in  himself,  but 
with  what  he  is  as  manifested  to  us.    If  my  knowl- 
edge of   him  is   only  phsenomenal,   the    assertions 
which  I  reject  are  phsenomenal  too."*    In  short, 
whatever  theology  is  content  to  offer  itself  not  as  an 
ontology  or  science  of  the  Absolute  itself,  but  simply 
on  the  same  terms  as, any  other  science,  or  as  a  gen- 
eralization of  certain  phsenomena  in  the  supposition 
that  they  are  the  phsenomena  or  effects  of  a  Divine 
personality  antecedent  to  all  nature,  is  safe,  Mr.  Mill 
holds,  from  all  injury  from  the  doctrine  of  the  Eela- 
tivity of  Knowledge,  as  understood  by  true  philos- 
ophy, and  can  only  be  assailed,  as  any  other  theory 
might  be,  on  ordinary  logical  grounds.    Such  a  the- 

*  Pp.  98,  99. 


f< 


Jt 


328 


EECEIJTT  BEinSH   PHILOSOPHY. 


RECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


329 


I 


ology  has  only  to  prove  itself  to  be  the  only  adequate 
theory  or  generalization  of  the  phsenomena,  or  of  cer- 
tain phaenomena  of  nature,  to  make  itself  good ;  and 
it  is  only  a  theology  that  should  profess  itself  to  be 
more  than  this,  to  be  a  revelation  of  the  absolute  or 
noumenal  Existence  underlying  all  phsenomenal  na- 
ture, that  true  Philosophy  must  condemn  beforehand. 

In  all  this,  however,  Mr.  Mill  has  spoken  only  vi- 
cariously, or  by  way  of  showing  the  compatibility  of 
certain  views  with  certain  defined  conditions,  provided 
they  have  fulfilled  certain  other  defined  conditions. 
What  one  wants  to  know  is  the  final  attitude  in 
which,  according  to  Mr.  Mill's  own  judgment  of  his 
system  of  Empirical  Cogitationism  all  in  all,  it  ought 
to  leave  men  in  respect  of  the  great  religious  ques- 
tions. 

Here  the  last  word  of  Mr.  Mill's  volume  seems  to 
be  simply  what  is  implied  in  the  very  quotations  in 
which  he  has  spoken  vicariously.  It  is  a  reiteration 
of  what  we  have  seen  him  assert  in  his  article  on 
Comte's  Philosophy — to  wit,  that,  so  far  as  is  yet  visi- 
ble, true  philosophy  {i.  e.  Empirical  Idealism  or  Em- 
pirical Cogitationism)  may  fairly  leave  these  questions 
open.  The  most  explicit  statement  to  this  effect  in 
his  own  name,  occurs,  I  think,  in  the  chapter  in 
which,  after  expounding  his  idealistic  or  cogitational 
theory  of  matter,  he  considers  how  far  the  same 


theory  is  applicable  to  mind.  It  had  been  objected 
by  Eeid  to  the  idealistic  theory  that  it  left  no  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  our  fellow-creatures,  and  no 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  God.  We  have  seen 
how  Mr.  Mill  disposes  of  the  first  part  of  the  objec- 
tion—to wit,  that  the  theory  would  leave  us  without 
evidence  of  the  existence  of  other  created  minds  or 
sentiencies  besides  our  own.  This  part  of  the  objec- 
tion disposed  of,  Mr.  Mill  proceeds  to  answer  the  sec- 
ond part.  "  As  the  theory,"  he  says,  "  leaves  the  evi- 
dence of  the  existence  of  my  fellow-creatures  exactly 
as  it  was  before,  so  does  it  also  with  that  of  the  exist- 
ence of  God.  Supposing  me  to  believe  that  the  Di- 
vine Mind  is  simply  the  series  of  the  Divine  thoughts 
and  feelings  prolonged  through  eternity,  that  would 
be,  at  any  rate,  believing  God's  existence  to  be  as  real 
as  my  own.  And,  as  for  evidence,  the  argument  of 
Paley's  Natural  Theology,  or,  for  that  matter,  of  his 
Evidences  of  Christianity,  would  stand  exactly  where 
it  does.  The  Design  argument  is  drawn  from  the 
analogy  of  human  experience.  From  the  relation 
which  human  works  bear  to  human  thoughts  and 
feelings,  it  infers  a  corresponding  relation  between 
works  more  or  less  similar,  but  superhuman,  and  su- 
pernatural thoughts  and  feelings.  If  it  proves  th6se, 
nobody  but  a  metaphysician  needs  care  whether  or 
not  there  is  a  mysterious  substratum  for  them.   Again, 


330 


EECENT  BRITISH   PHILOSOPHY. 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


331 


I 


I 


the  arguments  for  Eevelation  undertake  to  prove  by- 
testimony  that,  within  the  sphere  of  human  expe- 
rience, works  were  done  requiring  a  greater  than  hu- 
man power,  and  words  said  requiring  a  greater  than 
human  wisdom.  These  positions,  and  the  evidences 
of  them,  neither  lose  nor  gain  anything  by  our  sup- 
posing that  the  wisdom  means  only  wise  thoughts  and 
volitions,  and  that  the  power  means  thoughts  and  vo- 
litions followed  by  imposing  phsenomena."  ^  The  re- 
sult of  all  which  is  that,  if  Theism  will  consent  that  the 
Divine  Mind,  for  whose  existence  it  contends,  is  know- 
able  only  as  our  own  minds  are  knowable — to  wit,  as 
a  series  of  thoughts  and  feelings,  but  these  thoughts 
and  feelings  transcendently  hyperphysical  or  Divine, 
or,  again^  as  a  thread  of  consciousness,  but  that  con- 
sciousness transcendently  hyperphysical  or  Divine- 
then  Theism  may  remain  an  open  question  And  so, 
on  the  same  terms  of  consistency  with  the  mode  of 
thought  of  Empirical  Cogitationism,  other  questions 
of  the  supernatural,  of  similar  moment,  may  also  re- 
main open  questions. 

Now,  without  returning  on  objections  previously 
urged  against  the  reconcileability  of  Mr.  Mill's  ideal- 
istic theory  with  any  knowledge  of  the  existence  of 
other  created  sentiencies  or  threads  of  consciousness 
tantamount  to  that  which  we  have  of  om-  own  exist- 

*  Pp.  210,  211. 


ence  (which  objections,  however,  if  valid  in  that  con- 
nexion, would  be  as  valid  now  against  the  reconcile- 
ability of  the  theory  with  the  required  knowledge  of 
the  existence  of  a  Divine  Mind — ^.  e.  the  knowledge 
of  such  a  mind  as  more  than  a  mere  notion  or  concep- 
tion of  our  own),  let  me  simply  say  that  I  can  see  no 
interpretation  of  Mr.  Mill's  fundamental  principle  of 
Empiricism  according  to  which  those  questions  of  a 
Supernatural  which  he  would  keep  open  ought  not  to 
be,  at  once  and  for  ever,  dosed  questions.  Empiricism, 
BO  far  as  I  can  see  any  meaning  in  it,  leads  inevitably 
at  last  to  Zero,  Absolute  Nihilism,  or  the  resolute 
non-conception  of  an  ultimate  anything.  It  must 
either  stop  there,  or  transmute  itself  at  that  point, 
for  the  nonce,  into  an  enormous  all-including  Tran- 
scendentalism. Unless  as  the  name  for  the  deter- 
mining eternal  a  ^priori  whence  all  else  has  pro- 
ceeded, and  has  inherited  law,  structure,  form,  ne- 
cessity, through  every  stage  of  the  evolution,  I  can 
see  no  meaning  whatever  for  the  word  Deity.  If  Mr. 
Mill  vindicates  the  belief  in  such  a  Deity  as  compati- 
ble with  true  philosophy,  well  and  good.  Only  how 
he  can  then  assert  that  the  true  philosophy  is  that 
which  supposes  that  every  notion,  belief,  faculty,  or 
power  of  the  human  mind  is  entirely  generated  out 
of  experience,  without  the  coeflSciency  of  any  innate 
or  structural  tendency,  form,  capability,  necessity,  or 


w 


332 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPmf. 


EECENT  BEmSH  PHILOSOPHY. 


333 


< 


1 


I 

I 


I 


determination,  passes  my  eompreliension.    I  cannot 
conceive  anything  as  resulting  from  the  experience  of 
a  zero ;  and,  unless  I  start  with  a  human  mind  defin- 
able as  zero,  I  must  allow  a  very  definite  amount  of 
a  jpriari  bequest  in  that  human  mind  wherewith  to 
grasp  and  mould  experience.  Or,  if  Empiricism  pushes 
the  dispute  farther  back,  and,  allowing  that  bequest, 
undertakes  to  resolve  it  into  prior  experience,  still,  at 
every  stage,  the  assertion  recurs,  "  We  are  not  yet  at 
zero ;  something  is  a  priori^  something  structural  and 
predetermined,  even  here."     Or,  if  at  last,  somewhere 
behind  the  IS'ebula,  we  do  reach  Zero,  or  l^othingness, 
what  becomes  of  Deity  ?    Is  Deity  at  the  back  of  the 
original  zero  or  nothingness  out  of  which  all  else  has 
been  evolved  or  convolved  empirically  ?     Then  either 
Zero  would  have  remained  such,  and,  as  ex  nihilo  nil 
fitj  there  would  have  been  no  evolution  whatever,  or 
else  the  true  origin  of  the  whole  evolution  is  not  zero 
but  Deity.    But,  on  this  last  supposition,  what  mean- 
ing, such  as  that  claimed  for  it,  remains  in  the  princi- 
ple of  Empiricism  ? 

Waiving  this  objection,  however,  and  allowing 
Mr.  Mill's  reservation  of  the  question  of  Deity  and 
other  cognate  questions  as  open  questions  in  philos- 
ophy to  be  perfectly  consistent  with  his  interpretation 
of  the  principle  of  Empiricism  (for  which  it  may  very 
well  happen  that  mine  is  but  a  blundering  substitute), 


let  me  look  farther  at  that  notion  of  Deity  for  which 
Mr.  Mill  insists  that  a  space  is  open  in  his  philosophy. 
Let  us  look  at  it  in  its  connexion  with  his  cosmological 
theory  of  Idealism  or  Cogitationism.    Here,  I  think, 
there  are  curious  results.    For  what  is  the  Deity  or 
Divine  Mind  whose  existence  then  remains  an  open 
question.     A  Divine,  or  transcendent,  superhuman,   | 
thread  of  consciousness,  or  series  of  thoughts  and  feel- 
ings.   Ex  hypothesis  no  other  Deity  is  allowed  than  a 
Deity  conceivable  according  to  the  sublimed  analogy 
of  our  experience  of  our  own  minds.    ITow,  what  I 
say  is,  not  that  such  a  Deity  of  Idealism  may  not  be 
a  suflScient  Deity  for  all  the  needs  of  religion  or  the 
human  mind,  but  only  that  there  seems  to  be  an  in- 
teresting consequence  of  such  a  notion  of  Deity,  which 
Mr.  Mill's  Cogitationism  implies,  but  which  he  has 
left  undeveloped.    Was  it  not  involved  in  Mr.  MiU's 
theory  of  the  human  mind  as  a  thread  of  conscious- 
ness or  series  of  feelings,  that  there  must  have  been  a 
crude  period  in  the  history  of  that  consciousness  or 
series  of  feelings,  when  as  yet  it  had  not  worked  out 
the  notions  of  the  Ego  and  the  ]^on-Ego,  but  existed 
only  as  a  confused  neutrum  of  both  ?    Is  this  analogy 
to  be  transferred  to  the  Divine  Mind  ?    If  so,  what  do 
we  end  in  ?    In  what  but  the  Absolute  Idealism,  or 
Absolute  Identity-system,  of  Schelling  and  Hegel, 
which  supposes  an  aboriginal  Absolute  Neutrum,  of 


i1 


334 


EECENT  BRITISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


KECENT  BETTISH  PHILOSOPHY. 


335 


Mi 


•II 


I 


r 


wWcli  the  universe  as  a  wliole  is  to  be  conceived  as 
the  external  forthrusliing  or  Non-Ego,  and  Deity  per- 
sonally as  the  self-consciousness,  or  Ego,  accompany- 
ing the  forthrushing  ? 

Tes,  that  final  alternative  to  which  Tve  seem  to 
be  led  up  by  all  other  modes  of  purely  speculative 
thought  seems  to  be  also  the  alternative  to  which  Mr. 
Mill's  Cogitationism  leads  us  up.  It  is  the  alternative 
of  Nihilism  or  Summation  in  an  Absolute.  The 
choice  between  these  alternatives  seems  to  be  the 
question  that  is  left  open.  But  to  say  that  it  is  left 
open  at  all  is,  I  apprehend,  the  same  as  saying  that 
one  has  to  choose,  now  as  heretofore,  between  Empir- 
icism and  Transcendentalism  in  philosophy.  This,  it 
seems,  though  with  the  scope  and  meaning  of  the  two 
terms  marvellously  enlarged  by  science,  is  still  the  es- 
sential distinction.  Logically,  Empiricism  seems  to 
have  its  only  termination  in  Nihilism,  while  Absolute 
Identity  seems  to  be  but  the  modem  principle  of 
Transcendentalism  reasoned  back  universally  to  its 
uttermost.  Are  we  here  in  that  predicament  where 
it  is  only  an  act  of  faith,  an  impassioned  throe  of  the 
soul  obeying  its  own  structural  necessity,  that  can 
effect  the  solution  ?  Are  we  in  presence  of  the  last 
and  most  gigantic  possible  form  of  that  difficulty 
which  is  said  to  lie  at  the  root  of  all  our  thinkings 


about  anything  whatsoever,  and  to  be  the  very  law 
of  our  thinkings — ^the  perpetual  balance  of  two  propo- 
sitions, mutually  contradictory,  and  both  inconceiv- 
able, yet  one  of  which  must  necessarily  be  true  ?  Or 
where  is  the  logic,  Hegelian  or  any  other,  that  shall 
really  dare  the  stricter  solution  of  uniting  the  two 
extremes,  by  showing  how  in  one  organic  beat  or 
swing  of  thought  there  may  be  comprised  the  whole 
arc  between  Nothingness  and  Absolute  Being  ?  On 
these  questions,  as  well  as  on  all  the  crowd  of  home- 
lier questions  which  concern  the  practical  fiUing-up 
of  any  metaphysical  system  to  fit  it  for  the  needs  and 
uses  of  the  human  soul,  much  remains  to  be  said,  and 
much  presses  on  me  that  might  be  said.  But  it  wiU 
be  more  consistent  with  the  nature  of  this  work— 
which  professes  to  be  only  a  historical  review  of  recent 
British  Philosophy,  with  interspersed  criticisms— if  I 
stop,  for  the  present,  exactly  at  this  point. 


THE   END. 


i 


f 


m. 


M 


<f: 


I'lCJVTPVanBHIR 


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